BELGIAN ARMY
NOTICES
ON
THE OUTLASTING WAR SITES
[Illustration: [Logo]]
Illustrated by a map scale 1/100.000, four sketches and thirteen
photographs made by the Army Photographic Service.
[Illustration: [Logo]]
1923
Imprimerie du Ministère de la Défense Nationale Bruxelles.
[Illustration:
H. M. THE KING ALBERT OF BELGIUM.
]
OFFICIAL LIST
OF THE OUTLASTING WAR SITES.
The figures of the list are connected with those printed on the
1/100.000 map included with this booklet, as well as with those of the
following notices.
Pages.
1. German battery “Wilhelm II” at Knocke on sea 7
2. German guns on the pier of Zeebrugge 10
3. German battery “Deutschland” at Breedene 14
4. German battery “Tirpitz” at Ostend 15
5. German admiralty Headquarters at Middelkerke 19
6. The Great Redan at Nieuport 19
7. “Karnak” battery at Oost-dunkerke 23
8. Levelcrossing guard shelter at Ramscappelle with machine-gun
pit 24
9. Machine-gun pit in front of the Pervyse railway station 26
10. Observation-post of the Pervyse railway station 26
11. Battalion commander’s Headquarters at Km. 4.400 of the
Dixmude-Nieuport railway 30
12. Foot of the Oud-Stuyvekenskerke tower with neighbouring
shelter 30
13. The trench called “Boyau de la mort” (Death Trench) and the
breastwork called “Ouvrage du cavalier”. German saphead on
the left bank of the Yser river and concrete dug-out on
the righthand river bank (km. 16) 34
14. Company commander’s post near the Yserdam, at Dixmude in
front of the canal of Handzaeme (lefthand bank) 42
15. Mill of Dixmude and series of German pillboxes on the
righthand Yser-bank, up to the railway line 44
16. Concrete dug-out south of the railway bridge at Dixmude
(lefthand bank) 42
17. Albert and Elisabeth redoubts between kilom. 19 and 20 of
the Yser river (lefthand bank) 53
18. The “Joconde’s” dwelling, kilom. 19.500 of the Yser river
(left bank) 53
19. Battalion commander’s Headquarters at kilom. 19.500 of Yser
river (lefthand bank) 53
20. Bridge-head at kilom. 19.500 and “Presqu´île” wood
(righthand bank) 54
21. Observation-post near the church of Clercken 58
22. “Grand-Père” concrete dug-out north of Kippe, kilom. 12.500
of the Dixmude-Yper road 60
23. “Castel Britannia” south of Kippe, kilom. 12.500 of the
Dixmude-Ypres road 60
24. Hoekske (spot where three german guns stuck in the mud) 60
25. German gun of Leugenboom, at Couckelaere 65
NOTICES
ON
THE OUTLASTING WAR SITES
1.—German battery “Kaiser Wilhelm II” at Knocke on Sea.
Before going into the description of the war sites along the Belgian
sea-coast, it is important to cast a general glance on the defences
established there by the Germans.
Admiral Schröder was given the task of the organization of the
sea-front. To do so he had at his disposal: the German Marine Army
Corps, a coast artillery altogether powerful in number as well as in the
caliber of the guns, a flotilla of patrolers, torpedo-boats, destroyers,
submarines and a few squadrons of aeroplanes and seaplanes.
In a few months time Belgian coast, thus strongly and thoroughly
organized was to be looked upon as a real up to date fortress. The power
of the defences was mainly concentrated round Zeebrugge and Ostend,—the
two german war outlets of the naval basis Bruges,—also between
Lombartzijde and Middelkerke,—where both territorial and seafronts were
hinged,—and finally at Knocke and East of that locality, for the
protection of the river Schelde’s estuary.
The pivot of the coast defences was to be incumbent on the artillery
acting in close cooperation with the land and sea-forces. The artillery
was to engage at long range all the allied boats and to keep them under
a constant crossfire, while they were endeavouring to proceed towards
the coast. For that purpose, about sixty batteries, thirty five of which
of the heaviest type were placed either along or at the rear of the
sandhills.
In fact, the guns of very high caliber were distributed behind the belt
of dunes; their tactical duty was to keep off the coast all boats which
would try to carry out long range bombardments. As those batteries could
not from their emplacements use direct fire, being unable to see the
targets, observation-posts with good field of view on the sea—for fire
registering—were found necessary. Herein lies the reason of the
construction of the numerous concrete ones, some of them still remaining
hidden along the downs.
As far as the smaller guns are concerned, these were dug in along the
dunes and were performing direct fire to prevent against raids, attempts
of landing or bottling the harbours.
Against eventual landings, the defences also comprised a series of mine
barrages, screens of nettings for submarines, hindering the access of
the shore. Redoubts manned by infantry troops were staking out an almost
uninterrupted line of trenches which were running along the beach, right
up to the Dutch frontiers.
Machine-guns and field guns were utilized for flanking the strand and
for anti-aircraft action.
The German defence of the Belgian coast was completed by high sea
forces.
The organization of the maritime defences was only seriously taken in
hand in 1915. The “Boat-detachement” composed of trawlers, mine
sweepers, tow boats and barges, was formed up in February that year.
Small types of torpedo-boats and submarines were sent dismounted, and
conveyed by railway up to the dock-yards created at Bruges, Ostend, and
later on at Hoboken, where those units were mounted. They formed with a
certain number of other units which came directly by sea, a flotilla of
submarines and one of torpedo-boats. Motor trawlers were on the watch
far out in the sea.
