INTRODUCTION

I

The temple of classical architecture demands a god, who resides

therein. Sculpture exhibits the same in plastic beauty, and confers

forms on the material it employs for this purpose, which do not in

their nature remain external to what is spiritual, but are the form

itself immanent in the defined content. The corporeality, however, and

sensuousness, no less than the ideal universality of the sculptured

figure, are opposed on the one hand to subjective ideality, and in part

to the particularity of the individual, in whose element the content

of the religious, no less than also the worldly life, must secure

reality by virtue of a novel form of art. This mode of expression,

which is of subjective import, and at the same time particularized in

its characterization, the art of painting itself contributes under

the principle of the plastic arts. In other words it subordinates the

realistic expression of form to the more ideal presentment of colour,

and makes the expression of the ideality of soul the central point[1]

of the presentment. The universal sphere, however, in which these

arts are motived, the one in the ideal of symbolism, the other in the

plastic ideal, the third in the romantic type, is the sensuous or

_external_ form of spirit and natural objects.

The spiritual content possesses, however, as essentially appertinent

to the ideality of consciousness, a determinate existence which is for

this ideality at the same time foreign to the medium itself of the

external appearance and envisagement presented to it by material form.

From this foreign element it is further necessary that it removes its

conceptions in order to place them in a realm which, in respect to

material no less than the mode of expression, is independently of an

ideal or subjective character. This was the forward step which we saw

_music_ make, in so far as it embodied pure ideality and subjective

emotion in the configurations of essentially resonant sound rather than

in visible forms. It, however, passed by this very means into a further

extreme, that is, an ideal mode of concentration not fully explicit,

whose content in musical tones itself only found symbolic expression.

For tone taken by itself is without content, and has its definition in

the numerical relations, so that what is qualitative in the spiritual

content no doubt generally corresponds to these quantitative relations

which are expressed in essential differences, oppositions, and

mediation, but in its qualitative determinacy is not entirely able to

receive its impression in musical tone. If this aspect is not wholly to

fail the art of music must, by reason of its onesidedness, summon to

its assistance the more definite articulation of language, and requires

for its more secure attachment to particularity and the characteristic

expression of the content a text, without which it is unable to

complete fully the ideality which is poured forth by means of musical

tones.

By virtue of this expression of ideas and emotions, the abstract

ideality of music receives a clearer and more secure exposition. At

the same time what we have here unfolded by its means is, to a certain

extent, not the point of view of idea and the artistic mode adapted

to its expression, but merely the emotional life as it accompanies

the same; also in part we find that here, too, music entirely divests

itself of fusion with the verbal text in order to develop its own

movement without restraint in the world of tone simply. For this reason

the realm of idea, which is unable to remain under I such a more purely

abstract mode of ideal intensity, and seeks a configuration in a world

which embraces its one homogeneous and concrete reality, breaks away on

its part likewise from the bond of music, and in the exclusive art of

poetry discovers the adequate realization it demands.

_Poetry,_ in other words the art of human speech, is the _third_

or final step, the _totality_, which unites and embraces in a yet

higher sphere, in the sphere of the very life of Spirit itself[2],

the two extremes of the plastic arts and music. For on the one hand

poetry contains just as music does the principle which apprehends an

ideal content in its ideality, the principle which in architecture,

sculpture, and painting is lost, or at most incompletely asserted.

And on the other hand it expatiates itself, under the modes of ideal

conception, intuition, and feeling simply, in an objective world,

which does not entirely destroy the defined forms of sculpture and

painting, and is capable of unfolding all the conditions of an event, a

succession or interchange of emotional states, passions, conceptions,

and the exclusive course of human action with more completeness than

any other art.

2. But in a still more intimate way the art of poetry constitutes a

third or final term in its relation to painting and music regarded as

the _romantic_ arts.

