Produced by Al Haines
[Frontispiece: FRONTENAC ANSWERING PHIPS'S MESSENGER, 1690. From a
colour drawing by C. W. Jefferys]
THE FIGHTING
GOVERNOR
A Chronicle of Frontenac
BY
CHARLES W. COLBY
TORONTO
GLASGOW, BROOK & COMPANY
1915
Copyright in all Countries subscribing to
the Berne Convention
{v}
CONTENTS
Page
I. CANADA IN 1672 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. LOUIS DE BUADE, COMTE DE FRONTENAC . . . . . . . . . . . 17
III. FRONTENAC'S FIRST YEARS IN CANADA . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
IV. GOVERNOR, BISHOP, AND INTENDANT . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
V. FRONTENAC'S PUBLIC POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
VI. THE LURID INTERVAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
VII. THE GREAT STRUGGLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
VIII. FRONTENAC'S LAST DAYS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
{vii}
ILLUSTRATIONS
FRONTENAC ANSWERING PHIPS'S MESSENGER, 1690 . . . . _Frontispiece_
From a colour drawing by C. W. Jefferys.
LADY FRONTENAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _Facing page 22_
From a painting in the Versailles Gallery.
JEAN BAPTISTE COLBERT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " 26
From an engraving in the Château de Ramezay.
ROBERT CAVELIER DE LA SALLE . . . . . . . . . . . . " 40
From an engraving by Waltner, Paris.
FIGURE OF FRONTENAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " 80
From the Hébert Statue at Quebec.
PIERRE LE MOYNE, SIEUR D'IBERVILLE . . . . . . . . . " 118
From an engraving in the John Ross Robertson
Collection, Toronto Public Library.
{1}
CHAPTER I
CANADA IN 1672
The Canada to which Frontenac came in 1672 was no longer the infant
colony it had been when Richelieu founded the Company of One Hundred
Associates. Through the efforts of Louis XIV and Colbert it had
assumed the form of an organized province.[1] Though its inhabitants
numbered less than seven thousand, the institutions under which they
lived could not have been more elaborate or precise. In short, the
divine right of the king to rule over his people was proclaimed as
loudly in the colony as in the motherland.
It was inevitable that this should be so, for the whole course of
French history since the thirteenth century had led up to the
absolutism of Louis XIV. During the early ages of feudalism France had
been distracted by the wars of her kings against rebellious nobles.
The virtues and firmness of Louis IX {2} (1226-70) had turned the scale
in favour of the crown. There were still to be many rebellions--the
strife of Burgundians and Armagnacs in the fifteenth century, the Wars
of the League in the sixteenth century, the cabal of the Fronde in the
seventeenth century--but the great issue had been settled in the days
of the good St Louis. When Raymond VII of Toulouse accepted the Peace
of Lorris (1243) the government of Canada by Louis XIV already existed
in the germ. That is to say, behind the policy of France in the New
World may be seen an ancient process which had ended in untrammelled
autocracy at Paris.
This process as it affected Canada was not confined to the spirit of
government. It is equally visible in the forms of colonial
administration. During the Middle Ages the dukes and counts of France
had been great territorial lords--levying their own armies, coining
their own money, holding power of life and death over their vassals.
In that period Normandy, Brittany, Maine, Anjou, Toulouse, and many
other districts, were subject to the king in name only. But, with the
growth of royal power, the dukes and counts steadily lost their
territorial {3} independence and fell at last to the condition of
courtiers. Simultaneously the duchies or counties were changed into
provinces, each with a noble for its governor--but a noble who was a
courtier, holding his commission from the king and dependent upon the
favour of the king. Side by side with the governor stood the
intendant, even more a king's man than the governor himself. So
jealously did the Bourbons guard their despotism that the crown would
not place wide authority in the hands of any one representative. The
governor, as a noble and a soldier, knew little or nothing of civil
business. To watch over the finances and the prosperity of the
province, an intendant was appointed. This official was always chosen
from the middle class and owed his position, his advancement, his whole
future, to the king. The governor might possess wealth, or family
connections. The intendant had little save what came to him from his
sovereign's favour. Gratitude and interest alike tended to make him a
faithful servant.
But, though the crown had destroyed the political power of the nobles,
it left intact their social pre-eminence. The king was as supreme as a
Christian ruler could be. Yet {4} by its very nature the monarchy
could not exist without the nobles, from whose ranks the sovereign drew
his attendants, friends, and lieutenants. Versailles without its
courtiers would have been a desert. Even the Church was a stronghold
of the aristocracy, for few became bishops or abbots who were not of
gentle birth.
The great aim of government, whether at home or in the colonies, was to
maintain the supremacy of the crown. Hence all public action flowed
from a royal command. The Bourbon theory required that kings should
speak and that subjects should obey. One direct consequence of a
system so uncompromisingly despotic was the loss of all local
initiative. Nothing in the faintest degree resembling the New England
town-meeting ever existed in New France. Louis XIV objected to public
gatherings of his people, even for the most innocent purposes. The
sole limitation to the power of the king was the line of cleavage
between Church and State. Religion required that the king should
refrain from invading the sphere of the clergy, though controversy
often waxed fierce as to where the secular ended and the spiritual
began.
{5}
When it became necessary to provide institutions for Canada, the
organization of the province in France at once suggested itself as a
fit pattern. Canada, like Normandy, had the governor and the intendant
for her chief officials, the seigneury for the groundwork of her
society, and mediaeval _coutumes_ for her laws.
The governor represented the king's dignity and the force of his arms.
He was a noble, titled or untitled. It was the business of the
governor to wage war and of the intendant to levy taxes. But as an
expedition could not be equipped without money, the governor looked to
the intendant for funds, and the intendant might object that the plans
of the governor were unduly extravagant. Worse still, the commissions
under which both held office were often contradictory. More than three
thousand miles separated Quebec from Versailles, and for many months
governor and intendant quarrelled over issues which could only be
settled by an appeal to the king. Meanwhile each was a spy as well as
a check upon the other. In Canada this arrangement worked even more
harmfully than in France, where the king could make himself felt
without great loss of time.
{6}
Yet an able intendant could do much good. There are few finer episodes
in the history of local government than the work of Turgot as intendant
of the Limousin.[2] Canada also had her Talon, whose efforts had
transformed the colony during the seven years which preceded
Frontenac's arrival. The fatal weakness was scanty population. This
Talon saw with perfect clearness, and he clamoured for immigrants till
Colbert declared that he would not depopulate France to people Canada.
Talon and Frontenac came into personal contact only during a few weeks,
but the colony over which Frontenac ruled as governor had been created
largely by the intelligence and toil of Talon as intendant.[3]
While the provincial system of France gave Canada two chief personages,
a third came from the Church. In the annals of New France there is no
more prominent figure than the bishop. François de Laval de
Montmorency had been in the colony since 1659. {7} His place in
history is due in large part to his strong, intense personality, but
this must not be permitted to obscure the importance of his office.
His duties were to create educational institutions, to shape
ecclesiastical policy, and to represent the Church in all its dealings
with the government.
Many of the problems which confronted Laval had their origin in special
and rather singular circumstances. Few, if any, priests had as yet
been established in fixed parishes--each with its church and
_presbytère_. Under ordinary conditions parishes would have been
established at once, but in Canada the conditions were far from
ordinary. The Canadian Church sprang from a mission. Its first
ministers were members of religious orders who had taken the conversion
of the heathen for their chosen task. They had headquarters at Quebec
or Montreal, but their true field of action was the wilderness. Having
the red man rather than the settler as their charge, they became
immersed, and perhaps preoccupied, in their heroic work. Thus the
erection of parishes was delayed. More than one historian has
upbraided Laval for thinking so much of the mission that he neglected
the spiritual needs of the colonists. However {8} this may be, the
colony owed much to the missionaries--particularly to the Jesuits. It
is no exaggeration to say that the Society of Jesus had been among the
strongest forces which stood between New France and destruction. Other
supports failed. The fur trade had been the corner-stone upon which
Champlain built up Quebec, but the profits proved disappointing. At
the best it was a very uncertain business. Sometimes the prices in
Paris dwindled to nothing because the market was glutted. At other
times the Indians brought no furs at all to the trading-posts. With
its export trade dependent upon the caprice of the savages, the colony
often seemed not worth the keeping. In these years of worst
discouragement the existence of the mission was a great prop.
On his arrival in 1672 Frontenac found the Jesuits, the Sulpicians, and
the Récollets all actively engaged in converting the heathen. He
desired that more attention should be paid to the creation of parishes
for the benefit of the colonists. Over this issue there arose, as we
shall see by and by, acute differences between the bishop and the
governor.
Owing to the large part which religion had in the life of New France
the bishop took his {9} place beside the governor and the intendant.
This was the triumvirate of dignitaries. Primarily each represented a
different interest--war, business, religion. But they were brought
into official contact through membership in the _Conseil Souverain_,
which controlled all details of governmental action.
The Sovereign Council underwent changes of name and composition, but
its functions were at all times plainly defined. In 1672 the members
numbered seven. Of these the governor, the bishop, and the intendant
formed the nucleus, the other four being appointed by them. In 1675
the king raised the number of councillors to ten, thus diluting the
authority which each possessed, and thenceforth made the appointments
himself. Thus during the greater part of Frontenac's régime the
governor, the bishop, and the intendant had seven associates at the
council-board. Still, as time went on, the king felt that his control
over this body was not quite perfect. So in 1703 he changed the name
from Sovereign Council to Superior Council, and increased its members
to a total of fifteen.
The Council met at the Château St Louis on Monday morning of each week,
at a round table where the governor had the bishop on {10} his right
hand and the intendant on his left. Nevertheless the intendant
presided, for the matters under discussion fell chiefly in his domain.
Of the other councillors the attorney-general was the most conspicuous.
To him fell the task of sifting the petitions and determining which
should be presented. Although there were local judges at Quebec, Three
Rivers, and Montreal, the Council had jurisdiction over all important
cases, whether criminal or civil. In the sphere of commerce its powers
were equally complete and minute. It told merchants what profits they
could take on their goods, and how their goods should be classified
with respect to the percentage of profit allowed. Nothing was too
petty for its attention. Its records depict with photographic accuracy
the nature of French government in Canada. From this source we can see
how the principle of paternalism was carried out to the last detail.
But Canada was a long way from France and the St Lawrence was larger
than the Seine. It is hard to fight against nature, and in Canada
there were natural obstacles which withstood to some extent the forces
of despotism. It is easy to see how distance from the court gave both
governor and intendant {11} a range of action which would have been
impossible in France. With the coming of winter Quebec was isolated
for more than six months. During this long interval the two officials
could do a great many things of which the king might not have approved,
but which he was powerless to prevent. His theoretical supremacy was
thus limited by the unyielding facts of geography. And a better
illustration is found in the operation of the seigneurial system upon
which Canadian society was based. In France a belated feudalism still
held the common man in its grip, and in Canada the forms of feudalism
were at least partially established. Yet the Canadian habitant lived
in a very different atmosphere from that breathed by the Norman
peasant. The Canadian seigneur had an abundance of acreage and little
cash. His grant was in the form of uncleared land, which he could only
make valuable through the labours of his tenants or _censitaires_. The
difficulty of finding good colonists made it important to give them
favourable terms. The habitant had a hard life, but his obligations
towards his seigneur were not onerous. The man who lived in a log-hut
among the stumps and could hunt at will through the {12} forest was not
a serf. Though the conditions of life kept him close to his home,
Canada meant for him a new freedom.
Freest of all were the coureurs de bois, those dare-devils of the
wilderness who fill such a large place in the history of the fur trade
and of exploration. The Frenchman in all ages has proved abundantly
his love of danger and adventure. Along the St Lawrence from Tadoussac
to the Sault St Louis seigneuries fringed the great river, as they
fringed the banks of its tributary, the Richelieu. This was the zone
of cultivation, in which log-houses yielded, after a time, to
white-washed cottages. But above the Sault St Louis all was
wilderness, whether one ascended the St Lawrence or turned at Ile
Perrot into the Lake of Two Mountains and the Ottawa. For young and
daring souls the forest meant the excitement of discovery, the licence
of life among the Indians, and the hope of making more than could be
gained by the habitant from his farm. Large profits meant large risks,
and the coureur de bois took his life in his hand. Even if he escaped
the rapid and the tomahawk, there was an even chance that he would
become a reprobate.
{13}
But if his character were of tough fibre, there was also a chance that
he might render service to his king. At times of danger the government
was glad to call on him for aid. When Tracy or Denonville or Frontenac
led an expedition against the Iroquois, it was fortunate that Canada
could muster a cohort of men who knew woodcraft as well as the Indians.
In days of peace the coureur de bois was looked on with less favour.
The king liked to know where his subjects were at every hour of the day
and night. A Frenchman at Michilimackinac,[4] unless he were a
missionary or a government agent, incurred severe displeasure, and many
were the edicts which sought to prevent the colonists from taking to
the woods. But, whatever the laws might say, the coureur de bois could
not be put down. From time to time he was placed under restraint, but
only for a moment. The intendant might threaten and the priest might
plead. It recked not to the coureur de bois when once his knees felt
the bottom of the canoe.
{14}
But of the seven thousand French who peopled Canada in 1672 it is
probable that not more than four hundred were scattered through the
forest. The greater part of the inhabitants occupied the seigneuries
along the St Lawrence and the Richelieu. Tadoussac was hardly more
than a trading-post. Quebec, Three Rivers, and Montreal were but
villages. In the main the life of the people was the life of the
seigneuries--an existence well calculated to bring out in relief the
ancestral heroism of the French race. The grant of seigneurial rights
did not imply that the recipient had been a noble in France. The
earliest seigneur, Louis Hébert, was a Parisian apothecary, and many of
the Canadian gentry were sprung from the middle class. There was
nothing to induce the dukes, the counts, or even the barons of France
to settle on the soil of Canada. The governor was a noble, but he
lived at the Château St Louis. The seigneur who desired to achieve
success must reside on the land he had received and see that his
tenants cleared it of the virgin forest. He could afford little
luxury, for in almost all cases his private means were small. But a
seigneur who fulfilled the conditions of his grant could look forward
to occupying a {15} relatively greater position in Canada than he could
have occupied in France, and to making better provision for his
children.
Both the seigneur and his tenant, the habitant, had a stake in Canada
and helped to maintain the colony in the face of grievous hardships.
The courage and tenacity of the French Canadian are attested by what he
endured throughout the years when he was fighting for his foothold.
And if he suffered, his wife suffered still more. The mother who
brought up a large family in the midst of stumps, bears, and Iroquois
knew what it was to be resourceful.
Obviously the Canada of 1672 lacked many things--among them the stern
resolve which animated the Puritans of New England that their sons
should have the rudiments of an education.[5] At this point the
contrast between New France and New England discloses conflicting
ideals of faith and duty. In later years the problem of knowledge
assumed larger proportions, but during the period of Frontenac the
chief need of Canada was heroism. Possessing this virtue abundantly,
Canadians lost no time in lamentations over {16} the lack of books or
the lack of wealth. The duty of the hour was such as to exclude all
remoter vistas. When called on to defend his hearth and to battle for
his race, the Canadian was ready.
[1] See _The Great Intendant_ in this Series.
[2] Anne Robert Jacques Turgot (1727-81), a statesman, thinker, and
philanthropist of the first order. It was as intendant of Limoges that
Turgot disclosed his great powers. He held his post for thirteen years
(1761-74), and effected improvements which led Louis XVI to appoint him
comptroller-general of the Kingdom.
[3] See _The Great Intendant_.
[4] The most important of the French posts in the western portion of
the Great Lakes, situated on the strait which unites Lake Huron to Lake
Michigan. It was here that Saint-Lusson and Perrot took possession of
the West in the name of France (June 1671). See _The Great Intendant_,
pp. 115-16.
[5] For example, Harvard College was founded in 1636, and there was a
printing-press at Cambridge, Mass., in 1638.
{17}
CHAPTER II
LOUIS DE BUADE, COMTE DE FRONTENAC
Louis de Buade, Comte de Frontenac et de Palluau, was born in 1620. He
was the son of Henri de Buade, a noble at the court of Louis XIII. His
mother, Anne de Phélippeaux, came from a stock which in the early
Bourbon period furnished France with many officials of high rank,
notably Louis de Phélippeaux, Comte de Pontchartrain. His father
belonged to a family of southern France whose estates lay originally in
Guienne. It was a fortunate incident in the annals of this family that
when Antoine de Bourbon became governor of Guienne (1555) Geoffrey de
Buade entered his service. Thenceforth the Buades were attached by
close ties to the kings of Navarre. Frontenac's grandfather, Antoine
de Buade, figures frequently in the _Memoirs_ of Agrippa d'Aubigné as
aide-de-camp to Henry IV; Henri de Buade, Frontenac's father, was a
playmate and close friend of {18} Louis XIII;[1] and Frontenac himself
was a godson and a namesake of the king.
While fortune thus smiled upon the cradle of Louis de Buade, some
important favours were denied. Though nobly born, Frontenac did not
spring from a line which had been of national importance for centuries,
like that of Montmorency or Châtillon. Nor did he inherit large
estates. The chief advantage which the Buades possessed came from
their personal relations with the royal family. Their property in
Guienne was not great, and neither Geoffrey, Antoine, nor Henri had
possessed commanding abilities. Nor was Frontenac the boyhood friend
of his king as his father had been, for Louis XIV was not born till
1638. Frontenac's rank was good enough to give him a chance at the
French court. For the rest, his worldly prosperity would depend on his
own efforts.