In 1916, the naval forces anchored in the Flanders base were
considerably increased in number, but it was particularly in the year
1917 that the Germans multiplied their submarines, thus turning the
harbours of Ostend and Zeebrugge into real haunts. Shelters were built
to protect them against air raids and the numerous bombardments carried
out by the British Fleet.
At Zeebrugge, the shelters were established along the mole and in the
tidal basins south of the locks and in the Bruges canal.
At Ostend, the flotillas were berthed in the wharfs and the darses. The
submarines were sheltered alongside the marine docks.
The year 1917 saw the submarine warfare ruthlessly carried out and the
enemy’s torpedo-boats raided the British and French coast.
In the early 1918, during the dismal winter nights, the foe undertook
several offensive reconnoitrings up to the British Channel. These were
to be their last deeds.
Doggedly determined to bring an end to the U boats’ boundless crimes,
the British Admiralty tackled the plan for the bottling up of the two
Belgian harbours. It was thus that were performed the most astounding
operations, which took the enemy unaware, pinning him down in Zeebrugge
and almost paralysing him in Ostend.
⁂
“=Kaiser Wilhelm II battery=” constitutes one of the typical kind of
heavy battery erected by the Germans along the North-Sea.
_Armement_: Four 12 inch marine guns, firing at 38 kilomètres (23½
miles) a shell weighing more than 400 kilos, needing a charge of 103
kilos.
The tube was 17 meters 25 cm^s long.
_Gun crew_: 5 officers and 360 other ranks.
_Observation-posts_: especially in Knocke’s Kursaal and on the down 23
near Duinbergen.
_Ammunition supply_: was done by railway.
_Historical account_: the battery was armed in July 1916 but did only
fire during our Flanders offensive in 1918.
It fired the last time on the 18^{th} October at about 3 p. m. and the
next day the battery was taken by our troops.
2.—Germans Guns upon the jetty of Zeebrugge.
We will not study the guns, but we feel compelled to bring back to
memory, one of the most striking naval operations of the Great War.
British Raid against Zeebrugge.
Loathing the countless crimes of the foe’s submarine warfare, Admiral
Sir Jellicoe, the newly promoted First Sea Lord, brought forward a
scheme for the bottling up of Zeebrugge and Ostend, the two outlets of
the German Naval basis Bruges.
The operations, though of the boldest character, was agreed upon and
attempted on April 22^d 1918, eve of S^t Georges’ day, patron of
England. Admiral Sir Roger Keyes was entrusted with the glorious
mission.
Five old Cruisers loaded with ferro-concrete, with on board a crew
mainly composed of volunteers were to carry that mission through. Three
of these cruisers, namely: H. M. S. _Thetis_, _Intrepid_, and
_Iphigenia_ were bound for Zeebrugge; H. M. S. _Brilliant_ and _Sirius_
for Ostend. A flotilla composed of destroyers, submarines, several steam
barges and motor trawlers had to cooperate in the action.
The attack against Zeebrugge seeming the more difficult of the two had
to be shouldered by the old cruiser H. M. S. _Vindictive_ and the two
Liverpool carriers _Iris_ and _Daffodil_. These units were to undertake
a daring diversion in dashing for the pier.
It was 5 o’clock p. m. when the fleet was concentrated at about 63 miles
off the coast and from thither directed towards the two goals. While a
wind due North East was carrying forward a thick smoke screen produced
by fume boats, the fleet sailed forth without raising the enemy’s
attention.
Unfortunately, at a few cable’s lengths from the ports the wind suddenly
swerved due South-West, cleaning away the smoke cloud, disclosing at
once the “Gallant British Fleet”. It was then 11.56 p. m. Like
lightenings, all the guns and machine-guns, raised as though by magic
power, roared their rapid rounds.
In front of Ostend, the lights guiding the boats towards the coast were
hit by shellfire and put out of action. Unable to be driven, the attack
failed. H. M. S. _Sirius_ and H. M. S. _Brilliant_ were sunk at 3
kilomètres East of the harbour’s entrance[1].
Footnote 1:
The operation against Ostend was successfully carried out during the
night of the 9^{th} to 10^{th} May. H. M. S. _Vindictive_ managed to
place herself athwart in the entrance of the harbour and there was
blown up.
In front of Zeebrugge, in spite of the infernal artillery and
machine-gun fire, sweeping the mole, H. M. S. _Vindictive_, under
captain A. F. B. Carpenter, helped by the _Daffodil_ and _Iris_ managed
to land his men. That diversion brought the whole fire and the enemy’s
attention up to the mole, thus clearing the way to the blockships.
Machine-gun nests and a part of the enemy’s organizations were destroyed
or set on fire. Little damage was done, which after all was merely
accessory.
During that time, H. M. S. _Thetis_ was nearing the channel. She
succeeded to cross the mine-barrage but unluckily her propeller got
entangled in the nets of the defences, rendering all manœuvres
impossible whatever. The commander was then forced to blow her up after
that the crew had been taken on board of the trawlers. Her position
after all greatly helped the rapid sanding up of the harbour.
H. M. S. _Intrepid_ and _Iphigenia_ which followed H. M. S. _Thetis_ up,
overran all the obstacles and managed to enter the canal. They placed
themselves athwart in order to block entirely the entrance up. It is
then, when freed from their crews that were embarked on board of the
trawlers, that their captains exploded charges.
