Produced by Al Haines.
[Illustration: Cover]
[Illustration: Leon Trotzky]
THE BOLSHEVIKI
AND
WORLD PEACE
BY LEON TROTZKY
INTRODUCTION BY LINCOLN STEFFENS
BONI AND LIVERIGHT
NEW YORK
1918
Copyright
1918
Boni & Liveright Inc.
CONTENTS
Introduction by Lincoln Steffens
Author's Preface
CHAPTER
I. The Balkan Question
II. Austria-Hungary
III. The War against Czarism
IV. The War against the West
V. The War of Defense
VI. What Have Socialists to do with Capitalist Wars?
VII. The Collapse of the International
VIII. Socialist Opportunism
IX. The Decline of the Revolutionary Spirit
X. Working Class Imperialism
XI. The Revolutionary Epoch
INTRODUCTION
The voice that speaks in this book is the voice of Leon Trotzky, the
Bolshevik Minister of Foreign Affairs for Revolutionary Russia. It is
expressing ideas and views which lighted him on the course of his policy
toward the War, Peace and the Revolution. It throws light, therefore,
on that policy; it helps to an understanding of it, if one wishes to
understand. But that isn't all. The spirit that flames and casts
shadows upon these pages is not only Trotzky's. It is the spirit also of
the Bolsheviki; of the red left of the left wing of the revolutionary
movement of New Russia. It flashed from Petrograd to Vladivostok, in
the first week of the revolt; it burned all along the Russian Front
before Trotzky appeared on the scene. It will smoulder long after he is
gone. It is a hot Fact which has to be picked up and examined, this
spirit. Whether we like it or don't, it is there; in Russia; it is
elsewhere; it is everywhere to-day. It is the spirit of war; class war,
but war. It is in this book.
Nor is that all.
The mind in this book--the point of view from which it starts, the views
to which it points--Trotzky's mind is the international mind. We have
heard before of this new intelligence; we have read books, heard
speeches, witnessed acts demonstrative of thoughts and feelings which
are not national, but international; not patriotic, but loyal only to
the lower-class-conscious war aims of the workers of the world. The
class warrior is as familiar a figure to us as the red spirit is of the
red left of revolution. But the voice which utters here the spirit and
the mind, not only of the Russian, but of the world revolution is the
voice of one having authority.
And Trotzky, in power, has been as red as he is in this book. The
minister of foreign affairs practised in Petrograd what he preached in
Switzerland, where he wrote most of the chapters of his book. And he
practised also what all the other great International Socialist leaders
talked and wrote.
That's what makes him so hard to understand, him and his party and the
Bolshevik policy. We are accustomed to the sight of Socialists and
Radicals going into office and being "sobered by the responsibilities of
power." French and Italian Socialists in the Liberal ministries of
their countries; British Labor leaders in Parliament in England or in
the governments of their Colonies; and the whole Socialist party in
Germany and Austria (except Liebknecht in prison)--all are examples of
the effect of power upon the International Mind. The phenomenon of
compromise and surrender is so common that many radicals oppose the
taking of any responsible office by any member of their parties; and
some of the extremists are advocating no political action whatsoever,
nothing but industrial, economic or what they call "direct action."
(Our I.W.W.'s don't vote, on principle.) This is anarchism.
Leon Trotzky is not an anarchist; except in the ignorant sense of the
word as used by educated people. He is a Socialist; an orthodox Marxian
Socialist. But he has seen vividly the danger of political power. The
body of this book was addressed originally to the German and Austrian
Socialists, and it is a reasoned, but indignant reproach of them for
letting their political position and their nationalistic loyalty carry
them away into an undemocratic, patriotic, political policy which
betrayed the weaker nations in their empires, helped break up the Second
(Socialist) International and led the Socialist parties into the support
of the War.
Clear upon it, Trotzky himself does not illustrate his own thesis. He
not only detests intellectually the secrecy and the sordid wickedness of
the "old diplomacy"; when he came as minister into possession of the
archives of the Russian Foreign Office, he published the secret
treaties.
That hurt. And so with the idea of a people's peace. All the
democratic world had been talking ever since the war began of a peace
made, not by diplomats in a private room, but by the chosen
representatives of all the peoples meeting in an open congress. The
Bolsheviki worked for that from the moment the Russian Revolution broke;
and they labored for the Stockholm Conference while Paul Milyoukov and
Alexander Kerensky were negotiating with the allied governments. When
the Bolsheviki succeeded to power, Lenine and Trotzky formally
authorized and officially proposed such a congress. Moreover Trotzky
showed that they were willing, if they could, to force the other
countries to accept the people's peace conference.
This hurt. This hurt so much that the governments united in
extraordinary measures to prevent the event. And when they succeeded,
and it was seen that no people's peace could be made openly and
directly, Trotzky proceeded by another way to get to the same end. He
opened negotiations with the Kaiser's government and allies; arranged an
armistice and agreed tentatively upon terms of peace.