Inevitably he became a soldier. He entered the army at fifteen. It
was one of the greatest moments in French history. Richelieu was prime
minister, and the long {19} strife between France and the House of
Hapsburg had just begun to turn definitely in favour of France.
Against the Hapsburgs, with their two thrones of Spain and Austria,[2]
stood the Great Cardinal, ready to use the crisis of the Thirty Years'
War for the benefit of his nation--even though this meant a league with
heretics. At the moment when Frontenac first drew the sword France (in
nominal support of her German allies) was striving to conquer Alsace.
The victory which brought the French to the Rhine was won through the
capture of Breisach, at the close of 1638. Then in swift succession
followed those astounding victories of Condé and Turenne which
destroyed the military pre-eminence of Spain, took the French to the
gates of Munich, and wrung from the emperor the Peace of Westphalia
(1648).
During the thirteen years which followed Frontenac's first glimpse of
war it was a glorious thing to be a French soldier. The events of such
an era could not fail to leave {20} their mark upon a high-spirited and
valorous youth. Frontenac was predestined by family tradition to a
career of arms; but it was his own impetuosity that drove him into war
before the normal age. He first served under Prince Frederick Henry of
Orange, who was then at the height of his reputation. After several
campaigns in the Low Countries his regiment was transferred to the
confines of Spain and France. There, in the year of Richelieu's death
(1642), he fought at the siege of Perpignan. That he distinguished
himself may be seen from his promotion, at twenty-three, to the rank of
colonel. In the same year (1643) Louis XIV came to the throne; and
Condé, by smiting the Spaniards at Rocroi, won for France the fame of
having the best troops in Europe.
It was not the good fortune of Frontenac to serve under either Condé or
Turenne during those campaigns, so triumphant for France, which marked
the close of the Thirty Years' War. From Perpignan he was ordered to
northern Italy, where in the course of three years he performed the
exploits which made him a brigadier-general at twenty-six. Though
repeatedly wounded, he survived twelve years of constant fighting with
no {21} more serious casualty than a broken arm which he carried away
from the siege of Orbitello. By the time peace was signed at Münster
he had become a soldier well proved in the most desperate war which had
been fought since Europe accepted Christianity.
To the great action of the Thirty Years' War there soon succeeded the
domestic commotion of the Fronde. Richelieu, despite his high
qualities as a statesman, had been a poor financier; and Cardinal
Mazarin, his successor, was forced to cope with a discontent which
sprang in part from the misery of the masses and in part from the
ambition of the nobles. As Louis XIV was still an infant when his
father died, the burden of government fell in name upon the
queen-mother, Anne of Austria, but in reality upon Mazarin. Not even
the most disaffected dared to rebel against the young king in the sense
of disputing his right to reign. But in 1648 the extreme youth of
Louis XIV made it easy for discontented nobles, supported by the
Parlement of Paris, to rebel against an unpopular minister.
The year 1648, which witnessed the Peace of Westphalia and the outbreak
of the Fronde, was rendered memorable to Frontenac by his marriage. It
was a runaway match, which {22} began an extraordinary alliance between
two very extraordinary people. The bride, Anne de la Grange-Trianon,
was a daughter of the Sieur de Neuville, a gentleman whose house in
Paris was not far from that of Frontenac's parents. At the time of the
elopement she was only sixteen, while Frontenac had reached the ripe
age of twenty-eight. Both were high-spirited and impetuous. We know
also that Frontenac was hot-tempered. For a short time they lived
together and there was a son. But before the wars of the Fronde had
closed they drifted apart, from motives which were personal rather than
political.
[Illustration: LADY FRONTENAC. From a painting in the Versailles
Gallery.]
Madame de Frontenac then became a maid of honour to the Duchesse de
Montpensier, daughter of Gaston d'Orléans[3] and first cousin to Louis
XIV. This princess, known as _La Grande Mademoiselle_, plunged into
the politics of the Fronde with a vigour which involved her whole
household--Madame de Frontenac included--and wrote _Memoirs_ in which
her adventures are recorded at full length, to the pungent criticism of
her foes and the {23} enthusiastic glorification of herself. Madame de
Frontenac was in attendance upon _La Grande Mademoiselle_ during the
period of her most spectacular exploits and shared all the excitement
which culminated with the famous entry of Orleans in 1652.
Madame de Frontenac was beautiful, and to beauty she added the charm of
wit. With these endowments she made her way despite her slender
means--and to be well-born but poor was a severe hardship in the reign
of Louis XIV. Her portrait at Versailles reflects the striking
personality and the intelligence which won for her the title _La
Divine_. Throughout an active life she never lacked powerful friends,
and Saint-Simon bears witness to the place she held in the highest and
most exclusive circle of court society.
Frontenac and his wife lived together only during the short period
1648-52. But intercourse was not wholly severed by the fact of
domestic separation. It is clear from the _Memoirs_ of the Duchesse de
Montpensier that Frontenac visited his wife at Saint-Fargeau, the
country seat to which the duchess had been exiled for her part in the
wars of the Fronde. Such evidence as there is seems to show that
Madame de Frontenac considered herself {24} deeply wronged by her
husband and was unwilling to accept his overtures. From Mademoiselle
de Montpensier we hear little after 1657, the year of her quarrel with
Madame de Frontenac. The maid of honour was accused of disloyalty,
tears flowed, the duchess remained obdurate, and, in short, Madame de
Frontenac was dismissed.
The most sprightly stories of the Frontenacs occur in these _Memoirs_
of _La Grande Mademoiselle_. Unfortunately the Duchesse de Montpensier
was so self-centred that her witness is not dispassionate. She
disliked Frontenac, without concealment. As seen by her, he was vain
and boastful, even in matters which concerned his kitchen and his
plate. His delight in new clothes was childish. He compelled guests
to speak admiringly of his horses, in contradiction of their manifest
appearance. Worst of all, he tried to stir up trouble between the
duchess and her own people.
Though Frontenac and his wife were unable to live together, they did
not become completely estranged. It may be that the death of their
son--who seems to have been killed in battle--drew them together once
more, at least in spirit. It may be that with the Atlantic between
them they appreciated each {25} other's virtues more justly. It may
have been loyalty to the family tradition. Whatever the cause, they
maintained an active correspondence during Frontenac's years in Canada,
and at court Madame de Frontenac was her husband's chief defence
against numerous enemies. When he died it was found that he had left
her his property. But she never set foot in Canada.
Frontenac was forty-one when Louis XIV dismissed Fouquet and took
Colbert for his chief adviser. At Versailles everything depended on
royal favour, and forty-one is an important age. What would the young
king do for Frontenac? What were his gifts and qualifications?
It is plain that Frontenac's career, so vigorously begun during the
Thirty Years' War, had not developed in a like degree during the period
(1648-61) from the outbreak of the Fronde to the death of Mazarin.
There was no doubt as to his capacity. Saint-Simon calls him 'a man of
excellent parts, living much in society.' And again, when speaking of
Madame de Frontenac, he says: 'Like her husband she had little property
and abundant wit.' The bane of Frontenac's life at this time was his
extravagance. He lived like a {26} millionaire till his money was
gone. Not far from Blois he had the estate of Isle Savary--a property
quite suited to his station had he been prudent. But his plans for
developing it, with gardens, fountains, and ponds, were wholly beyond
his resources. At Versailles, also, he sought to keep pace with men
whose ancestral wealth enabled them to do the things which he longed to
do, but which fortune had placed beyond his reach. Hence,
notwithstanding his buoyancy and talent, Frontenac had gained a
reputation for wastefulness which did not recommend him, in 1661, to
the prudent Colbert. Nor was he fitted by character or training for
administrative duty. His qualifications were such as are of use at a
post of danger.
[Illustration: JEAN BAPTISTE COLBERT. From an engraving in the Château
de Ramezay.]
His time came in 1669. At the beginning of that year he was singled
out by Turenne for a feat of daring which placed him before the eyes of
all Europe. A contest was about to close which for twenty-five years
had been waged with a stubbornness rarely equalled. This was the
struggle of the Venetians with the Turks for the possession of
Crete.[4] To Venice {27} defeat meant the end of her glory as an
imperial power. The Republic had lavished treasure upon this war as
never before--a sum equivalent in modern money to fifteen hundred
million dollars. Even when compelled to borrow at seven per cent,
Venice kept up the fight and opened the ranks of her nobility to all
who would pay sixty thousand ducats. Nor was the valour of the
Venetians who defended Crete less noble than the determination of their
government. Every man who loved the city of St Mark felt that her fate
was at stake before the walls of Candia.
Year by year the resources of the Venetians had grown less and their
plight more desperate. In 1668 they had received some assistance from
French volunteers under the Duc de la Feuillade. This was followed by
an application to Turenne for a general who would command their own
troops in conjunction with Morosini. It was a forlorn hope if ever
there was one; and Turenne selected Frontenac. {28} Co-operating with
him were six thousand French troops under the Duc de Navailles, who
nominally served the Pope, for Louis XIV wished to avoid direct war
against the Sultan. All that can be said of Frontenac's part in the
adventure is that he valiantly attempted the impossible. Crete was
doomed long before he saw its shores. The best that the Venetians and
the French could do was to fight for favourable terms of surrender.
These they gained. In September 1669 the Venetians evacuated the city
of Candia, taking with them their cannon, all their munitions of war,
and all their movable property.
The Cretan expedition not only confirmed but enhanced the standing
which Frontenac had won in his youth. And within three years from the
date of his return he received the king's command to succeed the
governor Courcelles at Quebec.
Gossip busied itself a good deal over the immediate causes of
Frontenac's appointment to the government of Canada. The post was
hardly a proconsular prize. At first sight one would not think that a
small colony destitute of social gaiety could have possessed
attractions to a man of Frontenac's rank and {29} training. The salary
amounted to but eight thousand livres a year. The climate was
rigorous, and little glory could come from fighting the Iroquois. The
question arose, did Frontenac desire the appointment or was he sent
into polite exile?
There was a story that he had once been a lover of Madame de Montespan,
who in 1672 found his presence near the court an inconvenience. Others
said that Madame de Frontenac had eagerly sought for him the
appointment on the other side of the world. A third theory was that,
owing to his financial straits, the government gave him something to
keep body and soul together in a land where there were no great
temptations to spend money.
Motives are often mixed; and behind the nomination there may have been
various reasons. But whatever weight we allow to gossip, it is not
necessary to fall back on any of these hypotheses to account for
Frontenac's appointment or for his willingness to accept. While there
was no immediate likelihood of a war involving France and England,[5]
and {30} consequent trouble from the English colonies in America, New
France required protection from the Iroquois. And, as a soldier,
Frontenac had acquitted himself with honour. Nor was the post thought
to be insignificant. Madame de Sévigné's son-in-law, the Comte de
Grignan, was an unsuccessful candidate for it in competition with
Frontenac. For some years both the king and Colbert had been giving
real attention to the affairs of Canada. The Far West was opening up;
and since 1665 the population of the colony had more than doubled. To
Frontenac the governorship of Canada meant promotion. It was an office
of trust and responsibility, with the opportunity to extend the king's
power throughout the region beyond the Great Lakes. And if the salary
was small, the governor could enlarge it by private trading. Whatever
his motives, or the motives of those who sent him, it was a good day
for Frontenac when he was sent to Canada. In France the future held
out the prospect of little but a humiliating scramble for sinecures.
In Canada he could do constructive work for his king and country.
Those who cross the sea change their skies but not their character.
Frontenac bore with {31} him to Quebec the sentiments and the habits
which befitted a French noble of the sword.[6] The more we know about
the life of his class in France, the better we shall understand his
actions as governor of Canada. His irascibility, for example, seems
almost mild when compared with the outbreaks of many who shared with
him the traditions and breeding of a privileged order. Frontenac had
grown to manhood in the age of Richelieu, a period when fierceness was
a special badge of the aristocracy. Thus duelling became so great a
menace to the public welfare that it was made punishable with death;
despite which it flourished to such an extent that one nobleman, the
Chevalier d'Andrieux, enjoyed the reputation of having slain
seventy-two antagonists.
Where duelling is a habitual and honourable exercise, men do not take
the trouble to restrain primitive passions. Even in dealings with
ladies of their own rank, French nobles often stepped over the line
where rudeness {32} ends and insult begins. When Malherbe boxed the
ears of a viscountess he did nothing which he was unwilling to talk
about. Ladies not less than lords treated their servants like dirt,
and justified such conduct by the statement that the base-born deserve
no consideration. There was, indeed, no class--not even the
clergy--which was exempt from assault by wrathful nobles. In the
course of an altercation the Duc d'Epernon, after striking the
Archbishop of Bordeaux in the stomach several times with his fists and
his baton, exclaimed: 'If it were not for the respect I bear your
office, I would stretch you out on the pavement!'
In such an atmosphere was Frontenac reared. He had the manners and the
instincts of a belligerent. But he also possessed a soul which could
rise above pettiness. And the foes he loved best to smite were the
enemies of the king.
[1] As an illustration of their intimacy, there is a story that one day
when Henry IV was indisposed he had these two boys on his bed, and
amused himself by making them fight with each other.
[2] Charles V held all his Spanish, Burgundian, and Austrian
inheritance in his own hand from 1519 to 1521. In 1521 he granted the
Austrian possessions to his brother Ferdinand. Thenceforth Spain and
Austria were never reunited, but their association in politics
continued to be intimate until the close of the seventeenth century.
[3] Gaston d'Orléans was the younger brother of Louis XIII, and
heir-presumptive until the birth of Louis XIV in 1638. His vanity and
his complicity in plots to overthrow Richelieu are equally famous.
[4] This was not the first time that Frontenac had fought against the
Turks. Under La Feuillade and Coligny he had taken part in
Montecuculli's campaign in 1664 against the Turks in Hungary, and was
present at the great victory of St Gothard on the Raab. The regiment
of Carignan-Salières was also engaged on this occasion. In the next
year it came to Canada, and Lorin thinks that the association of
Frontenac with the Carignan regiment in this campaign may have been
among the causes of his nomination to the post of governor.
[5] By the Treaty of Dover (May 20, 1670) Charles II received a pension
from France and promised to aid Louis XIV in war with Holland.
[6] Frontenac's enemies never wearied of dwelling upon his
uncontrollable rage. A most interesting discussion of this subject
will be found in _Frontenac et Ses Amis_ by M. Ernest Myrand (p. 172).
For the bellicose qualities of the French aristocracy see also _La
Noblesse Française sous Richelieu_ by the Vicomte G. d'Avenel.
{33}
CHAPTER III
FRONTENAC'S FIRST YEARS IN CANADA
Frontenac received his commission on April 6, 1672, and reached Quebec
at the beginning of September. The king, sympathetic towards his
needs, had authorized two special grants of money: six thousand livres
for equipment, and nine thousand to provide a bodyguard of twenty
horsemen. Gratified by these marks of royal favour and conscious that
he had been assigned to an important post, Frontenac was in hopeful
mood when he first saw the banks of the St Lawrence. His letters show
that he found the country much less barbarous than he had expected; and
he threw himself into his new duties with the courage which is born of
optimism. A natural fortress like Quebec could not fail to awaken the
enthusiasm of a soldier. The settlement itself was small, but
Frontenac reported that its situation could not be more favourable,
even if this spot were to become the capital of a great empire. It
was, indeed, {34} a scene to kindle the imagination. Sloping down to
the river-bank, the farms of Beauport and Beaupré filled the
foreground. Behind them swept the forest, then in its full autumnal
glory.
Awaiting Frontenac at Quebec were Courcelles, the late governor, and
Talon the intendant. Both were to return to France by the last ships
of that year; but in the meantime Frontenac was enabled to confer with
them on the state of the colony and to acquaint himself with their
views on many important subjects. Courcelles had proved a stalwart
warrior against the Iroquois, while Talon possessed an unrivalled
knowledge of Canada's wants and possibilities. Laval, the bishop, was
in France, not to return to the colony till 1675.
The new governor's first acts went to show that with the king's dignity
he associated his own. The governor and lieutenant-general of a vast
oversea dominion could not degrade his office by living like a
shopkeeper. The Château St Louis was far below his idea of what a
viceregal residence ought to be. One of his early resolves was to
enlarge and improve it. Meanwhile, his entertainments surpassed in
splendour anything Canada had yet {35} seen. Pomp on a large scale was
impossible; but the governor made the best use of his means to display
the grace and majesty of his office.
On the 17th of September Frontenac presided for the first time at a
meeting of the Sovereign Council;[1] and the formal inauguration of his
régime was staged for the 23rd of October. It was to be an impressive
ceremony, a pageant at which all eyes should be turned upon him, the
great noble who embodied the authority of a puissant monarch. For this
ceremony the governor summoned an assembly that was designed to
represent the Three Estates of Canada.
The Three Estates of clergy, nobles, and commons had existed in France
from time immemorial. But in taking this step and in expecting the
king to approve it Frontenac displayed his ignorance of French history;
for the ancient meetings of the Three Estates in France had left a
memory not dear to the crown.[2] They had, in truth, given the kings
{36} moments of grave concern; and their representatives had not been
summoned since 1614. Moreover, Louis XIV was not a ruler to tolerate
such rival pretensions as the States-General had once put forth.
Parkman thinks that, 'like many of his station, Frontenac was not in
full sympathy with the centralizing movement of his time, which tended
to level ancient rights, privileges and prescriptions under the
ponderous roller of the monarchical administration.' This, it may be
submitted, is only a conjecture. The family history of the Buades
shows that they were 'king's men,' who would be the last to imperil
royal power. The gathering of the Three Estates at Quebec was meant to
be the fitting background of a ceremony. If Frontenac had any thought
beyond this, it was a desire to unite all classes in an expression of
loyalty to their sovereign.