It was while these manœuvres were on, that Lieutenant Richard D.
Sandford drove his submarine,—the C_{3}—, below the bays of the pier and
there blew her up, making a breach thirty meters long, thus isolating
the jetty from the coast. This last deed was to be the master piece of
the gallant expedition. The explosion had been tremendous.
As soon as the three cruisers loaded with concrete had been sunk, H. M.
S. _Vindictive_ re-embarked her crew and the whole little “British Main”
turned back “Homeward-Bound”. The men of the _Vindictive_ were then
taken on board of the admiral’s boat, the _Warwick_.
There is one point which must be kept in mind, that is that during the
whole of these operations, the powerful defences, switched on Zeebrugge,
were thundering death from every gun, from every rifle and machine-gun,
and, under that tornado of fire the battle area was no else but real
hell!
The next day, the aerial photographs proved the wonderful results
attained by the expedition, results which were far beyond the most
optimistical previsions. In regard to this wonderful achievement and the
temerity needed to carry it through, the casualties have shown
relatively light. From out of the 1780 officers and other ranks who took
part in the raid, 176 were killed, 412 wounded and 49 missing.
[Illustration:
The Blocking of Zeebrugge by the British Navy during the night of
April 22^d to 23^d 1918.
]
1. Rhine barges anchored in line (forming boom).
2. One pounder quick firing gun (pom-pom).
3. Nettings of the defence.
4. Lighthouse.
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
5. Mole batteries.
6. „
7. „
───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
8. Shelter for submarines.
9. Aeroplanes sheds.
10. S. S. Brussels.
11. Breach caused by the explosion of the submarine C3.
12. Extreme line of the flood.
13. Groden battery.
14. Wurtemberg battery.
15. Zeppelin battery.
16. Lübeck battery.
17. Pier.
18. Channel-entrance.
19. Friedrichsort battery.
20. Kanal battery.
As far as the boats losses are concerned, only the destroyer _North
Star_ and two motor boats went down.
This raid is the most striking instance of military valour and devotion
to duty. We feel as though we must emphasize the glorious conduct of the
British sailors and the best way is for us to oppose the straight
forwardness of the British sailormen to the sly and underhanded methods
of the Germans, who only feel apt to sink, without being seen,
defenceless boats, thus bringing death on to harmless people.
3.—German battery “Deutschland” at Breedene.
The battery “Deutschland” is situated near the Jacobinessen farm.
_Armement_: Four 15 inch guns firing at 55 kilometers a shell 2 meters
long.
The charge was contained in a brass shell case.
The tube was 17 meters 10 cm. long.
_Gun crew_: Each gun was attended by 150 men, in other words the whole
battery was 8 officers and 600 all ranks strong.
_Observation-posts_: The main observation-post (concrete) was built in
Albert’s Parc; auxiliary posts were connected to it by phones, such was
the case for the one of the hotel Belle-Vue at Wenduyne, and the other
called “Fulda” at Mariakerke.
_Ammunition supply_: was done by railway.
_Historical account_: The construction of the Deutschland battery was
done piece by piece and began in the early part of September 1915.
Belgian labour was requisitioned for that work, with Russian prisoners
of war, the hands employed for that battery amounted to seven hundred
that toiled months on end for it.
The battery’s activity culminated in 1918, specially in May, going
increasingly from the 1^{st} of June up to the 15^{th}, 16^{th}, 17^{th}
of October 1918. After the last fire which occurred on the morning of
the 17^{th} of October the German disabled the guns and left them few
hours later, the battery was then captured by our boys, on their way for
victory.
4.—German Battery “Tirpitz” at Ostend.
_Armement_: Four 12 inch guns, firing at a range of 35 kilometers a
shell weighing 375 kilos needing a charge of 103 kilos.
The tube was 12 meters 90 cms long.
_Gun crew_: 5 officers and 400 other ranks.
_Observation-posts_: One at Mariakerke on the roof of the asylum, the
other in the dunes.
_Ammunition supply_ was also done by railway.
_Historical account_: The guns of this battery had been ordered to
Krupp, by the Belgian Army, in view to complete the armement of
fortified position of Antwerp. At the outbreak of the war the German
Government kept hold of them and used them for their coast defences in
Belgium.
The battery was in position West of Ostend close by Hamilton Farm. The
first rounds date from September the 7^{th} 1915. Only two guns opened
fire at that time and during one of the firing a barrel of one of them
burst causing the death of twelve gunners; that tube was afterwards
replaced by another.
On January the 24^{th} 1916, the “Tirpitz” battery fired a hundred
shells on the Church of Nieuport and on the old Templers’s Tower, last
vestige of the first convent of that order, which dated from the
XII^{th} century. That destruction must have proved very satisfactory to
the German commanders, for, in recognition of that gallant deed, iron
crosses were awarded to 10 gunners of the battery.
The four guns fired for the first time in battery fire in July the
16^{th} 1916. The allied counter-battery work was fairly active, mainly
in 1917 and 1918. The pivot of that counter-battery fire was formed of
French 12 inch guns, mounted on railway; these were firing from round
Coxyde.
On July 16^{th} 1917 the French gunners were rather successful, several
of the guns servants were killed, shelters were destroyed, and the men
were scattered. The guns themselves were hit by shell splinters. The top
of the gun pits were then strengthened with a bursting layer thick of
one meter of concrete, and the battery resumed its action on the 22^d of
the same month.