This act not only hurt; it stunned the world, and no wonder! It was
like a declaration of war against a whole world at war. It was
unbelievable. The only explanation offered was that Trotzky and Lenine
were pro-German or dishonest, or both, and these things were said in
high places; and they were said with conviction, too. Moreover this
conviction colored, if it did not determine, the attitude the Allies
took toward New Russia and the peace proposals Trotzky got from the
German government. Was this assumption of the dishonesty of Trotzky the
only explanation of his act?
This book shows, as I have said, that Trotzky saw things from the
revolutionary, international point of view, which is not that of his
judges; which is incomprehensible to them. He wrote it after the War
began; he finished the main part of it before the Russian Revolution. It
is his view of the War, its causes and its effects, especially upon
international Socialism and "the" Revolution. These are the things he
holds in his mind all through all these pages: "the" Revolution and
world democracy. Also I have shown that, like the Russians generally,
his mind is literal. The Russians mean what they say, exactly; and
Trotzky not only means, he does what he writes. Putting these
considerations together, we can make a comprehensible statement of the
motive and the purpose of his policy; if we want to comprehend.
To all the other secretaries of state or of foreign affairs in the
world, the Russian Revolution was an incident, an interruption of the
War. To Minister Trotzky it was the other way around.
The World War was an incident, an effect, a check of "the" Revolution.
Not the Russian Revolution, you understand. To Trotzky the Russian
Revolution is but one, the first of that series of national revolutions
which together will become the Thing he yearns for and prophesies: the
World Revolution.
His peace policy therefore is a peace drive directed, not at a separate
peace with the Central Powers; and not even at a general peace, but to
an ending of the War in and by "the" Revolution everywhere.
Especially in Germany and Austria. He said this. The correspondent of
the London _Daily News_ cabled on January 2, right after the armistice
and the agreement upon peace terms to be offered the Allies, that
"Trotzky is doing his utmost to stimulate a revolution in Germany....
Our only chance to defeat German designs is to publish terms (from the
Allies) ... to help the democratic movement in Germany."
Trotzky is not pro-German. He certainly was not when he wrote this
book. He hates here both the Austrian and the German dynasties, and his
ill-will toward the House of Hapsburg is so bitter that it sounds
sometimes as if there were something personal about it. And there is.
He shows a knowledge of and a living sympathy with the small and subject
nations which Austria rules, exploits and mistreats. He blames his
Austrian comrades for their allegiance to a throne which is not merely
undemocratic, but "senile" and tyrannical. That he, the literal
Trotzky, would turn right around and, as the Russian Minister of Foreign
Affairs, do what he had so recently criticized the Austrian Socialists
for doing is unlikely.
Trotzky is against all the present governments of Europe, and the
"bourgeois system" everywhere in the world. He isn't pro-Allies; he
isn't even pro-Russian. He isn't a patriot at all. He is for a class,
the proletariat, the working people of all countries, and he is for his
class only to get rid of classes and get down or up to--humanity. And
so with his people.
The Russians have listened to the Socialist propaganda for generations
now. They have learned the chief lessons it has taught: liberty, land,
industrial democracy and the class-war the world over. This War was not
their war; it was the Czar's war; a war of the governments in the
interest of their enemies, the capitalists of their several countries,
who, as Trotzky says, were forcing their states to fight for the right
to exploit other and smaller peoples. So when they overthrew the Czar,
the Russians wanted to drop his war and go into their own, the class
war. Kerensky held them at the front in the name of "the" Revolution;
he would get peace for them by arrangement with the allies. He didn't;
he couldn't; he was dismissed by them. Not by the Bolsheviki, but by the
Russian people who know the three or four things they want: land and
liberty at home; the Revolution and Democracy for all the world.
I heard a radical assert one day that that was the reason Trotzky could
be such an exception to the rule about radicals in power. He came to the
head of the Russian Revolution when his ideas were the actual demands of
the Russian people and that it was not his strength of character, but
the force of a democratic public opinion in mob power, which made him
stick to his philosophy and carry out his theories and promises. I find
upon inquiry here in New York that while he was living and working as a
journalist on the East Side, he left one paper after another because he
could not conform, to their editorial policies and would not compromise.
He was "stiff-necked," "obstinate," "unreasonable." In other, kinder
words, Trotzky is a strong man, with a definite mind and a purpose of
his own, which he has the will and the nerve to pursue.
Also, however, Trotzky is a strong man who is ruled by and represents a
very simple-minded people who are acting like him, literally upon the
theory that the people govern now, in Russia; the common people; and
that, since they don't like the War of the Czar, the Kaiser, the Kings
and the Emperors, their government should make peace with the peoples of
the world, a democratic peace against imperialism and capitalism and the
state everywhere, for the establishment in its stead of a free,
world-wide democracy.
That may be the true explanation of Trotzky's Bolshevik peace policy in
the world crisis of the World War. That is the explanation which is
suggested by this book.
"Written in extreme haste," he says at the close of his preface, "under
conditions far from favorable to systematic work ... the entire book,
from the first page to the last, was written with the idea of the New
International constantly in mind--the New International which must rise
out of the present world cataclysm, the International of the last
conflict and the final victory."
LINCOLN STEFFENS.
