THE WAR AGAINST CZARISM
But how about Czarism? Would not Germany's and Austria's victory mean
the defeat of Czarism? And would not the beneficent results of the
defeat of Czarism greatly outbalance the beneficent results of a
dismembered Austria-Hungary?
The German and Austrian Social Democrats lay much stress upon this
question in the arguing they do about the War. The crushing of a small
neutral country, the ruin of France--all this is justified by the need
to fight Czarism. Haase gives as the reason for voting the war credits
the necessity of "defense against the danger of Russian despotism."
Bernstein goes back to Marx and Engels and quotes old texts for his
slogan, "Settling with Russia!"
Suedekum, dissatisfied with the result of his Italian mission, says that
what the Italians are to blame for is not understanding Czarism. And
when the Social Democrats of Vienna and Budapest fall in line under the
Hapsburg banner in its "holy war" against the Servians struggling for
their national unity, they sacrifice their Socialistic honor to the
necessity for fighting Czarism.
And the Social Democrats are not alone in this. The entire bourgeois
German press has no other aims, for the moment, than the annihilation of
the Russian autocracy, which oppresses the peoples of Russia and menaces
the freedom of Europe.
The Imperial Chancellor denounces France and England as vassals of
Russian despotism. Even the German Major-General von Morgen, assuredly a
true and tried "friend of liberty and independence," calls on the Poles
to rebel against the despotism of the Czar.
But for us who have gone through the school of historical materialism it
would be a disgrace if we did not perceive the actual relations of the
interests in spite of these phrases, these lies, this boasting, this
foul vulgarity and stupidity.
No one can genuinely believe that the German reactionaries really do
cherish such a hatred of Czarism, and are aiming their blows against it.
On the contrary, after the War Czarism will be the same to the rulers of
Germany that it was before the War--the most closely related form of
government. Czarism is indispensable to the Germany of the
Hohenzollerns, for two reasons. In the first place, it weakens Russia
economically, culturally and militaristically, and so prevents its
development as an imperialistic rival. In the second place, the
existence of Czarism strengthens the Hohenzollern Monarchy and the
Junker oligarchy, since if there were no Czarism, German absolutism
would face Europe as the last mainstay of feudal barbarism.
German absolutism never has concealed the interest of blood relationship
that it has in the maintenance of Czarism, which represents the same
social form though in more shameless ways. Interests, tradition,
sympathies draw the German reactionary element to the side Czarism.
"Russia's sorrow is Germany's sorrow." At the same time the
Hohenzollerns, behind the back of Czarism, can make a show of being the
bulwark of culture "against barbarism," and can succeed in fooling their
own people if not the rest of Western Europe.
"With sincere sorrow I see a friendship broken that Germany has kept
faithfully," said William II. in his speech upon the declaration of war,
referring neither to France nor to England, but to Russia, or rather, to
the Russian dynasty, in accordance with the Hohenzollern's Russian
religion, as Marx would have said.
We are told that Germany's political plan is to create, on the one hand,
a basis of rapprochement with France and England by a victory over those
countries, and, on the other hand, to utilize a strategic victory over
France in order to crush Russian despotism.
The German Social Democrats must either have inspired William and his
chancellor with this plan, or else must have ascribed this plan to
William and his chancellor.
As a matter of fact, however, the political plans of the German
reactionaries are of exactly the opposite character, must necessarily be
of the opposite character.
For the present we will leave open the question of whether the
destructive blow at France was dictated by strategic considerations, and
whether "strategy" sanctioned defensive tactics on the Western front.
But one thing is certain, that not to see that the policy of the Junkers
required the ruin of France, is to prove that one has a reason for
keeping one's eyes closed. France--France is the enemy!
