THE WAR OF DEFENSE
"The thing for us to do now is to avert this danger [Russian
despotism], and to secure the culture and the independence of
our land. Thus we will make good our word, and do what we have
always said we would. In the hour of danger we will not leave
our Fatherland in the lurch.... Guided by these principles we
vote for the war credits."
This was the declaration of the German Social Democratic fraction, read
by Haase in the Reichstag session of August 4.
Here only the defense of the fatherland is mentioned. Not a word is
said of the "liberating" mission of this War in behalf of the peoples of
Russia, which was later sung in every key by the Social Democratic
press. The logic of the Socialist press, however, did not keep pace
with its patriotism. For while it made desperate efforts to represent
the War as one of pure defense, to secure the safety of Germany's
possessions, it at the same time pictured it as a revolutionary
offensive war for the liberation of Russia and of Europe from Czarism.
We have already shown clearly enough why the peoples of Russia had every
reason to decline with thanks the assistance offered them at the point
of the Hohenzollern bayonets. But how about the "defensive" character of
the War?
What surprises us even more than what is said in the declaration of the
Social Democracy is what it conceals and leaves unsaid. After Hollweg
had already announced in the Reichstag the accomplished violation of the
neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg as a means of attacking France,
Haase does not mention this fact in a single word. This silence is so
monstrous that one is tempted to read the declaration a second and a
third time. But in vain. The declaration is written as though such
countries as Belgium, France and England had never existed on the
political map of the German Social Democracy.
But facts do not cease to be facts simply because political parties shut
their eyes to them. And every member of the International has the right
to ask this question of Comrade Haase, "What portion of the five
billions voted by the Social Democratic fraction was meant for the
destruction of Belgium?" It is quite possible that in order to protect
the German fatherland from Russian despotism it was inevitable that the
Belgian fatherland should be crushed. But why did the Social Democratic
fraction keep silent on this point?
The reason is clear. The English Liberal government, in its effort to
make the War popular with the masses, made its plea exclusively on the
ground of the necessity of protecting the independence of Belgium and
the integrity of France, but utterly ignored its alliance with Russian
Czarism. In like manner, and from the same motives, the German Social
Democracy speaks to the masses only about the war against Czarism, but
does not mention even by name Belgium, France and England. All this is
of course not exactly flattering to the international reputation of
Czarism. Yet it is quite distressing that the German Social Democracy
should sacrifice its own good name to the call to arms against Czarism.
Lassalle said that every great political action should begin with a
statement of things as they are. Then why does the defense of the
Fatherland begin with an abashed silence as to things as they are? Or
did the German Social Democracy perhaps think that this was not a "big
political action"?
Anyway, the defense of the Fatherland is a very broad and very elastic
conception. The world catastrophe began with Austria's ultimatum to
Serbia. Austria, naturally, was guided solely by the need of defending
her borders from her uneasy neighbor. Austria's prop was Germany. And
Germany, in turn, as we already know, was prompted by the need to secure
her own state. "It would be senseless to believe," writes Ludwig
Quessel on this point, "that one wall could be torn away from this
extremely complex structure (Europe) without endangering the security of
the whole edifice."
Germany opened her "Defensive War" with an attack upon Belgium, the
violation of Belgium's neutrality being allegedly only a means of
breaking through to France along the line of least resistance. The
military defeat of France also was to appear only as a strategic episode
in the defense of the Fatherland.
To some German patriots this construction of things did not seem quite
plausible, and they had good grounds for disbelieving it. They suspected
a motive which squared far better with the reality. Russia, entering
upon a new era of military preparation, would be a far greater menace to
Germany in two or three years than she was then. And France during that
time would have completely carried out her three-year army reform. Is
it not clear, then, that an intelligent self-defense demanded that
Germany should not wait for the attack of her enemies but should
anticipate them by two years and take the offensive at once? And isn't
it clear, too, that such an offensive war, deliberately provoked by
Germany and Austria, is in reality a preventive war of defense?
Not infrequently these two points of view are combined in a single
argument. Granted that there is some slight contradiction between them.
The one declares that Germany did not want the War now and that it was
forced upon her by the Triple Entente, while the other implies that war
was disadvantageous to the Entente now and that for that very reason
Germany had taken the initiative to bring on the War at this time. But
what if there is this contradiction? It is lightly and easily glossed
over and reconciled in the saving concept of a war of defense.