New York, January 4th, 1918
AUTHOR'S PREFACE
The forces of production which capitalism has evolved have outgrown the
limits of nation and state. The national state, the present political
form, is too narrow for the exploitation of these productive forces.
The natural tendency of our economic system, therefore, is to seek to
break through the state boundaries. The whole globe, the land and the
sea, the surface as well as the interior, has become one economic
workshop, the different parts of which are inseparably connected with
each other. This work was accomplished by capitalism. But in
accomplishing it the capitalist states were led to struggle for the
subjection of the world-embracing economic system to the profit
interests of the bourgeoisie of each country. What the politics of
imperialism has demonstrated more than anything else is that the old
national state that was created in the revolutions and the wars of
1789-1815, 1848-1859, 1864-1866, and 1870 has outlived itself, and is
now an intolerable hindrance to economic development.
The present War is at bottom a revolt of the forces of production
against the political form of nation and state. It means the collapse
of the national state as an independent economic unit.
The nation must continue to exist as a cultural, ideologic and
psychological fact, but its economic foundation has been pulled from
under its feet. All talk of the present bloody clash being a work of
national defense is either hypocrisy or blindness. On the contrary, the
real, objective significance of the war is the breakdown of the present
national economic centres, and the substitution of a world economy in
its stead. But the way the governments propose to solve this problem of
imperialism is not through the intelligent, organized cooeperation of
all of humanity's producers, but through the exploitation of the world's
economic system by the capitalist class of the victorious country; which
country is by this War to be transformed from a great power into the
world power.
The War proclaims the downfall of the national state. Yet at the same
time it proclaims the downfall of the capitalist system of economy. By
means of the national state capitalism has revolutionized the whole
economic system of the world. It has divided the whole earth among the
oligarchies of the great powers, around which were grouped the
satellites, the small nations, who lived off the rivalry between the
great ones. The future development of world economy on the capitalistic
basis means a ceaseless struggle for new and ever new fields of
capitalist exploitation, which must be obtained from one and the same
source, the earth. The economic rivalry under the banner of militarism
is accompanied by robbery and destruction which violate the elementary
principles of human economy. World production revolts not only against
the confusion produced by national and state divisions but also against
the capitalist economic organization, which has now turned into
barbarous disorganization and chaos.
The War of 1914 is the most colossal breakdown in history of an economic
system destroyed by its own inherent contradictions.
All the historical forces whose task it has been to guide the bourgeois
society, to speak in its name and to exploit it, have declared their
historical bankruptcy by the War. They defended capitalism as a system
of human civilization, and the catastrophe born out of that system is
primarily _their_ catastrophe. The first wave of events raised the
national governments and armies to unprecedented heights never attained
before. For the moment the nations rallied around them. But the more
terrible will be the crash of the governments when the people, deafened
by the thunder of the cannon, realize the meaning of the events now
taking place in all their truth and frightfulness.
The revolutionary reaction of the masses will be all the more powerful
the more prodigious the cataclysm which history is now bringing upon
them.
Capitalism has created the material conditions of a new Socialist
economic system. Imperialism has led the capitalist nations into
historic chaos. The War of 1914 shows the way out of this chaos by
violently urging the proletariat on to the path of Revolution.
For the economic backward countries of Europe the War brings to the fore
problems of a far earlier historic origin--problems of democracy and
national unity. This is in a large measure the case with the peoples of
Russia, Austria-Hungary and the Balkan Peninsula. But these historically
belated questions, which were bequeathed to the present epoch as a
heritage from the past, do not alter the fundamental character of the
events. It is not the national aspirations of the Serbs, Poles,
Roumanians or Finns that has mobilized twenty-five million soldiers and
placed them in the battlefields, but the imperialistic interests of the
bourgeoisie of the Great Powers. It is imperialism that has upset
completely the European _status quo_, maintained for forty-five years,
and raised again the old questions which the bourgeois revolution proved
itself powerless to solve.
Yet in the present epoch it is quite impossible to treat these questions
in and by themselves. They are utterly devoid of an independent
character. The creation of normal relations of national life and
economic development on the Balkan Peninsula is unthinkable if Czarism
and Austria-Hungary are preserved. Czarism is now the indispensable
military reservoir for the financial imperialism of France and the
conservative colonial power of England. Austria-Hungary is the mainstay
of Germany's imperialism. Issuing from the private family clashes
between the national Servian terrorists and the Hapsburg political
police, the War very quickly revealed its true fundamental character--a
struggle of life and death between Germany and England. While the
simpletons and hypocrites prate of the defense of national freedom and
independence, the German-English War is really being waged for the
freedom of the imperialistic exploitation of the peoples of India and
Egypt on the one hand, and for the imperialistic division of the peoples
of the earth on the other.
Germany began its capitalistic development on a national basis with the
destruction of the continental hegemony of France in the year 1870-1871.