(_a_) One reason of this is that its principle is that generally of

an _intelligence_ which has nothing further to do with gross matter

as such, seeking, as is the case with architecture, to transform it

through symbolism to an environment related analogically to spiritual

life, or as in the case of sculpture in order to implant upon material

substance the natural form congenial to such life under the spatial

condition of its expression. What the end is now is to express

immediately for mind the manifestations of Spirit with all its ideas

of imagination and art, without setting forth their external and

visible bodily presence. And a further reason consists in this, that

poetry is able to grasp in the form of ideality itself and with a far

greater wealth than is possible for music or painting, not merely the

innermost actuality of conscious life, but also what is particular and

individual in external existence, and equally able to contrast such

facts in the complete diversity of their specific traits and accidental

peculiarities.

(_b_) The art of poetry is, however, as totality, also again, from

another point of view, essentially to be distinguished from the

above-mentioned arts whose fundamental qualities it thus in a measure

combines.

(_α_) In this respect, if we compare it with painting, the latter art

is throughout at an advantage, where it is of importance to bring

before our senses a content under the condition of its external

appearance. It is true no doubt that poetry is able by various means

to envisualize objects precisely in the way that for the imagination

generally the principle of objectification is made real to our

intuitive sense. But in so far as conceptive power, in the element

of which poetry pre-eminently moves, is of a spiritual nature and

implies the presence of the universality of thought, it is incapable

of attaining the definition of sensuous perception. On the other hand,

the varied traits which poetry brings together, in order to make the

concrete form of a content visible, do not fall as with painting

into one and the same totality, which is set before us wholly as a

simultaneous appearance of all its details, but they break apart,

inasmuch as the imagination can only give us the complexity it contains

under the form of succession. This is, however, only a defect from the

sensuous point of view, a defect which reason is able in its own way

to rectify. That is to say, inasmuch as human speech, even in the case

where it endeavours to summon before our sight a concrete object, is

not concerned with the sensuous apprehension of an immediate external

object, but always with the ideal relation, the mental intuition, for

this reason the particular characteristics, albeit they are set before

us in a series, are nevertheless fused together in the element of one

essentially homogeneous spirit, which is able to qualify the effect of

succession, to bring the varied array into one picture, and to secure

and enjoy this picture in imaginative contemplation. Moreover, this

deficiency of sensuous realization and objective definition, when

we contrast poetry with painting, brings as a contrary result the

possibility of an incalculable superfluity of material. For inasmuch

as the poetic art in painting restricts itself to a determinate

space, and even more to a distinct moment in a situation or action,

for this reason it is prevented from portraying an object in its

entire ideal profundity no less than in the extension of its temporal

development. But what is true is throughout concrete in the sense that

it comprises within its embrace a unity of essential determinations.

In its phenomenal appearance, however, these are not merely unfolded

as a co-existent spatial phenomenon but in a temporal series as a

history, whose course painting is only able to present in a relatively

inadequate manner. Even in the case of every stalk, every tree, each

has in this sense its history, a change, sequence, and exclusive whole

of varied conditions. And this is even more true of the sphere of

spirit, which can only be exhaustively portrayed as veritable spirit

in phenomenal guise when it is set before our imagination as such a

process.

(_β_) We have already seen that poetry possesses for its external

medium that of tone in common with _music_. The wholly external, or,

as we might say in the false sense of the expression, the objective

material in the progressive series of the particular arts finally

vanishes in the subjective medium of sound, which is divested of all

visibility, and which suffers an ideal content only to be apprehended

by a conscious state independent of sight.[3] For music, however, the

configuration of musical _tone_ as such is the essential end. For

although the soul in the course and movement of melody and its harmonic

relations presents what is ideal in objects, or its own ideal content,

to the emotional life; yet the ideality thus presented is not pure

ideality, but the human soul interwoven in the closest way with the

musical tone as its expression, and the configuration of such musical

expression which confers on music its true character. So much is this

the case that music receives its independent position as an art just in

proportion as the animation given by it to the emotional life is more

emphasized in the world of pure music than in that of man's ordinary

spiritual activity.[4] But for this very reason it is only to a

relative degree capable of reproducing the variety of spiritual ideas

and intuitions, the entire extension of the ideal wealth of conscious

life: it remains restricted to the more abstract universality of all

that it grasps as content, and the more indefinite manifestations of

our emotion.

