THE EFFECTS OF THE NEGRO MIGRATION ON THE SOUTH
As we have noted the immensity, the make-up, and the causes of this
movement, we are now justified in seeking to know something concerning
its effects upon the South. If this movement had any effects upon the
South, these undoubtedly must have been felt first and most in its
economic interests; for, as we have seen, the majority of the migrants
were laborers who left the farms and industries of this section in
response to the great demand for labor in the North. That the South is
almost wholly dependent on Negro labor is a truism, because for
various reasons it has been unable to obtain any considerable amount
of any other kind of labor. Its native white labor supply that is
available to perform the menial work is considerably small, and very
little of its labor force is drawn from the foreign-born element,
which has been coming to this country in such large numbers during the
years immediately preceding the beginning of the Great War. In 1910,
when a study was made of the distribution of the immigrants to this
country, it was found that 84 per cent of them were in the North, 9.7
per cent in the West, whereas only 5.4 per cent of them were in the
South.[71] In 1920, 82.9 per cent of the foreign born were in the
North, 10.8 per cent in the West, and only 6.3 per cent in the South.
We are aware of the fact also that previous to this Negro movement
there existed a surplus of Negro labor due to adverse natural
conditions in certain parts of the South, and that in order to remove
this excess the migration was gladly welcomed. It happened, however,
that when this superfluous labor was removed, the migration stream did
not stop, but flowed on, and thus swept off a very large part of the
labor that was necessary to carry on production on the farms and in
the various other industries. We may set down labor shortage, then,
as the first effect of the movement upon the South.
Although the South was in direst need of labor as a result of this
movement, yet the danger therefrom was not as extensive and serious as
it was once thought to be. This labor shortage did not have the effect
of plunging the whole section into disaster. For the most part, real
hardships were experienced only in certain sections, especially those
that had contributed heavily to the movement. From the farming and
industrial interests of those States struck hardest by this exodus
came many objections to the movement, and these were taken as
indications of losses and interruptions in these enterprises. It is
said that in every State from the Carolinas to Mississippi there lay
idle thousands of acres of land, which would have been put to use had
labor been available. Even where good crops had been grown, in many
places, there was question as to whether or not sufficient labor could
be secured to harvest them.[72] Again, in some instances, industries
like farming had been completely paralyzed; in others they had been
greatly retarded, owing to the necessity of breaking in new men to
occupy the places of experienced workers who had left for the North.
The lumber mills, mines, docks, and cotton oil mills all suffered from
the effects of labor shortage.[73]
As far as this lack of labor affected the South, these facts indicate
what was true in a general way; but in order to obtain a better view
of the situation let us refer to labor shortage as it existed in a few
of the States that were struck exceedingly hard by the migration. A
study of the labor situation in Mississippi[74] showed that while the
supply of labor was considerably diminished by the migration, the
demand for labor was altered. In some parts of the State the demand
was decreased, in others it was increased. In those sections where
agriculture had had time since the invasion of the boll-weevil to
reorganize itself on a mixed farming basis, with the emphasis placed
on the raising of livestock, the demand for labor was decreased, and
the wages were lowest, because this type of farming required less
laborers a hundred acres than did the old type which emphasized mainly
the raising of cotton. In East Mississippi much land lay idle, but it
seemed that the shortage of labor there was due to lack of capital. A
heavy migration stream flowed also from South Mississippi and resulted
in cutting short the labor supply of the lumber mills and docks. On
the whole, labor shortage in this State was quite general, inasmuch as
after the movement started employers throughout the State were forced
to advance wages from 10 per cent to 25 per cent.
Shortage of labor was a serious problem in Alabama,[75] especially in
those sections of the State designated the "black-belt counties."
Throughout these sections during 1917 much land lay idle, partly
because of the scarcity of tenants and laborers, and partly because of
the reluctance of landowners, merchants, and bankers to supply the
capital necessary for cultivating it. The farm demonstration agent of
Dallas County reported in 1917 a reduction of 3,000 in the number of
plows usually operated. In these same counties farms owned and managed
by lumber companies were for the most part deserted and in many cases
the crops were given very feeble attention. In all parts of the State
the lumber companies complained of a serious labor shortage.