Now that the development of German industry on a national foundation has
transformed Germany into the first capitalistic power of the world, she
finds herself colliding with the hegemony of England in her further
course of development. The complete and unlimited domination of the
European continent seems to Germany the indispensable prerequisite of
the overthrow of her world enemy. The first thing, therefore, that
imperialistic Germany writes in her programme is the creation of a
Middle European League of Nations. Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Balkan
Peninsula and Turkey, Holland, the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland,
Italy, and, if possible, enfeebled France and Spain and Portugal, are to
make one economic and military whole, a Great Germany under the hegemony
of the present German state.
This programme, which has been thoroughly elaborated by the economists,
political students, jurists and diplomats of German imperialism and
translated into reality by its strategists, is the most striking proof
and most eloquent expression of the fact that capitalism has expanded
beyond the limits of the national state and feels intolerably cramped
within its boundaries. The national Great Power must go and in its
place must step the imperialistic World Power.
In these historical circumstances the working class, the proletariat,
can have no interest in defending the outlived and antiquated national
"fatherland," which has become the main obstacle to economic
development. The task of the proletariat is to create a far more
powerful fatherland, with far greater power of resistance--_the
republican United States of Europe_, as the foundation of the United
States of the World.
The only way in which the proletariat can meet the imperialistic
perplexity of capitalism is by opposing to it as a practical programme
of the day the Socialist organization of world economy.
War is the method by which capitalism, at the climax of its development,
seeks to solve its insoluble contradictions. To this method the
proletariat must oppose its _own_ method, the method of the Social
Revolution.
The Balkan question and the question of the overthrow of Czarism,
propounded to us by the Europe of yesterday, can be solved only in a
revolutionary way, in connection with the problem of the United Europe
of to-morrow. The immediate, urgent task of the Russian Social
Democracy, to which the author belongs, is the fight against Czarism.
What Czarism primarily seeks in Austria-Hungary and the Balkans is a
market for its political methods of plunder, robbery and acts of
violence. The Russian bourgeoisie all the way up to its radical
intellectuals has become completely demoralized by the tremendous growth
of industry in the last five years, and it has entered into a bloody
league with the dynasty, which had to secure to the impatient Russian
capitalists their part of the world's booty by new land robberies.
While Czarism stormed and devastated Galicia, and deprived it even of
the rags and tatters of liberty granted to it by the Hapsburgs, while it
dismembered unhappy Persia, and from the corner of the Bosporus strove
to throw the noose around the neck of the Balkan peoples, it left to the
liberalism which it despised the task of concealing its robbery by
sickening declamations over the defense of Belgium and France. The year
1914 spells the complete bankruptcy of Russian liberalism, and makes the
Russian proletariat the sole champion of the war of liberation. It
makes the Russian Revolution definitely an integral part of the Social
Revolution of the European proletariat.
In our war against Czarism, in which we have never known a "national"
truce, we have never looked for help from Hapsburg or Hohenzollern
militarism, and we are not looking for it now. We have preserved a
sufficiently clear revolutionary vision to know that the idea of
destroying Czarism was utterly repugnant to German imperialism. Czarism
has been its best ally on the Eastern border. It is united to it by
close ties of social structure and historical aims. Yet even if it were
otherwise, even if it could be assumed that, in obedience to the logic
of military operations, it would deal a destructive blow to Czarism, in
defiance of the logic of its own political interests--even in such a
highly improbable case we should refuse to regard the Hohenzollerns not
only as an objective but as a subjective ally. The fate of the Russian
Revolution is so inseparably bound up with the fate of European
Socialism, and we Russian Socialists stand so firmly on the ground of
internationalism, that we cannot, we must not for a moment, entertain
the idea of purchasing the doubtful liberation of Russia by the certain
destruction of the liberty of Belgium and France, and--what is more
important still--thereby inoculating the German and Austrian proletariat
with the virus of imperialism.
We are united by many ties to the German Social Democracy. We have all
gone through the German Socialist school, and learned lessons from its
successes as well as from its failures. The German Social Democracy was
to us not only _a_ party of the International. It was _the_ Party _par
excellence_. We have always preserved and fortified the fraternal bond
that united us with the Austrian Social Democracy. On the other hand, we
have always taken pride in the fact that we have made our modest
contribution towards winning suffrage in Austria and arousing
revolutionary tendencies in the German working class. It cost more than
one drop of blood to do it. We have unhesitatingly accepted moral and
material support from our older brother who fought for the same ends as
we on the other side of our Western border.
Yet it is just because of this respect for the past, and still more out
of respect for the future, which ought to unite the working class of
Russia with the working classes of Germany and Austria, that we
indignantly reject the "liberating" aid which German imperialism offers
us in a Krupp munition box, with the blessing, alas! of German
Socialism. And we hope that the indignant protest of Russian Socialism
will be loud enough to be heard in Berlin and in Vienna.
The collapse of the Second International is a tragic fact, and it were
blindness or cowardice to close one's eyes to it. The position taken by
the French and by the larger part of English Socialism is as much a part
of this breakdown as the position of the German and Austrian Social
Democracy. If the present work addresses itself chiefly to the German
Social Democracy it is only because the German party was the strongest,
most influential, and in principle the most basic member of the
Socialist world. Its historic capitulation reveals most clearly the
causes of the downfall of the Second International. At first glance it
may appear that the social revolutionary prospects of the future are
wholly deceptive. The insolvency of the old Socialist parties has
become catastrophically apparent. Why should we have faith in the
future of the Socialist movement? Such skepticism, though natural,
nevertheless leads to quite an erroneous conclusion. It leaves out of
account the good will of history, just as we have often been too prone
to ignore its ill will, which has now so cruelly shown itself in the
fate that has overcome the International.
