FROM UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS

The American war had been for five years in progress; for two years a

treaty of alliance, having as sole object "to maintain effectually the

liberty, sovereignty, and independence, absolute and unlimited, of the

United States," bound us French to the "insurgents"; successes and

reverses followed each other in turn: Brooklyn, Trenton, Brandywine,

Saratoga. Quite recently the news had come of the double victory at sea

and on land of d'Estaing at Grenada, and Paris had been illuminated. The

lights were scarcely out when news arrived of the disaster of the same

d'Estaing at Savannah. All France felt anxious concerning the issue of a

war which had lasted so long and whose end continued to be doubtful.

When, in the first months of 1780, the report went about that a great

definitive effort was to be attempted, that it was not this time a

question of sending ships to the Americans, but of sending an army, and

that the termination of the great drama was near, the enthusiasm was

unbounded. All wanted to take part. There was a prospect of crossing

the seas, of succoring a people fighting for a sacred cause, a people of

whom all our volunteers praised the virtues; the people led by

Washington, and represented in Paris by Franklin. An ardor as of

crusaders inflamed the hearts of French youths, and the intended

expedition was, in fact, the most important that France had launched

beyond the seas since the distant time of the crusades. The cause was a

truly sacred one, the cause of liberty, a magical word which then

stirred the hearts of the many. "Why is liberty so rare?" Voltaire had

said--"Because the most valuable of possessions."

All those who were so lucky as to be allowed to take part in the

expedition were convinced that they would witness memorable, perhaps

unique, events, and it turned out, indeed, that they were to witness a

campaign which, with the battle of Hastings, where the fate of England

was decided in 1066, and that of Bouvines, which made of France in 1214

a great nation, was to be one of the three military actions with

greatest consequences in which for the last thousand years the French

had participated.

A striking result of this state of mind is that an extraordinary number

of those who went noted down their impressions, kept journals, drew

sketches. Never perhaps during a military campaign was so much writing

done, nor were so many albums filled with drawings.

Notes, letters, journals, sketches have come down to us in large

quantities, and from all manner of men, for the passion of observing and

narrating was common to all kinds of people: journals and memoirs of

army chiefs like Rochambeau, or chiefs of staff like Chastellux, a

member of the French Academy, adapter of Shakespeare, and author of a

_Félicité Publique_, which, Franklin said, showed him to be "a real

friend of humanity"; narratives of a regimental chaplain, like Abbé

Robin, of a sceptical rake like the Duke de Lauzun, the new Don Juan,

whose battle stories alternate with his love reminiscences, handsome,

impertinent, licentious, an excellent soldier withal, bold and

tenacious, marked, like several of his companions, to mount the

revolutionary scaffold; journals of officers of various ranks, like

Count de Deux-Ponts, Prince de Broglie, he, too, marked for the

scaffold; Count de Ségur, son of the marshal, himself afterward an

Academician and an ambassador; Mathieu-Dumas, future minister of war of

a future King of Naples, who bore the then unknown name of Joseph

Bonaparte; the Swedish Count Axel de Fersen, one of Rochambeau's aides,

who was to organize the French royal family's flight to Varennes, and to

die massacred by the mob in his own country; notes, map, and sketches

of Baron Cromot-Dubourg, another of Rochambeau's aides; journal, too,

among many others, of a modest quartermaster like Blanchard, who gives a

note quite apart, observes what others do not, and whose tone, as that

of a subordinate, is in contrast with the superb ways of the "seigneurs"

his companions.

From page to page, turning the leaves, one sees appear, without speaking

of Lafayette, Kosciusko, and the first enthusiasts, many names just

emerging from obscurity, never to sink into it again: Berthier, La

Pérouse, La Touche-Tréville, the Lameth brothers, Bougainville, Custine,

the Bouillé of the flight to Varennes, the La Clocheterie of the fight

of _La Belle Poule_, the Duportail who was to be minister of war under

the Constituent Assembly, young Talleyrand, brother of the future

statesman, young Mirabeau, brother of the orator, himself usually known

for his portly dimensions as _Mirabeau-tonneau_, ever ready with the cup

or the sword, young Saint-Simon, not yet a pacifist, and not yet a

Saint-Simonian,[1] Suffren, in whose squadron had embarked the future

Director Barras, an officer then in the regiment of Pondichéry. All

France was really represented, to some extent that of the past, to a

larger one that of the future.