In order to deceive our observers, a dummy battery was erected by the
German at about 2 kilometers away from the real emplacement, in the
direction of Wilskerke. Two old Belgian mortars of the 1862 type,
brought from Liége, and, four dummy guns made of wood were forming the
battery. Each time Tirpitz was firing a shot, the dummy was exploding
three successive charges, thus giving the impression of four rounds.
Another trick used by the enemy was, that whenever the counter-battery
was on, the crew was blowing up huge fougases thus preventing the
registering of the fire.
The last fire occured on the 15^{th} of October 1918, and the battery
was then destroyed.
[Illustration:
KNOCKE ON SEA.—German Battery Wilhelm II.
]
[Illustration:
NIEUPORT.—Aerial photo of the Main Redan (August 10^{th} 1918).
]
5.—German Admiralty Headquarters at Middelkerke.
If the material employed for the coast defences was of the first
quality, the German took the same care for the fitting up of the
position held by the naval infantry, which disposed of strong and
numerous dug-outs, skilfully camouflaged, in other word they formed
magnificent battle posts.
The Admiralty Headquarters at Middelkerke is a wonderful display of
luxury and it emphasises their taste for comfort.
Nothing was left uncared for; in case of alarm the admiral could easily
act in complete quiétude. He had his staff well at hand, his liaisons
thoroughly assured and could deliver his orders and instruction with the
maximum efficiency.
6.—The “Great Redan” at Nieuport.
From the old fortified position of Nieuport, the part situated North of
the harbour solely remained after the dismantling had been decided by
the Belgian State, in 1859.
Unproperly called during the war “Great Redan” that work—if one wants to
be accurate—is formed of a non reveted horne work which must have
belonged to the old fortification of Nieuport rebuilt in 1793, and
preceded with a half moon work constructed after 1815.
The whole place, in fact, had to be reconstructed following the Vauban
system, with the funds accordingly allotted by the Paris treaty of 1815.
The abandonment of those remains of fortifications since 1859 had
evidently reduced them to mere ruins, when the battle of the Yser was
fought in 1914. If the “Great Redan” was not utilized during the battle
as firing line, at least it afforded a magnificent place of arms, to
shelter the reserve troops for the defence of the “Little Bridge-head of
Nieuport”.
The latter place also known as the “Bridge-head of Palingbrug” extended
itself from the right bank of the channel, at the hight of the old
lighthouse to the brickwork (Plasschendaele canal) passing by the
kilometer 14.500 of the Nieuport Westende road.
It is from the evening of the 20^{th} of October 1914 onward that the
defence clung to that position.
To spare his men, Lieutenant General Dossin was contrived to flood the
“Groot Noord Nieuwland Polder” up, by letting in the seawater in to the
creek of Nieuwendamme, the dikes of which had been previously pierced.
This inundation was stretched in the evening of the 21^{st} of October.
After the epic fights at Lombarzyde and Groot Bamburg-Farm, in which
heroism was lavishly displayed by our men, during the day and night of
the 22^{nd}, the French troops under General Grossetti came at dawn on
the 23^{rd} to relieve the Belgian troops in Nieuport.
They were to resume the offensive movement the Belgian troops had
started, but the foe having pierced the line at Saint-Georges and
Tervaete, compelled the staff to withdraw the troops from Nieuport to
take position on the bridge-head of Palingbrug, in order to dispose of a
maximum of reserve to be arrayed on the threatened front and also to
draft the counter-attacks which were more and more urging.
On the evening of the 26^{th}, Colonel Claudon, commanding the French
troops at Palingbrug, judging his contingent too weak to hold on that
position, retired on the left bank of the Channel, in doing so he gave
up the bridge-head, the Great Redan, the five bridges and the locks, in
one word that retreat meant the abandonment of the key of the whole
hydrographic system of the region.
Fortunately, the enemy not only worn out but much more concerned with
the center of his front of attack, did not venture to keep in touch with
the troops at Nieuport and failed to notice the leaving of the right
bank of the river Yser, of which he might have so easely drawn
advantage. The German, perhaps still believing in the existence of the
fortress of Nieuport, did not attack.
Up to the 3^d of November 1914 the Palingbrug was left abandoned.
Though, it is during that period of time that the inundation was
stretched. A first attempt took place on the morning of the 27^{th} of
October, but was a failure, it is only at 5 a. m. on the 28^{th} that we
managed to open and keep it so during the incoming tide, the old lock of
Furnes.
The inroad of water through that lock having been reckoned unsufficient,
the Belgian G.H.Q. decided to make use of the Noordvaart lock, but the
latter was since the evening of the 26^{th} right in “No man’s land”,
position which rendered the operation most dangerous.
Under the protection of 40 cyclists carabiniers who had to cross over in
walking on the Furnes lock gates (the bridge having been blown up, by
order of Colonel Claudon after the retreat of the 26^{th}), Captain Umé,
of the Royal Engineers successfully managed to open the locks of
Noordvaart. The following nights the operations were renewed and
gradually the sheet of water rose and rose. Awestruck by that mystery,
the enemy, fortunately realised it but too late.
At last, on the 3^d of November, while the Yser battle had proved a
victory, all along the Belgian line, reconnaissances were carried out in
front of the advanced posts.
On November the 4^{th}, detachment of the 2^d Army Division occupied
again the bridge-head of Palingbrug and the Redan, which we pledge our
word was never tred on by German heels.
