THE DECLINE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT
Six or seven years ago a political ebb-tide everywhere followed upon the
revolutionary flood-tide. In Russia the counter-revolution triumphed
and began a period of decay for the Russian proletariat both in politics
and in the strength of their own organizations. In Austria the thread
of achievements started by the working class broke off, social insurance
legislation rotted in the government offices, nationalist conflicts
began again with renewed vigor in the arena of universal manhood
suffrage, weakening and dividing the Social Democracy. In England, the
Labor Party, after separating from the Liberal Party, entered into the
closest association with it again. In France the Syndicalists passed
over to reformist positions. Gustav Herve changed to the opposite of
himself in the shortest time. And in the German Social Democracy the
Revisionists lifted their heads, encouraged by history's having given
them such a revenge. The South Germans perpetrated their demonstrative
vote for the budget. The Marxists were compelled to change from
offensive to defensive tactics. The efforts of the Left wing to draw
the Party into a more active policy were unsuccessful. The dominating
Center swung more and more towards the Right, isolating the radicals.
Conservatism, recovering from the blows it received in 1905, triumphed
all along the line.
In default of revolutionary activity as well as the possibility for
reformist work, the Party spent its entire energy on building up the
organization, on gaining new members for the unions and for the Party,
on starting new papers and getting new subscribers. Condemned for
decades to a policy of opportunist waiting, the Party took up the cult
of organization as an end in itself. Never was the spirit of inertia
produced by mere routine work so strong in the German Social Democracy
as in the years immediately preceding the great catastrophe. And there
can be no doubt that the question of the preservation of the
organizations, treasuries, People's Houses and printing presses played a
mighty important part in the position taken by the fraction in the
Reichstag towards the War. "Had we done anything else we would have
brought ruin upon our organization and our presses" was the first
argument I heard from a leading German comrade.
And how characteristic it is of the opportunistic psychology induced by
mere organization work, that out of ninety-one Social Democratic papers
not one found it possible to protest against the violation of Belgium.
Not one! After the repeal of the anti-Socialist laws, the Party
hesitated long before starting its own printing presses, lest these
might be confiscated by the government in the event of great happenings.
And now that it has its own presses, the Party hierarchy fears every
decisive step so as not to afford opportunity for confiscation.
Most eloquent of all is the incident of the _Verwaerts_ which begged for
permission to continue to exist--on the basis of a new programme
indefinitely suspending the class conflict. Every friend of the German
Social Democracy had a sense of profound pain when he received his issue
of the central organ with its humiliating "By Order of Army
Headquarters." Had the _Verwaerts_ remained under interdiction, that
would have been an important political fact to which the Party later
could have referred with pride. At any rate that would have been far
more honorable than to continue to exist with the imprint of the
general's boots on its forehead.
But higher than all considerations of policy and the dignity of the
Party stood considerations of membership, printing presses,
organization. And so the _Verwaerts_ now lives as two-paged evidence of
the unlimited brutality of Junkerdom in Berlin and in Louvain, and of
the unlimited opportunism of the German Social Democracy.
The Right wing stood more by its principles, which resulted from
political considerations. Wolfgang Heine crassly formulated these
principles of German Reformism in an absurd discussion as to whether the
Social Democrats should leave the hall of the Reichstag when the members
rose to cheer the Emperor's name, or whether they should merely keep
their seats. "The creation of a republic in the German Empire is now and
for some time to come out of the range of all possibility, so that it is
not really a matter for our present policy." The practical results
still not yet achieved may be reached, but only through co-operation
with the liberal bourgeoisie. "For that reason, not because I am a
stickler for form, I have called attention to the fact that
parliamentary co-operation will be rendered difficult by demonstrations
that needlessly _hurt the feelings_ of the majority of the House."
But if a simple infringement of monarchical etiquette was enough to
destroy the hope of reformist co-operation with the liberal middle
class, then certainly the break with the bourgeois "nation" in the
moment of national "danger" would have hindered, for years to come, not
only all desired reforms, but also all reformist desires. That attitude
that was dictated to the routinists of the Party center by sheer anxiety
over the preservation of the organization was supplemented among the
Revisionists by political considerations. Their standpoint proved in
every respect to be more comprehensive and won the victory all over. The
entire Party press is now industriously acclaiming what it once heaped
scorn upon, that the present patriotic attitude of the working class
will win for them, after the war, the good will of the possessing
classes for bringing about reforms.
Therefore, the German Social Democracy did not feel itself, under the
stress of these great events, a revolutionary power with tasks far
exceeding the question of widening the state's boundaries, a power that
does not lose itself for an instant in the nationalistic whirl, but
calmly awaits the favorable moment for joining with the other branches
of the International in a purposeful interference in the course of
events. No, instead of that the German Social Democracy felt itself to
be a sort of cumbersome train threatened by hostile cavalry. For that
reason it subordinated the entire future of the International to the
quite extraneous question of the defense of the frontiers of the class
state--because it felt itself first and foremost to be a conservative
state within the state.
"Look at Belgium!" cries the _Verwaerts_ to encourage the
workmen-soldiers. The People's Houses there have been changed into army
hospitals, the newspapers suppressed, all Party life crushed out.[5]
And therefore hold out until the end, "until the decisive victory is
ours." In other words, keep on destroying, let the work of your own
hands be a terrifying lesson to you. "Look at Belgium," and out of this
terror draw courage for renewed destruction.
[5] A sentimental correspondent of the _Vorwaerts_ writes that he was
looking for Belgian comrades in the _Maison du Peuple_ and found a
German army hospital there. And what did the _Vorwaerts_
correspondent want of his Belgian comrades? "_To win them to the
cause of the German people_--just when Brussels itself had been
won 'for the cause of the German people!'"
What has just been said refers not to the German Social Democracy alone,
but also to all the older branches of the International that have lived
through the history of the last half century.