Eduard Bernstein, who is sincerely trying to justify the political stand
taken by the German Social Democracy, draws the following conclusions:
Were Germany under a democratic rule, there would be no doubt as to how
to settle accounts with Czarism. A democratic Germany would conduct a
revolutionary war on the East. It would call on the nations oppressed
by Russia to resist the tyrant and would give them the means wherewith
to wage a powerful fight for freedom. [Quite right!] However, Germany
is not a democracy, and therefore it would be a utopian dream [Exactly!]
to expect any such policy with all its consequences from Germany as she
is. (_Vorwaerts_, August 28.) Very well then! But right here Bernstein
suddenly breaks off his analysis of the actual German policy "with all
its consequences." After showing up the blatant contradiction in the
position of the German Social Democracy, he closes with the unexpected
hope that a reactionary Germany may accomplish what none but a
revolutionary Germany could accomplish. _Credo quid absurdum_.
Nevertheless, it might be said in opposition to this that while the
ruling class in Germany has naturally no interest in fighting Czarism,
still Russia is now Germany's enemy, and, quite independently of the
will of the Hohenzollerns, the victory of Germany over Russia might
result in the great weakening, if not the complete overthrow of Czarism.
Long live Hindenburg, the great unconscious instrument of the Russian
Revolution, we might cry along with the Chemnitz _Volksstimme_. Long
live the Prussian Crown Prince--also a quite unconscious instrument.
Long live the Sultan of Turkey who is now serving in the cause of the
Revolution by bombarding the Russian cities around the Black Sea. Happy
Russian Revolution--how quickly the ranks of her army are growing!
However, let us see if there is not something really to be said on this
side of the question. Is it not possible that the defeat of Czarism
might actually aid the cause of the Revolution?
As to such a _possibility_, there is nothing to be said against it. The
Mikado and his Samurai were not in the least interested in freeing
Russia, yet the Russo-Japanese War gave a powerful impetus to the
revolutionary events that followed.
Consequently similar results may be expected from the German-Russian
War.
But to place the right political estimate upon these historical
possibilities we must take the following circumstances into
consideration.
Those who believe that the Russo-Japanese War brought on the Revolution
neither know nor understand historical events and their relations. The
war merely hastened the outbreak of the Revolution; but for that very
reason it also weakened it. For had the Revolution developed as a
result of the organic growth of inner forces, it would have come later,
but would have been far stronger and more systematic. Therefore,
revolution has no real interest in war. This is the first
consideration. And the second thing is, that while the Russo-Japanese
War weakened Czarism, it strengthened Japanese militarism. The same
considerations apply in a still higher degree to the present
German-Russian War.
In the course of 1912-1914 Russia's enormous industrial development once
for all pulled the country out of its state of counter-revolutionary
depression.
The growth of the revolutionary movement on the foundation of the
economic and political condition of the laboring masses, the growth of
opposition in broad strata of the population, led to a new period of
storm and stress. But in contrast to the years 1902-1905, this movement
developed in a far more conscious, systematic manner, and, what is more,
was based on a far broader social foundation. It needed time to mature,
but it did not need the lances of the Prussian Samurai. On the
contrary, the Prussian Samurai gave the Czar the opportunity of playing
the role of defender of the Serbs, the Belgians and the French.
If we presuppose a catastrophal Russian defeat, the war _may_ bring a
quicker outbreak of the Revolution, but at the cost of its inner
weakness. And if the Revolution should even gain the upper hand under
such circumstances, then the bayonets of the Hohenzollern armies would
be turned on the Revolution. Such a prospect can hardly fail to
paralyze Russia's revolutionary forces; for it is impossible to deny the
fact that the party of the German proletariat stands behind the
Hohenzollern bayonets. But this is only one side of the question. The
defeat of Russia necessarily presupposes decisive victories by Germany
and Austria on the other battlefields, and this would mean the enforced
preservation of the national-political chaos in Central and Southeastern
Europe and the unlimited mastery of German militarism in all Europe.
An enforced disarmament for France, billions in indemnities, enforced
tariff walls around the conquered nations, and an enforced commercial
treaty with Russia, all this in conjunction would make German
imperialism master of the situation for many decades.
Germany's new policy, which began with the capitulation of the party of
the proletariat to nationalistic militarism, would be strengthened for
years to come. The German working class would feed itself, materially
and spiritually, on the crumbs from the table of victorious imperialism,
while the cause of the Social Revolution would have received a mortal
blow.