A few time afterwards an offensive movement took place and was
undertaken by the Franco-Belgian troops, that operation forced the enemy
to give up the channel North of the “Geleïde”. The front was then fixed
on a position baptized “The Main bridge-head of Nieuport” on a line
parallel to the channel and at about 600 meters East of the latter,
running round the Western side of Lombartzyde and prolonging itself
almost parallel to Plasschendaele canal up to the Boterdijk.
That front never knew any alterations till July 1917.
The 10th of July 1917, at about 8 o’clock p. m., after a regular
bombardment of more than 10 hours duration, all along the Nieuport
sector, the enemy rushed the positions held, only since a few days, by
the British Infantry. The fight lasted the whole night long and after
the most bloody hand to hand fights, the attackers succeeded to enter
the British trenches between the beach and the Geleïde and throwing the
occupants in the channel, those who swam across escaped from death or
capture.
From up the 11 July onward the Nieuport front was running along the
channel right up to Geleïde river, where it was hinged to the primitive
front, which determined attacks had successfully brought to its original
point.
Later the “Redan” and its surrounding area were subjected to almost
daily bombardments, which soon gave them a bloody fame.
The powder-mill of the old work, thanks to the superimposed vaults,
which were forming its ceiling, managed to resist to all kind of German
shells, which made it deserve the nickname of _Rubber house_. It was
occupied during the operations both as battle headquarters and as
advanced dressing station.
In March 1918, the Belgian front had to be stretched out, in order to
relieve allied divisions. To avoid the weakening of our resistance, our
front having been thus considerably lengthened and the occupation having
become very thin, the G. H. Q. decided to stretch a further inundation
which allowed to gain up several outposts.
At Nieuport, the Redan became the front line. It was hooked North by the
“huitrière” (oyster-pond), fronting the West bank of the channel, and
South at “Dupuis and de Luc” trench.
Those three points d’appui formed an important point of resistance: they
were covering the locks. They were garrisoned by a battalion; its duty
was to hold at all costs and it did it.
At last, the Belgian offensive was launched from up the southern part of
our front on the 28^{th} of September 1918. North of Dixmude our troops
remained momentarily waiting and the position of Nieuport had still to
suffer severe bombardments. But the last occupants of the Redan stood
them up lightly, only anxiously waiting their turn to rush victoriously
over the parapet. The kick off was given on the 17^{th} of October and
the very same day they were able to admire with a legitimate pride the
magnificent enemy artillery, which had made them suffer so much and that
the Germans had left them, the guns still loaded.
7.—Karnak battery at Oost-Dunkerke.
English battery composed of two 9.2 inches, guns. That battery was
situated at about 1 kilometer East of Oost-Dunkerke and at 200 meters
South of Oost-Dunkerke bath and Nieuport bath road.
Its interest lies in the reason of its having been constructed
underneath the great dunes, from that emplacement the battery drew the
three fold advantages in regard to camouflage, protection and mainly in
creating great difficulties to the German counter-battery; indeed the
latter was deprived of any aiming point whatever, and the shell craters
were rapidly leveled up by the sand.
Karnak battery, which was manned by British gunners had been placed
under the Orders of the O. C. of the Nieuport sector, who utilized it
for momentous counter-battery and destruction fires.
8.—Levelcrossing guard shelter at Ramscappelle with machine-gun-pit.
Ramscappelle was the only point West of the Nieuport-Dixmude railway
line that ever was trod on by the invader. After the taking of
St-Georges on October 24^{th} 1914, the foe in order to widen his
success rushed on the 26^{th} for the Noordvaart and compelled our
troops after a night of fierce struggle to withdraw on the railway
track, on which they clung without much difficulty up to the 29^{th} of
October.
During the evening of the 29^{th}, two attempts of the enemy against the
railway line facing Ramscappelle failed. The 30^{th}, at 4.45 a. m. a
new trial was again pinned down. And finally round 5.30 a. m. after a
terrific artillery preparation, a last and more powerful attack than the
previous ones, forced the resistance at a point South of the halt of
Ramscappelle, the enemy linked himself on the railway line which he now
enfilades and thus proceeding northward, reached the village.
The 5^{th} and 6^{th} line Regiments, which had battled with the finest
determination, withdrew and took a strong position at the Koolhofbrug
and Jockveld farm from whither they managed to prevent the enemy to
emerge from out the village, thus stemming the rush for good and all.
Lieutenant General Dossin, in command of the 2^d Army Division, ordered
the counter-strike to be organized at once. Accordingly at the beginning
of the afternoon a force composed of four French Battalions and five
Belgian ones plus a machine-gun company, and, with in support two
Belgian and two French battalions, went slowly forward, encircled the
village altogether northward, westward and southward. When that move had
been completed, the assault was launched; it was then 7 o’clock p. m.
The group of houses on the southern side of the wind mill and the wind
mill itself were carried out at the first jump, thanks to the fighting
spirit of the men and also to the efficient artillery fire of N^o
26^{th} Belgian Field Battery, which, in spite of a hurricane of
machine-gun bullets had been brought as far forward as the Pelican
bridge.
The fighting ground being of a very close nature permitted but a very
slow progression of the wings. But nothing daunted, the attack however
reached the nearer outskirts of the village, bar the eastern side of the
brook, called Ramscapelleleed excepted.
