of Dixmude, towards kilometer 19, to the close contact of the enemy a
bridge-head which would be afterwards widened, in order to create a
starting position to permit our army to take and offensive. It was Major
Panhuys who was charged with this perilous operation, with a group
composed of his own battalion (the 1^{st} battalion of the 2^d foot
jagers), re-enforced with a company of machine-gunners and a company of
cyclists. It was important to take the enemy unawares. All was put in
action to that end, each one having his definite mission to accomplish.
During the night of the 21^{st} to the 22^d of December 1914, a night
cold and dark, the group crossed the river in two places and managed to
instal itself on a position uniting the little wood of the peninsula of
kilometer 19.500 with a bend to the North, facing the cemetery of
Dixmude. The enemy being taken by surprise, could not till dawn offer an
efficient resistance: but already our troops had organized the ground
and maintained their positions in spite of firing, counter-attacks and
severe bombardments.
[Illustration:
Bridge-head of kilometer 19.500 of the river Yser in June 1915.
]
The heroïc group, who had performed the operation with such valour and
spirit, was mentioned in despatches by decision of the H. M. the King.
It was of the utmost importance to strengthen the occupation, but there
could be no question of working by day, the enemy holding the watch and
sway over the land, and especially over the knoll of Woumen (castle of
kilometer 19). So our troops were kept to the task without respite.
Afterwards the extension of the bridge-head to the South, for months saw
added to the companies on guard, picket companies and detachments of
pioneers, nightly erecting parapets and communication trenches, building
shelters, casting footbridges over muddy ground, covering the positions
with wire netting work, regulating the current of the waters at Sparken
and Waalevaardeken by locks and dams, multiplying and rebuilding the
footbridges on the river etc., in a word executing the thousand and one
labours required by an advanced position to render it strong and
powerful, durable if not comfortable and give to the troops of the
principal resisting position real and positive security.
Then, arose the question of progressing towards the East and towards the
North. The works of extension were commenced, but it was soon realised
what a great effort and incessant sacrifice such an enterprise would
demand, that about Mai 1915 the bridge-head was brought back to its
former line. During the course of the war, the evolution of fighting
methods altered and likewise the mission of the advanced positions and
the effective forces of the garrisons which held them. For this reason,
when the bridge-head of kilometer 19.500 was created, and which had to
resist to the utmost, it required more than one battalion to guard it;
and in 1918, a few posts of section or squad sufficed, the mission of
the advanced ones having simply become at this place, for watching
purposes in case of a defensive, or kick off in the case of an
offensive.
To give one an exact idea of the enormous effort that the bridge-head of
the kilometer 19 cost, one needed to see the development and extension
it had taken in May 1915 and be equally penetrated with the idea, that
all the work had been done at the price of heavy losses, although it had
been done by night, under the bullets and shrapnells, in bad weather and
often with reduced means. This bridge-head contributed greatly to
maintain an offensive spirit in the minds of the infantrymen, it served
also as a base to many patrols towards the enemy’s organizations and
notably to a famous raid on the castle of kilometer 19 on the night of
the 28^{th} to the 29^{th} of October 1917, which was a brilliant
success, led by Captain Dendal, who brought back materials and
prisoners.
Several times the Germans tried to rush the bridge-head of kilometer 19,
but without any result whatever.
And then during the offensive of September 1918, it served as a starting
trench to the troops of the Belgian 4^{th} division, for the victorious
assault which ended by the liberation of Dixmude.
21.—Observation-post near the Church of Clercken.
Clercken Ridge was very precious to the enemy to whom it gave the
opportunity to establish a lot of natural observation-posts which had
not the vulnerability of the confined kite balloons and which assured
more stability to the observation. Many of these posts were destroyed
during the war, especially by the destructive fires which preceded the
great offensive in Flanders on the 28^{th} of September 1918. Others,
such as the mill of Clercken, are already rebuilt, so offer no longer
any historical interest.
[Illustration:
German observation-post near the church of Clercken.
Sketch showing the directions of the villages seen from this
observation-post.
]
However the one which is situated near the church of Clercken, and still
exists in the same state as when abandoned by the Germans (see sketch),
shows how easily the enemy could see into our lines, in spite of all the
efforts made by the Belgian Army to counteract their observations, such
as: diverse dissimulations, plantations of all kinds, artificial masks
in linen, sandbags, reeds and straw, etc....
