Du bist des Todes! Eine britt'sche Mutter zeugte dich![25]

advances towards him, he throws away sword and shield and pleads at her

feet for his life. The reasons he gives at length in order to arouse

her sympathy: his defencelessness; the wealth of his father, who would

ransom him with gold; the gentleness of the sex to which Joan belongs

as maid; the love of his sweet bride, who waits for his return home in

tears; the grief of the parents whom he has left at home; the grievous

fate of death unwept for in a foreign land--all these motives are

themselves, in one aspect of them, essentially objective conditions,

effective and of value as such, and on the other hand, the tranquil

exposition of them is itself in the epic vein. In the same way the

poet motives the condition, that Joan must hearken to him, through the

external circumstance of the defencelessness of the pleader, although

from the dramatic point of view she ought without delay and at the bare

sight to have slain him, being as she was the relentless foe of all

Englishmen, and in fact expresses such destructive hatred with every

resource of rhetoric, justifying her action by the statement that she

is bound with most fearful vow to the spirit-world.

Mit dem Schwert zu tödten alles Lebende, das ihr

Der Schlachten Gott verhängnissvoll entgegenschickt.[26]

If the point of importance to the maid were merely that Montgomery

ought not to die defenceless, he possessed apparently an excellent

means in his grasp of retaining his life; in other words he had merely

to refuse to take up his weapons. This view is supported by the fact

that Joan has already listened to him so long. Yet when she demands

that he should fight for his life with her, of mortal flesh like

himself, he again takes up his sword and falls by her hand. Such a

_development_ of the scene had been more in keeping with the drama had

it dispensed with all this varied epic exposition.

(_γγ_) In general, then, we may characterize the type in which we

have the poetic passage of epic events set before us in the following

way, namely, that the epic presentation does not merely linger over

the picture of objective reality and ideal conditions, but over and

above this provides _obstacles_ to a final solution. This not only

applies to its relation to the wide field of external condition, to

which the more immediate vision enforces us, but also in respect

to the culminating movement of the action, more especially in its

contrast to dramatic poetry. For this reason above all it diverts us

from the execution of the fundamental purpose, the connected course

of whose evolved conflict a dramatic poet ought never to lose sight

of, into much digressive matter; and, moreover, by this means avails

itself of the opportunity, to bring before our vision the complex

unity of a world of circumstances, which otherwise could not have

been expressed in speech. We have an illustration of such an obstacle

in the beginning of the Iliad. Homer here at once tells us about the

fatal sickness, which Apollo had spread throughout the Greek camp,

and connects with it the strife between Achilles and Agamemnon. This

wrath is the second impediment. Even more obviously in the Odyssey is

every adventure that Odysseus has to pass through, a delay to his home

return. More particularly, however, the distinct episode serves to

interrupt the unimpaired progression of the story, and is to a great

extent an obstacle to this. Such, for instance, is the shipwreck of

Æneas, his love for Dido, the appearance of Armida in Tasso, and we may

add as a rule the many independent love affairs of particular heroes

in the romantic Epos, which, in the poetry of Ariosto, accumulate and

interlace with such profusion, that the conflict between Christian and

Saracen is thereby entirely hidden. In the "Divine Comedy" of Dante

we do not find such definite examples of obstruction to the plot or

narrative. In this case we must associate the slow advance of the Epic

denouement partly with the generally pausing manner of the description,

and in part with the many little episodical histories and conversations

with particular characters, whether damned or otherwise, about whom the

poet permits himself more detailed information.

In this connection it is above all things necessary that impediments

of this description, which interfere with the flow of narrative to its

final end, should not be presented as though they were merely means

directed to objects of an objective character. For inasmuch as already

the general condition, on the basis of which the movement of the epic

world is carried forward, is only truly poetical where it appears as a

self-constructed growth, so too its entire course, either in virtue of

circumstances or the inherent destiny, must also appear self-originated

without our being able to detect thereby the personal views of

the poet; and this is all the more so because, in the form of its

objectivity--not merely under its aspects of phenomenal reality, but

also in respect to the substantive character of its content--it claims

for the whole no less than its divisible content that it is a positive

growth, spontaneous in its origin and independent. If, however, a

directive world of gods is its apex, controlling the course of events,

it is even more necessary that the poet himself should possess a lively

and vivid faith in them, because in that case it is generally through

the instrumentality of these that obstructions such as we have referred

to are asserted; consequently where these divine forces are treated

merely as some lifeless mechanism, it is inevitable that everything

for which they are responsible must equally become so in a poetic

composition which is artificial even in intention.