Many of those journals have been published (Cromot-Dubourg's only in an

English version printed in America[2]); others have been lost; others

remain unpublished, so that after all that has been said, and well said,

it still remains possible, with the help of new guides and new

documents, to follow Washington and Rochambeau once more, and in a

different company, during the momentous journey which led them from the

Hudson to the York River. The Washington papers and the Rochambeau

papers, used only in part, are preserved in the Library of Congress. A

juvenile note, in contrast with the quiet dignity of the official

reports by the heads of the army, is given by the unprinted journal, a

copy of which is also preserved in the same library, kept by one more of

Rochambeau's aides, Louis Baron de Closen, an excellent observer, gay,

warm-hearted, who took seriously all that pertained to duty, and merrily

all the rest, especially mishaps. Useful information is also given by

some unprinted letters of George Washington, some with the

superscription still preserved: "On public service--to his Excellency,

Count de Rochambeau, Williamsburg, Virginia," the whole text often in

the great chief's characteristic handwriting, clear and steady, neither

slow nor hasty, with nothing blurred and nothing omitted, with no

trepidation, no abbreviation, the writing of a man with a clear

conscience and clear views, superior to fortune, and the convinced

partisan, in every circumstance throughout life, of the straight line.

The British Government has, moreover, most liberally opened its

archives, so that, both through the recriminatory pamphlets printed in

London after the disaster and the despatches now accessible, one can

know what was said day by day in New York and out of New York, in the

redoubts at Yorktown, and in the French and American trenches around the

place.

I

Lieutenant-General Jean-Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, Comte de

Rochambeau, aged then fifty-five, and Washington's senior by seven

years, was in his house, still in existence, Rue du Cherche-Midi,

Paris,[3] at the beginning of March, 1780; he was ill and about to leave

for his castle of Rochambeau in Vendomois; post-horses were in readiness

when, in the middle of the night, he received, he says in his

memoirs,[4] a "courrier bringing him the order to go to Versailles and

receive the instructions of his Majesty." For some time rumors had been

afloat that the great attempt would soon be made. He was informed that

the news was true, and that he would be placed at the head of the army

sent to the assistance of the Americans.

The task was an extraordinary one. He would have to reach the New World

with a body of troops packed on slow transports, to avoid the English

fleets, to fight in a country practically unknown, by the side of men

not less so, and whom we had been accustomed to fight rather than

befriend, and for a cause which had never before elicited enthusiasm at

Versailles, the cause of republican liberty.

This last point was the strangest of all, so strange that even Indians,

friends of the French in former days, asked Rochambeau, when they saw

him in America, how it was that his King could think fit to help other

people against "their own father," their King. Rochambeau replied that

the latter had been too hard on his subjects, that they were right,

therefore, in shaking off the yoke, and we in helping them to secure

"that natural liberty which God has conferred on man."

This answer to "Messieurs les Sauvages," is an enlightening one; it

shows what was the latent force that surmounted all obstacles and caused

the French nation to stand as a whole, from beginning to end, in favor

of the Americans, to applaud a treaty of alliance which, while entailing

the gravest risks, forbade us all conquest, and to rejoice

enthusiastically at a peace which after a victorious war added nothing

to our possessions. This force was the increasing passion among the

French for precisely "that natural liberty which God has conferred on

man."

Hatred of England, quickened though it had been by the harsh conditions

of the treaty of Paris bereaving us of Canada, in 1763, had much less

to do with it than is sometimes alleged. Such a feeling existed, it is

true, in the hearts of some of the leaders, but not of all; it did in

the minds also of some of the officers, but again not of all. What

predominated in the mass of the nation, irrespective of any other

consideration, was sympathy for men who wanted to fight injustice and to

be free. The cause of the insurgents was popular because it was

associated with the notion of liberty; people did not look beyond.[5]

It is often forgotten that this time was not in France a period of

Anglophobia, but of Anglomania. Necker, so influential, and who then

held the purse-strings, was an Anglophile; so was Prince de Montbarey,

minister of war; so was that Duke de Lauzun who put an end for a time to

his love-affairs and came to America at the head of his famous legion.

All that was English was admired and, when possible, imitated: manners,

philosophy, sports, clothes, parliamentary institutions, Shakespeare,

just translated by Le Tourneur, with the King and Queen as patrons of

the undertaking; but, above all, wrote Count de Ségur, "we were all

dreaming of the liberty, at once calm and lofty, enjoyed by the entire

body of citizens of Great Britain."[6]

Such is the ever-recurring word. Liberty, philanthropy, natural rights,

these were the magic syllables to conjure with. "All France," read we in

Grimm and Diderot's correspondence, "was filled with an unbounded love

for humanity," and felt a passion for "those exaggerated general maxims

which raise the enthusiasm of young men and which would cause them to

run to the world's end to help a Laplander or a Hottentot." The ideas of

Montesquieu, whose _Esprit des Lois_ had had twenty-two editions in one

year, of Voltaire, of d'Alembert were in the ascendant, and liberal

thinkers saw in the Americans propagandists for their doctrine. General

Howe having occupied New York in 1776, Voltaire wrote to d'Alembert:

"The troops of Doctor Franklin have been beaten by those of the King of

England. Alas! philosophers are being beaten everywhere. Reason and

liberty are unwelcome in this world."