In 1917 it was reported that no acute shortage of labor existed in
either the rural or urban districts of Georgia, but that there could
be found many instances of individual employers who needed more Negro
labor. "If such labor were available," said an investigator, "from 700
to 1,200 (men) could be placed in the saw-mill and turpentine
industries at $1.50 and probably $2.00 per day; perhaps 2,000 at $1.75
and $2.00 per day could be placed in shipbuilding industries; (and)
from 1,500 to 2,000 could be utilized from September to December in
picking cotton at $1.00, $1.50 and $1.75 per hundred pounds."[76]
In North Carolina there was a scarcity of labor before the movement
got well under way. In 1916 eighty-seven counties out of a total of
one hundred counties reported a shortage of labor, and in many parts
of the State farmers adopted the plan of raising live-stock instead of
agricultural crops. Much land lay idle, and where this was not the
case there was a noted increase in the use of farm machinery to
supplement the meager labor supply. Especially acute was the demand
for cotton pickers. On the whole, the labor situation became so
serious that average wages for Negro labor were rapidly advanced
beyond those of former times.[77]
What then was the attitude of the South toward that movement? As has
been seen, this Negro exodus, by causing a shortage of labor,
threatened the economic well-being of many parts of the South. This
being so, it is readily seen that those regions so affected could not
ignore the movement. In fact, when the pressure was felt, keen
interest in the whole matter was aroused and in some cases even much
anxiety and apprehension were manifested. In this mood the South
directed its attention to this unusual situation and resolved to meet
the emergency by stopping the migration itself instead of first trying
to remove its causes. In order to accomplish this it was necessary to
use force, which was of two kinds, namely, (1) force in the form of
moral suasion, and (2) certain devices which rest on physical
strength.[78] The former weapon employed to check the movement took
the form of strong and persuasive appeals on the part of Southern
newspapers and Southern leaders to Negroes who were either leaving or
who anticipated leaving the South. In these appeals the Negroes were
told that they were better off in the South, that the southern white
man was their friend and that living conditions in the North were far
more difficult than those in the South. They cited as examples of this
the cold climate of the North, the hard and heavy work, and asserted
that even though wages in the North were high the cost of living was
still higher. The Negroes, therefore, would do well to remain where
they were.[79] In the employment of this weapon to check the movement
the newspapers took the lead and carried on a well-organized campaign
to frighten the Negroes out of the notion of leaving the South. Some
papers carefully circulated false reports to the effect that many
Negroes were returning to their homes because of unexpected hardships
in the North. Others told of thousands of Negro men dying of cold and
hunger in Northern cities, where the climate was so severe that
icicles hung from one's nose and ears and one's breath actually turned
to snow as it was exhaled.[80] These appeals and false reports,
however, had no effect in checking the movement, and the South,
therefore, was compelled to resort to more drastic means in order to
achieve its end.
The first repressive move made by the South to check the movement was
that against the labor agents of the North, who undoubtedly were the
chief instrumentalities through which the migration was kept in
operation. The method of procedure was to pass laws which either
regulated or prohibited the exodus of laborers through the activity of
labor agents. Many States already had such laws on their statute
books, and where this was the case these laws were revised or were
substituted by new ones.[81] These laws usually took one of two forms,
either excessive labor agents' license or requirements of State
residence. These were the chief qualifications of any who desired to
solicit labor to be employed outside the State so concerned. For the
violation of these laws anyone was subject to arrest and upon
conviction was either heavily fined or sentenced to terms of
imprisonment with hard labor.
A few examples will show how these laws operated against labor agents
or against any suspected of enticing labor away from the state. In
Alabama, when the labor problem became very acute, laws were passed
imposing heavy license fees upon labor agents. Any agent desiring to
operate in that State was compelled to pay a license of $500 to the
State and $250 to each county concerned. In addition, each city
required of him a license of from $300 to $500. Thus the cost of
soliciting labor in Alabama for each agent was upwards of $1,000. In
the "black belt" counties of this state a number of labor agents
caught operating in violation of these laws were convicted and heavily
fined, and upon failure to pay the same were sentenced to labor on the
public roads. The cities and towns of the State of Florida enacted
measures requiring a very high license of labor agents and providing
the penalty of imprisonment in case of failure to comply with these
regulations. In Jacksonville, Florida, for instance, there was passed
an ordinance which stipulated that labor agents each should pay $1,000
license fees for the privilege of recruiting labor to be sent outside
of the State. The penalty for violation of this law was $600 fine and
sixty days in jail.[83] Georgia also passed severe laws to check the
operations of labor agents. In Macon[84] the City Council set the
license fee of a labor agent at $25,000, and required in addition a
recommendation of said agent by ten local ministers, ten
manufacturers, and twenty-five business men. In several counties of
this State labor agents were arrested for violating these laws.[85]
Four Southern cities and as many States brought lawsuits against a
great Northern railroad for violation of the laws and ordinances
regarding the soliciting of labor to be sent outside the boundaries
of these respective cities and States.[86] In some instances also
Negro assistants of railroad labor agents were maltreated, arrested,
and heavily fined.[87] For example, at Thomasville, Georgia, a Negro
and a white man were arrested on the charge of being labor agents.[88]
In another case, at Sumter, South Carolina, a popular Negro minister
who was found at the railroad station bidding farewell to some of his
parishioners, who were leaving for the North, was arrested as a labor
agent.[89]
Besides these tirades against the labor agents, drastic methods were
adopted to prevent the Negroes from going North. These were resorted
to mainly by the police and were so executed as to discourage movement
from the South. In some cities police officers visited railroad
stations, rounded up Negroes by hundreds, and took them to prison on
the flimsiest sort of accusations. On the days following such arrests,
however, all the Negroes who had been thus imprisoned were
released.[90] An example of this is the occurrence at Savannah,
Georgia, where on one occasion the police arrested and jailed every
Negro who happened to be in the station regardless of where he might
have been going. Sometimes, as was done once at Albany, Georgia, they
destroyed the tickets of migrants who were waiting to board trains for
the North.[91] At Greenville, Mississippi, it was the custom to stop
trains, drag Negroes therefrom, and prevent others from boarding them.