At Quebec it was not difficult to secure representatives of clergy and
commons. But, as nobles seldom emigrated to Canada, some talent was
needed to discover gentlemen of sufficient standing to represent the
aristocracy. The situation was met by drawing upon the officers and
the seigneurs. The Estates thus duly convened, Frontenac {37}
addressed them on the glory of the king and the duty of all classes to
serve him with zeal. To the clergy he hinted that their task was not
finished when they had baptized the Indians. After that came the duty
of converting them into good citizens.
Frontenac's next step was to reorganize the municipal government of
Quebec by permitting the inhabitants to choose two aldermen and a
mayor. Since these officials could not serve until they had been
approved by the governor, the change does not appear to have been
wildly radical. But change of any kind was distasteful to the Bourbon
monarchy, especially if it seemed to point toward freedom. So when in
due course Frontenac's report of these activities arrived at
Versailles, it was decided that such innovations must be stopped at
once. The king wished to discourage all memory of the Three Estates,
and Frontenac was told that no part of the Canadian people should be
given a corporate or collective status. The reprimand, however, did
not reach Canada till the summer of 1673, so that for some months
Frontenac was permitted to view his work with satisfaction.
His next move likewise involved a new departure. Hitherto the king had
{38} discouraged the establishment of forts or trading-posts at points
remote from the zone of settlement. This policy was based on the
belief that the colonists ought to live close together for mutual
defence against the Iroquois. But Frontenac resolved to build a fort
at the outlet of Lake Ontario. His enemies stated that this arose out
of his desire to make personal profit from the fur trade; but on public
grounds also there were valid reasons for the fort. A thrust is often
the best parry; and it could well be argued that the French had much to
gain from a stronghold lying within striking distance of the Iroquois
villages.
At any rate, Frontenac decided to act first and make explanations
afterwards. On June 3, 1673, he left Quebec for Montreal and beyond.
He accommodated himself with cheerfulness to the bark canoe--which he
described in one of his early letters as a rather undignified
conveyance for the king's lieutenant--and, indeed, to all the hardships
which the discharge of his duties entailed. His plan for the summer
comprised a thorough inspection of the waterway from Quebec to Lake
Ontario and official visits to the settlements lying along the route.
Three Rivers did not detain him long, for he was already {39} familiar
with the place, having visited it in the previous autumn. On the 15th
of the month his canoe came to shore beneath Mount Royal.
Montreal was the colony's farthest outpost towards the Iroquois.
Though it had been founded as a mission and nothing else, its situation
was such that its inhabitants could not avoid being drawn into the fur
trade. To a large extent it still retained its religious character,
but beneath the surface could be detected a cleavage of interest
between the missionary zeal of the Sulpicians and the commercial
activity of the local governor, François Perrot. And since this Perrot
is soon to find place in the present narrative as a bitter enemy of
Frontenac, a word concerning him may fitly be written here. He was an
officer of the king's army who had come to Canada with Talon. The fact
that his wife was Talon's niece had put him in the pathway of
promotion. The order of St Sulpice, holding in fief the whole island
of Montreal, had power to name the local governor. In June 1669 the
Sulpicians had nominated Perrot, and two years later his appointment
had been confirmed by the king. Later, as we shall see, arose the
thorny question of {40} how far the governor of Canada enjoyed
superiority over the governor of Montreal.
The governor of Montreal, attended by his troops and the leading
citizens, stood at the landing-place to offer full military honours to
the governor of Canada. Frontenac's arrival was then signalized by a
civic reception and a _Te Deum_. The round of civilities ended, the
governor lost no time in unfolding the real purpose of his visit, which
was less to confer with the priests of St Sulpice than to recruit
forces for his expedition, in order that he might make a profound
impression on the Iroquois. The proposal to hold a conference with the
Iroquois at Cataraqui (where Kingston now stands) met with some
opposition; but Frontenac's energy and determination were not to be
denied, and by the close of June four hundred French and Indians were
mustered at Lachine in readiness to launch their canoes and barges upon
Lake St Louis.
[Illustration: ROBERT CAVELIER DE LA SALLE. From an engraving by
Waltner, Paris]
If Montreal was the outpost of the colony, Lachine was the outpost of
Montreal. Between these two points lay the great rapid, the Sault St
Louis, which from the days of Jacques Cartier had blocked the ascent of
the St Lawrence to seafaring boats. At Lachine La Salle had formed his
seigneury in 1667, {41} the year after his arrival in Canada; and it
had been the starting-point for the expedition which resulted in the
discovery of the Ohio in 1671. La Salle, however, was not with
Frontenac's party, for the governor had sent him to the Iroquois early
in May, to tell them that Onontio would meet his children and to make
arrangements for the great assembly at Cataraqui.
The Five Nations, remembering the chastisement they had received from
Tracy in 1666,[3] accepted the invitation, but in dread and distrust.
Their envoys accordingly proceeded to the mouth of the Cataraqui; and
on the 12th of July the vessels of the French were seen approaching on
the smooth surface of Lake Ontario. Frontenac had omitted from his
equipage nothing which could awe or interest the savage. He had
furnished his troops with the best possible equipment and had with him
all who could be spared safely from the colony. He had even managed to
drag up the rapids and launch on Lake Ontario two large barges armed
with small cannon and brilliantly painted. The whole flotilla,
including a multitude of canoes arranged by squadron, was now put in
battle {42} array. First came four squadrons of canoes; then the two
barges; next Frontenac himself, surrounded by his personal attendants
and the regulars; after that the Canadian militia, with a squadron from
Three Rivers on the left flank, and on the right a great gathering of
Hurons and Algonquins. The rearguard was composed of two more
squadrons. Never before had such a display been seen on the Great
Lakes.
Having disclosed his strength to the Iroquois chiefs, Frontenac
proceeded to hold solemn and stately conference with them. But he did
not do this on the day of the great naval procession. He wished to let
this spectacle take effect before he approached the business which had
brought him there. It was not until next day that the meeting opened.
At seven o'clock the French troops, accoutred at their best, were all
on parade, drawn up in files before the governor's tent, where the
conference was to take place. Outside the tent itself large canopies
of canvas had been erected to shelter the Iroquois from the sun, while
Frontenac, in his most brilliant military costume, assumed all the
state he could. In treating with Indians haste was impossible, nor did
Frontenac desire that the {43} speech-making should begin at once. His
fort was hardly more than begun, and he wished the Iroquois to see how
swiftly and how well the French could build defences.
When the proceedings opened there were the usual long harangues,
followed by daily negotiations between the governor and the chiefs. It
was a leading feature of Frontenac's diplomacy to reward the friendly,
and to win over malcontents by presents or personal attention. Each
day some of the chiefs dined with the governor, who gave them the food
they liked, adapted his style of speech to their ornate and
metaphorical language, played with their children, and regretted,
through the interpreter Le Moyne, that he was as yet unable to speak
their tongue. Never had such pleasant flattery been applied to the
vanity of an Indian. At the same time Frontenac did not fail to insist
upon his power; indeed, upon his supremacy. As a matter of fact it had
involved a great effort to make all this display at Cataraqui. In his
discourses, however, he laid stress upon the ease with which he had
mounted the rapids and launched barges upon Lake Ontario. The sum and
substance of all his harangues was this: 'I am your good, kind father,
loving {44} peace and shrinking from war. But you can see my power and
I give you fair warning. If you choose war, you are guilty of
self-destruction; your fate is in your own hands.'
Apart from his immediate success in building under the eyes of the
Iroquois a fort at the outlet of Lake Ontario, Frontenac profited
greatly by entering the heart of the Indian world in person. He was
able, for a time at least, to check those tribal wars which had
hampered trade and threatened to involve the colony. He gained much
information at first hand about the _pays d'en haut_. And throughout
he proved himself to have just the qualities which were needed in
dealing with a North American Indian--firmness, good-humour, and
dramatic talent.
On returning from Lake Ontario to Quebec Frontenac had good reason to
be pleased with his summer's work. It still remained to convince
Colbert that the construction of the fort at Cataraqui was not an undue
expense and waste of energy. But as the initial outlay had already
been made, he had ground for hope that he would not receive a positive
order to undo what had been accomplished. At Quebec he received
Colbert's disparaging comments upon the assembly of the Three Estates
{45} and the substitution of aldermen for the syndic who had formerly
represented the inhabitants. These comments, however, were not so
couched as to make the governor feel that he had lost the minister's
confidence. On the whole, the first year of office had gone very well.
A stormier season was now to follow. The battle-royal between
Frontenac and Perrot, the governor of Montreal, began in the autumn of
1673 and was waged actively throughout the greater part of 1674.
Enough has been said of Frontenac's tastes to show that he was a
spendthrift; and there can be no doubt that as governor of Canada he
hoped to supplement his salary by private trading. Soon after his
arrival at Quebec in the preceding year he had formed an alliance with
La Salle. The decision to erect a fort at Cataraqui was made for the
double reason that while safeguarding the colony Frontenac and La Salle
could both draw profit from the trade at this point in the interior.
La Salle was not alone in knowing that those who first met the Indians
in the spring secured the best furs at the best bargains. This
information was shared by many, including François Perrot. Just above
the island of Montreal is another island, which {46} lies between Lake
St Louis and the Lake of Two Mountains. Perrot, appreciating the
advantage of a strategic position, had fixed there his own
trading-post, and to this day the island bears his name. Now, with
Frontenac as a sleeping partner of La Salle there were all the elements
of trouble, for Perrot and Frontenac were rival traders. Both were
wrathful men and each had a selfish interest to fight for, quite apart
from any dispute as to the jurisdiction of Quebec over Montreal.
Under such circumstances the one thing lacking was a ground of action.
This Frontenac found in the existing edict against the coureurs de
bois--those wild spirits who roamed the woods in the hope of making
great profits through the fur trade, from which by law they were
excluded, and provoked the special disfavour of the missionary by the
scandals of their lives, which gave the Indians a low idea of French
morality. Thus in the eyes of both Church and State the coureur de
bois was a _mauvais sujet_, and the offence of taking to the forest
without a licence became punishable by death or the galleys.
Though Frontenac was not the author of this severe measure, duty
required him to enforce it. Perrot was a friend and {47} defender of
the coureurs de bois, whom he used as employees in the collection of
peltries. Under his régime Montreal formed their headquarters. The
edict gave them no concern, since they knew that between them and
trouble stood their patron and confederate.
Thus Frontenac found an excellent occasion to put Perrot in the wrong
and to hit him through his henchmen. The only difficulty was that
Frontenac did not possess adequate means to enforce the law. Obviously
it was undesirable that he should invade Perrot's bailiwick in person.
He therefore instructed the judge at Montreal to arrest all the
coureurs de bois who were there. A loyal attempt was made to execute
this command, with the result that Perrot at once intervened and
threatened to imprison the judge if he repeated his effort.
Frontenac's counterblast was the dispatch of a lieutenant and three
soldiers to arrest a retainer of Perrot named Carton, who had shown
contempt of court by assisting the accused woodsmen to escape. Perrot
then proclaimed that this constituted an unlawful attack on his rights
as governor of Montreal, to defend which he promptly imprisoned Bizard,
the lieutenant sent by Frontenac, together with Jacques Le Ber, the
leading {48} merchant of the settlement. Though Perrot released them
shortly afterwards, his tone toward Frontenac remained impudent and the
issue was squarely joined.
But a hundred and eighty miles of wilderness separated the governor of
Canada from the governor of Montreal. In short, before Perrot could be
disciplined he must be seized, and this was a task which if attempted
by frontal attack might provoke bloodshed in the colony, with heavy
censure from the king. Frontenac therefore entered upon a
correspondence, not only with Perrot, but with one of the leading
Sulpicians in Montreal, the Abbé Fénelon. This procedure yielded
quicker results than could have been expected. Frontenac's letter
which summoned Perrot to Quebec for an explanation was free from
threats and moderate in tone. It found Perrot somewhat alarmed at what
he had done and ready to settle the matter without further trouble. At
the same time Fénelon, acting on Frontenac's suggestion, urged Perrot
to make peace. The consequence was that in January 1674 Perrot acceded
and set out for Quebec with Fénelon as his companion.
Whatever Perrot's hopes or expectations of leniency, they were quickly
dispelled. The {49} very first conference between him and Frontenac
became a violent altercation (January 29, 1674). Perrot was forthwith
committed to prison, where he remained ten months. Not content with
this success, Frontenac proceeded vigorously against the coureurs de
bois, one of whom as an example was hanged in front of Perrot's prison.
The trouble did not stop here, nor with the imprisonment of Brucy, who
was Perrot's chief agent and the custodian of the storehouse at He
Perrot. Fénelon, whose temper was ardent and emotional, felt that he
had been made the innocent victim of a detestable plot to lure Perrot
from Montreal. Having upbraided Frontenac to his face, he returned to
Montreal and preached a sermon against him, using language which the
Sulpicians hastened to repudiate. But Fénelon, undaunted, continued to
espouse Perrot's cause without concealment and brought down upon
himself a charge of sedition.
In its final stage this _cause célèbre_ runs into still further
intricacies, involving the rights of the clergy when accused by the
civil power. The contest begun by Perrot and taken up by Fénelon ran
an active course throughout the greater part of a year (1674), and
finally the {50} king himself was called in as judge. This involved
the sending of Perrot and Fénelon to France, along with a voluminous
written statement from Frontenac and a great number of documents. At
court Talon took the side of Perrot, as did the Abbé d'Urfé, whose
cousin, the Marquise d'Allègre, was about to marry Colbert's son.
Nevertheless the king declined to uphold Frontenac's enemies. Perrot
was given three weeks in the Bastille, not so much for personal
chastisement as to show that the governor's authority must be
respected. On the whole, Frontenac issued from the affair without
suffering loss of prestige in the eyes of the colony. The king
declined to reprimand him, though in a personal letter from his
sovereign Frontenac was told that henceforth he must avoid invading a
local government without giving the governor preliminary notice. The
hint was also conveyed that he should not harry the clergy.
Frontenac's position, of course, was that he only interfered with the
clergy when they were encroaching upon the rights of the crown.
Upon this basis, then, the quarrel with Perrot was settled. But at
that very moment a larger and more serious contest was about to begin.
[1] In the minutes of this first meeting of the Sovereign Council at
which Frontenac presided the high-sounding words 'haut et puissant'
stand prefixed to his name and titles.
[2] The power of the States-General reached its height after the
disastrous battle of Poitiers (1356). For a short period, under the
leadership of Étienne Marcel, it virtually supplanted the power of the
crown.
[3] See _The Great Intendant_, chap. iii.
{51}
CHAPTER IV
GOVERNOR, BISHOP, AND INTENDANT
At the beginning of September 1675 Frontenac was confronted with an
event which could have given him little pleasure. This was the
arrival, by the same ship, of the bishop Laval, who had been absent
from Canada four years, and Jacques Duchesneau, who after a long
interval had been appointed to succeed Talon as intendant. Laval
returned in triumph. He was now bishop of Quebec, directly dependent
upon the Holy See[1] and not upon the king of France. Duchesneau came
to Canada with the reputation of having proved a capable official at
Tours.
By temper and training Frontenac was ill-disposed to share authority
with any one. In the absence of bishop and intendant he had filled the
centre of the stage. Now he must become reconciled to the presence at
Quebec {52} of others who held high rank and had claims to be
considered in the conduct of public affairs. Even at the moment of
formal welcome he must have felt that trouble was in store. For
sixteen years Laval had been a great person in Canada, and Duchesneau
had come to occupy the post which Talon had made almost more important
than that of governor.
Partly through a clash of dignities and partly through a clash of
ideas, there soon arose at Quebec a conflict which rendered personal
friendship among the leaders impossible, and caused itself to be felt
in every part of the administration. Since this antagonism lasted for
seven years and had large consequences, it becomes important to examine
its deeper causes as well as the forms which under varying
circumstances it came to assume.
In the triangular relations of Frontenac, Laval, and Duchesneau the
bishop and the intendant were ranged against the governor. The
simplest form of stating the case is to say that Frontenac clashed with
Laval over one set of interests and with Duchesneau over another; over
ecclesiastical issues with the bishop and over civil interests with the
intendant. In the Sovereign Council these {53} three dignitaries sat
together, and so close was the connection of Church with State that not
a month could pass without bringing to light some fresh matter which
concerned them all. Broadly speaking, the differences between
Frontenac and Laval were of more lasting moment than those between
Frontenac and Duchesneau. In the end governor and intendant quarrelled
over everything simply because they had come to be irreconcilable
enemies. At the outset, however, their theoretical grounds of
opposition were much less grave than the matters in debate between
Frontenac and Laval. To appreciate these duly we must consider certain
things which were none the less important because they lay in the
background.
When Frontenac came to Canada he found that the ecclesiastical field
was largely occupied by the Jesuits, the Sulpicians, and the Récollets.
Laval had, indeed, begun his task of organizing a diocese at Quebec and
preparing to educate a local priesthood. Four years after his arrival
in Canada he had founded the Quebec Seminary (1663) and had added
(1668) a preparatory school, called the Little Seminary. But the three
missionary orders were still the mainstay of the Canadian {54} Church.
It is evident that Colbert not only considered the Jesuits the most
powerful, but also thought them powerful enough to need a check.
Hence, when Frontenac received his commission, he received also written
instructions to balance the Jesuit power by supporting the Sulpicians
and the Récollets.