22.—“Grand-Père” concrete dug-out.
23.—“Castel Britannia”.
24.—Hoekske.
The southern part of the Belgian front may be classed as one of the most
agitated sectors of the Western front. The short communications of the
press which announced in their brief laconic style: “Bombing actions at
het Sas and at Steenstraat; duel of artillery in the region of
Noordschote”, said nothing of the horror of certain days of guard where
the blood marked the ground of trenches, a hundred times turned over and
as many times reestablished and always defended by our heroical troops.
Drie Grachten, le Passeur, Steenstraat, Merckem, all these names
resound, like as many bugle calls proclaiming the heroism of our
soldiers and the glory of our arms.
It was in July-October 1917 that the Franco-British offensive gave us
back, in that region, a corner of Belgian land. A few Belgian units
participated on the 27^{th} of October to the last assault which drove
the enemy back beyond Luyghem, Kippe, Aschoop and reached, on the right,
the outskirts of Houthulst forest. The effort had to be followed up, our
troops had to extend to the North of Dixmude, the progression of the
Allies; our artillery preparation was ended, the Belgian army only
waited for the signal!
But a run of unfavourable circumstances: the russian defection, the
Caporetto incidents and the continual rain obliged the allies’ chief
staff to suspend the offensive. One had to be resigned and wait, but it
was a great deception to the Belgian soldier.
The 11^{th} of November 1917, the 4^{th} army division relieved a French
division at Merckem. The state of the field after the battle, is
depicted in the following extract from the order of the division
commander dated the 14^{th} of November. “In order to avoid, during the
relieves, the sinking of the men in the excavations which are hollowed
out all over the track, it is advised to gather the men in groups of
five, holding one to one another with a rope and thus lending each other
mutual help.”
Nineteen hundred and seventeen was, in fact, the year of offensives with
long artillery preparations, which transformed the battle fields into
masterpieces of devastation. The soil ploughed up by thousands of
projectiles formed a vast field of hollows, filled with water by the
autumn rains. Nothing else was seen in this desolate landscape but a few
cut down trunks of trees and the monstrous concretes of the Germans,
which were sometimes demolished and overturned.
However, it was absolutely necessary to remain on the chaotic ground.
The positions had to be established strong enough to repulse the
counter-attacks. At first it was only a system of shell holes surrounded
by blocks of concrete which had been deserted by the enemy. It was a
dreadful hard winter for the 4^{th} army division. When the engineers
and infantrymen at the price of terrible labour, had repaired and
rebuilt the roads and tracks which facilitated and rendered possible the
relieves, the rational and defensive organization of the sector was
undertaken. Successive lines showed themselves, and were bound between
by intermediate lines and a well organized plan of defence was able to
be applied.
The “Grand-Père” (Grand-father) concrete dug-out, the remains of which
have been preserved, was one of the posts best known among of the
advanced positions of Merckem. It formed a rather prominent salient
which was always a temptation to the enemy and provoked him to many
sudden attacks, generally preceded by violent artillery fires
demolishing all the surroundings.
The 4^{th} army division managed to repulse two attempts and that at two
days’ interval: one on the night 26–27 and the other 28–29 of November
1917. They were more like trials on the part of the enemy to stake out
our advanced positions.
During the occupation of the sector by the 3^d army division, the raids
became real attacks to reconquer the “Grand-father”. The 15^{th} of
February 1918, the enemy was thrown back in his own lines; but on the
7^{th} of March, he managed to take a footing and bring machine-guns in
the concrete shelter, from where our counter-attacks drove him out on
the evening of the 8^{th}.
It was decided then, to rectify the advanced line by suppressing the
salient of the grand-father, and also the one, constituted by three
little posts of Aschoop, which also was subjected to the enemy’s fires.
The last german raid on the “Grand-father” was on the 27^{th} of March
1918, which hastened the decision, taken on the 29^{th} of the same
month, to abandon after destruction the salients of the Grand-father and
Aschoop.
The “Grand-father” was again occupied by our troops the 9^{th} of
September 1918 after the taking of the german position of Kwaebeek
brook. A centre of resistance was established there and was occupied
till the offensive of the 28^{th} of September 1918.