But the belligerents on the other side disputed this advantageous
position of being on the defensive, which Germany sought to assume, and
did it successfully. France could not permit the defeat of Russia on
the ground of her own self-defense. England gave as the motive for her
interference the immediate danger to the British Islands which a
strengthening of Germany's position at the mouth of the Channel would
mean. Finally, Russia, too, spoke only of self-defense. It is true
that no one threatened Russian territory. But national possessions,
mark you, do not consist merely in territory, but in other, intangible,
factors as well, among them, the influence over weaker states. Servia
"belongs" in the sphere of Russian influence and serves the purpose of
maintaining the so-called balance of power in the Balkans, not only the
balance of power between the Balkan States but also between Russian and
Austrian influence. A successful Austrian attack on Servia threatened
to disturb this balance of power in Austria's favor, and therefore meant
an indirect attack upon Russia. Sasonov undoubtedly found his strongest
argument in Quessel's words: "It would be senseless to believe that one
wall could be torn away from the extremely complex structure (Europe)
without endangering the security of the entire edifice."
It is superfluous to add that Servia and Montenegro, Belgium and
Luxemburg, could also produce some proofs of the defensive character of
their policies. Thus, all the countries were on the defensive, none was
the aggressor. But if that is so, then what sense is there in opposing
the claims of defensive and offensive war to each other? The standards
applied in such cases differ greatly, and are not frequently quite
incommensurable.
What is of fundamental importance to us Socialists is the question of
the _historical_ role of the War. Is the War calculated to effectively
promote the productive forces and the state organizations, and to
accelerate the concentration of the working class forces? Or is the
reverse true, will it hinder in this? This materialistic evaluation of
wars stands above all formal or external considerations, and in its
nature has no relation to the question of defense or aggression. And
yet sometimes these formal expressions about a war designate with more
or less truth the actual significance of the war. When Engels said that
the Germans were on the defensive in 1870, he had least of all the
immediate political and diplomatic circumstances in mind. The
determining fact for him was that in that war Germany was fighting for
her right to national unity, which was a necessary condition for the
economic development of the country and the Socialist consolidation of
the proletariat. In the same sense the Christian peoples of the Balkans
waged a war of defense against Turkey, fighting for their right to
independent national development against the foreign rule.
The question of the immediate international political conditions leading
to a war is independent of the value the war possesses from the
_historico-materialistic_ point of view. The German war against the
Bonapartist Monarchy was historically unavoidable. In that war the
right of development was on the German side. Yet those historical
tendencies did not, in themselves, predetermine the question as to which
party was interested in provoking the war just in the year 1870. We
know now very well that international politics and military
considerations induced Bismarck to take the actual initiative in the
war. It might have happened just the other way, however. With greater
foresight and energy, the government of Napoleon III could have
anticipated Bismarck, and begun the war a few years earlier. That would
have radically changed the immediate political aspect of events, but it
would have made no difference in the historic estimate of the war.
Third in order is the factor of diplomacy. Diplomacy here has a two-fold
task to perform. First, it must bring about war at the moment most
favorable for its own country from the international as well as the
military standpoint. Second, it must employ methods which throw the
burden of responsibility for the bloody conflict, in public opinion, on
the enemy government. The exposure of diplomatic trickery, cheating and
knavery is one of the most important functions of Socialist political
agitation. But no matter to what extent we succeed in this at the
crucial juncture, it is clear that the net of diplomatic intrigues in
themselves signifies nothing either as regards the historic role of the
war or its real initiators. Bismarck's clever manoeuvres forced Napoleon
III to declare war on Prussia, although the actual initiative came from
the German side.
Next follows the purely military aspect. The _strategic_ plan of
operations can be calculated chiefly for defense or attack, regardless
of which side declared the war and under what conditions. Finally, the
first tactics followed in the carrying out of the strategic plan not
infrequently plays a great part in estimating the war as a war of
defense or of aggression.
"It is a good thing," wrote Engels to Marx on July 31, 1870,
"that the French attacked first on German soil. If the Germans
repel the invasion and follow it up by invading French
territory, then it will certainly not produce the same
impression as if the Germans had marched into France without a
previous invasion. In this way the war remains, on the French
side, more Bonapartistic."
Thus we see by the classic example of the Franco-Prussian War that the
standards for judging whether a war is defensive or aggressive are full
of contradictions when two nations clash. Then how much more so are
they when it is a clash of several nations. If we unroll the tangle
from the beginning, we arrive at the following connection between the
elements of attack and defense. The first _tactical_ move of the French
should--at least in Engels' opinion--make the people feel that the
responsibility of attack rested with the French. And yet the entire
_strategic_ plan of the Germans had an absolutely aggressive character.