That in such circumstances a Russian revolution, even if temporarily
successful, would be an historical miscarriage, needs no further proof.
Consequently, this present battling of the nations under the yoke of
militarism laid upon them by the capitalistic classes contains within
itself monstrous contrasts which neither the War itself nor the
governments directing it can solve in any way to the interest of future
historical development. The Social Democrats could not, and can not
now, combine their aims with any of the historical possibilities of this
War, that is, with either the victory of the Triple Alliance or the
victory of the Entente.
The German Social Democracy was once well aware of this. The
_Vorwaerts_ in its issue of July 28, discussing the very question of the
war against Czarism, said:
"But if it is not possible to localize the trouble, if Russia
should step into the field? What should our attitude toward
Czarism be then? Herein lies the great difficulty of the
situation. Has not the moment come to strike a death blow at
Czarism? If German troops cross the Russian frontier, will that
not mean the victory of the Russian Revolution?"
And the _Vorwaerts_ comes to the following conclusion:
"Are we so sure that it _will_ mean victory to the Russian
Revolution if German troops cross the Russian frontier? It may
readily bring the collapse of Czarism, but will not the German
armies fight a revolutionary Russia with even greater energy,
with a keener desire for victory, than they do the absolutistic
Russia?"
More than this. On August 3, on the eve of the historical session of
the Reichstag, the _Vorwaerts_ wrote in an article entitled "The War
upon Czarism":
"While the conservative press is accusing the strongest party in
the Empire of high treason, to the rejoicing of other countries,
there are other elements endeavoring to prove to the Social
Democracy that the impending war is really an old Social
Democratic demand. War against Russia, war upon the
blood-stained and faithless Czarism--this last is a recent
phrase of the press which once kissed the knout--isn't this what
Social Democracy has been asking for from the beginning? ...
"These are literally the arguments used by one portion of the
bourgeois press, in fact the more intelligent portion, and it
only goes to show what importance is attached to the opinion of
that part of the German people which stands behind the Social
Democracy. The slogan no longer is 'Russia's sorrow is Germany's
sorrow.' Now it is 'Down with Czarism!' But since the days
when the leaders of the Social Democracy referred to [Bebel,
Lassalle, Engels, Marx] demanded a democratic war against
Russia, Russia has quite ceased to be the mere palladium of
reaction. Russia is also the seat of revolution. The overthrow
of Czarism is now the task of all the Russian people, especially
the Russian proletariat, and it is just the last weeks that have
shown how vigorously this very working class in Russia is
attacking the task that history has laid upon it.... And all
the nationalistic attempts of the 'True Russians' to turn the
hatred of the masses away from Czarism and arouse a reactionary
hatred against foreign countries, particularly Germany, have
failed so far. The Russian proletariat knows too well that its
enemy is not beyond the border but within its own land. Nothing
was more distasteful to these nationalistic agitators, the True
Russians and Pan-Slavists, than the news of the great peace
demonstration of the German Social Democracy. Oh, how they
would have rejoiced had the contrary been the case, had they
been able to say to the Russian proletariat, 'There, you see,
the German Social Democrats stand at the head of those who are
inciting the war against Russia!' And the Little Father in St.
Petersburg would also have breathed a sigh of relief and said,
'That is the news I wanted to hear. Now the backbone of my most
dangerous enemy, the Russian Revolution, is broken. The
international solidarity of the proletariat is torn. Now I can
unchain the beast of nationalism. I am saved!"
Thus wrote the _Vorwaerts_ after Germany had already declared war on
Russia.
These words characterize the honest manly stand of the proletariat
against a belligerent jingoism. The _Vorwaerts_ clearly understood and
cleverly stigmatized the base hypocrisy of the knout-loving ruling class
of Germany, which suddenly became conscious of its mission to free
Russia from Czarism. The _Vorwaerts_ warned the German working class of
the political extortion that the bourgeois press would practise on their
revolutionary conscience. "Do not believe these friends of the knout,"
the _Vorwaerts_ said to the German proletariat. "They are hungry for
your souls, and hide their imperialistic designs behind liberal-sounding
phrases. They are deceiving you--you, the cannon-fodder with souls that
they need. If they succeed in winning you over, they will only be
helping Czarism by dealing the Russian Revolution a fearful moral blow.