The night was spent in carrying out violent musketry fire, and to goad
the enemy several reconnaissances were pushed in the village while a
section of a French and Belgian bridging company was erecting a foot
bridge on the Ramscappelleleed. The artillery kept hammering the enemy’s
defences into ruins.
At dawn of the 31^{th} of October, the german resistance weakened and a
general attack carries the village up bringing in one jump the
assaulting troops right up the railway line, scattering the remaining
defenders and pushing them back toward the river Yser.
The german fled, leaving their dead and wounded behind them, they also
abandoned in the inundation the two famous “Minenwerfer”, which only
seven days ago had annihilated a whole Belgian battalion, which was
defending the Yser crossing at the Union Bridge.
During the whole war, the Nieuport-Dixmude railway line formed in the
“Ramscappelle sector”, the main line of resistance. When the water had
retired a little, the sector was guarded by two main-guards i. e.
Rijkenhoek and Beverdijk, particularly famous as kick off points for the
numerous attacks and raids of our troops against the Violette and
Terstille farms.
That line offered numerous and well constructed shelters affording to
our men relatively comfortable dwellings. Here and there, at places
offering good field of fire or permitting to sweep main-traffic passages
concrete machine pits (such as the one at the station) were built. In
the hut of the railway guard an artillery observation-post was also
constructed.
9.—Machine-gun shelter facing the Pervyse railway station.
10.—Observation-post at the Pervyse railway station.
From up the 26^{th} of October 1914, date at which our troops were
compelled to leave the Beverdijk, the Dixmude railway track outlined in
front of Pervyse our first front line.
On the 30^{th} of October meanwhile the foe was rushing for Ramscappelle
he hurled detachments against the Pervyse station. That attack miserably
failed under the violent rifle firing of the 1^{st} Battalion of the
12^{th} line Regiment which had been swiftly reinforced by few sections
of the 2^d Bat.
The assailants fled seeking refuge in the houses bordering the Schoore
road opposite the railway station, where they were made prisoner in the
course of the day. The rest managed to retire back to their former
position but had to fight their way through the inundation in order to
rally their line.
[Illustration:
PERVYSE.—The inundation facing the railway station (September 1916).
]
[Illustration:
OUD-STUYVEKENSKERKE.—The Tower (November 1914).
]
[Illustration:
OUD-STUYVEKENSKERKE.—The Tower (February 1917).
]
The above assault was to be the only one the first line of Pervyse ever
had to grapple with.
The main-guard of Schilderbrug with its advanced posts, (one outlook
post on the road and two sentry posts on the water with the intermediate
ones) gave the troops a sufficient security to allow the men, in spite
of the rafale fires which from time to time poured upon the line, to
say: “It is fine in Pervyse”.
The line was organized since the early days of its occupation, then was
gradually improved to become during the last years of war a model of
stabilized trench warfare area.
Even the station itself, where an artillery observation-post had been
constructed, was wedged in a powerful stronghold whose solid concrete
shelters for machine-guns were forming the bastions.
One of the above mentioned machine-gun pits, that of the south eastern
angle may still be seen and will give a thorough idea of the
organization.
The observation-post of the railway station, one of the main O. P. s. of
the Belgian front, had a vast field of view and was provided with visual
apparatus of the highest precision.
It was connected in 1917, by means of two telephone wires with
alternative courses, to Dunkirk signalling post and that, in order to
warn the city of the firing intended for her by the Leugenboom gun.
The report of the monster, perceived at Pervyse was at once communicated
to Dunkirk where the receiving station was to alert the town by means of
the powerful steam-whistles or other such alarm signals.
11.—Battalion commander’s Headquarters at Km. 4.400 of the
Nieuport-Dixmude railway line.
That concrete dug-out served as battle Headquarters to the major
commanding the Oud-Stuyvekenskerke subsector. It was of that type
adopted for such shelters prompted along the railway line.
These emplacements were generally constructed in the years 1916 and 1917
to take the place of the far less resisting ones whose walls as well as
roofings were formed by beams and logs in juxtaposition. The roof had
been rendered waterproof by means of tarred board, while a more or less
thick layer of bags filled with concrete rendered them safe against
small shells.
These which replaced them, some of which are still remaining such that
of kilom. 4.400, were very well conceived. They often contained several
different rooms, the number of which were varying according the need of
the sector: major’s orderly room, major’s and adjutant’s lodging, visual
signalling and very-light posts, telephone central, etc....
12.—The base of the tower of Oud-Stuyvekenskerke.
The old tower of Oud-Stuyvekenskerke has not been able to resist to the
amount of projectiles poured upon it by the Germans, throughout the
whole campaign. Its emplacement however, and the concrete bloc which has
taken its place are interesting as marking the extreme advance of the
enemy in the region, it also brings back to memory the terrific
bombardments and fights which that corner of Flanders witnessed.
[Illustration:
DIXMUDE.—Aerial photo (Mai 26^{th} 1917).
]
[Illustration:
DIXMUDE.—Their Majesties King and Queen at the “Death trench”. (June
1^{st} 1917).
]
[Illustration:
DIXMUDE.—Their Majesties King and Queen at the Riderswork. (June
1^{st} 1917).
The Queen examining private J. Vermeire’s helmet, which had just been
pierced by a German bullet.
]
At the end of the Yser battle, after the 29^{th} of October 1914,
Oud-Stuyvekenskerke was only occupied for a few days by weak German
detachements, whilst our line of defence had been brought back upon the
Nieuport-Dixmude railway line and rejoining the Yser at the kilometer 16
by a line running through Roode-Poort farm and the houses of the Burg.