Strangers were subjected to search in order to secure evidence which
might prove them to be labor agents.[92] The ticket agent at
Hattiesburg, Mississippi, until restrained by the general
superintendent, attempted to interfere with the movement by refusing
to sell tickets to Negroes desiring to leave for the North.[93] Also,
the Mayor of the city of New Orleans, Louisiana, tried to check the
movement by requesting the President of the Illinois Central Railroad
to use his influence to stop this road from carrying Negroes to the
North. To this request the President replied that, while he was
opposed to the Negro migration, his road, as a common carrier, could
not either refuse to sell tickets to the Negroes or fail to provide
them the necessary means of transportation.[94] Moreover, many Negroes
who were not migrants were subjected on every hand to arbitrary
arrests on mere petty charges in order to intimidate and terrorize
them.
These repressive measures apparently had no effect in checking the
movement, for Negroes continued to move to the North in large numbers.
When this was realized, a changed state of affairs followed. The
better portion of the public opinion of those States affected by the
migration condemned this policy of force as a means of stopping the
exodus, on the one hand, and on the other suggested the adoption of
measures which would conciliate the Negroes, and thereby remove those
conditions causing them to leave the South. This was urged by some of
the editors of leading newspapers, and by leaders of other social
agencies interested in problems regarding the relations between the
races in the South. These editors were for the most part very frank
about the whole matter, and, therefore, did not hesitate to make it
known that in order to check the movement there was need of a square
deal for the Negro, higher wages, and a more sympathetic attitude
toward the aspirations and general improvement of the Negro race.[95]
The following excerpts from the editorials of a few of these papers
will show what this opinion was. _The Charlotte Observer_ said:
"The real thing that started the exodus lies at the door of the
farmer and is easily within his power to remedy. The Negro must
be given better homes and better surroundings. Fifty years after
the Civil War he should not be expected to be content with the
same conditions which existed at the close of the War. We cannot
blame him for no longer countenancing life in the windowless
cabin, nor with being discontented with the same scale of
remuneration for his labor that prevailed when farmers were
unable to do anything better for him."[96]
_The Daily News_ of Jackson, Mississippi, moreover, had this to say:
"The Negro exodus is the most serious economic matter that
confronts the people of Mississippi today. And it isn't worth
while to sit around and cuss the labor agents either. That won't
help us the least bit in getting to a proper solution. We may as
well face the facts, even when the facts are very ugly and very
much against us. The plain truth of the matter is the white
people of Mississippi are not giving the Negro a square deal. And
this applies not merely to Mississippi, but to all the other
states in the South. How can we expect to hold our Negro labor
when we are not paying decent living wages? Have we any right to
abuse the Negro for moving to the Northern states where he is
tempted by high wages when we are not paying him his worth at
home?... Then, too, the Negro is not being given a square deal in
the matter of education. In a majority of our rural districts
especially the schools for Negro children are miserable
makeshifts, the teacher often more ignorant than the pupils,
little or nothing allowed for their support, and the children
derive no benefits whatever.... The ugly fact remains that we
have not been doing our duty by the Negro, and until we do there
is no reason to hope for a better settlement of our industrial
conditions."[97]
_The Progressive Farmer_, too, another Southern organ, was of this
opinion:
"Farm labor has always commanded smaller wages in the South than
in other parts of the country. In 1910, the average monthly wage
of male farm laborers in the South Atlantic States was only
$18.76, and in the South Central States, $20.27, while in the
North Atlantic and North Central States the average exceeded $30,
and in the Western States reached $44.35.... We ought to face the
competition of other sections, not by taxing and mobbing labor
agents, but by treating our own labor so fairly that it will be
willing to stay with us."[98]
Besides these we have the opinions of two other social agencies that
were also in favor of the remedy of conciliation as a means of
checking the exodus. These are the University Commission on Southern
Race Questions and the Southern Sociological Congress. The former
advocated as a check on the movement the giving to the Negroes a
larger measure of those things which human beings hold dearer than
material goods.[99] In its judgment some of these things were as
follows: fair treatment, opportunity to labor and enjoy the legitimate
fruits of labor, assurance of even-handed justice in the courts, good
educational facilities, sanitary living conditions, tolerance, and
sympathy. At its annual meeting in 1917 the Southern Sociological
Congress expressed the belief that the movement could be stopped, not
by repression, but by cooperation between peoples of both races.[100]
Most of the speakers at this gathering recommended a getting together
of the leaders of the whites and the blacks so that they might discuss
the situation very frankly and thereby work out plans to ensure the
Negro a square deal and a man's chance in the South.