In the like degree, then, that mind (_Geist_) elaborates the more

abstract universality in a concrete whole of idea, ends, actions, and

events, and no less contributes to its conformation the particularizing

perception, it not only forsakes the subjective life of mere emotion

and builds up that life into an unfolded realm of objective reality

in this case, too, within the ideal world of the imagination itself,

it is compelled, by virtue of the nature of such transformation, to

forsake the attempt to express the new realm thus secured solely

and exclusively by means of tone relations. Precisely as the medium

of sculpture is too poor to express the more ample content that it

is the function of the art of painting to call into life, so too

the conditions of musical tone and melodic expression are unable to

realize fully the imaginative pictures of the poet. For these in part

possess the ideas more accurately defined to consciousness and, in

part, the form of external appearance impressed on the inner sense

of perceptive reason. Spirit consequently withdraws its content from

musical tone as such, and declares itself through words, which it is

true do not entirely forsake the element of sound, but sink to the

purely external sign of the communication. In other words, by means of

this repletion with spiritual ideas, musical tone becomes the voice of

articulate words; language, in its turn, is diverted from an end in

itself to a means of ideal expression which has lost its independent

self-subsistancy. This constitutes in fact what we have already

established as the essential difference between music and poetry. The

content of the art of speech is the collective art of the world of

ideas elaborated by the imagination, the spiritual which remains at

home in its vision, which remains in this ideal realm, and, even in

its movement toward an objective world, is only conscious of the same

as a symbol that differs from its own conscious content. In music

art reproduces the penetration of Spirit in a sensuously apparent

and present form. In poetry it even forsakes the element of _musical

tone_ and articulation opposed to it, at least to the extent that this

musical tone is no longer reclothed in fully adequate externality

and the exclusive expression of that content. The ideal no doubt is

expressed, but it fails to discover its real existence in the sensuous

medium of tone, despite the fact that it is of a more ideal character;

this it discovers exclusively in its own essential content, by virtue

of which it expresses the content of mind as it is realized in the

ideality of the imagination simply as such.

(_c_) In the _third_ place, and finally, if we consider the specific

character of poetry relatively to this distinction between music and

painting, and we may include with it the other plastic arts, we shall

find the same simply to consist in the subordination of the mode under

which all poetical content is envisaged and configured by the medium of

sense. In other words, when tone, as it does in the art of music, or

for that matter, colour as in that of painting, no longer essentially

recovers and expresses the entire content, in that case the musical

treatment of the composition under its aspects of time, no less than

those of harmony and melody, drops away; we have left us merely the

generalized configuration of the time-measure of syllables and words,

to which we may add rhythm, euphony, and the like. And further, it is

to be noted that we have this, not in the sense of a genuine medium for

the content, but rather as a mode of externality which is accidental,

and which only receives an artistic form, because art cannot permit any

mode of its external manifestation whatever to be entirely a question

of accidental caprice.

(_α_) In connection with this withdrawal of the spiritual content from

the sensuous medium we are at once met with the question what it is

then which, under such a view, constitutes the actual externality or

objectivity in poetry, that of tone being thus excluded. The answer

to this is simple. It is the _ideal envisagement_ and _imaginative

content_ itself. We have here spiritual forms substituted for sensuous,

and supply a configurative material, such as we met with before in

marble, bronze, colour, or musical tones. In other words, we must guard

ourselves from such an inadequate statement of the facts as that ideas

and imagery are nothing more or less than the _content_ of poetry.