Through his dispute with Perrot, Frontenac had strained the good
relations which Colbert wished him to maintain with the Sulpicians.
But the friction thus caused was in no way due to Frontenac's dislike
of the Sulpicians as an order. Towards the Jesuits, on the other hand,
he cherished a distinct antagonism which led him to carry out with
vigour the command that he should keep their power within bounds. This
can be seen from the earliest dispatches which he sent to France.
Before he had been in Quebec three months he reported to Colbert that
it was the practice of the Jesuits to stir up strife in families, to
resort to espionage, to abuse the confessional, to make the Seminary
priests their puppets, and to deny the king's right to license the
brandy trade. What seemed to the Jesuits an unforgivable affront was
Frontenac's charge that they cared more for beaver skins than for the
conversion of the savages. This {55} they interpreted as an insult to
the memory of their martyrs, and their resentment must have been the
greater because the accusation was not made publicly in Canada, but
formed part of a letter to Colbert in France. The information that
such an attack had been made reached them through Laval, who was then
in France and found means to acquaint himself with the nature of
Frontenac's correspondence.
Having displeased the Sulpicians and attacked the Jesuits, Frontenac
made amends to the Church by cultivating the most friendly relations
with the Récollets. No one ever accused him of being a bad Catholic.
He was exact in the performance of his religious duties, and such
trouble as he had with the ecclesiastical authorities proceeded from
political aims rather than from heresy or irreligion.
Like so much else in the life of Canada, the strife between Frontenac
and Laval may be traced back to France. During the early years of
Louis XIV the French Church was distracted by the disputes of Gallican
and Ultramontane. The Gallicans were faithful Catholics who
nevertheless held that the king and the national clergy had rights
which the Pope must respect. The Ultramontanes {56} defined papal
power more widely and sought to minimize, disregard, or deny the
privileges of the national Church.
Between these parties no point of doctrine was involved,[2] but in the
sphere of government there exists a frontier between Church and State
along which many wars of argument can be waged--at times with some
display of force. The Mass, Purgatory, the Saints, Confession, and the
celibacy of the priest, all meant as much to the Gallican as to the
Ultramontane. Nor did the Pope's headship prove a stumbling-block in
so far as it was limited to things spiritual. The Gallican did,
indeed, assert the subjection of the Pope to a General Council, quoting
in his support the decrees of Constance and Basel. But in the
seventeenth century this was a theoretical contention. What Louis XIV
and Bossuet strove for was the limitation of papal power in matters
affecting property and political rights. The real questions upon which
Gallican and Ultramontane differed were the {57} appointment of bishops
and abbots, the contribution of the Church to the needs of the State,
and the priest's standing as a subject of the king.
Frontenac was no theorist, and probably would have written a poor
treatise on the relations of Church and State. At the same time, he
knew that the king claimed certain rights over the Church, and he was
the king's lieutenant. Herein lies the deeper cause of his troubles
with the Jesuits and Laval. The Jesuits had been in the colony for
fifty years and felt that they knew the spiritual requirements of both
French and Indians. Their missions had been illuminated by the supreme
heroism of Brébeuf, Jogues, Lalemant, and many more. Their house at
Quebec stood half-way between Versailles and the wilderness. They were
in close alliance with Laval and supported the ideal and divine rights
of the Church. They had found strong friends in Champlain and
Montmagny. Frontenac, however, was a layman of another type. However
orthodox his religious ideas may have been, his heart was not lowly and
his temper was not devout. Intensely autocratic by disposition, he
found it easy to identify his own will to power with a defence {58} of
royal prerogative against the encroachments of the Church. It was an
attitude that could not fail to beget trouble, for the Ultramontanes
had weapons of defence which they well knew how to use.
Having in view these ulterior motives, the acrimony of Frontenac's
quarrel with Laval is not surprising. Rightly or wrongly, the governor
held that the bishop was subservient to the Jesuits, while Colbert's
plain instructions required the governor to keep the Jesuits in check.
From such a starting-point the further developments were almost
automatic. Laval found on his return that Frontenac had exacted from
the clergy unusual and excessive honours during church services. This
furnished a subject of heated debate and an appeal by both parties to
the king. After full consideration Frontenac received orders to rest
content with the same honours which were by custom accorded the
governor of Picardy in the cathedral of Amiens.
More important by far than this argument over precedence was the
dispute concerning the organization of parishes. Here the issue hinged
on questions of fact rather than of theory. Beyond question the
habitants were entitled to have priests living permanently in {59}
their midst, as soon as conditions should warrant it. But had the time
come when a parish system could be created? Laval's opinion may be
inferred from the fact that in 1675, sixteen years after his arrival in
Canada, only one priest lived throughout the year among his own people.
This was the Abbé de Bernières, curé of Notre Dame at Quebec. In 1678
two more parishes received permanent incumbents--Port Royal and La
Durantaye. Even so, it was a small number for the whole colony.
Frontenac maintained that Laval was unwilling to create a normal system
of parishes because thereby his personal power would be reduced. As
long as the curés were not permanently stationed they remained in
complete dependence on the bishop. All the funds provided for the
secular clergy passed through his hands. If he wished to keep for the
Seminary money which ought to go to the parishes, the habitants were
helpless. It was ridiculous to pamper the Seminary at the expense of
the colonists. It was worse than ridiculous that the French themselves
should go without religious care because the Jesuits chose to give
prior attention to the souls of the savage.
{60}
Laval's argument in reply was that the time had not yet come for the
creation of parishes on a large scale. Doubtless it would prove
possible in the future to have churches and a parochial system of the
normal type. Meanwhile, in view of the general poverty it was
desirable that all the resources of the Church should be conserved. To
this end the habitants were being cared for by itinerant priests at
much less expense than would be entailed by fixing on each parish the
support of its curé.
Here, as in all these contests, a mixture of motives is evident. There
is no reason to doubt Frontenac's sincerity in stating that the
missions and the Seminary absorbed funds of the Church which would be
better employed in ministration to the settlers. At the same time, it
was for him a not unpleasant exercise to support a policy which would
have the incidental effect of narrowing the bishop's power. After some
three years of controversy the king, as usual, stepped in to settle the
matter. By an edict of May 1679 he ordained that the priests should
live in their parishes and have the free disposition of the tithes
which had been established under an order of 1667. Thus on the subject
of the {61} curés Frontenac's views were officially accepted; but his
victory was rendered more nominal than real by the unwillingness or
inability of the habitants to supply sufficient funds for the support
of a resident priesthood.
In Frontenac's dispute with the clergy over the brandy question no new
arguments were brought forward, since all the main points had been
covered already. It was an old quarrel, and there was nothing further
to do than to set forth again the opposing aspects of a very difficult
subject. Religion clashed with business, but that was not all. Upon
the prosecution of business hung the hope of building up for France a
vast empire. The Jesuits urged that the Indians were killing
themselves with brandy, which destroyed their souls and reduced them to
the level of beasts. The traders retorted that the savages would not
go without drink. If they were denied it by the French they would take
their furs to Albany, and there imbibe not only bad rum but
soul-destroying heresy. Why be visionary and suffer one's rivals to
secure an advantage which would open up to them the heart of the
continent?
Laval, on the other hand, had chosen his side in this controversy long
before Frontenac {62} came to Canada, and he was not one to change his
convictions lightly. As he saw it, the sale of brandy to the Indians
was a sin, punishable by excommunication; and so determined was he that
the penalty should be enforced that he would allow the right of
absolution to no one but himself. In the end the king decided it
otherwise. He declared the regulation of the brandy trade to fall
within the domain of the civil power. He warned Frontenac to avoid an
open denial of the bishop's authority in this matter, but directed him
to prevent the Church from interfering in a case belonging to the
sphere of public order. This decision was not reached without deep
thought. In favour of prohibition stood Laval, the Jesuits, the
Sorbonne, the Archbishop of Paris, and the king's confessor, Père La
Chaise. Against it were Frontenac, the chief laymen of Canada,[3] the
University of Toulouse, and Colbert. In extricating himself from this
labyrinth of conflicting opinion Louis XIV was guided by reasons of
general policy. He had never seen the Mohawks raving drunk, and, like
Frontenac, {63} he felt that without brandy the work of France in the
wilderness could not go on.
Such were the issues over which Frontenac and Laval faced each other in
mutual antagonism.
Between Frontenac and his other opponent, the intendant Duchesneau, the
strife revolved about a different set of questions without losing any
of its bitterness. Frontenac and Laval disputed over ecclesiastical
affairs. Frontenac and Duchesneau disputed over civil affairs. But as
Laval and Duchesneau were both at war with Frontenac they naturally
drew together. The alliance was rendered more easy by Duchesneau's
devoutness. Even had he wished to hold aloof from the quarrel of
governor and bishop, it would have been difficult to do so. But as an
active friend of Laval and the Jesuits he had no desire to be a neutral
spectator of the feud which ran parallel with his own. The two feuds
soon became intermingled, and Frontenac, instead of confronting
separate adversaries, found himself engaged with allied forces which
were ready to attack or defend at every point. It could not have been
otherwise. Quebec was a small place, and the three belligerents were
brought into the closest official contact by {64} their duties as
members of the Sovereign Council.
It is worthy of remark that each of the contestants, Frontenac, Laval,
and Duchesneau, has his partisans among the historians of the present
day. All modern writers agree that Canada suffered grievously from
these disputes, but a difference of opinion at once arises when an
attempt is made to distribute the blame. The fact is that characters
separately strong and useful often make an unfortunate combination.
Compared with Laval and Frontenac, Duchesneau was not a strong
character, but he possessed qualifications which might have enabled him
in less stormy times to fill the office of intendant with tolerable
credit. It was his misfortune that circumstances forced him into the
thankless position of being a henchman to the bishop and a drag upon
the governor.
Everything which Duchesneau did gave Frontenac annoyance--the more so
as the intendant came armed with very considerable powers. During the
first three years of Frontenac's administration the governor, in the
absence of an intendant, had lorded it over the colony with a larger
freedom from restraint than was normal under the French {65} colonial
system. Apparently Colbert was not satisfied with the result. It may
be that he feared the vigour which Frontenac displayed in taking the
initiative; or the quarrel with Perrot may have created a bad
impression at Versailles; or it may have been considered that the less
Frontenac had to do with the routine of business, the more the colony
would thrive. Possibly Colbert only sought to define anew the
relations which ought to exist between governor and intendant.
Whatever the motive, Duchesneau's instructions gave him a degree of
authority which proved galling to the governor.
Within three weeks from the date of Duchesneau's arrival the fight had
begun (September 23, 1675). In its earliest phase it concerned the
right to preside at meetings of the Sovereign Council. For three years
Frontenac, 'high and puissant seigneur,' had conducted proceedings as a
matter of course. Duchesneau now asked him to retire from this
position, producing as warrant his commission which stated that he
should preside over the Council, 'in the absence of the said Sieur de
Frontenac.' Why this last clause should have been inserted one finds
it hard to understand, for Colbert's subsequent letters {66} place his
intention beyond doubt. He meant that Duchesneau should preside,
though without detracting from Frontenac's superior dignity. The order
of precedence at the Council is fixed with perfect clearness. First
comes the governor, then the bishop, and then the intendant. Yet the
intendant is given the chair. Colbert may have thought that Duchesneau
as a man of business possessed a better training for this special work.
Clearly the step was not taken with a view to placing an affront upon
Frontenac. When he complained, Colbert replied that there was no other
man in France who, being already a governor and lieutenant-general,
would consider it an increase of honour to preside over the Council.
In Colbert's eyes this was a clerk's work, not a soldier's.
Frontenac saw the matter differently and was unwilling to be deposed.
Royal letters, which he produced, had styled him 'President of the
Council,' and on the face of it Duchesneau's commission only indicated
that he should preside in Frontenac's absence. With these arguments
the governor stood his ground. Then followed the representations of
both parties to the king, each taxing the other with misdemeanours both
political and {67} personal. During the long period which must elapse
before a reply could be received, the Sovereign Council was turned into
an academy of invective. Besides governor, bishop, and intendant,
there were seven members who were called upon to take sides in the
contest. No one could remain neutral even if he had the desire. In
voting power Laval and Duchesneau had rather the best of it, but
Frontenac when pressed could fall back on physical force; as he once
did by banishing three of the councillors--Villeray, Tilly, and
Auteuil--from Quebec (July 4, 1679).
Incredible as it may seem, this issue regarding the right to preside
was not settled until the work of the Council had been disturbed by it
for five years. What is still more incredible, it was settled by
compromise. The king's final ruling was that the minutes of each
meeting should register the presence of governor and intendant without
saying which had presided. Throughout the controversy Colbert
remonstrated with both Frontenac and Duchesneau for their turbulence
and unwillingness to work together. Duchesneau is told that he must
not presume to think himself the equal of the governor. Frontenac is
told that the intendant has very important {68} functions and must not
be prevented from discharging them. The whole episode shows how
completely the French colonial system broke down in its attempt to act
through two officials, each of whom was designed to be a check upon the
other.
Wholly alienated by this dispute, Frontenac and Duchesneau soon found
that they could quarrel over anything and everything. Thus Duchesneau
became a consistent supporter of Laval and the Jesuits, while Frontenac
retaliated by calling him their tool. The brandy question, which was
partly ecclesiastical and partly civil, proved an excellent
battle-ground for the three great men of Canada; and, as finance was
concerned, the intendant had something to say about the establishment
of parishes. But of the manifold contests between Frontenac and
Duchesneau the most distinctive is that relating to the fur trade. At
first sight this matter would appear to lie in the province of the
intendant, whose functions embraced the supervision of commerce. But
it was the governor's duty to defend the colony from attack, and the
fur trade was a large factor in all relations with the Indians. A
personal element was also added, for in almost every letter to the {69}
minister Frontenac and Duchesneau accused each other of taking an
illicit profit from beaver skins.
In support of these accusations the most minute details are given.
Duchesneau even charged Frontenac with spreading a report among the
Indians of the Great Lakes that a pestilence had broken out in
Montreal. Thereby the governor's agents were enabled to buy up beaver
skins cheaply, afterwards selling them on his account to the English.
Frontenac rejoined by accusing the intendant of having his own
warehouses at Montreal and along the lower St Lawrence, of being
truculent, a slave to the bishop, and incompetent. Behind Duchesneau,
Frontenac keeps saying, are the Jesuits and the bishop, from whom the
spirit of faction really springs. Among many of these tirades the most
elaborate is the long memorial sent to Colbert in 1677 on the general
state of Canada. Here are some of the items. The Jesuits keep spies
in Frontenac's own house. The bishop declares that he has the power to
excommunicate the governor if necessary. The Jesuit missionaries tell
the Iroquois that they are equal to Onontio. Other charges are that
the Jesuits meddle in all civil affairs, that their revenues {70} are
enormous in proportion to the poverty of the country, and that they are
bound to domineer at whatever cost.
When we consider how Canada from end to end was affected by these
disputes, we may well feel surprise that Colbert and the king should
have suffered them to rage so long. By 1682 the state of things had
become unbearable. Partisans of Frontenac and Duchesneau attacked each
other in the streets. Duchesneau accused Frontenac of having struck
the young Duchesneau, aged sixteen, and torn the sleeve of his jacket.
He also declared that it was necessary to barricade his house.
Frontenac retorted by saying that these were gross libels. A year
earlier Colbert had placed his son, Seignelay, in charge of the
Colonial Office. With matters at such a pass Seignelay rightly thought
the time had come to take decisive action. Three courses were open to
him. The bishop and the Jesuits he could not recall. But both the
governor and the intendant came within his power. One alternative was
to dismiss Frontenac; another, to dismiss Duchesneau. Seignelay chose
the third course and dismissed them both.
[1] Laval had wished strongly that the see of Quebec should be directly
dependent on the Papacy, and his insistence on this point delayed the
formal creation of the diocese.
[2] The well-known relation of the Jansenist movement to Gallican
liberties was not such that the Gallican party accepted Jansenist
theology. The Jesuits upheld papal infallibility and, in general, the
Ultramontane position. The Jansenists were opposed to the Jesuits, but
Gallicanism was one thing and Jansenist theology another.
[3] On October 26, 1678, a meeting of the leading inhabitants of Canada
was held by royal order at Quebec to consider the rights and wrongs of
the brandy question. A large majority of those present were opposed to
prohibition.
{71}
CHAPTER V
FRONTENAC'S PUBLIC POLICY
As was said long ago, every one has the defects of his qualities. Yet,
in justice to a man of strong character and patriotic aim, the
chronicler should take care that constructive work is given its due
place, for only those who do nothing make no mistakes.
During his first term of office Frontenac had many enemies in the
higher circles of society. His quarrel with Laval was a cause of
scandal to the devout. His deadlock with Duchesneau dislocated the
routine of government. There was no one who did not feel the force of
his will. Yet to friends and foes alike his recall at sixty-two must
have seemed the definite, humiliating close of a career. It was not
the moment to view in due perspective what he had accomplished. His
shortcomings were on the lips of every one. His strength had been
revealed, but was for the time forgotten. When he left Quebec in 1682
he must {72} have thought that he would never see it again. Yet when
need came he was remembered. This fact is a useful comment on his
first term, extenuating much that had seemed ground for censure in less
troubled days.
Let us now regard Frontenac's policy from his own point of view, and
attempt to estimate what he had accomplished down to the date of his
recall.