The name of _Castel Britannia_ was given to the place occupied by the
enemy’s batteries which oppressed up till 1917 our positions of the
sector of Steenstraat. Thick concrete masses protected them. They served
under the Belgian occupation as observation-posts and battle posts.
The cross road of _Hoekske_ is situated at the crossing of Steenstraat
to Dixmude road with the road of Merckem. It marks nearly the centre of
the subsector which bears its name, and is celebrated by the numerous
bombardments it has been subjected to. Heavy pieces of german artillery
have been sunk in its vicinity.
These three sites are destined to perpetuate the remembrance of the
defence of Merckem sector, organized by the 4^{th} army division at the
price of the greatest difficulties during the winter of 1917, and
brilliantly defended by the 3^d army division in April 1918, and the
gallant fields of action of the 1^{st} army division at the time
preceding the offensive of the 28^{th} of September. These sites will
remain it that region, the witnesses of the _battle of Merckem_, which
was fought the 17^{th} of April 1918 in the neighbourhood of Kippe near
Langemark, and where the 3^d army division, under general Jacques, and
the 4^{th} army division, under general Michel, were covered with glory.
The Germans, who were in immediate contact with the 3^d army division at
Kippe, made a sudden and abrupt irruption in the lines of this division
and advanced up to the front of the Merckem and Hoekske trenches, where
they were stopped.
Brilliant and heroical counter-attacks cleverly upheld by the artillery,
drove them back disabled in their positions.
On the side of the 4^{th} army division, the enemy, who, before
approaching the front had to descend the slope at the North-East-bank of
the Broenbeek and although vigorously welcomed by infantry and artillery
fires, managed to push through a corner between the main-guards of
Champaubert and Montmirail, whose wings were turned over to form a hook.
Held in that way, the efforts of the Germans to open the breach further
were vain. Crushed by violent musketry fires and the precise firing of
the artillery, the enemy could not hold the positions reached and had to
retire.
The battle of Merckem which had not procured to the Germans one atom of
land, nor advantage, cost them many dead and wounded, eight hundred
prisoners and the loss of numerous material, which was left in the hands
of the 3^d army division. The order of Leopold was granted to the 9^{th}
regiment of the line and to the 1^{st} jagers.
The inscription of “Merckem” on the regimental Colours of the 3^d army
division, and on those of the 13^{th} and 19^{th} of the line (4^{th}
army division) and also on the shields of the guns, rewarded the bravery
of the troops who won the battle.
As regards the moral point of view, the victory of the 17^{th} of April
in which our regiments had overthrown whole divisions of enemies,
revealed to the General Staff, the offensive worth and power of our army
and gave to it the full due, of its conscientiousness and strength and
the ardent desire to go forward.
From the 17^{th} of April, our soldiers at Merckem felt themselves
masters of the sector. Patrols and audacious raids were undertaken,
sometimes on Kloostermolen, sometimes on the trenches of the Kwaebeek
position or on the Little-son and on Italy, Portugal and Epernon farms.
The numerous prisoners brought back from these expeditions supplied our
Staff with informations, which were the more interesting because, at
that time, the allied armies had begun to drive back the enemy from the
French front.
At last, on the 9^{th} of September, at dawn, a brilliant attack was
executed without great loss by the 3^d line regiment. The position of
Kwaebeek, entirely taken, was organized, and, when a few days later, the
enemy who had recovered, attempted with the aid of great reinforcement
to drive back our troops in their former lines, the success was of short
duration, for the enemy had to let go.
It was from the position of Kwaebeek, that the 1st Infantry division,
started the 28^{th} of September 1918 to the signal for the great
liberating offensive.
25.—The big german gun of Leugenboom at Couckelaere near Moere.
Not having succeeded, in spite of their brutal effort and the use of
asphyxiating gas, which till then had never been made use of, to pierce
the front at Steenstraat, in April 1915, the Germans who had foreseen
every thing, began to bombard Dunkirk, this permitted to their press to
hide the check, to cry out loudly “Victory, our artillery is bombarding
Dunkirk”.