This is unquestionably true in a sense, as we shall demonstrate more

closely later on. Despite this, however, we are equally justified

in asserting that idea, imagery, emotion, and the like are specific

modes, under which every content in poetry is subsumed and manifested;

and consequently, that is, owing to the fact that the sensuous

aspect of the communication remains throughout a purely accidental

one[5]--it is these forms which supply the real material which the

poet has to elaborate artistically. No doubt the fact, the content,

must in poetry, as in other arts, receive its due objectification

for spirit; objectivity in this sense, however, is the exchange of

what was previously an external reality for one that is ideal; one

which receives an existence exclusively in conscious life itself, as

something conceived or imagined exclusively by mind. Mind is here on

its own ground objective to itself, and it suffers the medium of speech

merely as a means, that is to say, partly as one of communication, and

partly as one of immediate externality, from which, as from the pure

symbol merely, it is withdrawn throughout from itself into itself. For

this reason, in the case of genuine poetry, it is of no consequence

whether a poetical work be read in private or listened to; and for the

same reason it can also, without essential depreciation of its value,

be translated into other tongues, be transferred from versification

into prose, and thereby transmitted in tonal relations of an entirely

different character.[6]

(_β_) In the _second_ place the question presents itself as to the

_nature_ of the object _for_ which the ideal concept is employed in

poetry. We answer that it is thus used relatively to essential truth

in everything of interest to Spirit; not merely, that is, relatively

to what is substantive in the same in the universality of its

symbolic significance or classical differentiation, but equally to

all that is at the same time specific and particular, in short, to

practically everything in and with which mind is in any way interested

and concerned. The art of language, consequently, both in respect to

its content and the mode under which that content is made explicit,

possesses a field of immeasurable compass, wholly incomparable with

that of the other arts. Every content, every sort of spiritual or

natural fact, event, history, deed, action, all conditions, whether

ideal or external, fall within the domain and configurative powers of

poetry.

(_γ_) Material of this most varied character is not, however, made

poetical merely by reason of the fact that it is in a general way the

content of idea. Ordinary consciousness is able to elaborate precisely

the same content in the field of ideas, and to particularize concepts

without creating any poetical result. We recognized this fact when we

called the concept of mind merely the _material_ or medium, which only

receives a form adapted for poetry, in so far as it partakes of a novel

configuration by virtue of art. In precisely the same way mere colour

and tone in their immediacy are not as such the colour or tone of a

painter or a musician. We may in a general way describe the distinction

by stating that it is not the _idea as such_, but the _imagination_ of

the _artist_ which creates a poetical content, under conditions, that

is, in which the imagination grasps the same content in such a way that

it is itself therewith associated in language, words and their more

beautiful conjunction as human speech, just as in the other arts we

find it present in the architectonic form; the plastic of sculpture,

that adapted to painting, or musical tones and harmony.

A further necessary limitation of the art's appearance is this that

the content must, on the one hand, not be embraced in relations

applicable to mere _thinking_, whether that of science or speculative

philosophy, nor further in the form of inarticulate _emotion_, or with

a clarity and self-sufficiency which appeals _exclusively_ to the

organs of sense;[6] neither, in another direction, must it suffer the

idea to pass entirely into what we may in general terms describe as

the contingency, divisions, and relativity of _finite_ reality. The

imagination of the poet in this respect must maintain a middle course

between the abstract universality of pure thinking and the concrete

corporeality of material objects, in so far as we are acquainted with

the latter in the productions of the plastic arts. Furthermore such an

art must generally conform to the requirements we have, in an early

section of this work, insisted as essential to every art-product. In

other words, the art itself must find in its content the adequate

object of its appearance, must elaborate everything, which it embraces,

so far as the interest appeals to the intelligence simply,[7] as an

essentially independent and self-exclusive world. Only in so far as

it does this is the demand of art satisfied, and the content thereof

becomes, by virtue of the specific mode of _its_ manifestation, an

organic whole, which in its parts presents the appearance of a limited

association and ideal synthesis, while at the same time, as contrasted

with the world of accidental subordinations, its consistency is one of

essential freedom, a whole made explicit through itself.