Then the flood forced the foe to withdraw up to the bank of the river.
On the 3^{rd} of November 1914, the Belgian G. H. Q. ordered to push
forward reconnaitring parties all along our army front; advanced posts
were then placed which, little by little were multiplied untill they
formed a complete defence line of advanced guards, acting as outposts
screen to the whole defence scheme. The main-guards were all on duty
beyond the inundations, the mean of access to the main-guards being long
duck boards placed on threstle stuck in the soil. The one leading to
Oud-Stuyvekenskerke was particularly dangerous because the Germans had
aimed a fixed rifle on it, which was sweeping its whole length. The
losses there sustained have been very heavy, mainly when relieves were
on. To cut the casualties down the 4^{th} line Regiment erected concrete
shields against bullets and shell splinters.
The main-guard of Oud-Stuyvekenskerke was protecting the left flanc of
the organization of the Dixmude sector and that by keeping under its
fire the whole of the ground stretching itself in front of their
advanced posts. Besides, the hamlet which was situated on a little
knoll, was thus affording great advantages for the creation of
observation-posts.
In connection with this “War-Site” there is a name which is closely
associated with every details of its life. Known as the “Burgomaster of
Oud-Stuyvekenskerke”, R. Father Martial Lekeux, Artillery Commander,
spent the first years of the war in the tower, then when latter tumbled
down, he moved in the gable front of a farm where he organized a
remarkable observation-post. The name of Martial Lekeux deserves to be
mentioned here, because his dogged determination and pluck, unidentified
themselves with that main-guard of Oud-Stuyvekenskerke.
Three momentous German posts, were facing it, i. e. the farms n^o 1,
“den Toren and Van de Woude”, which owed many a tragic days to the keen
eyes of the Belgian observer.
For four years on end of trench warfare the main-guard of
Oud-Stuyvekenskerke held fast. It held under storms of iron, it held
against assailants who, at renewed attempts endeavoured to overrun it.
These different rushes, the one of March 1918 against our cyclist
carabiniers and the 1^{st} foot jagers as well as that of June of the
same year against the 22^{nd} line regiment have disclosed the stubborn
energy and enthusiastic courage which moved our men of 1918, classing
them amongst the best fighting elements of the great allied armies.
13.—Death Trench and the “Cavalier” field work.
When the battle of the Yser was over, our first front line was running
along the river in front of Dixmude in a direction due North-West up to
the kilometer 16. There the river Yser, makes a sudden bend and our
front was leaving the river side to prolonge itself westward, leaning on
the Roode-Poort farm thus joining the Nieuport-Dixmude railway line.
That particular point of kilometer n^o 16, which ought to have been on
the early days of stabilized warfare, a stronghold of our defensive
scheme, struck our high command, as being rather weak. The decision was
then taken to strengthen it.
A line of main-guards already covered the Belgian positions from
Nieuport up to Oud-Stuyvekenskerke, when General Jacquet decided, in
order to cover himself at the kilometer n^o 16, to prolonge that line by
adding to it an element, the advanced posts of which would be placed
along the river Reigersvliet and that right up to its mouth.
To carry that mission through it was thought necessary to rush the
petrol tanks, the mystery of which, more than their power had already
given to the sector a fair renown.
[Illustration:
Death trench and Riders’work-Operations which took place from up May
to October 1915 North and East of kilometer 16 of the river Yser.
]
The 1^{st} foot jagers, shouldered by the 3^{rd} divisional artillery
and accompanied by detachements of pioneers, tried the operations.
A keen fight developed for three long days, from up the 9^{th} to the
12^{th} May 1915[2], in a horrible ground, the main part being under
water, and cut up by deep and broad ditches and shell holes full of
water, offering no shelter whatever to the rafales of machine-guns and
the harassing fires of the artillery which were hacking our gallant boys
down. The attack failed in spite of their courage, and the losses
endured.
Footnote 2:
At the same time, the 3^d foot jagers began the fight on the right
bank, succeeding to establish a bridge-head South-East of kilometer
16. The enemy clung against it and the daily casualties were such that
it was decided to reduce its development and manning. In 1917 few
portions of trenches running along the right bank remained solely held
and were the starting point of the raids carried on against the
enemy’s organizations, right up to the end of the war. A few shelters,
last witnesses of our occupation, are still standing and will be kept
up for the future.
The 1^{st} foot jagers alone had lost in that action 10 officers and
five hundred and fifty men, killed or wounded. The plan was not given
up, but tactics was changed. The ground which had been captured was
hurriedly fitted up, while a platoon of a tunneling company was set at
task on the bank of the Yser to resume the advance by sap-work. The
mining was progressing satisfactorily when it was realized that on the
German side a similar work was on, which, in less than a fortnights time
reduced to few yards the distance separating the Belgian saphead from
the enemy’s.
On the 27^{th} of May 1915, during the relieve, and taking the advantage
of a pitch dark night and protected by a violent bombardment, a group of
Germans jumped in our trench placing a machine-gun section in it. The
enfilading fire of those guns caused heavy casualties to the 9^{th} line
regiment which delivered a counter-attack.
After useless efforts, the only alternative left was to push actively
forward the organization of the remaining portion of the trench so as to
render it able to resist, notwithstanding the achievement of the
previous object, it is to say the strengthening of the Yser salient at
kilometer 16.