However closely Laval and Duchesneau might seek to narrow Frontenac's
sphere of action, there was one power they could not deny him. As
commander of the king's troops in Canada he controlled all matters
relating to colonial defence. If his domestic administration was full
of trouble, it must also be remembered that during his first term of
office there was no war. This happy result was due less to accident
than to his own gifts and character. It is true that the friendship of
Louis XIV and Charles II assured peace between New France and New
England. But Canada could thank Frontenac for keeping the Iroquois at
arm's length.
We have seen how he built the stronghold at Cataraqui, which was named
Fort Frontenac. The vigour and the tact that he displayed on this
occasion give the keynote to {73} all his relations with the Indians.
Towards them he displayed the three qualities which a governor of
Canada most needed--firmness, sympathy, and fair dealing. His
arrogance, so conspicuous in his intercourse with equals or with
refractory subordinates, disappears wholly when he comes into contact
with the savages. Theatrical he may be, but in the forest he is never
intolerant or narrow-minded. And behind his pageants there is always
power.
Thus Frontenac should receive personal credit for the great success of
his Indian policy. He kept the peace by moral ascendancy, and to see
that this was no light task one need only compare the events of his
régime with those which marked the period of his successors, La Barre
and Denonville. This we shall do in the next chapter. For the present
it is enough to say that throughout the full ten years 1672-82 Canada
was free from fear of the Iroquois. Just at the close of Frontenac's
first term (1680-82) the Senecas were showing signs of restlessness by
attacking tribes allied to the French, but there is abundant reason to
suppose that had Frontenac remained in office he could have kept these
inter-tribal wars under control.
{74}
Bound up with the success of Frontenac's Indian policy is the
exploration of the West--an achievement which adds to this period its
chief lustre. Here La Salle is the outstanding figure and the laurels
are chiefly his. None the less, Frontenac deserves the credit of
having encouraged all endeavours to solve the problem of the
Mississippi. Like La Salle he had large ideas and was not afraid.
They co-operated in perfect harmony, sharing profits, perhaps, but
sincerely bent on gaining for France a new, vast realm. The whole
history of colonial enterprise shows how fortunate the French have been
in the co-operation of their explorers with their provincial governors.
The relations of La Salle with La Barre form a striking exception, but
the statement holds true in the main, and with reference to Algiers as
well as to Canada.
La Salle was a frank partisan of Frontenac throughout the quarrel with
Perrot and Fénelon. On one occasion he made a scene in church at
Montreal. It was during the Easter service of 1674. When Fénelon
decried magistrates who show no respect to the clergy and who use their
deputed power for their own advantage, La Salle stood up and called the
attention of the leading citizens to {75} these words. Frontenac, who
was always a loyal ally, showed that he appreciated La Salle's efforts
on his behalf by giving him a letter of recommendation to the court in
which La Salle is styled 'a man of intelligence and ability, more
capable than any one else I know here to accomplish every kind of
enterprise and discovery which may be entrusted to him.'
The result of La Salle's visit to Versailles (1674) was that he gained
privileges which made him one of the most important men in Canada, and
a degree of power which brought down on him many enemies. He received
the seigneury of Fort Frontenac, he was made local governor at that
post, and, in recognition of services already performed, he gained a
grant of nobility. It is clear that La Salle's forceful personality
made a strong impression at court, and the favours which he received
enabled him, in turn, to secure financial aid from his wealthy
relatives at Rouen.
What followed was the most brilliant, the most exciting, and the most
tragic chapter in the French exploration of America. La Salle
fulfilled all the conditions upon which he had received the seigneury
at Fort Frontenac, and found financial profit in maintaining the post.
{76} The original wooden structure was replaced by stone, good barracks
were built for the troops, there were bastions upon which nine cannon
announced a warning to the Iroquois, a settlement with well-tilled land
sprang up around the fort, schooners were built with a draught of forty
tons. But for La Salle this was not enough. He was a pathfinder, not
a trader. Returning to France after two years of labour and success at
Fort Frontenac, he secured a royal patent authorizing him to explore
the whole continent from the Great Lakes to Mexico, with the right to
build forts therein and to enjoy a monopoly of the trade in buffalo
skins. The expenses of the undertaking were, of course, to be borne by
La Salle and his associates, for the king never invested money in these
enterprises. However, the persuasiveness which enabled La Salle to
secure his patent enabled him to borrow the necessary funds. At the
close of 1678 he was once more at Fort Frontenac and ready for the
great adventure.
How La Salle explored the country of the Illinois in company with his
valiant friend, Henri de Tonty 'of the iron hand,' and how these two
heroic leaders traversed the continent to the very mouth of the
Mississippi, {77} is not to be told here. But with its risks, its
hardships, its tragedies, and its triumphs, this episode, which belongs
to the period of Frontenac's administration, will always remain a
classic in the records of discovery. The Jesuits, who did not love La
Salle, were no less brave than he, and the lustre of his achievements
must not be made to dim theirs. Yet they had all the force of a mighty
organization at their back, while La Salle, standing alone, braved
ruin, obloquy, and death in order to win an empire for France.
Sometimes he may have thought of fame, but he possessed that driving
power which goes straight for the object, even if it means sacrifice of
self. His haughtiness, his daring, his self-centred determination,
well fitted him to be the friend and trusted agent of Frontenac.
Another leading figure of the period in western discovery was Daniel
Greysolon du Lhut. Duchesneau calls him the leader of the coureurs de
bois. There can be no doubt that he had reached this eminence among
the French of the forest. He was a gentleman by birth and a soldier by
early training. In many ways he resembled La Salle, for both stood
high above the common coureurs de {78} bois in station, as in talent.
Du Lhut has to his credit no single exploit which equals La Salle's
descent of the Mississippi, but in native sagacity he was the superior.
With a temperament less intense and experiences less tragic, he will
never hold the place which La Salle securely occupies in the annals of
adventure. But few Frenchmen equalled him in knowledge of the
wilderness, and none displayed greater force of character in dealing
with the Indians.
What the mouth of the Mississippi was to La Salle the country of the
Sioux became to Du Lhut--a goal to be reached at all hazards. Not only
did he reach it, but the story of how he rescued Father Hennepin from
the Sioux (1680) is among the liveliest tales to be found in the
literature of the wilderness. The only regrettable circumstance is
that the story should have been told by Hennepin instead of by Du
Lhut--or rather, that we should not have also Du Lhut's detailed
version instead of the brief account which he has left. Above all, Du
Lhut made himself the guardian of French interests at Michilimackinac,
the chief French post of the Far West--the rendezvous of more tribes
than came together at any other point. The finest tale of his courage
{79} and good judgment belongs to the period of La Barre's
government--when, in 1684, at the head of forty-two French, he executed
sentence of death on an Indian convicted of murder. Four hundred
savages, who had assembled in mutinous mood, witnessed this act of
summary justice. But they respected Du Lhut for the manner in which he
had conducted the trial, and admired the firmness with which he
executed a fair sentence.
Du Lhut's exploits and character make him the outstanding figure of the
war which Duchesneau waged against the coureurs de bois. The intendant
certainly had the letter of the law on his side in seeking to clear the
woods of those rovers who at the risk of their own lives and without
expense to the government were gaining for France an unequalled
knowledge of the interior. Not only had the king decreed that no one
should be permitted to enter the forest without express permission, but
an edict of 1676 denied even the governor the right to issue a trading
pass at his unrestrained discretion. Frontenac, who believed that the
colony would draw great profit from exploration, softened the effect of
this measure by issuing licences to hunt. It was also within his power
to dispatch messengers to the tribes {80} of the Great Lakes.
Duchesneau reported that Frontenac evaded the edict in order to favour
his own partners or agents among the coureurs de bois, and that when he
went to Montreal on the pretext of negotiating with the Iroquois, his
real purpose was to take up merchandise and bring back furs. These
charges Frontenac denied with his usual vigour, but without silencing
Duchesneau. In 1679 the altercation on this point was brought to an
issue by the arrest, at the intendant's instance [Transcriber's note:
insistence?], of La Toupine, a retainer of Du Lhut. An accusation of
disobeying the edict was no trifle, for the penalty might mean a
sentence to the galleys. After a bitter contest over La Toupine the
matter was settled on a basis not unfavourable to Frontenac. In 1681 a
fresh edict declared that all coureurs de bois who came back to the
colony should receive the benefit of an amnesty. At the same time the
governor was empowered to grant twenty-five trading licences in each
year, the period to be limited to one year.
[Illustration: FIGURE OF FRONTENAC. From the Hébert Statue at Quebec]
The splendid services of Du Lhut, covering a period of thirty years,
are the best vindication of Frontenac's policy towards him and his
associates. Had Duchesneau succeeded in his efforts, Du Lhut would
have been {81} severely punished, and probably excluded from the West
for the remainder of his life. Thanks to Frontenac's support, he
became the mainstay of French interests from Lake Ontario to the
Mississippi. Setting out as an adventurer with a strong taste for
exploration, he ended as commandant of the most important
posts--Lachine, Cataraqui, and Michilimackinac. He served the colony
nobly in the war against the Iroquois. He has left reports of his
discoveries which disclose marked literary talent. From the early
years of Frontenac's régime he made himself useful, not only to
Frontenac but to each succeeding governor, until, crippled by gout and
age, he died, still in harness. The letter in which the governor
Vaudreuil announces Du Lhut's death (1710) to the Colonial Office at
Paris is a useful comment upon the accusations of Duchesneau. 'He
was,' says Vaudreuil, 'a very honest man.' In these words will be
found an indirect commendation of Frontenac, who discovered Du Lhut,
supported him through bitter opposition, and placed him where his
talents and energy could be used for the good of his country.
It will be remembered that Frontenac received orders from Colbert
(April 7, 1672) to {82} prevent the Jesuits from becoming too powerful.
In carrying out these instructions he soon found himself embroiled at
Quebec, and the same discord made itself felt throughout the wilderness.
Frontenac favoured the establishment of trading-posts and government
forts along the great waterways, from Cataraqui to Crèvecoeur.[1] He
sincerely believed that these were the best guarantees of the king's
power on the Great Lakes and in the valley of the Mississippi. The
Jesuits saw in each post a centre of debauchery and feared that their
religious work would be undone by the scandalous example of the
coureurs de bois. What for Frontenac was a question of political
expediency loomed large to the Jesuits as a vital issue of morals. It
was a delicate question at best, though probably a peaceable solution
could have been arranged, but for the mutual agreement of Frontenac and
the Jesuits that they must be antagonists. War having once been
declared, Frontenac proved a poor controversialist. He could have
defended his forest policy without alleging that the Jesuits maintained
their missions as a source of {83} profit, which was a slander upon
heroes and upon martyrs. Moreover, he exposed himself to a flank
attack, for it could be pointed out with much force that he had private
motives in advocating the erection of forts. Frontenac was intelligent
and would have recommended the establishment of posts whether he
expected profit from them or not, but he weakened his case by attacking
the Jesuits on wrong grounds.
During Frontenac's first term the settled part of Canada was limited to
the shores of the St Lawrence from Lachine downward, with a cluster of
seigneuries along the lower Richelieu. In this region the governor was
hampered by the rights of the intendant and the influence of the
bishop. Westward of Lachine stretched the wilderness, against whose
dusky denizens the governor must guard the colony. The problems of the
forest embraced both trade and war; and where trade was concerned the
intendant held sway. But the safety of the flock came first, and as
Frontenac had the power of the sword he could execute his plans most
freely in the region which lay beyond the fringe of settlement. It was
here that he achieved his greatest success and by his acts won a strong
place in the confidence {84} of the settlers. This was much, and to
this extent his first term of office was not a failure.
As Canada was then so sparsely settled, the growth of population filled
a large place in the shaping of public policy. With this matter,
however, Duchesneau had more to do than Frontenac, for it was the
intendant's duty to create prosperity. During the decade 1673-83 the
population of Canada increased from 6705 to 10,251. In percentage the
advance shows to better advantage than in totals, but the king had
hardened his heart to the demand for colonists. Thenceforth the
population of Canada was to be recruited almost altogether from births.
On the whole, the growth of the population during this period compares
favourably with the growth of trade. In 1664 a general monopoly of
Canadian trade had been conceded to the West India Company, on terms
which gave every promise of success. But the trading companies of
France proved a series of melancholy failures, and at this point
Colbert fared no better than Richelieu. When Frontenac reached Canada
the West India Company was hopelessly bankrupt, and in 1674 the king
acquired its rights. This change produced little or no improvement.
Like France, {85} Canada suffered greatly through the war with Holland,
and not till after the Peace of Nimwegen (1678) did the commercial
horizon begin to clear. Even then it was impossible to note any real
progress in Canadian trade, except in a slight enlargement of relations
with the West Indies. During his last year at Quebec Duchesneau gives
a very gloomy report on commercial conditions.
For this want of prosperity Frontenac was in no way responsible, unless
his troubles with Laval and Duchesneau may be thought to have damped
the colonizing ardour of Louis XIV. It is much more probable that the
king withheld his bounty from Canada because his attention was
concentrated on the costly war against Holland. Campaigns at home
meant economy in Canada, and the colony was far from having reached the
stage where it could flourish without constant financial support from
the motherland.
In general, Frontenac's policy was as vigorous as he could make it.
Over commerce, taxes, and religion he had no control. By training and
temper he was a war governor, who during his first administration fell
upon a time of peace. So long as peace prevailed he lacked the powers
and the opportunity to {86} enable him to reveal his true strength; and
his energy, without sufficient vent, broke forth in quarrels at the
council board.
With wider authority, Frontenac might have proved a successful governor
even in time of peace, for he was very intelligent and had at heart the
welfare of the colony. As it was, his restrictions chafed and goaded
him until wrathfulness took the place of reason. But we shall err if
we conclude that when he left Canada in discomfiture he had not earned
her thanks. Through pride and faults of temper he had impaired his
usefulness and marred his record. Even so there was that which rescued
his work from the stigma of failure. He had guarded his people from
the tomahawk and the scalping-knife. With prescient eye he had
foreseen the imperial greatness of the West. Whatever his
shortcomings, they had not been those of meanness or timidity.
[1] Fort Crèvecoeur was La Salle's post in the heart of the Illinois
country.
{87}
CHAPTER VI
THE LURID INTERVAL
We have seen that during Frontenac's first term of office no urgent
danger menaced the colony on the frontier. The missionary and the
explorer were steadily pressing forward to the head of the Great Lakes
and into the valley of the Mississippi, enlarging the sphere of French
influence and rendering the interior tributary to the commerce of
Quebec. But this peaceful and silent expansion had not passed
unnoticed by those in whose minds it aroused both rivalry and dread.
Untroubled from without as New France had been under Frontenac, there
were always two lurking perils--the Iroquois and the English.
The Five Nations owed their leadership among the Indian tribes not only
to superior discipline and method but also to their geographical
situation. The valley of the St Lawrence lay within easy reach, either
through Lake Champlain or Lake Ontario. On the {88} east at their very
door lay the valley of the Mohawk and the Hudson. From the western
fringe of their territory they could advance quickly to Lake Erie, or
descend the Ohio into the valley of the Mississippi. It was doubtless
due to their prowess rather than to accident that they originally came
into possession of this central and favoured position; however, they
could now make their force felt throughout the whole north-eastern
portion of the continent.
Over seventy years had now passed since Champlain's attack upon the
Iroquois in 1609; but lapse of time had not altered the nature of the
savage, nor were the causes of mutual hostility less real than at
first. A ferocious lust for war remained the deepest passion of the
Iroquois, to be satisfied at convenient intervals. It was unfortunate,
in their view, that they could not always be at war; but they
recognized that there must be breathing times and that it was important
to choose the right moment for massacre and pillage. Daring but
sagacious, they followed an opportunist policy. At times their
warriors delighted to lurk in the outskirts of Montreal with tomahawk
and scalping-knife and to organize great war-parties, such as that {89}
which was arrested by Dollard and his heroic companions at the Long
Sault in 1660. At other times they held fair speech with the governor
and permitted the Jesuits to live in their villages, for the French had
weapons and means of fighting which inspired respect.
The appearance of the Dutch on the Hudson in 1614 was an event of great
importance to the Five Nations. The Dutch were quite as ready as the
French to trade in furs, and it was thus that the Iroquois first
procured the firearms which they used in their raids on the French
settlements. That the Iroquois rejoiced at having a European colony on
the Hudson may be doubted, but as they were unable to prevent it, they
drew what profit they could by putting the French and Dutch in
competition, both for their alliance and their neutrality.
But, though the Dutch were heretics and rivals, it was a bad day for
New France when the English seized New Amsterdam (1664) and began to
establish themselves from Manhattan to Albany. The inevitable conflict
was first foreshadowed in the activities of Sir Edmund Andros, which
followed his appointment as governor of New York in 1674. He visited
the Mohawks in their own villages, {90} organized a board of Indian
commissioners at Albany, and sought to cement an alliance with the
whole confederacy of the Five Nations. In opposition to this France
made the formal claim (1677) that by actual residence in the Iroquois
country the Jesuits had brought the Iroquois under French sovereignty.
Iroquois, French, and English thus formed the points of a political
triangle. Home politics, however--the friendship of Stuart and
Bourbon--tended to postpone the day of reckoning between the English
and French in America. England and France were not only at peace but
in alliance. The Treaty of Dover had been signed in 1670, and two
years later, just as Frontenac had set out for Quebec, Charles II had
sent a force of six thousand English to aid Louis XIV against the
Dutch. It was in this war that John Churchill, afterwards Duke of
Marlborough, won his spurs--fighting on the French side!
None the less, there were premonitions of trouble in America,
especially after Thomas Dongan became governor of New York in 1683.