The present War signalizes the collapse of the national states. The
Socialist parties of the epoch now concluded were national parties. They
had become ingrained in the national states with all the different
branches of their organizations, with all their activities and with
their psychology. In the face of the solemn declarations at their
congresses they rose to the defense of the conservative state, when
imperialism, grown big on the national soil, began to demolish the
antiquated national barriers. And in their historic crash the national
states have pulled down with them the national Socialist parties also.
It is not Socialism that has gone down, but its temporary historical
external form. The revolutionary idea begins its life anew as it casts
off its old rigid shell. This shell is made up of living human beings,
of an entire generation of Socialists that has become fossilized in
self-abnegating work of agitation and organization through a period of
several decades of political reaction, and has fallen into the habits
and views of national opportunism or possibilism. All efforts to save
the Second International on the old basis, by personal diplomatic
methods and mutual concessions, are quite hopeless. The old mole of
history is now digging its passageways all too well and none has the
power to stop him.
As the national states have become a hindrance to the development of the
forces of production, so the old Socialist parties have become the main
hindrance to the revolutionary movement of the working class. It was
necessary that they should demonstrate to the full their extreme
backwardness, that they should discredit their utterly inadequate and
narrow methods, and bring the shame and horror of national discord upon
the proletariat, in order that the working class might emancipate
itself, through these fearful disillusionments, from the prejudices and
slavish habits of the period of preparation, and become at last that
which the voice of history is now calling it to be--the revolutionary
class fighting for power.
The Second International has not lived in vain. It has accomplished a
huge cultural work. There has been nothing like it in history before.
It has educated and assembled the oppressed classes. The proletariat
does not now need to begin at the beginning. It enters on the new road
not with empty hands. The past epoch has bequeathed to it a rich
arsenal of ideas. It has bequeathed to it the weapons of criticism.
The new epoch will teach the proletariat to combine the old weapons of
criticism with the new criticism of weapons.
This book was written in extreme haste, under conditions far from
favorable to systematic work. A large part of it is devoted to the old
International which has fallen. But the entire book, from the first to
the last page, was written with the idea of the New International
constantly in mind, the New International which must rise up out of the
present world cataclysm, the International of the last conflict and the
final victory.
LEON TROTZKY.
THE BOLSHEVIKI AND WORLD PEACE
CHAPTER I
THE BALKAN QUESTION
"The War at present being waged against Russian Czarism and its
vassals is dominated by a great historic idea. The impetus of
this great historic idea consecrates the battlefields of Poland
and of Eastern Russia. The roar of cannon, the rattling of
machine guns, and the onrush of cavalry, all betoken the
enforcement of the democratic programme for the liberation of
the nations. Had Czarism, in league with the French
capitalistic powers and in league with an unscrupulous 'nation
of shopkeepers,' not succeeded in suppressing the Revolution of
1905, the present slaughter of the nations would have been
avoided.
"A democratic Russia would never have consented to wage this
unscrupulous and futile War. The great ideas of freedom and
justice now speak the persuasive language of the machine gun and
the sword, and every heart susceptible of sympathy with justice
and humanity can only wish that the power of Czarism may be
destroyed once for all, and that the oppressed Russian
nationalities may again secure the right to decide their own
destinies."
The above quotation is from the _Nepszava_ of August 31, 1914, the
official organ of the Socialist party of Hungary. Hungary is the land
whose entire inner life was erected upon the high-handed oppression of
the national minorities, upon the enslavement of the laboring classes,
upon the official parasitism and usury of the ruling caste of large
landowners. It is the land in which men like Tisza are masters of the
situation, dyed-in-the-wool agrarians, with the manners of political
bandits. In a word, Hungary is a country closest of kin to Czar-ruled
Russia.
So what is more fitting than that the _Nepszava_, the Socialist organ of
Hungary, should hail with outbursts of enthusiasm the liberating mission
of the German and Austro-Hungarian armies? Who other than Count Tisza
could have felt the call to "enforce the democratic programme for the
liberation of the nations"? Who was there to uphold the eternal
principles of law and justice in Europe but the ruling clique of
Budapest, the discredited Panamists? Would you entrust this mission to
the unscrupulous diplomacy of "perfidious Albion," to the nation of
shopkeepers?
Laughter turns away wrath. The tragic inconsistencies of the policies
followed by the International not only reach their climax in the
articles of the poor Nepszava; they disarm us by their humor.