These preceding views, however, were not at all the general opinion
regarding the remedies to check the migration, for there was another
element, representing the old South, which did not consider them with
any degree of favor. It viewed the movement as a specific and
temporary thing, and held that had there been no floods during 1916,
and if the boll-weevil had not ravaged the cotton plantations, there
would have been no migration, for the Negroes never would have been
induced to go North. It alleged that the Negroes did not want more
money, if the getting of it meant harder work; and that what the Negro
needed was a soft climate. It also asserted that the relations between
the two races were never so good as they were then. Hence this element
favored standing aloof and allowing the movement to stop of its own
accord.[101]
Notwithstanding this view of the situation, there prevailed the
opinion that the remedy for checking the exodus lay in the adoption of
those measures promotive of sympathy and kindness, and forthwith plans
were effected with the aim of inducing the Negroes to remain and of
inviting others who had departed to return to the South. The following
are some of the chief measures which were adopted to achieve this end:
(1) A general and substantial increase in wages; (2) movement on the
part of the farmers to deal more fairly in business matters with the
Negro tenants by making clear at the outset the terms of all
contracts, and by keeping strict accounts and making prompt
settlements with them; (3) the correcting of certain former abuses
such as short weighing of coal, discounting of store checks, and
unfair prices in the commissaries; (4) instituting of crop
diversification in order to keep the laborers supplied with work the
year round; (5) better housing; (6) better school conditions; and (7)
the drawing closer together of the two races through the medium of
county meetings for the study of problems growing out of racial
relations. A typical example of this last-named policy is the
"Community Congress" plan in Bolivar County, Mississippi. The
essential feature of this body is a representative general committee
composed of twenty-five white planters and business men, and five
Negro leaders from the five supervisors' districts within the county.
The function of this organization is to consider and offer solutions
of any and all important problems pertaining to the community. There
is, moreover, the Farm Extension Bureau of the Chamber of Commerce of
Memphis, Tennessee, which was organized for the purpose of conducting
educational campaigns to improve agricultural and rural conditions.
This organization has extended its work from Tennessee into
Mississippi and Arkansas, and has adopted the policy of employing
Negroes to act as demonstrators among farmers of their own race in
order to furnish the Negro farmers with greater incentive to become
more skilful and industrious in their vocation.[102]
Since we have seen the attitude of the white leaders of the South
toward this movement, it might also be of interest to know what was
the view of the Negro leaders in regard to this exodus of their race.
In the first place, many of the local leaders in the South were much
opposed to this movement, but hesitated to give outward expression to
this for fear of rebuke from members of their race. Hence, their
policy was that of maintaining silence about the whole matter. On the
other hand, the editors of some of the leading Negro papers of the
South were somewhat outspoken and were more or less inclined to be in
sympathy with the movement. They nevertheless expressed regrets that
the Negroes were leaving the South, but this did not in the least move
them to do anything to help check the movement. They took the position
that the migrants had not been given justice in economic, political,
and social affairs, and that, therefore, they had no just grounds on
which to base appeals to them to remain in the South. In fact, in view
of these adverse circumstances, they felt that the Negroes could not
be blamed for moving to the North.[103]
Other leaders, however, especially those in the North, were more
positive and frank as regards their attitude toward the movement.