The _diplomatic_ moves of Bismarck forced Bonaparte to declare war
against his will and thus appear as the disturber of the peace of
Europe, while the military-political initiative in the war came from the
Prussian government. These circumstances are by no means of slight
importance for the _historical_ estimate of the war, but they are not at
all exhaustive.
One of the causes of this war was the growing ambition of the Germans
for national self-determination, which conflicted with the dynastic
pretensions of the French Monarchy. But this national "war of defense"
led to the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine and so in its second stage
turned into a dynastic war of conquest.
The correspondence between Marx and Engels shows that they were guided
chiefly by historical considerations in their attitude towards the War
of 1870. To them, of course, it was by no means a matter of
indifference as to who conducted the war and how it was conducted. "Who
would have thought it possible," Marx writes bitterly, "that twenty-two
years after 1848 a nationalist war in Germany could have been given such
theoretical expression." Yet what was of decisive significance to Marx
and Engels was the objective consequences of the war. "If the Prussians
triumph, it will mean the centralization of the state power--useful to
the centralization of the German working-class."
Liebknecht and Bebel, starting with the same historical estimate of the
war, were directly forced to take a political position toward it. It
was by no means in opposition to the views of Marx and Engels, but, on
the contrary, with their perfect acquiescence that Liebknecht and Bebel
refused, in the Reichstag, to take any responsibility for this War. The
statement they handed in read:
"We cannot grant the war appropriations that the Reichstag is
asked to make because that would be a vote of confidence in the
Prussian government.... As opponents on principle of every
dynastic war, as Social Republicians and members of the
International Labor Association, which, without distinction of
nationality, fights all oppressors and endeavors to unite all
the oppressed in one great brotherhood, we cannot declare
ourselves either directly or indirectly in favor of the present
war."
Schweitzer acted differently. He took the historical estimate of the
war as a direct guide for his tactics--one of the most dangerous of
fallacies!--and in voting the war credits gave a vote of confidence to
the policy of Bismarck. And this in spite of the fact that it was
necessary, if the centralization of state power arising out of the War
was to turn out of use to the Social Democratic cause, that the
working-class should from the very beginning oppose the dynastic-Junker
centralization with their own class-centralization filled with
revolutionary distrust of the rulers.
Schweitzer's political attitude invalidated the very consequences of the
War that had induced him to give a vote of confidence to the makers of
the War.
Forty years later, drawing up the balance sheet of his life-work, Bebel
wrote:
"The attitude that Liebknecht and I took at the outbreak and
during the continuance of the war has for years been a subject
of discussion and violent attack, at first even in the Party;
but only for a short time. Then they acknowledged that we had
been right. I confess that I do not in any way regret our
attitude, and if at the outbreak of the War we had known what we
learned within the next few years from the official and
unofficial disclosures, our attitude from the very start would
have been still harsher. We would not merely have abstained, as
we did, from voting the first war credits, we would have voted
_against_ them." (_Autobiography_, Part II, p. 167.)
If we compare the Liebknecht-Bebel statement of 1870 with Haase's
declaration in 1914, we must conclude that Bebel was mistaken when he
said, "Then they acknowledged that we had been right." For the vote of
August 4 was eminently a condemnation of Bebel's policy forty-four years
earlier, since in Haase's phraseology, Bebel had then left the
Fatherland in the lurch in the hour of danger.
What political causes and considerations have led the party of the
German proletariat to abandon its glorious traditions? Not a single
weighty reason has been given so far. All the arguments adduced are
full of contradictions. They are like diplomatic communiques which are
written to justify an already accomplished act. The leader writer of
_Die Neue Zeit_ writes--with the blessing of Comrade Kautsky--that
Germany's position towards Czarism is the same as it was towards
Bonapartism in 1870! He even quotes from a letter of Engels: "All
classes of the German people realized that it was a question, first of
all, of national existence, and so they fell in line at once." For the
same reason, we are told, the German Social Democracy has fallen into
line now. It is a question of national existence. "Substitute Czarism
for Bonapartism, and Engels' words are true to-day." And yet the fact
remains, in all its force, that Bebel and Liebknecht demonstratively
refused to vote either money or confidence to the government in 1870.
Does it not hold just as well, then, if we "substitute Czarism for
Bonapartism"? To this question no answer has been vouchsafed.
But what did Engels really write in his letter concerning the tactics of
the labor party?