The present series of events began with the ultimatum, sent to Servia by
Austria-Hungary. There was not the slightest reason why the
international Social Democracy should take under its protection the
intrigues of the Serbs or any other of the petty dynasties of the Balkan
Peninsula. They were all endeavoring to hide their political adventures
under the cloak of national aspirations. We had still less cause to
lash ourselves into a state of moral indignation because a fanatic young
Serb responded to the cowardly, criminal and wily national politics of
the Vienna and Budapest government authorities with a bloody
assassination.[1]
[1] It is noteworthy that these opportunistic Austrian and German
Socialists are now writhing with moral indignation over the
"treacherous assassination at Sarajevo." And yet they always
sympathized with the Russian terrorists more than we, the Russian
Social Democrats, did, who are opposed on principle to the
terroristic method. Lost in the mist of chauvinism, they can no
longer see that the unfortunate Servian terrorist, Gavrilo
Prinzip, represents precisely the same national principle as the
German terrorist, Sand. Perhaps they will even ask us to transfer
our sympathies from Sand to Kotzebue? Or perhaps these eunuchs
will advise the Swiss to overthrow the monuments erected to the
assassin Tell and replace them with monuments to the Austrian
governor, Gessler, one of the spiritual forerunners of the
murdered archduke?
Of one thing we have no doubt. In the dealings between the Danube
Monarchy and the Servian government, the historic right, that is to say,
the right of free development, rests entirely with Servia, just as Italy
was in the right in the year 1859. Underneath the duel between the
imperial police scoundrels and the terrorists of Belgrade, there is
hidden a far deeper meaning than merely the greed of the
Kareorgoievitches or the crimes of the Czar's diplomacy. On one side
were the imperialistic claims of a national state that had lost its
vitality, and on the other side, the strivings of the dismembered
Servian nation to reintegrate itself into a national whole and become a
living vital state.
Is it for this that we have sat so long in the school of Socialism to
forget the first three letters of the democratic alphabet? This
absolute lapse of memory, moreover, made its appearance only after the
fourth of August. Up to that fatal date the German Marxists showed that
they knew very well what was happening in Southeastern Europe.
On July 3, 1914, after the assassination at Sarajevo, the _Vorwaerts_
wrote:
"The bourgeois revolution of the South Slavs is in full swing,
and the shooting at Sarajevo, however wild and senseless an act
in itself, is as much a chapter of this revolution as the
battles by which the Bulgarians, Serbs and Montenegrins
liberated the peasants of Macedonia from the yoke of Turkish
feudal exploitation. Is it a wonder that the South Slavs of
Austria-Hungary look with longing to their racial brothers in
the kingdom of Servia? The Serbs in Servia have attained the
highest goal a people can attain in the present order of
society. They have attained national independence. Whereas in
Vienna or Budapest they treat every one bearing the name of Serb
or Croatian with blows and kicks, with court-martial justice and
the gallows.... There are seven and a half million South Slavs
who, as a result of the victories in the Balkans, have grown
bolder than ever in demanding their political rights. And if
the imperial throne of Austria continues to resist their impact,
it will topple over and the entire Empire with which we have
coupled our destiny will break to pieces. For it is in line
with historic evolution that such national revolutions should
march onward to victory."
If the international Social Democracy together with its Servian
contingent, offered unyielding resistance to Servia's national claims,
it was certainly not out of any consideration for the historic rights of
Austria-Hungary to oppress and disintegrate the nationalities living
within her borders; and most certainly not out of consideration for the
liberating mission of the Hapsburgs. Until August, 1914, no one, except
the black and yellow hirelings of the press, dared to breathe a word
about that. The Socialists were influenced in their course of conduct
by entirely different motives. First of all, the proletariat, although
by no means disputing the historic right of Servia to strive for
national unity, could not trust the solution of this problem to the
powers then controlling the destinies of the Servian kingdom. And in
the second place--and this was for us the deciding factor--the
international Social Democracy could not sacrifice the peace of Europe
to the national cause of the Serbs, recognizing, as it did, that, except
for a European revolution, the only way such unity could be achieved was
through a European war.
But from the moment Austria-Hungary carried the question of her own fate
and that of Servia to the battlefield, Socialists could no longer have
the slightest doubt that social and national progress would be hit much
harder in Southeastern Europe by a Hapsburg victory than by a Servian
victory. To be sure, there was still no reason for us Socialists to
identify our cause with the aims of the Servian army. This was the idea
that animated the Servian Socialists, Ljaptchevitch and Katzlerovitch,
when they took the manly stand of voting against the war credits.[2]
But surely we had still less reason to support the purely dynastic
rights of the Hapsburgs and the imperialistic interests of the
feudal-capitalistic cliques against the national struggle of the Serbs.
At all events, the Austro-Hungarian Social Democracy, which now invokes
its blessings upon the sword of the Hapsburgs for the liberation of the
Poles, the Ukrainians, the Finns and the Russian people, must first of
all clarify its ideas on the Servian question, which it has gotten so
hopelessly muddled.
[2] To appreciate fully this action of the Servian Socialists we must
bear in mind the political situation by which they were
confronted. A group of Servian conspirators had murdered a member
of the Hapsburg family, the mainstay of Austro-Hungarian
clericalism, militarism, and imperialism. Using this as a welcome
pretext, the military party in Vienna sent an ultimatum to Servia,
which, for sheer audacity, has scarcely ever been paralleled in
diplomatic history. In reply, the Servian government made
extraordinary concessions, and suggested that the solution of the
question in dispute be turned over to the Hague tribunal.