From time to time, the enemy tried to attack the trench but each time
was repulsed by spontaneous counter-strokes. The enormous casualties
suffered, either by the bombardments or by the numerous raids, carried
out by the enemy, against the trench, made it deserve the name of:
“Death Trench”. (Boyau de la Mort.)
In September 1915, the more urgent works of the Death Trench were nearly
finished and could easely suffice to the defence of the left bank of the
river at kilometer n^o 16. The attention of the engineers was then
driven on to the construction of the “Cavalier”, work which was to
complete the above mentioned defence, by securing it against all
attempts of the enemy to cross the river.
The characteristic features of the “Cavalier” comes from the working
condition it had to be submitted to, it is to say, to combine the
defence as to fit or better to match in the most perfect way to the one
of the “Death trench” thus forming a center of the highest possible
resistance.
The “Cavalier” in itself presents two different and parallel lines, the
first one on the level with the ground, to serve the purpose of round
way and communication line, the second, above level thus dominating the
whole region. The latter trench is the firing one, the overlooking
position of which permitting to carry out enfilading and plunging fires
upon the two banks of the river Yser as well as in the Death Trench
itself, and on the enemy’s organization round kilometer n^o 16.
The dead angles of that position were under machine-gun fire and later,
automatic rifles were placed at the entrance of the Death Trench, and
also in the one connecting it with the “Cavalier”.
The building up of the “Cavalier” was long and cost to our sappers and
infantrymen many a toilsome days and many a casualties. Seeing those
provoking works, the German indeed did not remain inactive, they
frequently ruined our works with their artillery and minenwerfers,
inflicting to our troops awful losses.
The close of 1915 marked the end of the grounding of the accessory
defences. The emplacements for trench mortars, machine-guns pits were
rising little by little, the dug-out for the officer in Command of the
“Cavalier” sector, was gradually coming to shape, and the shelters were
rising from out the soil.
It was then decided to reduce the occupation of the “Death Trench”.
On October 11^{th} 1915, the bank of the Yser was blown up by a mine at
about 275 meters in front of kilometer 16, thus opening a gap 6 or 8
meters in length, which connected the Yser to the flooded area. The
Northern portion of the trench was filled up and then abandoned.
Three bombing teams, garrisoned by day time the thus shortened line.
Our men had become first class bomb throwers and feeling themselves well
shouldered by the Van Deuren mortars (Belgian Stokes Guns) were full of
confidence and never feared their opponents.
In 1916 the organization of the “Cavalier” completes itself and becomes
a real redoubt. The two flights of the work is provided with offensive
and defensive weapons, as well as with liaison material of the most
diverse nature. Concrete shelters for the men have taken the place of
those built with logs, which so often were bombed to ruins by the enemy.
A post of visual signalling was placed so as to maintain a constant
contact with the commander of the sector.
May 1916 was to be a tragic month for the kilometer 16 sector.
From up the 2^{nd} on to the 22^{nd}, the German switched on the “Death
Trench” a fire of the most terrific power, and hurling troops forward
they managed to get a foot-hold in our position, but nothing daunted, a
counter-attack winged them at once back, by dint of grenades fights and
sharp hand to hand struggles.... The enemy fled, he had not even had
time to take his dead and wounded back with him.
In July 1916, an artillery observation-post was established at the
“Cavalier”. The camouflage section came and erected there a strong steel
cabin, loopholed towards the enemy side, and also provided with a
periscope. A telephone wire was connecting that post to the Divisional
Artillery Commander.
But the month of may with its hard and bloody days the men had to
contend with, were not to be forgotten, and a keen wish for vengeance
was nursed by every one.
Was the No “One” enemy trench not presenting itself to us in a similar
way as our “Death Trench” to him? In fact, we were on the bridge-head on
the right bank. The attack and destruction of that line was decided.
On July 18^{th} 1916, after that several reconnaissances had made during
the preceding nights, and thorough destruction fire switched on to the
trench, a detachment of n^o 4 company of the IV^{th} Bat. of the 2^{nd}
line Regiment, under the command of Lieutenants Loyse and Desenfans
stormed it. The object of the raid was not to remain there, but the duty
of the raiding-party was to “clean the place up” and keep it free of
Germans a sufficient length of time to blow all the concrete shelters
up, to render them unhabitable. The “cleaning up” was thoroughly done,
but unfortunately Lieutenant Loyse having been dangerously wounded,
could not give the signal which was to start the blowing of the charges,
that sapper sergeant Billiet had placed, after having himself taken an
ample share in the first part of the show.
This raid is recorded as an example of the kind. All the dead and
wounded of the party were brought back to our lines.
The enthusiasm was at its highest, the confidence kindled, the regiment
avenged.
The sector was calm for a good while.
The 17^{th} of October 1916, the German, roused once again, opened on
our line, at kilometer 16, the most powerful bombardment, foreboding a
new attack. But our gunners were on the watch, they directed at once a
counter-bombardment so violently efficient that it must have taken out
from the enemy’s mind the slightest wish to jump out of his haunts.
Ten days later, the 2^d line regiment decided to do away with the “One”
enemy trench, for good and all. From up the 27^{th} on to the 31^{st} of
October detachment raided by night the accursed trench, they undertook
the destruction of the shelters, turning the whole of No “One” line into
real havoc.
In the course of the years 1917 and 1918, the life at the kilometer 16
quietened down, the intervals between the bombardments and mortar duals
lengthened, and were replaced by intermittant artillery and hand
grenades fights.