3. The last point to which we must in conclusion draw attention in

respect to this distinction between poetry and the other arts is

connected with the different mode under which the imagination of the

poet substantiates its ideas in the objective medium of its exposition.

The arts hitherto considered were entirely serious in their attachment

to the material of sense, a medium in which they themselves were

operative, in so far as they merely bestowed on their content a

form, which could be throughout accepted and elaborated by means of

conglomerations of material substance, whether bronze, marble, or wood,

or the media of colour and tones.[8] In a certain sense, no doubt,

poetry also has to meet a condition somewhat similar. That is to say,

in poetical composition we must not overlook the fact that its results

have to be intelligible to mind by means of the communication of human

speech. But we shall find none the less that the situation in the two

cases is essentially altered.

(_a_) Otherwise expressed, by reason of the importance pertaining to

the material aspect in the plastic arts and music, we find that, as a

result of the _defined_ restrictions of this material, only a _limited_

number of conceptions can be fully reproduced in a particularized form

of reality such as stone, colour, and tone: the content therefore and

the possibilities of artistic composition are narrowed within very

definable limits. It was on account of this fact that we were able to

associate closely and exclusively every one of these specific arts

with one particular form of artistic creation pre-eminently adapted to

it. In this way the form of symbolism was appropriate to architecture,

the classical to sculpture, and the romantic to painting and music. It

is no doubt true that the particular arts in both directions from and

toward their proper domain tended to pass over into the other forms.

We took account of this fact when we found it possible to refer to a

classic and romantic style of architecture, a symbolical and Christian

type of sculpture, and even used the term classic in connection with

painting and music. Departures such as these from the prevailing type

were, however, merely experimental essays which prepared the way in

subordination to a new type rather than its culminating effort; or they

showed us how one art tended to pass beyond its true limits in seeking

to grasp a content or a relation to its material of a type that only a

further art development could adequately elaborate. Generally speaking,

we have seen that architecture has least resource in the expression of

its content; in sculpture there is already an increase of possibility,

which is further extended to its widest range[9] by painting and music.

And the reason of this is that in proportion as the ideality and

particularization under all its aspects by the external medium is made

more explicit the variety of the content and of the forms it receives

also increases.

Poetry, on the other hand, casts itself free of all subordination to

the material of sense, at least to this extent, that in the definition

of external or objective expression no reason whatever remains why it

should restrict itself to specific content or any limitation to its

power of composition and reproduction. It is therefore exclusively

united to no specific art type; rather we may define it as the

_universal_ art, which is capable of reclothing and expressing under

every conceivable mode every content that can possibly enter into or

proceed from the imagination of man. And it can do this because its

material is nothing more or less than the imagination itself, which

is the universal root and ground of all the particular arts and their

specific types.

We have already, in another connection, when concluding our discussion

of the particular artistic types, come across what was practically the

same thing. What we sought for, then, in our conclusion was that art

in one of its types should make itself independent of that mode of

representation properly called specific, remaining thereby predominant

above the entire sphere in which such a totality of particularization

is reproduced. An elaboration so comprehensive is among all the

particular arts by the very nature of the case only possible to poetry.

Its realization is effected through the development of poetical

creation in part by means of the actual reconstitution of every

particular type, and partly by the liberation of the mode of conception

and its content from the boundaries fixed for it in the essentially

exclusive types of conception, whose character we have severally

defined as symbolical, classical, and romantic.

