CHAPTER III.

FINANCES.--REDUCTION OF THE ARMY.

The distress of the country became that of the government. Small as

the government expenditure then was, only about twenty-one millions

of dollars (including eleven millions for permanent or incidental

objects), it was still too great for the revenues of the government

at this disastrous period. Reductions of expense, and loans, became

the resort, and economy--that virtuous policy in all times--became

the obligatory and the forced policy of this time. The small regular

army was the first, and the largest object on which the reduction

fell. Small as it was, it was reduced nearly one-half--from 10,000

to 6,000 men. The navy felt it next--the annual appropriation of

one million for its increase being reduced to half a million. The

construction and armament of fortifications underwent the like

process. Reductions of expense took place at many other points,

and even the abolition of a clerkship of $800 in the office of the

Attorney General, was not deemed an object below the economical

attention of Congress. After all a loan became indispensable, and

the President was authorized to borrow five millions of dollars.

The sum of twenty-one millions then to be raised for the service

of the government, small as it now appears, was more than double

the amount required for the actual expenses of the government--for

the actual expense of its administration, or the working its

machinery. More than half went to permanent or incidental objects,

to wit: principal and interest of the public debt, five and a half

millions; gradual increase of the navy, one million; pensions, one

and a half millions; fortifications, $800,000; arms, munitions,

ordnance, and other small items, about two millions; making in the

whole about eleven millions, and leaving for the expense of keeping

the machinery of government in operation, about ten millions of

dollars; and which was reduced to less than nine millions after

the reductions of this year were effected. A sum of one million of

dollars, over and above the estimated expenditure of the government,

was always deemed necessary to be provided and left in the treasury

to meet contingencies--a sum which, though small in itself, was

absolutely unnecessary for that purpose, and the necessity for

which was founded in the mistaken idea that the government expends

every year, within the year, the amount of its income. This is

entirely fallacious, and never did and never can take place; for

a large portion of the government payments accruing within the

latter quarters of any year are not paid until the next year. And

so on in every quarter of every year. The sums becoming payable in

each quarter being in many instances, and from the nature of the

service, only paid in the next quarter, while new revenue is coming

in. This process regularly going on always leaves a balance in the

treasury at the end of the year, not called for until the beginning

of the next year, and when there is a receipt of money to meet the

demand, even if there had been no balance in hand. Thus, at the end

of the year 1820, one of the greatest depression, and when demands

pressed most rapidly upon the treasury, there was a balance of above

two millions of dollars in the treasury--to be precise, $2,076,607

14, being one-tenth of the annual revenue. In prosperous years the

balance is still larger, sometimes amounting to the fourth, or

the fifth of the annual revenue; as may be seen in the successive

annual reports of the finances. There is, therefore, no necessity to

provide for keeping any balance as a reserve in the treasury, though

in later times this provision has been carried up to six millions--a

mistake which economy, the science of administration, and the purity

of the government, requires to be corrected.

Thirty Years' View (Vol. 1 of 2) or, A History of the Working of the American Government for Thirty Years, from 1820 to 1850 · 第 3 / 166 章