A marine gun of 380 mm. installed in a public house called “In het
Predikboom” (kilometer 12^{th}, road Dixmude-Poelcappelle) had just
started, to execute its first shot. That was on the 26^{th} of April
1915.
A powerful counter-battery action was soon organized and proved a
success. Twice the gun was disabled, the first time for a period of
forty two days and the second time for forty eight. The 9^{th} of August
1915 registered its last shot.
Nevertheless the counter-battery maintained its firing in order to
prevent the Germans rebuilding the place and arming it.
In October 1916, an extraordinary activity was shown at the former
emplacement of Predikboom. Numerous and deliberate firings were executed
by the counter-batteries; and one might well ask if this German activity
was not a new dodge. Another place, in fact was being built at
Leugenboom (3200 meters to the North of Couckelaere).
The emplacement of Leugenboom was noted for the first time the 7^{th} of
May 1917 by Captain Jaumotte while making one of his aerial
reconnoitrings. He took a photograph of it, which clearly showed the
advanced state of the works, the switch line, grafted on a point to a
normal gauge, thus forming the junction at Eerneghem, to the state
railway line Ostend-Thourout.
Without a doubt the firing on Dunkirk was going to begin again.
The Belgian artillery staff, started at once a plan of action against
that urgent threat. The said staff obtained of the 36^{th} French army
corps, which was operating on the Belgian front the aid of two guns of
A. L. V. F. (artillerie lourde sur voie ferrée, i. e. Heavy railway
battery) two magnificent naval guns of 305 (12 inch.).
These two pieces will be the soul of the counter-battery, they will be
upheld in their action by a special group of numerous heavy batteries
which will make opposition on all german batteries opening fire on the
two heavy guns.
The plan was prepared, but to realise it, important and preliminary
works had to be executed, which took five days after Captain Jaumotte’s
reconnoitring.
These works consisted thus: first of all, the building of firing
emplacements for the heavy artillery; establishing many telephone
connections, needed since the creation of the special group, connections
which had to perform not only the centralisation of the command, but
also a perfect understanding between the director of the firing, the
batteries and the observation-posts and the cross registering section,
as well as the creation of antennas to receive the messages of aerial
observations.
The railway battalion, pushed on after three days of splendid and
extraordinary efforts, the works sufficiently far to render the point of
Eggewaertscappelle capable of bearing the firing of the heavy guns. The
group of telegraphists and telephonists accomplished at the same time,
grand and important works of liaison, which altogether constituted the
tool of the firing director.
A firing program was elaborated, a program which led the action on
Leugenboom and on the Tirpitz battery (see site n^o 4) at the same time.
The firing on the Tirpitz was assured by two heavy guns of 305 in
position on the point of Coxyde-Bains.
The 13^{th} of May, the two heavy guns of 305 were brought to the
place of firing which had been chosen—the switch-point of
Eggewaertscappelle—and a nice clear day was waited to open action.
That beautiful day was longed for right up to the 20^{th} of May 1917.
The execution of the genuine program was preceded by an independant
firing directed on the German observation-post installed in the belfry
of Eessen, with a 240 (10 inch.) gun in position at the East of Burg
Molen, upheld by the special group. The tower was partially demolished.
About 11 o’clock, the heavy guns of 305 of Eggewaertscappelle fired
their first shot on Leugenboom, while the gun of Burg Molen continued
its demolishing and blinding work on the enemy’s observation-post. A
little while after the guns of Coxyde-Bains entered in action in their
turn against Tirpitz battery. The observation of these firings were both
terrestrial and aerial.
The firing program was continued the following days when the weather was
favourable for observation.
On the 25^{th} of May, an aerial photograph of Leugenboom position was
taken. It did not disclose the least damage to the concrete block, but
its clearness sufficiently noted the gun carriage not yet armed, in the
centre of the honeycomb which formed the platform.
In order to parry, as might be the case, to a more accurate enemy
counter-battery, the railway battalion built or layed out sucessively
several sites for heavy artillery firing. It is so, that two sites on
the switch point of Eggewaertscappelle, a third at the station of
Moerhoek and a fourth on the point of Isenberghe, served as reserve, and
were occupied in turns.
The Leugenboom heavy gun entered in action the 27^{th} of June 1917.