(_b_) The above considerations will further serve to justify the

position, which, in the course of our inquiry, regarded as the

development of a philosophy, we previously assigned to the art of

poetry. In other words by reason of the fact that poetry is, to a

degree quite impossible to any other mode of artistic production,

concerned with the universal simply as such in Art, we might appear

to have some reason for insisting that it marks the commencement

of an investigation in the full sense of the word philosophical,

and only from such a starting point can we enter into the sphere of

particularization, in which we find the series of the other arts as

limited and determined by their specific sensuous medium. Looking

back, however, at the result arrived at in our investigation of the

particular art types we shall find that the course of philosophical

evolution consisted, first, in an increased penetration of the ideal

content, and, from another point of view, in the demonstration that

originally Art sets forth in the search, then in the discovery of and

finally with an advance beyond that content compatible with its powers.

This notion of the beautiful and _Art_ must enforce itself in _the

arts_ themselves. The starting-point of our inquiry, therefore, was

architecture, in which we found merely an impulse toward the complete

representation of what pertains to Spirit in a material medium. This

is so much the case that it is only through sculpture that art first

attains to a genuine interfusion of ideality with the medium; and

further that only in the arts of painting and music do we reach the

stage where, by virtue of the ideal and subjective character of their

content, we find the perfected fusion effected no less under the aspect

of conception than that of practical execution in the medium accepted.

This process culminates most decisively in poetry, by virtue of the

fact that the very nature of its objective realization can only be

apprehended as an effort to draw apart from and cancel the material of

sense rather than one of reproduction which does not as yet venture to

clothe itself and move in the objective medium of sense-perception. In

order, however, to make this liberation intelligible in philosophical

terms it is of importance that we have already disposed of the question

what it is from which art undertakes to liberate itself. This question

stands in close relation to the fact that poetry is essentially capable

of embracing the entirety of intelligible content and artistic modes

of expression. We may add further that we have viewed this as the

acceptance of a totality, which can only be interpreted philosophically

as the abrogation of limitation in particularity. Our previous

consideration of what we mean by things that are one-sided would be

involved in such an exposition, the self-exclusive character of such

one-sidedness being cancelled by such a totality.

It is only through the course of such an exposition that we can

effectively demonstrate that poetry is the specific art in which a

point is reached which marks the beginning of the disintegration of art

itself, a point at which the philosophical consciousness discovers its

bridge of passage to the notion of religion as such, as also to the

prose of scientific thought. The boundary lines of the realm of beauty

are, as we have already seen, on the one hand the prose of finite

condition and our ordinary conscious life, starting from which Art

makes its effort in the direction of truth, and, on the other, of the

loftier spheres of religion and science, from which it passes over into

a comprehension of the Absolute till more emancipate from all material

association.

(_c_) Despite therefore the completeness with which the art of poetry

reproduces, under a mode of objectification that is most ideal, the

entire totality of Beauty, nevertheless intelligence is able to

discover even here too in this final domain of art a residue of defect.

We may for this purpose within our art-system directly contrast the

poetic art with that of architecture. In other words architecture was

still unable to subordinate the external material to the ideal content

sufficiently to clothe the same in a form adequate to mind; poetry on

the other hand carries the process of negating its sensuous medium

so far that instead of transforming that which stands in opposition

to gross spatial matter, namely tone, as architecture does with its

material into a significant symbol, it rather reduces it to a mere

sign of no significance. But by doing so it destroys the fusion of

spiritual ideality with external existence, so thoroughly that to this

extent it ceases to be compatible with the original notion of Art. In

other words it comes dangerously near to bidding goodbye to the region

of sense altogether, remaining wholly absorbed in that of ideality.

The fair mean between these extremes of architecture and poetry is

secured by sculpture, painting, and music. Every one of these arts not

merely still reproduces the spiritual content completely in a medium

borrowed from the objective world, but also leaves us with that which

lies open to our senses, no less than our intelligence. For although

painting and music, regarded as romantic arts, attach themselves to a

medium already more ideal, they do none the less supply the immediacy

of objective existence, which, however, in this increase of ideality,

shows indications of disappearance, while again from the opposite point

of view they prove themselves, through their media of colour and tone,

more profuse in fulness of particularization and manifold configuration

than is required from the material of sculpture.