Thereupon Austria declared war on Servia. If the idea of a "war of
defense" has any meaning at all, it certainly applied to Servia in
this instance. Nevertheless, our friends, Ljaptchevitch and
Katzlerovitch, unshaken in their conviction of the course of
action that they as Socialists must pursue, refused the government
a vote of confidence. The writer was in Servia at the beginning
of the War. In the Skuptchina, in an atmosphere of indescribable
national enthusiasm, a vote was taken on the war credits. The
voting was by roll-call. Two hundred members had all answered
"Yes." Then in a moment of deathlike silence came the voice of
the Socialist Ljaptchevitch--"No." Every one felt the moral force
of this protest, and the scene has remained indelibly impressed
upon my memory.
The question at issue, however, is not confined to the fate of the ten
million Serbs. The clash of the European nations has brought up the
entire Balkan question anew. The Peace of Bucharest, signed in 1903,
has solved neither the national nor the international problems in the
Near East. It has only intensified the added confusion resulting from
the two unfinished Balkan Wars, unfinished because of the complete
temporary exhaustion of the nations participating in it.
Roumania had followed in the path of Austro-Hungarian politics, despite
the Romanesque sympathies of its population, especially in the cities.
This was due not so much to dynastic causes, to the fact that a
Hohenzollern prince occupied the throne, as to the imminent danger of a
Russian invasion. In 1879 the Russian Czar, as thanks for Roumania's
support in the Russo-Turkish war of "liberation," cut off a slice of
Roumanian territory, the province of Bessarabia. This eloquent deed
provided a sufficient backing to the dynastic sympathies of the
Hohenzollern in Bucharest. But the Magyar-Hapsburg clique succeeded in
incensing the Roumanian people against them by their denationalizing
policy in Transylvania, which has a population of three million
Roumanians as against three-fourths of a million in the Russian province
of Bessarabia; and they further antagonized them by their commercial
treaties, which were dictated by the interests of the large
Austro-Hungarian land-owners. So that Roumania's entrance into the War
on the side of the Czar, despite the courageous and active agitation
against participation in the War on either side, carried on by the
Socialist party under the leadership of my friends Gherea and Rakowsky,
is to be laid altogether at the door of the ruling class of
Austria-Hungary, who are reaping the harvest they have sown here as well
as elsewhere.
But the matter is not disposed of by fixing the historical
responsibility. To-morrow, in a month, in a year or more the War will
bring to the foreground the whole question of the destiny of the Balkan
peoples and of Austria-Hungary, and the proletariat will have to have
its answer to this question. European democracy in the nineteenth
century looked with distrust at the Balkan people's struggle for
independence, because it feared that Russia might be strengthened at the
expense of Turkey. On this subject Karl Marx wrote in 1853, on the eve
of the Crimean War:
"It may be said that the more firmly established Servia and the
Servian nationality is the more the direct influence of Russia
on the Turkish Slavs is shoved into the background. For in order
to be able to assert its peculiar position as a state, Servia
had to import its political institutions, its schools ... from
Western Europe."
This prophecy has been brilliantly fulfilled in what has actually
happened in Bulgaria, which was created by Russia as an outpost on the
Balkans. As soon as Bulgaria was fairly well established as a national
state, it developed a strong anti-Russian party, under the leadership of
Russia's former pupil, Stambulov, and this party was able to stamp its
iron seal upon the entire foreign policy of the young country. The whole
mechanism of the political parties in Bulgaria is so constructed as to
enable it to steer between the two European combinations without being
absolutely forced into the channel of either, unless it chooses to enter
it of its own accord. Roumania went with the Austro-German alliance,
Servia, since 1903, with Russia, because the one was menaced directly by
Russia, the other by Austria. The more independent the countries of
Southeast Europe are from Austria-Hungary, the more effectively they
will be able to protect their independence against Czarism.
The balance of power in the Balkans, created by the Congress of Berlin
in 1879, was full of contradictions. Cut up by artificial
ethnographical boundaries, placed under the control of imported
dynasties from German nurseries, bound hand and foot by the intrigues of
the Great Powers, the peoples of the Balkans could not cease their
efforts for further national freedom and unity. The national politics
of independent Bulgaria was naturally directed towards Macedonia,
populated by Bulgarians. The Berlin Congress had left it under Turkish
rule. On the other hand, Servia had practically nothing to look for in
Turkey with the exception of the little strip of land, the sandbag Novy
Bazar. Its national interests lay on the other side of the
Austro-Hungarian boundary, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slavonia and
Dalmatia. Roumania had no interests in the south, where it is separated
from European Turkey by Servia and Bulgaria. Roumania's expansion
policy was directed towards the northwest and east, towards Hungarian
Transylvania and Russian Bessarabia. Finally, the national expansion of
Greece, like that of Bulgaria, collided with Turkey.