(_γ_) Having thus briefly adverted to the totality of objects, which

the Epos is able to unfold by interweaving a particular event with a

universal national world-condition, and, further, having discussed

the manner in which the course of events is developed, we have now,

_thirdly_, and in conclusion, to examine the problem as to the nature

of the _unity_ and _rounding off_ of an epic composition.

(_αα_) This is a point all the more important for the reason that in

our own day people are ready to take up the view that we may end an

Epic as we like, or continue it just as capriciously. Although this is

the opinion of men of talent and learning--it is in fact the contention

of F. N. Wolff--it remains none the less a crude and illiterate view.

It in fact amounts to nothing less than excluding from the finest

ethic compositions any genuine character of artistic composition. For

it is only in virtue of the fact that an Epos depicts an essentially

exclusive, and thereby, for the firs time independent world, that it

is at all a work of fine art in contrast to what is, in part, the

diffuse, and, in part, the finite, series of independent sections,

causes, effects, and other modes of self-causative reality. One can,

of course, so far admit that for the genuine and primitive Epos the

wholly aesthetic review of the design and organization of the parts,

of the position and completion of the episodes, of the kind of similes

employed, and so forth, this is not the point of most importance,

inasmuch as here, more than in lyrical poetry of a later date, and

its artificial elaboration of the drama, the general world-outlook,

the faith in divine beings, and, in a word, what is most essential in

such national Bibles, must be expressed as the aspect of most weight.

Nevertheless, these great national books, such as are the Ramajana, the

Iliad, and the Odyssey, and even the "Song of the Nibelings," ought not

to lose that quality which alone, in respect to both their beauty and

their art, can endow them with the worth and freedom of artistic works,

the quality, that is, whereby they bring before our vision a complete

sphere of action. What we have simply to do, therefore, is to discover

the appropriate form of this exclusive unity.

(_ββ_) The term Unity, if employed in this general sense, has become

a very commonplace one even for tragedy, one capable of much misuse.