Andros had shown good judgment in his dealings with the Iroquois, and
his successor, inheriting a sound policy, went even further on the same
course. Dongan, an {91} Irishman of high birth and a Catholic,
strenuously opposed the pretensions of the French to sovereignty over
the Iroquois. When it was urged that religion required the presence of
the Jesuits among them, he denied the allegation, stating that he would
provide English priests to take their place. A New England Calvinist
could not have shown more firmness in upholding the English position.
Indeed, no governor of Puritan New England had ever equalled Dongan in
hostility to Catholic New France.
Frontenac's successor, Lefebvre de la Barre, who had served with
distinction in the West Indies, arrived at Quebec in September 1682.
By the same ship came the new intendant, Meulles. They found the Lower
Town of Quebec in ruins, for a devastating fire had just swept through
it. Hardly anything remained standing save the buildings on the cliff.
La Barre and Meulles were soon at loggerheads. It appears that,
instead of striving to repair the effects of the fire, the new governor
busied himself to accumulate a fortune. He had indeed promised the
king that, unlike his predecessors, he would seek no profit from
private trading, and had on this ground requested an increase of
salary. {92} Meulles presently reported that, far from keeping this
promise, La Barre and his agents had shared ten or twelve thousand
crowns of profit, and that unless checked the governor's revenues would
soon exceed those of the king. Meulles also accuses La Barre of
sending home deceitful reports regarding the success of his Indian
policy. We need not dwell longer on these reports. They disclose with
great clearness the opinion of the intendant as to the governor's
fitness for his office.
La Barre stands condemned not by the innuendoes of Meulles, but by his
own failure to cope with the Iroquois.
The presence of the Dutch and English had stimulated the Five Nations
to enlarge their operations in the fur trade and multiply their
profits. The French, from being earliest in the field, had established
friendly relations with all the tribes to the north of the Great Lakes,
including those who dwelt in the valley of the Ottawa; and La Salle and
Tonty had recently penetrated to the Mississippi and extended French
trade to the country of the Illinois Indians. The furs from this
region were being carried up the Mississippi and forwarded to Quebec by
the Lakes and the St Lawrence. This brought the Illinois within {93}
the circle of tribes commercially dependent on Quebec. At the same
time the Iroquois, through the English on the Hudson, now possessed
facilities greater than ever for disposing of all the furs they could
acquire; and they wanted this trade for themselves.
The wholesome respect which the Iroquois entertained for Frontenac kept
them from attacking the tribes under the protection of the French on
the Great Lakes; but the remote Illinois were thought to be a safe
prey. During the autumn of 1680 a war-party of more than six hundred
Iroquois invaded the country of the Illinois. La Salle was then in
Montreal, but Tonty met the invaders and did all he could to save the
Illinois from their clutches. His efforts were in vain. The Illinois
suffered all that had befallen the Hurons in 1649.[1] The Iroquois,
however, were careful not to harm the French, and to demand from Tonty
a letter to show Frontenac as proof that he and his companions had been
respected.
Obviously this raid was a symptom of danger, and in 1681 Frontenac
asked the king to send him five or six hundred troops. A further
disturbing incident occurred at the {94} Jesuit mission of Sault Ste
Marie, where an Illinois Indian murdered a Seneca chieftain. That
Frontenac intended to act with firmness towards the Iroquois, while
giving them satisfaction for the murder of their chief, is clear from
his acts in 1681 no less than from his general record. But his forces
were small and he had received particular instructions to reduce
expenditure. And, with Duchesneau at hand to place a sinister
interpretation upon his every act, the conditions were not favourable
for immediate action. Then in 1682 he was recalled.
Such, in general, were the conditions which confronted La Barre, and in
fairness it must be admitted that they were the most serious thus far
in the history of Canada. From the first the Iroquois had been a pest
and a menace, but now, with the English to flatter and encourage them,
they became a grave peril. The total population of the colony was now
about ten thousand, of whom many were women and children. The regular
troops were very few; and, though the disbanded Carignan soldiers
furnished the groundwork of a valiant militia, the habitants and their
seigneurs alone could not be expected to defend such a territory
against such a foe.
{95}
Above all else the situation demanded strong leadership; and this was
precisely what La Barre failed to supply. He was preoccupied with the
profits of the fur trade, ignorant of Indian character, and past his
physical prime; and his policy towards the Iroquois was a continuous
series of blunders. Through the great personal influence of Charles Le
Moyne the Five Nations were induced, in 1683, to send representatives
to Montreal, where La Barre met them and gave them lavish presents.
The Iroquois, always good judges of character, did not take long to
discover in the new governor a very different Onontio from the imposing
personage who had held conference with them at Fort Frontenac ten years
earlier.
The feebleness of La Barre's effort to maintain French sovereignty over
the Iroquois is reflected in his request that they should ask his
permission before attacking tribes friendly to the French. When he
asked them why they had attacked the Illinois, they gave this ominous
answer: 'Because they deserved to die.' La Barre could effect nothing
by a display of authority, and even with the help of gifts he could
only postpone war against the tribes of the Great Lakes. The Iroquois
intimated that for the present they would be {96} content to finish the
destruction of the Illinois--a work which would involve the destruction
of the French posts in the valley of the Mississippi. La Barre's chief
purpose was to protect his own interests as a trader, and, so far from
wishing to strengthen La Salle's position on the Mississippi, he looked
upon that illustrious explorer as a competitor whom it was legitimate
to destroy by craft. By an act of poetic justice the Iroquois a few
months later plundered a convoy of canoes which La Barre himself had
sent out to the Mississippi for trading purposes.
The season of 1684 proved even less prosperous for the French. Not
only Dongan was doing his best to make the Iroquois allies of the
English; Lord Howard of Effingham, the governor of Virginia, was busy
to the same end. For some time past certain tribes of the Five
Nations, though not the confederacy as a whole, had been making forays
upon the English settlers in Maryland and even in Virginia. To adjust
this matter Lord Howard came to Albany in person, held a council which
was attended by representatives of all the tribes, and succeeded in
effecting a peace. Amid the customary ceremonies the Five Nations
buried the hatchet with the English, {97} and stood ready to
concentrate their war-parties upon the French.
It must not be inferred that by an act of reconciliation these subtle
savages threw themselves into the arms of the English, exchanging a new
suzerainty for an old. They always did the best they could for their
own hand, seeking to play one white man against the other for their own
advantage. It was a situation where, on the part of French and
English, individual skill and knowledge of Indian character counted for
much. On the one hand, Dongan showed great intelligence and activity
in making the most of the fact that Albany was nearer to the land of
the Five Nations than Quebec, or even Montreal. On the other, the
French had envoys who stood high in the esteem of the Iroquois--notably
Charles Le Moyne, of Longueuil, and Lamberville, the Jesuit missionary.
But for the moment the French were heavily burdened by the venality of
La Barre, who subordinated public policy to his own gains. We have now
to record his most egregious blunder--an attempt to overawe the
Iroquois with an insufficient force--an attempt which Meulles declared
was a mere piece of acting--not designed for real war on behalf of the
colony, {98} but to assist the governor's private interests as a
trader. From whatever side the incident is viewed it illustrates a
complete incapacity.
On July 10, 1684, La Barre left Quebec with a body of two hundred
troops. In ascending the river they were reinforced by recruits from
the Canadian militia and several hundred Indian allies. After much
hardship in the rapids the little army reached Fort Frontenac. Here
the sanitary conditions proved bad and many died from malarial fever.
All thought of attack soon vanished, and La Barre altered his plans and
decided to invite the Iroquois to a council. The degree of his
weakness may be seen from the fact that he began with a concession
regarding the place of meeting. An embassy from the Onondagas finally
condescended to meet him, but not at Fort Frontenac. La Barre, with a
force such as he could muster, crossed to the south side of Lake
Ontario and met the delegates from the Iroquois at La Famine, at the
mouth of the Salmon River, not far from the point where Champlain and
the Hurons had left their canoes when they had invaded the Onondaga
country in 1615.
The council which ensued was a ghastly joke. La Barre began his speech
by {99} enumerating the wrongs which the French and their dependent
tribes had recently suffered from the Iroquois. Among these he
included the raid upon the Illinois, the machinations with the English,
and the spoliation of French traders. For offences so heinous
satisfaction must be given. Otherwise Onontio would declare a war in
which the English would join him. These were brave words, but
unfortunately the Iroquois had excellent reason to believe that the
statement regarding the English was untrue, and could see for
themselves the weakness of La Barre's forces.
This conference has been picturesquely described by Baron La Hontan,
who was present and records the speeches. The chief orator of the
Onondagas was a remarkable person, who either for his eloquence or
aspect is called by La Hontan, Grangula, or Big Mouth. Having listened
to La Barre's bellicose words and their interpretation, 'he rose, took
five or six turns in the ring that the French and the savages formed,
and returned to his place. Then standing upright he spoke after the
following manner to the General La Barre, who sat in his chair of state:
Onontio, I honour you, and all the warriors that accompany me do the
same. Your interpreter has {100} made an end of his discourse, and now
I come to begin mine. My voice glides to your ear. Pray listen to my
words.
Onontio, in setting out from Quebec, you must have fancied that the
scorching beams of the sun had burnt down the forests which render our
country inaccessible to the French; or else that the inundations of the
lake had surrounded our cottages and confined us as prisoners. This
certainly was your thought; and it could be nothing else but the
curiosity of seeing a burnt or drowned country that moved you to
undertake a journey hither. But now you have an opportunity of being
undeceived, for I and my warriors come to assure you that the Senecas,
Cayugas, Onondagas, Oneidas, and Mohawks are not yet destroyed. I
return you thanks in their name for bringing into their country the
calumet of peace, which your predecessor received from their hands. At
the same time I congratulate you on having left under ground the
tomahawk which has so often been dyed with the blood of the French. I
must tell you, Onontio, that I am not asleep. My eyes are open, and
the sun which vouchsafes the light gives me a clear view of a great
captain at the head of a troop of soldiers, who speaks as if he were
asleep. He pretends that he does not approach this lake with any other
view than to smoke the calumet with the Onondagas. But Grangula knows
better. He sees plainly that Onontio meant to knock them on the head
if the French arms had not been so much weakened....
You must know, Onontio, that we have robbed no {101} Frenchman, save
those who supplied the Illinois and the Miamis (our enemies) with
muskets, powder, and ball.... We have conducted the English to our
lakes in order to trade with the Ottawas and the Hurons; just as the
Algonquins conducted the French to our five cantons, in order to carry
on a commerce that the English lay claim to as their right. We are
born freemen and have no dependence either upon the Onontio or the
Corlaer [the English governor]. We have power to go where we please,
to conduct whom we will to the places we resort to, and to buy and sell
where we think fit.... We fell upon the Illinois and the Miamis
because they cut down the trees of peace that served for boundaries and
came to hunt beavers upon our lands.... We have done less than the
English and French, who without any right have usurped the lands they
are now possessed of.
I give you to know, Onontio, that my voice is the voice of the five
Iroquois cantons. This is their answer. Pray incline your ear and
listen to what they represent.
The Senecas, Cayugas, Onondagas, Oneidas, and Mohawks declare that they
buried the tomahawk in the presence of your predecessor, in the very
centre of the fort, and planted the Tree of Peace in the same place.
It was then stipulated that the fort should be used as a place of
retreat for merchants and not a refuge for soldiers. Be it known to
you, Onontio, that so great a number of soldiers, being shut up in so
small a fort, do not stifle and choke the Tree of Peace. Since it took
root so easily it would be evil {102} to stop its growth and hinder it
from shading both your country and ours with its leaves. I assure you,
in the name of the five nations, that our warriors will dance the
calumet dance under its branches and will never dig up the axe to cut
it down--till such time as the Onontio and the Corlaer do separately or
together invade the country which the Great Spirit gave to our
ancestors.'[2]
When Le Moyne and the Jesuits had interpreted this speech La Barre
'retired to his tent and stormed and blustered.' But Grangula favoured
the spectators with an Iroquois dance, after which he entertained
several of the Frenchmen at a banquet. 'Two days later,' writes La
Hontan, 'he and his warriors returned to their own country, and our
army set out for Montreal. As soon as the General was on board,
together with the few healthy men that remained, the canoes were
dispersed, for the militia straggled here and there, and every one made
the best of his way home.'
With this ignominious adventure the career of La Barre ends. The
reports which Meulles sent to France produced a speedy effect in {103}
securing his dismissal from office. 'I have been informed,' politely
writes the king, 'that your years do not permit you to support the
fatigues inseparable from your office of governor and
lieutenant-general in Canada.'
La Barre's successor, the Marquis de Denonville, arrived at Quebec in
August 1685. Like La Barre, he was a soldier; like Frontenac, he was
an aristocrat as well. From both these predecessors, however, he
differed in being free from the reproach of using his office to secure
personal profits through the fur trade. No governor in all the annals
of New France was on better terms with the bishop and the Jesuits. He
possessed great bravery. There is much to show that he was energetic.
None the less he failed, and his failure was more glaring than that of
La Barre. He could not hold his ground against the Iroquois and the
English.
It has been pointed out already that when La Barre assumed office the
problems arising from these two sources were more difficult than at any
previous date; but the situation which was serious in 1682 and had
become critical by 1685 grew desperate in the four years of
Denonville's sway. The one {104} over-shadowing question of this
period was the Iroquois peril, rendered more and more acute by the
policy of the English.
The greatest mistake which Denonville made in his dealings with the
Iroquois was to act deceitfully. The savages could be perfidious
themselves, but they were not without a conception of honour and felt
genuine respect for a white man whose word they could trust.
Denonville, who in his private life displayed many virtues, seemed to
consider that he was justified in acting towards the savages as the
exigency of the moment prompted. Apart from all considerations of
morality this was bad judgment.
In his dealings with the English Denonville had little more success
than in his dealings with the Indians. Dongan was a thorn in his side
from the first, although their correspondence opened, on both sides,
with the language of compliment. A few months later its tone changed,
particularly after Dongan heard that Denonville intended to build a
fort at Niagara. Against a project so unfriendly Dongan protested with
emphasis. In reply Denonville disclaimed the intention, at the same
time alleging that Dongan was giving shelter at Albany to French
deserters. A {105} little later they reach the point of sarcasm.
Denonville taxes Dongan with selling rum to the Indians. Dongan
retorts that at least English rum is less unwholesome than French
brandy. Beneath these epistolary compliments there lies the broad fact
that Dongan stood firm by his principle that the extension of French
rule to the south of Lake Ontario should not be tolerated. He
ridicules the basis of French pretensions, saying that Denonville might
as well claim China because there are Jesuits at the Chinese court.
The French, he adds, have no more right to the country because its
streams flow into Lake Ontario than they have to the lands of those who
drink claret or brandy. It is clear that Dongan fretted under the
restrictions which were imposed upon him by the friendship between
England and France. He would have welcomed an order to support his
arguments by force. Denonville, on his side, with like feelings, could
not give up the claim to suzerainty over the land of the Iroquois.
The domain of the Five Nations was not the only part of America where
French and English clashed. The presence of the English in Hudson Bay
excited deep resentment at {106} Quebec and Montreal. Here Denonville
ventured to break the peace as Dongan had not dared to do. With
Denonville's consent and approval, a band of Canadians left Montreal in
the spring of 1686, fell upon three of the English posts--Fort Hayes,
Fort Rupert, Fort Albany--and with some bloodshed dispossessed their
garrisons. Well satisfied with this exploit, Denonville in 1687 turned
his attention to the chastisement of the Iroquois.
The forces which he brought together for this task were greatly
superior to any that had been mustered in Canada before. Not only were
they adequate in numbers, but they comprised an important band of
coureurs de bois, headed by La Durantaye, Tonty, Du Lhut, and Nicolas
Perrot--men who equalled the Indians in woodcraft and surpassed them in
character. The epitaph of Denonville as a governor is written in the
failure of this great expedition to accomplish its purpose.
The first blunder occurred at Fort Frontenac before mobilization had
been completed. There were on the north shore of Lake Ontario two
Iroquois villages, whose inhabitants had been in part baptized by the
Sulpicians and {107} were on excellent terms with the garrison of the
fort. In a moment of insane stupidity Denonville decided that the men
of these settlements should be captured and sent to France as galley
slaves. Through the ruse of a banquet they were brought together and
easily seized. By dint of a little further effort two hundred Iroquois
of all ages and both sexes were collected at Fort Frontenac as
prisoners--and some at least perished by torture. But, when executing
this dastardly plot, Denonville did not succeed in catching all the
friendly Iroquois who lived in the neighbourhood of his fort. Enough
escaped to carry the authentic tale to the Five Nations, and after that
there could be no peace till there had been revenge. Worst of all, the
French stood convicted of treachery and falseness.
Having thus blighted his cause at the outset, Denonville proceeded with
his more serious task of smiting the Iroquois in their own country.
Considering the extent and expense of his preparations, he should have
planned a complete destruction of their power. Instead of this he
attempted no more than an attack upon the Senecas, whose operations
against the Illinois and in other quarters had made {108} them
especially objectionable. The composite army of French and Indians
assembled at Irondequoit Bay on July 12--a force brought together at
infinite pains and under circumstances which might never occur again.