These may be roughly divided into two distinct classes, namely, the
conservative and the radical. Those of the former class adhered
largely to the view of Tuskegee Institute, which fosters the
traditions of Booker T. Washington.[104] They advised the Negroes to
remain in the South on the ground that it was there only that the
Negro could become a landholder, and that there were chances for him
to become a real estate owner almost at his own will. Some in this
class felt also that the Great War would soon end and that after that
the country would be flooded by immigrants from Europe, who would
doubtless deprive thousands of Negroes of work in the North. They
therefore counseled the Negroes to stay at home and to keep possession
of their property, especially their property in land.
The radicals, on the other hand, who insist on equal rights for the
race, boldly advised and urged the Negroes to come North. When this
exodus was well under way one of the members of this class, Dr. W. E.
B. Du Bois, spoke as follows: "There are not jobs for everybody; there
is no demand for the lazy and casual; but trained, honest Negro
laborers are welcome in the North at good wages just as they are
lynched in the South for impudence. Take your choice."[105]
Furthermore, others of this class, believing that immigration would
not be a factor in the labor situation for a long time to come,
likewise urged the Negroes to continue moving to the North. Their
desire was to see the Negro population increase its size in such great
proportions through this migration as to afford it the opportunity to
exercise in the North economic and political power hitherto
unknown.[106]
FOOTNOTES:
[71] Fairchild, H. P., _Immigration_, p. 226.
[72] Williams, W. T. B., _Negro Migration in 1916-17_, Rep. U. S.
Dept. Lab., p. 98.
[73] _Ibid._, pages 98-99.
[74] Leavell, R. H., _Negro Migration in 1916-17_, Rep. U. S. Dept.
Lab., pp. 17-19.
[75] Snavely, T. R., _Negro Migration in 1916-17_, Rep. U. S. Dept.
Lab., pp. 70-73.
[76] Woofter, T. J., Jr., _Negro Migration in 1916-17_, Rep. U. S.
Dept. Lab., p. 90.
[77] Snavely, T. R., _Negro Migration in 1916-17_, Rep. U. S. Dept.
Lab., pp. 73-74.
[78] Baker, R. S., _World's Work_, 34: 315-16, Je., 1917.
[79] Baker, R. S., _World's Work_, 34: 315-16, Je., 1917.
[80] Horwill, H. W., _Contemp. Rev._, 114: 302, Sept., 1918.
[81] Haynes, G. E., _Survey_, 40: 120, May 4, 1918.
[82] Snavely, T. R., _Negro Migration in 1916-17_, Rep. U. S. Dept.
Lab., pp. 64-64.
[83] Scott, E. J., _Negro Migration During The War_, pp. 72-73.
[84] _Ibid._, p. 73.
[85] Woofter, T. J., Jr., _Negro Migration in 1916-17_, Rep. U. S.
Dept. Lab., p. 86.
[86] Tyson, F. D., _Negro Migration in 1916-17_, Rep. U. S. Dept.
Lab., p. 121.
[87] _Ibid._, pp. 121-23.
[88] Scott, E. J., _Negro Migration During The War_, p. 74.
[89] Williams, W. T. B., _Negro Migration in 1916-17_, Rep. U. S.
Dept. Lab., p. 110.
[90] Horwill, H. W., _Contemp. Rev._, 114: 301-302, Sept., 1918.
[91] Williams, W. T. B., _Negro Migration in 1916-17_, Rep. U. S.
Dept. Lab., p. 110.
[92] Scott, E. J., _Negro Migration During The War_, p. 77.
[93] Scott, E. J., _Negro Migration During The War_, p. 77.
[94] _Ibid._, p. 78.
[95] Dillard, J. H., _Negro Migration in 1916-17_, Rep. U. S. Dept.
Lab., p. 13.
[96] Williams, W. T. B., _Negro Migration in 1916-17_, Rep. U. S.
Dept. Lab., p. 104.
[97] _Ibid._, _pp._ 111-112.
[98] Williams, W. T. B., _Negro Migration in 1916-17_, Rep. U. S.
Dept. Lab., p. 110.
[99] Min. Univ. Com. on Southern Race Questions, pp. 48-48, 1917.
[100] _Survey_, 38: 428, Aug. 11, 1917.
[101] _Living Age_, 295: 58-59, Oct. 6, 1917.
[102] _Negro Migration in 1916-17_, Rep. U. S. Dept. Lab., pp. 15-113.
See topics titled as follows: "Constructive Adjustments," "Means of
Checking the Exodus," "Constructive Possibilities," and "Initial
Remedies."
[103] Baker, R. S., _World's Work_, 34: 316, July, 1919.
[104] _Living Age_, 295: 59, Oct. 6, 1917.
[105] _Ibid._, p. 59.
[106] Woodson, C. G., _A Century of Negro Migration_, p. 176.