No doubt the art of poetry in its turn also endeavours, as a set-off to

this defect, to place the objective world before us with a breadth and

variety which even painting, at least in a single composition, fails

to secure: none the less this comprehensiveness remains throughout

merely a realization confined to consciousness itself; and, if it so

happens that poetry, in response to a demand for more material artistic

realization, attempts to increase the impression on our senses, it is

only able to do this by either borrowing these effects from music and

painting, in order to secure artistic means otherwise foreign to it;

or it is forced, if it seeks retain its genuine character, to employ

these sister arts only under a subordinate relation of service, while

the main stress is laid on the ideas of conscious life, the imagination

which appeals to the imagination, with which it is above all concerned.

This will suffice for discussion of the general relation under which

poetry is placed to the other arts. We shall now proceed to a closer

examination of the art of poetry itself, and with a view to this

propose to co-ordinate the same as follows.

We have already seen that in poetry it is the ideal concept itself from

which we derive content no less than medium. By reason, however, of

the fact that we already find outside Art's domain the world of idea

to be the most obvious mode of conscious life, it is above everything

else important to distinguish the conception of _poetry_ from that of

_prose._ The art of poetry, however, is not complete in this ideal

world of the imagination alone. It is necessary that it should clothe

the same in expressive _language._ It has therefore a twofold task

confronting it. On the one hand it is called upon so to arrange this

world of constructed idea that it may admit of complete translation

into speech: on the other it must take care not to leave this medium of

language in the form appropriated by ordinary conscious life. In other

words such must be treated poetically in order that the expression of

art may be distinguishable in the selection of words no less than their

position, and even their sound from that of ordinary prose.

Furthermore, on account of the fact that, though poetry avails itself

of language as a means of expression, it secures by far the most

unqualified freedom from those conditions and restrictions imposed on

the other arts by virtue of the particularization of their material,

it is possible for a poetical composition in a pre-eminent degree to

elaborate every one of the various modes of expression, otherwise

adopted unaffected by the onesidedness incidental to their application

to a particular art. The subdivision of such _modes of expression_ in

all their variety is consequently by far the most complete in the works

of poetry.

The further course of our investigation may now be epitomized as

follows:

_First,_ we have to elucidate what is in general terms _poetical,_ and

the _poetical composition_ in particular.

_Secondly,_ poetry will be examined as a means of _expression._

_Thirdly_, we shall deal with the subdivision of the art into _Epic,

Lyric,_ and _Dramatic_ poetry.

[Footnote 1: _Mittelpunkt._ We should rather say the unifying

significance of the creation.]

[Footnote 2: It would be perhaps better to translate _geistigen

Innerlichkeit_ with the words "the self-conscious life of the human

reason." This is developed and explained, however, in the next

paragraph.]

[Footnote 3: Hegel expresses this as "making the inner or ideal

content perceptible to the ideal faculty," that is, _prima facie_,

consciousness, or at least that sense which is nearest related to it,

viz., hearing.]

[Footnote 4: By _statt des Geistigen_ Hegel clearly contrasts pure

music with music related as accompaniment to human speech in song.]

[Footnote 5: Lit., "one that merely plays by the way."]

[Footnote 6: Such a statement is obviously one which would be

strongly resisted. The stress laid here on the purely ideal content

as contrasted with the beauty of rhythm and modal arrangement would

certainly suggest that Hegel was deficient in a sense for the musical

possibilities of language I presume he does use _gebunden_ in the sense

of verse.]

[Footnote 7: Hegel's expression is _in rein theoretischen Interesse._]

[Footnote 8: The medium of music is not of course strictly on all fours

with the others.]

[Footnote 9: That is under the limits of these four arts.]

I

The Philosophy of Fine Art, volume 4 (of 4) Hegel's Aesthetik · 第 47 / 73 题