For every event, in its causes and effects, creates an infinite chain,

which, in the direction of the past no less than the future, and in

a way that is in both directions incalculable, leads to a further

series of particular circumstances and actions, it being impossible

to determine all that may form part of the circumstances and detail

in other respects, or the mode of their coalescence. If we merely

confine our attention to this series, no doubt an Epos may be extended

backwards and forwards indefinitely; and, over and above this such

always offers opportunity for digression. But it is just such a series

as this which makes the composition prosaic. To adduce an example the

Greek cyclic poets have celebrated the entire cyclus of the Trojan

war, and in doing so continue at the point where Homer stops, with a

beginning, too, from the egg of Leda. But it is precisely on account

of this that they degenerate into prose, if we contrast them with

Homer's compositions. Just as little--I have already drawn attention

to this--can an individual as such surrender the central focus of his

unity, inasmuch as it is from this that the most varied events issue,

and are able to effect a union in the same, though they may be entirely

without connection regarded simply as events. We have consequently

to seek for another type of unity. In this respect we must briefly

determine the distinction between a mere _event_, and a _definite

action_, which accepts the form of event in the epic narrative. We

may define a mere event as the external aspect and realization of

every human action, without involving with it the execution of a

particular end; or, in general terms, we may call it every external

modification in the form and appearance of what actually exists. When

anyone is struck by lightning, that is a mere event, an external

occurrence. More is implied in the sack of a hostile city; we have here

the fulfilment of a predeterminate purpose. An essentially distinct

object of this kind, such as the liberation of the Holy Land from the

yoke of the Saracens and heathen, or better still the satisfaction of

a specific impulse, such as the wrath of Achilles, must, under the

mode of the epic eventuality, constitute the synthetic unity of the

Epopaea; and by this I mean that the poetic narrative must restrict

itself to that which is uniquely the effect of this conceived purpose

or specific impulse, and in this co-operation be rounded off in an

essentially exclusive unity. Action and execution of this type is,

however, only possible to human agency; so that, as the culminating

point of our composition, we must have in progressive conjunction

with purpose and impulse a _human personality._ Furthermore, if the

action and satisfaction of the entire heroic character, from which both

purpose and impulse proceed, are merely the result of wholly definite

situations and motives, which are dissipated as we look back in an

extensive complexity of relation, and if, further, the execution of the

purpose, as we look forward, carries with it a variety of result, then

in that case on the one hand no doubt a large number of presuppositions

will be involved with such a specific action, and on the other hand we

shall have many effects of reaction, which, however, will not be placed

in any more intimate poetic connection with just this determinate

character of the end under exposition. In this sense, for instance,

the wrath of Achilles has as little connection with the rape of Helen

or the judgment of Paris, although the one fact is presupposed in the

other, as it has with the actual sack of Troy. When, therefore, it is

contended that the Iliad neither possesses a necessary beginning, nor

an appropriate conclusion, such a verdict is due to an inability to see

distinctly that it is the wrath of Achilles which is the main subject

of the Iliad, and which consequently should supply the focus-point of

unity. If, on the contrary, we form a stable conception of the heroic

figure of Achilles, and assume that this, as asserted in the wrath

aroused in him by Agamemnon, is the connecting thread of the whole,

we shall be unable to conceive either a beginning or termination of

greater beauty. It is, as I have already pointed out, the direct motive

of this anger, which forms the poem's commencement; the consequences

of the same are comprised in all that follows. Against this critics

have attempted to enforce the view that in such a case the last cantos

are irrelevant, and might just as well be omitted. Such an opinion, if

we look at the poem itself, is untenable. For just as the dallying of

Achilles himself by the ships and his abstinence from the conflict are

purely the result of his indignant wrath, and are in this inactivity

bound up closely with the almost immediate success of the Trojans over

the Grecian host, no less than with the fight and death of Patroclus,

so, too, the lament and revenge of the noble Achilles and his victory

over Hector is closely linked with this fall of his brave friend. If in

the previous opinion it is implied that death is the end of everything,

and after that we may as well pack and be off, such a view merely

indicates extreme crudity of imaginative conception. With the idea of

death it is merely _Nature_ that is brought to a standstill; man is not

so, nor yet are the obligations of his _ethical life_ and _habit_,[27]

with their claim of honourable recognition for the fallen hero. In this

sense the sports that form part of the funeral rites of Patroclus,

the heartrending pleas of Priam, the reconciliation of Achilles, who

returns the father the corpse of his son, in order that in this case,

too, honour to the dead may not be absent, each and all are connected

with the previous events, and contribute to the supreme and satisfying

beauty of the narrative's conclusion.

(_γγ_) Inasmuch, however, as we have attempted above to make a

specifically individual action, which issues in accordance with a

deliberate purpose or heroic impulses, conform to the type of an epic

whole in which focal points are ascertainable that bind it together

and round off its completeness, the view is at least possible that

we have made the _unity_ of the Epos too nearly identical with that

of the _drama._ For in the drama also it is _one_ particular line of

action issuing from self-conceived purpose and character with its

conflict which constitutes the focal centre. In order, therefore,

not to involve these two types of poetry, the epos, that is, and the

drama, in confusion, though the confusion merely appear to be such, I

will yet again draw the reader's attention emphatically to my previous

explanation of the distinction between human action and event. And

quite apart from this the epic interest is not simply confined to

those characters, objects, and situations which have their ground

in the particular action as such, whose progress is the subject of

the epic narrative, but this action possesses the further stimulus

to its opposed factors and their resolution, and in fact is directed

throughout its course and exclusively within a _national_ and

_collective whole_, or substantive content, which claims on its own

account to assert a variety of characters, conditions, and events. In

this respect the final consummation of the Epos does not merely consist

in the particular content of the predominant action selected, but quite

as much in the entire synthesis of the _general world-survey_ whose

objective reality it undertakes to depict; in fact, the epic unity is

only then fully complete when the particular action, from one point of

view no doubt, in its independent character, but also from another,

regarded in its progression as the essentially rounded world within

the sphere of which it moves, is placed before us as one indissoluble

totality; and both of these spheres, or aspects of one sphere, repose

together in the mediating fulness and unimpaired unity of very life.

Such, then, are the most essential characteristics we find it possible,

within the limits accepted, to draw attention to in respect to the

genuine Epos.

It is, however, possible to apply the same form of objectivity to

other subject-matter, whose content does not carry with it the true

significance of genuine objectivity. It is very possible that a

theorist in Art will feel embarrassment when, with such modes of speech

before him, he is asked to make a classification adapted to all poems

without distinction; and we must not forget that under the generic term

of poem these hybrid forms have also to be reckoned. In any really

just classification, however, we ought only to include that which only

conforms with a definition of the generic notion.[28] All that is, on

the contrary, incomplete in content or form, or both, precisely for the

reason that it is not as it ought to be, is only subsumed defectively

under the notion, or in other words under the definition, which gives

us the thing as it ought to be, and in truth actually is. I only

propose, therefore, in conclusion and by way of supplement, to add a

few observations upon such subordinate and collateral branches of the

true epic composition.