Marching southwards they fought a trivial battle with the Senecas, in
which half a dozen on the French side were killed, while the Senecas
are said to have lost about a hundred in killed and wounded. The rest
of the tribe took to the woods. As a result of this easy victory the
triumphant allies destroyed an Iroquois village and all the corn which
it contained, but the political results of the expedition were worse
than nothing. Denonville made no attempt to destroy the other nations
of the confederacy. Returning to Lake Ontario he built a fort at
Niagara, which he had promised Dongan he would not do, and then
returned to Montreal. The net results of this portentous effort were a
broken promise to the English, an act of perfidy towards the Iroquois,
and an insignificant success in battle.
In 1688 Denonville's decision to abandon Fort Niagara slightly changed
the situation. The garrison had suffered severe losses through illness
and the post proved too remote for {109} successful defence. So this
matter settled itself. The same season saw the recall of Dongan
through the consolidation of New England, New York, and New Jersey
under Sir Edmund Andros. But in essentials there was no change.
Andros continued Dongan's policy, of which, in fact, he himself had
been the author. And, even though no longer threatened by the French
from Niagara, the savages had reason enough to hate and distrust
Denonville.
Yet despite these untoward circumstances all hope of peace between the
French and the Five Nations had not been destroyed. The Iroquois loved
their revenge and were willing to wait for it, but caution warned them
that it would not be advantageous to destroy the French for the benefit
of the English. Moreover, in the long course of their relations with
the French they had, as already mentioned, formed a high opinion of men
like Le Moyne and Lamberville, while they viewed with respect the
exploits of Tonty, La Durantaye, and Du Lhut.
Moved by these considerations and a love of presents, Grangula, of the
Onondagas, was in the midst of negotiations for peace with the French,
which might have ended happily but {110} for the stratagem of the Huron
chief Kondiaronk, called 'The Rat.' The remnant of Hurons and the
other tribes centring at Michilimackinac did not desire a peace of the
French and Iroquois which would not include themselves, for this would
mean their own certain destruction. The Iroquois, freed of the French,
would surely fall on the Hurons. All the Indians distrusted
Denonville, and Kondiaronk suspected, with good reason, that the Hurons
were about to be sacrificed. Denonville, however, had assured
Kondiaronk that there was to be war to the death against the Iroquois,
and on this understanding he went with a band of warriors to Fort
Frontenac. There he learned that peace would be concluded between
Onontio and the Onondagas--in other words, that the Iroquois would soon
be free to attack the Hurons and their allies. To avert this
threatened destruction of his own people, he set out with his warriors
and lay in ambush for a party of Onondaga chiefs who were on their way
to Montreal. Having killed one and captured almost all the rest, he
announced to his Iroquois prisoners that he had received orders from
Denonville to destroy them. When they explained that they were
ambassadors, he {111} feigned surprise and said he could no longer be
an accomplice to the wickedness of the French. Then he released them
all save one, in order that they might carry home this tale of
Denonville's second treachery. The one Iroquois Kondiaronk retained on
the plea that he wished to adopt him. Arrived at Michilimackinac, he
handed over the captive to the French there, who, having heard nothing
of the peace, promptly shot him. An Iroquois prisoner, whom Kondiaronk
secretly released for the purpose, conveyed to the Five Nations word of
this further atrocity.
The Iroquois prepared to deliver a hard blow. On August 5, 1689, they
fell in overwhelming force upon the French settlement at Lachine.
Those who died by the tomahawk were the most fortunate. Charlevoix
gives the number of victims at two hundred killed and one hundred and
twenty taken prisoner. Girouard's examination of parish registers
results in a lower estimate--namely, twenty-four killed at Lachine and
forty-two at La Chesnaye, a short time afterwards. Whatever the
number, it was the most dreadful catastrophe which the colony had yet
suffered.
{112}
Such were the events which, in seven years, had brought New France to
the brink of ruin. But she was not to perish from the Iroquois. In
October 1689 Frontenac returned to take Denonville's place.
[1] See _The Jesuit Missions_ in this Series, chap. vi.
[2] Grangula's speech is an example in part of Indian eloquence, and in
part of the eloquence of Baron La Hontan, who contributes many striking
passages to our knowledge of Frontenac's period.
{113}
CHAPTER VII
THE GREAT STRUGGLE
During the period which separates his two terms of office Frontenac's
life is almost a blank. His relations with his wife seem to have been
amicable, but they did not live together. His great friend was the
Maréchal de Bellefonds, from whom he received many favours of
hospitality. In 1685 the king gave him a pension of thirty-five
hundred livres, though without assigning him any post of dignity.
Already a veteran, his record could hardly be called successful. His
merits were known to the people of Canada; they believed him to be a
tower of strength against the Iroquois. At Versailles the fact stood
out most plainly that through infirmities of temper he had lost his
post. His pension might save him from penury. It was far too small to
give him real independence.
Had either La Barre or Denonville proved equal to the government of
Canada, it is almost {114} certain that Frontenac would have ended his
days ingloriously at Versailles, ascending the stairs of others with
all the grief which is the portion of disappointed old age. Their
failure was his opportunity, and from the dreary antechambers of a
court he mounts to sudden glory as the saviour of New France.
There is some doubt, as we have seen, concerning the causes which gave
Frontenac his appointment in 1672. At that time court favour may have
operated on his behalf, or it may have seemed desirable that he should
reside for a season out of France. But in 1689 graver considerations
came into play. At the moment when the Iroquois were preparing to
ravage Canada, the expulsion of James II from his throne had broken the
peace between France and England. The government of New France was now
no post for a court favourite. Louis XIV had expended much money and
effort on the colony. Through the mismanagement of La Barre and
Denonville everything appeared to be on the verge of ruin. It is
inconceivable that Frontenac, then in his seventieth year, should have
been renominated for any other cause than merit. Times and conditions
had changed. The task now was not to work peaceably with bishop {115}
and intendant, but to destroy the foe. Father Goyer, the Récollet who
delivered Frontenac's funeral oration, states that the king said when
renewing his commission: 'I send you back to Canada, where I expect you
will serve me as well as you did before; I ask for nothing more.' This
is a bit of too gorgeous rhetoric, which none the less conveys the
truth. The king was not reappointing Frontenac because he was, on the
whole, satisfied with what he had done before; he was reappointing him
because during his former term of office and throughout his career he
had displayed the qualities which were called for at the present crisis.
Thus Frontenac returned to Quebec in the autumn of 1689, just after the
Iroquois massacred the people of Lachine and just before they descended
upon those of La Chesnaye. The universal mood was one of terror and
despair. If ever Canada needed a Moses this was the hour.
It will be seen from the dates that Denonville's recall was not due to
the Lachine massacre and the other raids of the Iroquois in 1689, for
these only occurred after Frontenac had been appointed. Denonville's
dismissal was justified by the general results of {116} his
administration down to the close of 1688. Before Frontenac left France
a plan of campaign had been agreed upon which it was now his duty to
execute. The outlines of this plan were suggested by Callières, the
governor of Montreal,[1] who had been sent home by Denonville to
expound the needs of the colony in person and to ask for fresh aid.
The idea was to wage vigorous offensive warfare against the English
from Albany to New York. Success would depend upon swiftness and
audacity, both of which Frontenac possessed in full measure, despite
his years. Two French warships were to be sent direct to New York in
the autumn of 1689, while a raiding party from Canada should set out
for the Hudson as soon as Frontenac could organize it.
In its original form this plan of campaign was never carried out, for
on account of head winds Frontenac reached Quebec too late in the
autumn. However, the central idea remained in full view and suggested
the three war-parties which were sent out during the winter of 1690 to
attack the English colonies.
{117}
Louis XIV had given Denonville important reinforcements, and with war
clouds gathering in Europe he was unwilling or unable to detach more
troops for the defence of Canada. Hence, in warring against the
Iroquois and the English Frontenac had no greater resources than those
at the disposal of Denonville when he attacked the Senecas. In fact,
since 1687 there had been some wastage in the number of the regulars
from disease. The result was that Frontenac could not hope for any
solid success unless he received support from the Canadian militia.
In this crisis the habitants and their seigneurs accepted with courage
the duties laid upon them. In the narrower sense they were fighting
for their homes, but the spirit which they displayed under Frontenac's
leadership is not merely that which one associates with a war of
defence. The French soldier, in all ages, loved to strike the quick,
sharp blow, and it was now necessary for the salvation of Canada that
it should be struck. The Iroquois had come to believe that Onontio was
losing his power. The English colonies were far more populous than New
France. In short, the only hope lay in a swift, spectacular campaign
which would disorganize {118} the English and regain the respect of the
Iroquois.
The issue depended on the courage and capacity of the Canadians. It is
to their honour and to the credit of Frontenac that they rose to the
demand of the hour. The Canadians were a robust, prolific race,
trained from infancy to woodcraft and all the hardships of the
wilderness. Many families contained from eight to fourteen sons who
had used the musket and paddle from early boyhood, and could endure the
long tramps of winter like the Indians themselves. The frontiersman
is, and must be, a fighter, but nowhere in the past can one find a
braver breed of warriors than mustered to the call of Frontenac.
François Hertel and Hertel de Rouville, Le Moyne d'Iberville with his
brothers Bienville and Sainte-Hélène, D'Aillebout de Mantet and
Repentigny de Montesson, are but a few representatives of the
militiamen who sped forth at the call of Frontenac to destroy the
settlements of the English.
[Illustration: PIERRE LE MOYNE, SIEUR D'IBERVILLE. From an engraving
in the John Ross Robertson Collection, Toronto Public Library]
What followed was war in its worst form, including the massacre of
women and children. The three bands organized by Frontenac at the
beginning of 1690 set out on snowshoes from Montreal, Three Rivers, and
Quebec. {119} The largest party contained a hundred and fourteen
French and ninety-six Indians. It marched from Montreal against
Schenectady, commanded by D'Aillebout de Mantet and Le Moyne de
Sainte-Hélène. The second party, proceeding from Three Rivers and
numbering twenty-six French and twenty-nine Indians under the command
of François Hertel, aimed at Dover, Pemaquid, and other settlements of
Maine and New Hampshire. The Quebec party, under Portneuf, comprised
fifty French and sixty Indians. Its objective was the English colony
on Casco Bay, where the city of Portland now stands. All three were
successful in accomplishing what they aimed at, namely the destruction
of English settlements amid fire and carnage. All three employed
Indians, who were suffered, either willingly or unwillingly, to commit
barbarities.
It is much more the business of history to explain than to condemn or
to extenuate. How could a man like François Hertel lead one of these
raids without sinking to the moral level of his Indian followers? Some
such question may, not unnaturally, rise to the lips of a modern reader
who for the first time comes upon the story of Dover and Salmon {120}
Falls. But fuller knowledge breeds respect for François Hertel. When
eighteen years old he was captured by the Mohawks and put to the
torture. One of his fingers they burned off in the bowl of a pipe.
The thumb of the other hand they cut off. In the letter which he wrote
on birch-bark to his mother after this dreadful experience there is not
a word of his sufferings. He simply sends her his love and asks for
her prayers, signing himself by his childish nickname, 'Your poor
Fanchon.' As he grew up he won from an admiring community the name of
'The Hero.' He was not only brave but religious. In his view it was
all legitimate warfare. If he slew others, he ran a thousand risks and
endured terrible privations for his king and the home he was defending.
His stand at the bridge over the Wooster river, sword in hand, when
pressed on his retreat by an overwhelming force of English, holding the
pass till all his men are over, is worthy of an epic. He was
forty-seven years old at the time. The three eldest of his nine sons
were with him in that little band of twenty-six Frenchmen, and two of
his nephews. 'To the New England of old,' says Parkman, 'François
Hertel was the abhorred chief of Popish {121} malignants and murdering
savages. The New England of to-day will be more just to the brave
defender of his country and his faith.'
The atrocities committed by the French and Indians are enough to make
one shudder even at this distance of time. As Frontenac adopted the
plan and sent forth the war-parties, the moral responsibility in large
part rests with him. There are, however, some facts to consider before
judgment is passed as to the degree of his culpability. The modern
distinction between combatants and non-combatants had little meaning in
the wilds of America at this period. When France and England were at
open war, every settler was a soldier, and as such each man's duty was
to keep on his guard. If caught napping he must take the consequences.
Thus, to fall upon an unsuspecting hamlet and slay its men-folk with
the tomahawk, while brutal, was hardly more brutal than under such
circumstances we could fairly expect war to be.
The massacre of women and children is another matter, not to be excused
on any grounds, even though Schenectady and Salmon Falls are paralleled
by recent acts of the Germans in Belgium. Still, we should not forget
that European warfare in the age of {122} Frontenac abounded with just
such atrocities as were committed at Schenectady, Dover, Pemaquid,
Salmon Falls, and Casco Bay. The sack of Magdeburg, the wasting of the
Palatinate, and, perhaps, the storming of Drogheda will match whatever
was done by the Indian allies of Frontenac. These were unspeakable,
but the savage was little worse than his European contemporary. Those
killed were in almost all cases killed outright, and the slaughter was
not indiscriminate. At Schenectady John Sander Glen, with his whole
family and all his relations, were spared because he and his wife had
shown kindness to French prisoners taken by the Mohawks. Altogether
sixty people were killed at Schenectady (February 9, 1690),
thirty-eight men, ten women, and twelve children. Nearly ninety were
carried captive to Canada. Sixty old men, women, and children were
left unharmed. It is not worth while to take up the details of the
other raids. They were of much the same sort--no better and no worse.
Where a garrison surrendered under promise that it would be spared, the
promise was observed so far as the Indians could be controlled; but
English and French alike when they used Indian allies knew well that
their {123} excesses could not be prevented, though they might be
moderated. The captives as a rule were treated with kindness and
clemency when once the northward march was at an end.
Meanwhile, Frontenac had little time to reflect upon the probable
attitude of posterity towards his political morals. The three
war-parties had accomplished their purpose and in the spring of 1690
the colony was aglow with fresh hope. But the English were not slow to
retaliate. That summer New York and Massachusetts decided on an
invasion of Canada. It was planned that a fleet from Boston under Sir
William Phips should attack Quebec, while a force of militia from New
York in command of John Schuyler should advance through Lake Champlain
against Montreal. Thus by sea and land Canada soon found herself on
the defensive.
Of Schuyler's raid nothing need be said except that he reached
Laprairie, opposite Montreal, where he killed a few men and destroyed
the crops (August 23, 1690). It was a small achievement and produced
no result save the disappointment of New York that an undertaking upon
which much money and effort had been expended should terminate so
ingloriously. But the siege of Quebec by {124} Phips, though it
likewise ended in failure, is a much more famous event, and deserves to
be described in some detail.
The colony of Massachusetts mustered its forces for a great and unusual
exploit. Earlier in the same year a raid upon the coasts of Acadia had
yielded gratifying results. The surrender of Port Royal without
resistance (May 11, 1690) kindled the Puritan hope that a single summer
might see the pestiferous Romanists of New France driven from all their
strongholds. Thus encouraged, Boston put forth its best energies and
did not shrink from incurring a debt of £50,000, which in the
circumstances of Massachusetts was an enormous sum. Help was expected
from England, but none came, and the fleet sailed without it, in full
confidence that Quebec would fall before the assault of the colonists
alone.
The fleet, which sailed in August, numbered thirty-four ships, carrying
twenty-three hundred men and a considerable equipment. Sir William
Phips, the leader of the expedition, was not an Englishman by birth,
but a New Englander of very humble origin who owed his advancement to a
robust physique and unlimited assurance. He was unfitted for his
command, both because he lacked experience {125} in fighting such foes
as he was about to encounter, and because he was completely ignorant of
the technical difficulties involved in conducting a large,
miscellaneous fleet through the tortuous channels of the lower St
Lawrence. This ignorance resulted in such loss of time that he arrived
before Quebec amid the tokens of approaching winter. It was the 16th
of October when he rounded the island of Orleans and brought his ships
to anchor under the citadel. Victory could only be secured by sudden
success. The state of the season forbade siege operations which
contemplated starvation of the garrison.
Hopeful that the mere sight of his armada would compel surrender, Phips
first sent an envoy to Frontenac under protection of the white flag.
This messenger after being blindfolded was led to the Château and
brought before the governor, who had staged for his reception one of
the impressive spectacles he loved to prepare. Surrounding Frontenac,
as Louis XIV might have been surrounded by the grandees of France, were
grouped the aristocracy of New France--the officers of the French
regulars and the Canadian militia. Nothing had been omitted which
could create an impression of dignity and strength. {126} Costume,
demeanour, and display were all employed to overwhelm the envoy with
the insulted majesty of the king of France. Led into this high
presence the messenger delivered his letter, which, when duly
interpreted, was found to convey a summary ultimatum. Phips began by
stating that the war between France and England would have amply
warranted this expedition even 'without the destruction made by the
French and Indians, under your command and encouragement, upon the
persons and estates of their Majesties' subjects of New England,
without provocation on their part.' Indeed, 'the cruelties and
barbarities used against them by the French and Indians might, upon the
present opportunity, prompt unto a severe revenge.' But seeking to
avoid all inhumane and unchristian-like actions, Phips announces that
he will be content with 'a present surrender of your forts and castles,
undemolished, and the King's and other stores, unimbezzled, with a
seasonable delivery of all captives; together with a surrender of all
your persons and estates to my dispose; upon the doing whereof, you may
expect mercy from me, as a Christian, according to what shall be found
for their Majesties' service and the subjects' security. Which, {127}
if you refuse forthwith to do, I am come provided and am resolved, by
the help of God in whom I trust, by force of arms to revenge all wrongs
and injuries offered, and bring you under subjection to the Crown of
England, and, when too late, make you wish you had accepted of the
favour tendered. Your answer positive in an hour, returned by your own
trumpet, with the return of mine, is required upon the peril that will
ensue.'