And if, in spite of this, the Russian Revolution should raise its head,
these very people will help Czarism to crush it."
That is the sense of what the _Vorwaerts_ preached to the working class
up to the 4th of August.
And exactly three weeks later the same _Vorwaerts_ wrote:
"Liberation from Muscovitism (?), freedom and independence for Poland
and Finland, free development for the great Russian people themselves,
dissolution of the unnatural alliance between two cultural nations and
Czaristic barbarism--these were the aims that inspired the German people
and made them ready for any sacrifice,"
and inspired also the German Social Democracy and its chief organ.
What happened in those three weeks to cause the _Vorwaerts_ to repudiate
its original standpoint?
What happened? Nothing of importance. The German armies strangled
neutral Belgium, burned down a number of Belgian towns, destroyed
Louvain, the inhabitants of which had been so criminally audacious as to
fire at the armed invaders when they themselves wore no helmets and
waving feathers.[3] In those three weeks the German armies carried
death and destruction into French territory, and the troops of their
ally, Austria-Hungary, pounded the love of the Hapsburg Monarchy into
the Serbs on the Save and the Drina. These are the facts that apparently
convinced the _Vorwaerts_ that the Hohenzollerns were waging the war of
liberation of the nations.
[3] "How characteristically Prussian," wrote Marx to Engels, "to
declare that no man may defend his 'fatherland' except in
uniform!"
Neutral Belgium was crushed, and the Social Democrats remained silent.
And Richard Fischer was sent to Switzerland as special envoy of the
Party to explain to the people of a neutral country that the violation
of Belgian neutrality and the ruin of a small nation were a perfectly
natural phenomenon. Why so much excitement? Any other European
government, in Germany's place, would have acted in the same way. It
was just at this time that the German Social Democracy not only
reconciled itself to the War as a work of real or supposed national
defense, but even surrounded the Hohenzollern-Hapsburg armies with the
halo of an offensive campaign for freedom. What an unprecedented fall
for a party that for fifty years had taught the German working class to
look upon the German Government as the foe of liberty and democracy!
In the meantime every day of the War discloses the danger to Europe that
the Marxists should have foreseen at once. The chief blows of the
German government were not aimed at the East, but at the West, at
Belgium, France and England. Even if we accept the improbable premise
that nothing but strategic necessity determined this plan of campaign,
the logical political outcome of this strategy remains with all its
consequences, that is, the necessity for a full and definite defeat of
Belgium, France and the English land forces, so that Germany's hands
might be free to deal with Russia. Wasn't it perfectly clear that what
was at first represented as a temporary measure of strategic necessity
in order to soothe the German Social Democracy, would become an end in
itself through the force of events? The more stubborn the resistance
made by France, whose duty it has actually become to defend its
territory and its independence against the German attack, the more
certainly will the German armies be held on the Western front; and the
more exhausted Germany is on the Western front, the less strength and
inclination will remain for her supposedly main task, the task with
which the Social Democracy credited her, the "settling with Russia."
And then history will witness an "honorable" peace between the two most
reactionary powers of Europe, between Nicholas, to whom fate granted
cheap victories over the Hapsburg Monarchy,[4] rotten to its core, and
William, who had his "settling," but with Belgium, not with Russia.
[4] "Russian diplomacy is interested only in such wars," wrote Engels
in 1890, "as force her allies to bear the chief burden of raising
troops and suffering invasion, and leave to the Russian troops
only the work of reserves. Czarism makes war on its own account
only on decidedly weaker nations, such as Sweden, Turkey and
Persia." Austria-Hungary must now be placed in the same class as
Turkey and Persia.
The alliance between Hohenzollern and Romanoff--after the exhaustion and
degradation of the Western nations--will mean a period of the darkest
reaction in Europe and the whole world.
The German Social Democracy by its present policy smooths the way for
this awful danger. And the danger will become an actuality unless the
European proletariat interferes and enters as a revolutionary factor
into the plans of the dynasties and the capitalistic governments.