To this class of poetry above all the _idyll_ belongs in the modern

sense of that term, viz., that in which poetry stands aloof from the

profounder interests of spiritual and ethical life, and depicts mankind

in its innocence. Innocent life in this sense amounts to little more

than an ignorance of everything except eating and drinking. We may

add that what we eat and drink here is extremely simple, it is goat's

milk merely, or sheep's milk, or at the most cow's milk, roots, acorns,

vegetables, and cheese made from milk. I should say that bread is no

longer in the truly idyllic sphere; we must, however, allow to it

flesh-eating; for it is hardly possible that our idyllic shepherds and

shepherdesses could have wished to sacrifice their herds exclusively

to the gods. Their occupation will consist in looking the whole day

long after their beloved herds with their faithful hound, in providing

their food and drink, and along with this giving vent, with as much

sentimental feeling as possible, to every kind of mood which does not

disturb this condition of repose and contentment. In a word, they are

satisfied with their peculiar piety and gentleness, piping away on

their reed or oat-pipes, warbling to each other, and above all making

love with the greatest tenderness and innocence.

The Greeks, on the contrary, possessed in their plastic representations

a more jubilant world, with its attendants of Bacchus, Satyrs and

Fauns, who, in their harmless service of a god, stimulated animal

life and human joviality with a vivacity and truth totally different

from the above pretentious innocence, piety, and emptiness. We may

also recognize the same essentially animated outlook on the world as

illustrated in lively pictures of national condition, in the Greek

Bucolic poets such as Theocritus; this is so whether our poet lingers

over actual situations of the life of fisher-folk, or shepherds,

or extends the mode in which he expresses this, or similar spheres

of life, to a yet wider circle, either depicting such states in an

epic form, or treating them in lyric form and that of the objective

drama. Virgil already sings to us with less warmth in his Eclogues.

Most tedious of all, however, is Gessner, so tedious that I suppose

no one reads him nowadays. We can only wonder that the French ever

had so much taste for him that they even ranked him highest among

German poets. Their morbid sensibility on the one hand, which evades

the tumult and changes of life, while yearning also for some kind of

movement, and on the other the absence of all true interest in such

poetry, so that the otherwise disturbing influences of our culture were

not represented--both of these factors, no doubt, contributed to this

preference.

We may reckon as a further class of this hybrid type of Epic those

poems which are half description and half lyrics, a favourite type

with the English, and one which for the most part accepts for its

subject-matter Nature, the Seasons, and similar subjects. We may also

associate with this type the various _didactic_ poems concerned with

physical science, astronomy, medicine, chess, fishing, and hunting--in

short, the art which loves to elaborate in a poetic form what is really

the content of prose, an art which has been cultivated with much talent

in later Greek poetry, and after that by the Romans, and, in our time,

pre-eminently by the French. Such poetry, despite its general epic

temper, will very readily pass over into the lyric treatment.

The _romances_ and _ballads_, which we find both in the Middle Ages and

modern times, are no doubt poetry of a kind, though it is impossible to

define accurately their type; so far as their content is concerned they

are in part epic. If we look at the form of their composition, however,

they are for the most part lyrical, so that we have perforce to reckon

them from different points of view to different types.

The _romantic_ novel, that Epopaea of _modern society_, opens a

different field altogether. In this we possess, on the one hand, in

all its completeness and variety, an epic prodigality of interests,

conditions, characters, and living relations, the extensive background

in fact of an entire world. We have also the epic exposition of events.

What fails us here is the _primitive_ world-condition as poetically

conceived, which is the source of the genuine Epos. The romance or

novel in the modern sense pre-supposes a basis of reality already

organized in its _prosaic form_, upon which it then attempts, in its

own sphere, so far as this is possible from such a general point of

view, both in its treatment of the vital character of events and the

life of individuals and their destiny, to make good once more the

banished claims of poetical vision. For this reason one of the most

common collisions in the novel, and one most suitable to it, is the

conflict between the poetry of the heart and the prose of external

conditions antagonistic to it, including with such the contingency

such imply. This is a conflict which may be resolved on the lines of

tragedy or comedy, or finds its settlement in the twofold conclusion,

first, that the characters which in the first instance contend with

the ordinary course of life are taught to recognize in it what is

the genuine heart of things, becoming thereby reconciled to their

conditions and ready to cooperate with them; and, secondly, that they

learn how to brush away the purely prosaic aspect of all that they do

and accomplish, and thereby replace the prose which they have found

there with a reality allied and congenial to beauty and art. In so

far as the form of the exposition is concerned, the genuine romance

pre-supposes, precisely as the Epos does, the synthesized purvey of

the world and life as one whole, the manifold contents of which are

manifested within the reach of the individual event which supplies

the focal centre of the entire complexus. In his attitude to detail,

however, the poet must here permit himself a freer play both of

conception and execution, and all the more so because he is here less

able to avoid the prose of actual life in his descriptions, though this

freedom should not make him any more inclined to dwell exclusively in

such an atmosphere of prose and ordinary occurrence.

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