Another of the master minds of the day, the economist, thinker, and

reformer Turgot, the one whose advice, if followed, would have possibly

secured for us a bloodless revolution, was of the same opinion. In the

famous letter written by him on the 22d of March, 1778, to his English

friend, Doctor Price, Turgot showed himself, just as the French nation

was, ardently pro-American, but not anti-English. He deplored the

impending war, which ought to have been avoided by England's

acknowledging in time "the folly of its absurd project to subjugate the

Americans.... It is a strange thing that it be not yet a commonplace

truth to say that no nation can ever have the right to govern another

nation; that such a government has no other foundation than force, which

is also the foundation of brigandage and tyranny; that a people's

tyranny is, of all tyrannies, the most cruel, the most intolerable, and

the one which leaves the least resources to the oppressed ... for a

multitude does not calculate, does not feel remorse, and it bestows on

itself glory when all that it deserves is shame."

The Americans, according to Turgot, must be free, not only for their own

sake, but for the sake of humanity; an experiment of the utmost import

is about to begin, and should succeed. He added this, the worthy

forecast of a generous mind: "It is impossible not to form wishes for

that people to reach the utmost prosperity it is capable of. That people

is the hope of mankind. It must show to the world by its example, that

men can be free and tranquil, and can do without the chains that

tyrants and cheats of all garb have tried to lay on them under pretense

of public good. It must give the example of political liberty, religious

liberty, commercial and industrial liberty. The shelter which it is

going to offer to the oppressed of all nations will console the earth.

The ease with which men will be able to avail themselves of it and

escape the effects of a bad government will oblige governments to open

their eyes and to be just. The rest of the world will perceive by

degrees the emptiness of the illusions on which politicians have

festered." Toward England Turgot has a feeling of regret on account of

its policies, but no trace of animosity; and, on the contrary, the

belief that, in spite of what some people of note were alleging, the

absolutely certain loss of her American colonies would not result in a

diminution of her power. "This revolution will prove, maybe, as

profitable to you as to America."[7]

Not less characteristic of the times and of the same thinker's turn of

mind is a brief memorial written by him for the King shortly after, when

Captain Cook was making his third voyage of discovery, the one from

which he never returned. "Captain Cook," Turgot said, "is probably on

his way back to Europe. His expedition having no other object than the

progress of human knowledge, and interesting, therefore, all nations,

it would be worthy of the King's magnanimity not to allow that the

result be jeopardized by the chances of war." Orders should be given to

all French naval officers "to abstain from any hostile act against him

or his ship, and allow him to freely continue his navigation, and to

treat him in every respect as the custom is to treat the officers and

ships of neutral and friendly countries."[8] The King assented, and had

our cruisers notified of the sort of sacred character which they would

have to recognize in that ship of the enemy: a small fact in itself, but

showing the difference between the wars in those days and in ours, when

we have had to witness the wanton destruction of the Louvain library,

the shelling of the Reims cathedral, and the Arras town hall.

An immense aspiration was growing in France for more equality, fewer

privileges, simpler lives among the great, less hard ones among the

lowly, more accessible knowledge, the free discussion by all of the

common interests of all. A fact of deepest import struck the least

attentive: French masses were becoming more and more thinking masses.

One should not forget that between the end of the American Revolution

and the beginning of the French one only six years elapsed, between the

American and the French Constitutions but four years. At the very time

of the Yorktown campaign Necker was issuing his celebrated _Compte

Rendu_, which he addressed, "pro forma" to the King, and in reality to

the nation.[9] This famous account of the condition of France, the piece

of printed matter which was most widely read in those days, began,

"Sire," but ended: "In writing this I have proudly counted on that

public opinion which evil-minded persons may try to crush or to distort,

but which, in spite of their efforts, Truth and Justice carry along in

their wake."