"It does not seem possible to me that under such circumstances a German
political party can preach _total obstruction_, and place all sorts of
minor considerations above the main issue." _Total obstruction!_--But
there is a wide gap between total obstruction and the total capitulation
of a political party. And it was this gap that divided the positions
between Bebel and Schweitzer in 1870. Marx and Engels were with Bebel
against Schweitzer. Comrade Kautsky might have informed his leader
writer, Hermann Wendel, of this fact. And it is nothing but defamation
of the dead for _Simplicissimus_ now to reconcile the shades of Bebel
and Bismarck in Heaven. If _Simplicissimus_ and Wendel have the right
to awaken anybody from his sleep in the grave for the endorsement of the
present tactics of the German Social Democracy, then it is not Bebel,
but Schweitzer. It is the shade of Schweitzer that now oppresses the
political party of the German proletariat.
But the very analogy between the Franco-Prussian War and the present War
is superficial and misleading in the extreme. Let us set aside all the
international relations. Let us forget that the War meant first of all
the destruction of Belgium, and that Germany's main force was hurled not
against Czarism but republican France. Let us forget that the starting
point of the War was the crushing of Servia, and that one of its aims
was the strengthening and consolidation of the arch-reactionary state,
Austria-Hungary. We will not dwell on the fact that the attitude of the
German Social Democracy dealt a hard blow at the Russian Revolution,
which in the two years before the War had again flared up in such a
tempest. We will close our eyes to all these facts, just as the German
Social Democracy did on August 4th, when it did not see that there was a
Belgium in the world, a France, England, Servia, or Austria-Hungary. We
will grant only the existence of Germany.
In 1870 it was quite easy to estimate the historical significance of the
war. "If the Prussians win, the centralization of state power will
further the centralization of the German working class." And now? What
would be the result for the German working class of a Prussian victory
now?
The only territorial expansion which the German working class could
welcome, because it would complete the national unity, is a union of
German Austria with Germany. Any other expansion of the German
fatherland means another step towards the transformation of Germany from
a national state to a state of nationalities, and the consequent
introduction of all those conditions which render more difficult the
class struggle of the proletariat.
Ludwig Frank hoped--and he expressed this hope in the language of a
belated Lassallian--that later, after a victorious war, he would devote
himself to the work of the "internal building up" of the state. There
is no doubt that Germany will need this "internal building up" after a
victory no less than before the War. But will a victory make this work
easier? There is nothing in Germany's historical experiences any more
than in those of any other country to justify such a hope.
"We regarded the doings of the rulers of Germany [after the
victories of 1870] as a matter of course," says Bebel in his
_Autobiography_. "It was merely an illusion of the Party
Executive to believe that a more liberal spirit would prevail in
the new order. And this more liberal regime was to be granted by
the same man who had till then shown himself the greatest enemy,
I will not say of democratic development, but even of every
liberal tendency, and who now as victor planted the heel of his
Cuirassier boot on the neck of the new Empire." (Vol. II, p.
188.)
There is absolutely no reason to expect different results now from a
victory from above. On the contrary. In 1870 Prussian Junkerdom had
first to adapt itself to the new imperial order. It could not feel
secure in the saddle all at once. It was eight years after the victory
over France that the anti-Socialist laws were passed. In forty-four
years Prussian Junkerdom has become the imperial Junkerdom. And if,
after half a century of the most intense class struggle, Junkerdom
should appear at the head of the victorious nation, then we need not
doubt that it would not have felt the need of Ludwig Frank's services
for the internal building up of the state had he returned safe from the
fields of German victories.
But far more important than the strengthening of the class position of
the rulers is the influence a German victory would have upon the
proletariat itself. The war grew out of imperialistic antagonisms
between the capitalist states, and the victory of Germany, as stated
above, can produce only one result--territorial acquisitions at the
expense of Belgium, France and Russia, commercial treaties forced upon
her enemies, and new colonies. The class struggle of the proletariat
would then be placed upon the basis of the imperialistic hegemony of
Germany, the working class would be interested in the maintenance and
development of this hegemony, and revolutionary Socialism would for a
long time be condemned to the role of a propagandist sect.
Marx was right when in 1870 he foresaw, as a result of the German
victories, a rapid development for the German labor movement under the
banner of scientific Socialism. But now the international conditions
point to the very opposite prognosis. Germany's victory would mean the
taking of the edge off the revolutionary movement, its theoretic
shallowing, and the dying out of the Marxist ideas.