Austro-German politics, aiming at the artificial preservation of
European Turkey, broke down not on account of the diplomatic intrigues
of Russia, although these of course were not lacking. It broke down
because of the inevitable course of evolution. The Balkan Peninsula had
entered on the path of capitalist development, and it was this fact that
raised the question of the self-determination of the Balkan peoples as
national states to the historical issue of the day.
The Balkan War disposed of European Turkey, and thereby created the
conditions necessary for the solution of the Bulgarian and Greek
questions. But Servia and Roumania, whose national completion could
only be achieved at the expense of Austria-Hungary, found themselves
checked in their efforts at expansion southwards, and were compensated
at the expense of what racially belonged to Bulgaria--Servia in
Macedonia, and Roumania in Dobrudja. This is the meaning of the second
Balkan War and the Peace of Bucharest by which it was concluded.
The mere existence of Austria-Hungary, this Turkey of Middle Europe,
blocks the way to the natural self-determination of the peoples of the
Southeast. It compels them to keep constantly fighting against each
other, to seek support against each other from the outside, and so makes
them the tool of the political combinations of the Great Powers. It was
only in such chaos that Czaristic diplomacy was enabled to spin the web
of its Balkan politics, the last thread of which was Constantinople.
And only a federation of the Balkan states, both economic and military,
can interpose an invincible barrier to the greed of Czarism.
Now that European Turkey has been disposed of, it is Austria-Hungary
that stands in the way of a federation of the Balkan states. Roumania,
Bulgaria, and Servia would have found their natural boundaries, and
would have united with Greece and Turkey, on the basis of common
economic interests, into a league of defense. This would finally have
brought peace to the Balkan Peninsula, that witches' cauldron which
periodically threatened Europe with explosions, until it drew it into
the present catastrophe.
Up to a certain time the Socialists had to reconcile themselves to the
routine way in which the Balkan question was treated by capitalistic
diplomats, who in their conferences and secret agreements stopped up one
hole only to open another, even wider one. So long as this dilatory
method kept postponing the final solution, the Socialist International
could hope that the settlement of the Hapsburg succession would be a
matter not for a European war, but for the European Revolution. But now
that the War has destroyed the equilibrium of the whole of Europe, and
the predatory Powers are seeking to remodel the map of Europe--not on
the basis of national democratic principles, but of military
strength--the Social Democracy must come to a clear comprehension of the
fact that one of the chief obstacles to freedom, peace and progress, in
addition to Czarism and German militarism, is the Hapsburg Monarchy as a
state organization. The crime of the Galician Socialist group under
Daszynski consisted not only in placing the Polish cause above the cause
of Socialism, but also in linking the fate of Poland with the fate of
the Austro-Hungarian armies and the fate of the Hapsburg Monarchy.
The Socialist proletariat of Europe cannot adopt such a solution of the
question. For us the question of united and independent Poland is on a
par with the question of united and independent Servia. We cannot and
we will not permit the Polish question to be solved by methods which
will perpetuate the chaos at present prevailing in Southeastern Europe,
in fact through the whole of Europe. For us Socialists the independence
of Poland means its independence on both fronts, on the Romanoff front
and on the Hapsburg front. We not only wish the Polish people to be
free from the oppression of Czarism. We wish also that the fate of the
Servian people shall not be dependent upon the Polish nobility in
Galicia.
For the present we need not consider what the relations of an
independent Poland will be to Bohemia, Hungary and the Balkan
Federation. But it is perfectly clear that a complex of medium-sized and
small states on the Danube and in the Balkan Peninsula will constitute a
far more effective bar to the Czaristic designs on Europe than the weak,
chaotic Austro-Hungarian State, which proves its right to existence only
by its continued attempts upon the peace of Europe.
In the article of 1853, quoted above, Marx wrote as follows on the
Eastern question:
"We have seen that the statesmen of Europe, in their obdurate
stupidity, petrified routine, and hereditary intellectual
indolence, recoil from every attempt at answering the question
of what is to become of Turkey in Europe. The driving force
that favors Russia's advance towards Constantinople is the very
means by which it is thought to keep her away from it, the empty
theory, never carried out, of maintaining the _status quo_. What
is this _status quo_? For the Christian subjects of the Porte
it means nothing else than the perpetuation of their oppression
by Turkey. As long as they are under the yoke of the Turkish
rule, they look upon the head of the Greek Church, the ruler of
60 million Greek Church Christians, as _their natural protector
and liberator_."
What is here said of Turkey now applies in a still greater degree to
Austria-Hungary. The solution of the Balkan question is unthinkable
without the solution of the Austro-Hungarian question, as they are both
comprised in one and the same formula--the Democratic Federation of the
Danube and Balkan Nations.
"The governments with their old-fashioned diplomacy," wrote Marx, "will
never solve the difficulty. Like the solution of so many other
problems, the Turkish problem, too, is reserved for the European
Revolution." This statement holds just as good to-day as when it was
first written. But for the Revolution to solve the difficulties that
have piled up in the course of centuries, the proletariat must have its
_own_ programme for the solution of the Austro-Hungarian question. And
this programme it must oppose just as strenuously to the Czaristic greed
of conquest as to the cowardly and conservative efforts to maintain the
Austro-Hungarian _status quo_.