To which may be added as another token of the same state of mind that

the then famous Count de Guibert had some time before printed his _Essay

on Tactics_, so full of advanced ideas, notably on the necessary

limitation of the power of kings, that it had been suppressed by the

authorities; and he had dedicated it not to a prince nor to any man, but

to his mother country: "A ma Patrie."[10]

Six years after the end of the American war, on January 24, 1789, the

King of France ordered the drawing up of the famous _Cahiers_,

desiring, he said, that "from the extremities of his kingdom and the

most unknown habitations every one should be assured of a means of

conveying to him his wishes and complaints." And the _Cahiers_,

requesting liberties very similar to those of the Americans, came indeed

from the remotest parts of France, the work of everybody, of

quasi-peasants sometimes, who would offer excuses for their wild

orthography and grammar. The notes and letters of the volunteers of our

Revolution, sons of peasants or artisans, surprise us by the mass of

general ideas and views which abound in them. It was not, therefore, a

statement of small import that Franklin had conveyed to Congress when he

wrote from France: "The united bent of the nation is manifestly in our

favor." And he deplored elsewhere that some could think that an appeal

to France's own interest was good policy: "Telling them their commerce

will be advantaged by our success and that it is in their _interest_ to

help us, seems as much as to say: 'Help us and we shall not be obliged

to you.' Such indiscreet and improper language has been sometimes held

here by some of our people and produced no good effect." The truth is,

he said also, that "this nation is fond of glory, particularly that of

protecting the oppressed."[11]

The treaty of commerce, accompanying the treaty of alliance of

1778,[12] had been in itself a justification of this judgment. Help from

abroad was so pressingly needed in America that almost any advantages

requested by France as a condition would have been granted; but that

strange sight was seen: advantages being offered, unasked, by one party,

and declined by the other. France decided at once not to accept anything

as a recompense, not even Canada, if that were wrested from the English,

in spite of Canada's having been French from the first, and having but

recently ceased to be such. The fight was not for recompense but for

liberty, and Franklin could write to Congress that the treaty of

commerce was one to which all the rest of the world, in accordance with

France's own wishes, was free to accede, when it chose, on the same

footing as herself, England included.[13]

This was so peculiar that many had doubts; John Adams never lost his;

Washington himself had some, and when plans were submitted to him for an

action in Canada he wondered, as he wrote, whether there was not in them

"more than the disinterested zeal of allies."[14] What would take place

at the peace, if the allies were victorious? Would not France require,

in one form or another, some advantages for herself? But she did not;

her peace was to be like her war, pro-American rather than anti-English.

Another striking trait in the numerous French accounts which have come

down to us of this campaign against the English is the small space that

the English, as a nation, occupy in them. The note that predominates is

enthusiasm for the Americans, not hatred for their enemies. "In France,"

wrote Ségur in his memoirs, "in spite of the habit of a long obedience

to arbitrary power, the cause of the American insurgents fixed the

attention and excited the interest of all. From every side public

opinion was pressing the royal government to declare itself in favor of

republican liberty, and seemed to reproach it for its slowness and

timidity." Of any revenge to be taken on the enemy, not a word. "No one

among us," he said further, "thought of a revolution in France, but it

was rapidly taking place in our minds. Montesquieu had brought to light

again the long-buried title-deeds consecrating the rights of the people.

Mature men were studying and envying the laws of England."

Summing up the motives of the new crusaders, who were "starting off to

the war in the name of philanthropy," he found two: "One quite reasonable

and conscientious, the desire to well serve King and country ... another

more unique, a veritable enthusiasm for the cause of American liberty."

Ministers hesitated, on account of the greatness of the risk, "but they

were, little by little, carried away by the torrent." During the sea

voyage only the chiefs knew exactly whither they were going; some

officers thought at one time they might have to fight elsewhere than in

America. One of Rochambeau's officers, the aforementioned Mathieu-Dumas,

confided his misgivings to his journal: "Above all," he wrote, "I had

heartily espoused the cause of the independence of the Americans, and I

should have felt extreme regret at losing the honor of combating for

their liberty."[15] Of the English, again, not a word; what he longed

for, like so many others, was less to fight against the English than for

the Americans.

More striking, perhaps, than all the rest: shortly after we had decided

to take part in the war, the question of our motives and of a possible

annihilation of England as a great power was plainly put, in the course

of a familiar conversation, by the president of Yale University to the

future signer of the Louisiana Treaty, Barbé-Marbois, then secretary of

our legation in the United States. "Mons. Marbois," Ezra Stiles confided

to his diary, on the occasion of the French minister, La Luzerne, and

his secretary's visit to Yale, "is a learned civilian, a councillor of

the Parliament of Metz, æt. 35, as I judge; speaks English very

tolerably, much better than his Excellency the minister. He was very

inquisitive for books and American histories.... Among other things I

asked Mons. Marbois whether the Powers of Europe would contentedly see

Great Britain annihilated.

"He said, no; it would be for the interest of Europe that Britain should

have weight in the balances of power.... France did not want to enlarge

her dominions by conquest or otherwise."[16]

For the French diplomat, a man of great ability and well informed,

addressing, as he was, one to whom a "yes" instead of a "no" would have

caused no pain, far from it, the motive of our actions was neither a

prospective loss by England of her rank nor the increase of our own

possessions, but simply American independence.

With Americans of Past and Present Days · 第 21 / 67 题