Between 5 and 10 o’clock, it bombarded Malo-on-sea and Dunkirk. This
first action made numerous victims. The shells were of 380 mm.
One shell, amongst others, the first, it is thought, fell on the Casino
of Malo, where the general staff of the XV^{th} British army corps was
established: it made twenty four victims, eleven dead and thirteen
wounded.
In July 1917, there were several bombardments to be noted on different
objectives: Furnes, Dunkirk, Coxyde, Forthem and Alveringhem.
The bombardments of Dunkirk, threatening to become very frequent,
alarmed the authorities, and it was decided from the 19^{th} of July
1917 to create two direct telephone lines at different courses which
would join Dunkirk to the Pervyse railway station observation-post,
which was particularly well situated.
The starting shots of Leugenboom, heard at the railway station at
Pervyse, were in that way instantly communicated to Dunkirk, where the
reception posts gave the alert to the town by powerful horns and other
alarm engines, thus permitting the population to take refuge in the
concrete shelters specially built for that purpose.
In spite of the well studied counter-battery, the Leugenboom gun still
continued firing. The lulls, which lasted often long time, gave the hope
that a positive result had been obtained. Then after a lapse of one and
sometimes two months, the rage of the Germans revived and Dunkirk was
again subjected to further attacks.
In 1918, bombardments were very frequent. At certain times, they became
even daily, but Dunkirk was not always the objective. In May and notably
in June, the firing of Leugenboom was directed on Klein-Leysele and the
27^{th} of September 1918 on Bergues.
The offensive of Flanders, at last lights up. But the enraged Germans
will hold on till the last minute.
It is only on the 16^{th} of October at 20 minutes to three that the
heavy cannon of Leugenboom is for ever silenced. In its last spasms of
agony it dealt terrible blows to the localities situated behind the
front of attack.
At last on the 17^{th} of October the monster of Leugenboom belongs to
us. Our troops neared it, and, passing by it, threw a slightly haughtly
look, but certainly encouraged by their grand trophy. Pressed by our
soldiers, the Germans had hastily attempted to put their cannon out of
action. It was loaded and levelled horizontally, and so it remains to
the present day. In that position they hoped that the projectile would
touch the concrete mass before being entirely shot out of the tube, and
that its bursting would blow up the flight. But their anticipations were
not realised; the projectile, instead of being stopped by the mass of
concrete, passed through it, making a breach and burst about 800 meters
further.
It was a Krupp marine gun of 380 mm. (15 inch), type 1914, n^o 154, of a
total length of 17 m. 13 placed on a gun carriage, formed by two
formidable tanks, tap rooted in the centre of a concrete pit. This pit
has a special shape because, of the conditions the constructors imposed
themselves to give it a field of fire of 157°, the axis of which passes
by Dunkirk.
The total weight of the piece is 77630 kilos.
The breech has an outer diameter of one meter, the manœuvre is
electrical but there exists handles for hand manœuvring. The artillery
men were entirely protected by a cabin joined to the gun carriage, built
in strong sheet of iron of a thickness of about 50 mm.
The cannon fired a projectile of 750 kilogrammes.
The two heavy guns of Predikboom and Leugenboom subjected Dunkirk to
thirty two bombardments, the four hundred and eleven 15 inches shells of
which killed one hundred and fourteen persons and wounded one hundred
and eighty five.
[Illustration:
COUCKELAERE.—Heavy 15 inch gun at Leugenboom.
]
[Illustration:
CAESKERKE.—Arched communication trench and light railway line (1916).
]
LIST OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS AND SKETCHES
Pages.
H. M. THE KING ALBERT OF BELGIUM 3
CAESKERKE: Arched communication Trench and light railway line
(1916) 71
CLERCKEN: Sketch of the German Observation-post 59
COUCKELAERE: Heavy 15 inch German gun at Leugenboom 70
DIXMUDE: Their Majesties the King and Queen in the “Death
Trench” (June 1^{st} 1917) 32
DIXMUDE: Their Majesties the King and Queen at the “Rider’s
work” (June 1^{st} 1917) 32
DIXMUDE: The flour-mill. La minoterie (1916) 45
„ The flour-mill. La minoterie (1917) 46
„ Aerial photo (May 26^{th} 1917) 31