To this challenge Frontenac at once returned the answer which comported
with his character. When Phips's envoy took out his watch to register
the hour permitted by the ultimatum, Frontenac rejoined that he
required no time for deliberation, but would return his answer by the
mouth of the cannon. The ground which he assigned for the invasion of
New England was that its people had rebelled against their lawful
prince, the ally of France. Other more personal observations were
directed towards the manner in which Phips had behaved at Port Royal.
No word in writing would Frontenac send. The envoy (who was only a
subaltern) received his congé, was blindfolded and led back to his boat.
Compliments having been thus exchanged, it remained for Phips to make
good his {128} challenge. If we compare the four English and American
sieges of Quebec, the attack by Phips will be seen to have little in
common with those of Kirke and Montgomery, but to resemble rather
strikingly the attack by Wolfe. Without fighting, Kirke swooped down
upon a garrison which was exhausted by starvation. Arnold and
Montgomery operated without a fleet. But while Phips's attempt is
unlike Wolfe's in that it ended in failure, the presence of the fleet
and the attempt to effect a landing below the mouth of the St Charles
present features of real similarity. It is clear that Phips received
intelligence from prisoners of a possible landing above the town, at
the spot where Wolfe carried out his daring and desperate _coup de
main_. But, anticipating Wolfe in another quarter, he chose to make
his first attack on the flats rather than on the heights.
The troops ordinarily stationed at Quebec were increased just after
Phips's arrival by a force of seven hundred regulars and militiamen
under Callières, who had come down from Montreal with all possible
haste. So agile were the French and so proficient in irregular warfare
that Phips found it difficult to land any considerable detachment in
good order. Thirteen hundred of the English did succeed {129} in
forming on the Beauport Flats, after wading through a long stretch of
mud. There followed a preliminary skirmish in which three hundred
French were driven back with no great loss, after inflicting
considerable damage on the invaders. But though the English reached
the east bank of the St Charles they could do no more. Phips wasted
his ammunition on a fruitless and ill-timed bombardment, which was
answered with much spirit from the cliffs. Meanwhile the musketeers on
the bank of the St Charles were unable to advance alone and received no
proper supply of stores from the ships. Harassed by the Canadians,
wet, cold, and starving, they took to the boats, leaving behind them
five cannon. After this nothing happened, save deliberations on the
part of Phips and his officers as to whether there remained anything
that could be done other than to sail for home, beaten and humiliated,
with a heavy burden of debt to hang round the neck of a too ambitious
Massachusetts. Thus ended the second siege of Quebec (October 23,
1690).
Frontenac had lost two of his best soldiers--Sainte-Hélène, of the
fighting Le Moynes, and the Chevalier de Clermont; but, this
notwithstanding, the victory was felt to be complete. {130} The most
precious trophy was the flag of Phips's ship, which a shot from the
ramparts had knocked into the river, whence it was rescued and brought
ashore in triumph. Best of all, the siege had been too short to bring
famine in its train. The loss of life was inconsiderable, and in
prestige the soldiery of New France now stood on a pinnacle which they
had never before attained. When we consider the paucity of the forces
engaged, this repulse of the English from Quebec may not seem an
imposing military achievement. But Canada had put forth her whole
strength and had succeeded where failure would have been fatal. In the
shouts of rejoicing which followed Phips's withdrawal we hear the cry
of a people reborn.
The siege of Quebec and Schuyler's raid on Laprairie open up a subject
of large and vital moment--the historical antagonism of New France and
New England. Whoever wishes to understand the deeper problems of
Canada in the age of Frontenac should read John Fiske's volumes on the
English colonies. In the rise of Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, New
York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts one sees the certain doom which
was {131} impending over New France. It may be too much to say that
Richelieu by conquering Alsace threw away America. Even had the
population of Canada been increased to the extent called for by the
obligations of Richelieu's company in 1627, the English might have
nevertheless prevailed. But the preoccupation of France with the war
against Austria prevented her from giving due attention to the colonial
question at the critical moment when colonists should have been sent
out in large numbers. And it is certain that by nothing short of a
great emigration could France have saved Canada. As it was, the
English were bound to prevail by weight of population. When the
conflict reached its climax in the days of Montcalm and Wolfe, two and
a half million English Americans confronted sixty-five thousand French
Canadians. On such terms the result of the contest could not be
doubtful. Even in Frontenac's time the French were protected chiefly
by the intervening wilderness and the need of the English colonists to
develop their own immediate resources. The English were not yet ready
for a serious offensive war. In fact they, too, had their own Indian
question.
It is a matter of some interest to observe {132} how the conquest of
Canada was postponed by the lack of cohesion among the English
colonies. Selfishness and mutual jealousy prevented them from
combining against the common foe. Save for this disunion and fancied
conflict of interest, New France must have succumbed long before the
time of Montcalm. But the vital significance of the conflict between
New England and New France lies in the contrast of their spirit and
institutions. The English race has extended itself through the world
because it possessed the genius of emigration. The French colonist did
his work magnificently in the new home. But the conditions in the old
home were unfavourable to emigration. The Huguenots, the one class of
the population with a strong motive for emigrating, were excluded from
Canada in the interest of orthodoxy. The dangers of the Atlantic and
the hardships of life in a wintry wilderness might well deter the
ordinary French peasant; moreover, it by no means rested with him to
say whether he would go or stay. But, whatever their nature, the
French race lost a wonderful opportunity through the causes which
prevented a healthy, steady exodus to America.
England profited by having classes of people {133} sufficiently well
educated to form independent opinions and strong enough to carry out
the programme dictated by these opinions. While each of the English
colonies sprang from a different motive, all had in common the purpose
to form an effective settlement. The fur trade did France more harm
than good. It deflected her attention from the middle to the northern
latitudes and lured her colonists from the land in search of quick
profits. It was the enemy to the home. On the other hand, the English
came to America primarily in search of a home. Profits they sought,
like other people, but they sought them chiefly from the soil.
Thus English ideas took root in America, gained new vitality, and
assumed an importance they had not possessed in England for many
centuries. And, while for the moment the organization of the English
colonies was not well suited to offensive war, as we may judge from the
abortive efforts of Phips and Schuyler, this defect could be corrected.
Arising, as it did arise, from a lack of unity among the colonies, it
was even indicative of latent strength. From one angle, localism seems
selfishness and weakness; from another, it shows the vigorous life of
separate {134} communities, each self-centred and jealous of its
authority because the local instinct is so vitally active. It only
needed time to broaden the outlook and give the English colonies a
sense of their common interest. Virginia, New York, and Massachusetts,
by striking their roots each year more deeply into the soil of America,
became more and more self-supporting states in everything save name and
political allegiance; while New France, which with its austere climate
would have developed more slowly in any case, remained dependent on the
king's court.
Thus Frontenac's task was quite hopeless, if we define it as the effort
to overthrow English power in America. But neither he nor any one of
that age defined his duties so widely. In 1689 Canada was in extremes,
with the Iroquois at Lachine and Dongan threatening an attack from New
York. Frontenac's policy was defensive. If he struck first, it was
because he considered audacity to be his best safeguard. No one knew
better than Frontenac that a successful raid does not mean conquest.
[1] Louis Hector de Callières-Bonnevue was a captain of the French army
who became governor of Montreal in 1684, and succeeded Frontenac as
governor of Canada in 1698. He received the Cross of St Louis for
distinguished service against the Iroquois. Frontenac could not have
had a better lieutenant.
{135}
CHAPTER VIII
FRONTENAC'S LAST DAYS
Though the English might withdraw from Quebec, New France always had
the Iroquois with her. We must now pursue the thread of Frontenac's
dealings with the savages from the moment when he replaced Denonville.
It requires no flight of the imagination to appreciate the rage
Frontenac must have felt when, on returning to Canada, he saw before
his eyes the effects of La Barre's rapacity and Denonville's perfidy,
of which the massacres of Lachine and La Chesnaye furnished the most
ghastly proofs. But in these two cases the element of tragedy was so
strong as to efface the mood of exasperation. There remained a third
incident which must have provoked pure rage. This was the destruction
of Fort Frontenac, blown up, at Denonville's order, by the French
themselves (October 1689). The erection and maintenance of this post
had been a cardinal point in Frontenac's {136} Indian policy; and, more
particularly to aggravate the offence, there was the humiliating fact
that Denonville had ordered it demolished to comply with a demand from
the Iroquois. This shameful concession had been made shortly before
Frontenac reached Canada. It was Denonville's last important act in
the colony. On the chance that something might have occurred to delay
execution of the order, Frontenac at once countermanded it and sent
forward an expedition of three hundred men. But they were too late.
His beloved fortress was gone. The only comfort which Frontenac could
derive from the incident was that the work of destruction had been
carried out imperfectly. There remained a portion of the works which
could still be used.
Thus with regard to the Iroquois the situation was far worse in 1689
than it had been when Frontenac came to Canada in 1672. Everything
which he had done to conciliate the Five Nations had been undone; and
Dongan's intelligent activities, coinciding with this long series of
French mistakes, had helped to make matters worse. Nor was it now
merely a question of the Iroquois. The whole Indian world had been
convulsed by the {137} renewal of strife between Onontio and the Five
Nations. Tribes long friendly to the French and in constant trade with
them were being alienated. The Indian problem as Frontenac saw it in
1690 resolved itself to this: either peace with the Iroquois on terms
which would prove impressive to the Hurons, the Ottawas, and even to
the savages of the Mississippi; or else uncompromising war. For under
no circumstances could the French afford to lose their hold upon the
tribes from whom they derived their furs.
Obviously an honourable peace would be preferable to the horrors of a
forest war, and Frontenac did his best to secure it. To undo, as far
as possible, Denonville's treachery at Fort Frontenac and elsewhere, he
had brought back with him to Quebec the Iroquois who had been sent to
France--or such of them as were still alive. First among these was a
Cayuga chief of great influence named Ourehaoué, whose friendship
Frontenac assiduously cultivated and completely won. Towards the close
of January 1690 an embassy of three released Iroquois carried to
Onondaga a message from Ourehaoué that the real Onontio had returned
and peace must be made with him if the Five Nations wished to live. A
great {138} council was then held at which the English, by invitation,
were represented, while the French interest found its spokesman in a
Christian Iroquois named Cut Nose. Any chance of success was destroyed
by the implacable enmity of the Senecas, who remembered the attempt of
the French to check their raids upon the Illinois and the invasion of
their own country by Denonville. Cannehoot, a Seneca chieftain, rose
and stated that the tribes of Michilimackinac were ready to join the
English and the Iroquois for the destruction of New France; and the
assembly decided to enter this triple alliance. Frontenac's envoys
returned to Quebec alive, but with nothing to show for their pains. A
later effort by Frontenac was even less successful. The Iroquois, it
was clear, could not be brought back to friendship by fair words.
War to the knife being inevitable, Frontenac promptly took steps to
confirm his position with the hitherto friendly savages of the Ottawa
and the Great Lakes. When Cannehoot had said that the tribes of
Michilimackinac were ready to turn against the French, he was not
drawing wholly upon his imagination. This statement was confirmed by
the report of Nicolas Perrot, who knew the {139} Indians of the West as
no one else knew them--save perhaps Du Lhut and Carheil.[1] The French
were now playing a desperate game in the vast region beyond Lake Erie,
which they had been the first of Europeans to explore. The Ottawas and
the Hurons, while alike the hereditary foes of the Iroquois, were
filled with mutual jealousy which must be composed. The successes of
the Iroquois in their raids on the French settlements must be explained
and minimized. 'The Rat' Kondiaronk, the cleverest of the western
chieftains, must be conciliated. And to compass all these ends, Perrot
found his reliance in the word that Frontenac had returned and would
lead his children against the common foe. Meanwhile, the Iroquois had
their own advocates among the more timid and suspicious members of
these western tribes. During the winter of 1689-90 the French and the
Iroquois had about an even chance of winning the {140} Indians who
centred at Michilimackinac. But the odds were against the French to
this extent--they were working against a time limit. Unless Frontenac
could quickly show evidence of strength, the tribes of the West would
range with the Iroquois.
In the spring of 1690 Frontenac dispatched a force of a hundred and
fifty men to reinforce the garrison at Michilimackinac. On their way
westward these troops encountered a band of Iroquois and fortunately
killed a number of them. The scalps were an ocular proof of success;
and Perrot, who was of the party, knew how to turn the victory to its
best use by encouraging the Ottawas to torture an Iroquois prisoner.
The breach thus made between the Ottawas and the Five Nations
distinctly widened as soon as word came that the French had destroyed
Schenectady. Thus this dreadful raid against the English did not fail
of its psychological effect, as may be gathered from one of the
immediate consequences. Early in August there appeared on Lake St
Louis a vast flotilla of canoes, which at first caused the afflicted
habitants to fear that the Iroquois were upon them again. Instead of
this it was a great band of friendly savages from the West, drawn from
all the {141} trading tribes and bringing a cargo of furs of far more
than the usual value. Frontenac himself chanced to be in Montreal at
this fortunate moment. The market was held and concluded to mutual
satisfaction, but the crowning event of the meeting was a council, at
which, after an exchange of harangues, Frontenac entered into the
festivities of the savages as though he were one of themselves (August
1690). The governor's example was followed by his leading officers.
Amid the chanting of the war-song and the swinging of the tomahawk the
French renewed their alliance with the Indians of the West. All were
to fight until the Iroquois were destroyed. Even the Ottawas, who had
been coquetting with the Senecas, now came out squarely and said that
they would stand by Onontio.
Here, at last, was a real answer to the Lachine massacre. The
challenge had been fairly given, and now it was not a Denonville who
made the reply. There followed three years of incessant warfare
between the Iroquois and the French, which furnished a fair test of the
strength that each side could muster when fighting at its best. The
Five Nations had made up their minds. The cares of diplomacy they
threw to the winds. They {142} were on the war-path, united and
determined. The French, on their side, had Frontenac for leader and
many outrages to avenge. It was war of the wilderness in its most
unrelenting form, with no mercy expected or asked. The general result
can be quickly stated. The Iroquois got their fill of war, and
Frontenac destroyed their power as a central, dominating, terrorizing
confederacy.
The measure of this achievement is to be sought in the difficulties
which were overcome. Despite the eighty years of its existence the
colony was still so poor that regularity in the arrival of supplies
from France was a matter of vital importance. From the moment war
began English cruisers hovered about the mouth of the St Lawrence,
ready to pounce upon the supply-ships as they came up the river.
Sometimes the French boats escaped; sometimes they were captured; but
from this interruption of peaceful oversea traffic Canada suffered
grievously. Another source of weakness was the interruption of
agriculture which followed in the train of war. As a rule the Iroquois
spent the winter in hunting deer, but just as the ground was ready for
its crop they began to show themselves in the parishes near Montreal,
picking off the habitants in their {143} farms on the edge of the
forest, or driving them to the shelter of the stockade. These forays
made it difficult and dangerous to till the soil, with a corresponding
shrinkage in the volume of the crop. Almost every winter famine was
imminent in some part of the colony, and though spring was welcome for
its own sake, it invariably brought the Iroquois. A third calamity was
the interruption of the fur trade. Ordinarily the great cargoes
descended the Ottawa in fleets of from one hundred to two hundred
canoes. But the savages of the West well knew that when they embarked
with their precious bales upon a route which was infested by the
Iroquois, they gave hostages to fortune. In case of a battle the cargo
was a handicap, since they must protect it as well as themselves. In
case they were forced to flee for their lives, they lost the goods
which it had cost so much effort to collect. In these circumstances
the tribes of Michilimackinac would not bring down their furs unless
they felt certain that the whole course of the Ottawa was free from
danger. In seasons when they failed to come, the colony had nothing to
export and penury became extreme. At best the returns from the fur
trade were precarious. In 1690 and 1693 {144} there were good markets;
in 1691 and 1692 there were none at all.
From time to time Frontenac received from France both money and troops,
but neither in sufficient quantity to place him where he could deal the
Iroquois one final blow. Thus one year after another saw a war of
skirmishes and minor raids, sufficiently harassing and weakening to
both sides, but with results which were disappointing because
inconclusive. The hero of this border warfare is the Canadian
habitant, whose farm becomes a fort and whose gun is never out of
reach. Nor did the men of the colony display more courage than their
wives and daughters. The heroine of New France is the woman who rears
from twelve to twenty children, works in the fields and cooks by day,
and makes garments and teaches the catechism in the evening. It was a
community which approved of early marriage--a community where boys and
girls assumed their responsibilities very young. Youths of sixteen
shouldered the musket. Madeleine de Verchères was only fourteen when
she defended her father's fort against the Iroquois with a garrison of
five, which included two boys and a man of eighty (October 1692).
{145}
A detailed chronicle of these raids and counter-raids would be both
long and complicated, but in addition to the incidents which have been
mentioned there remain three which deserve separate comment--Peter
Schuyler's invasion of Canada in 1691, the activities of the Abnakis
against New England, and Frontenac's invasion of the Onondaga country
in 1696.
We have already seen that in 1690 an attempt was made by John Schuyler
to avenge the massacre at Schenectady. The results of this effort were
insignificant, but its purpose was not forgotten; and in 1691 the
Anglo-Dutch of the Hudson attempted once more to make their strength
felt on the banks of the St Lawrence. This time the leader was Peter
Schuyler, whose force included a hundred and twenty English and Dutch,
as against the forty who had attacked Canada in the previous summer.
The number of Indian allies was also larger than on the former
occasion, including both Mohawks and Mohegans. Apart from its superior
numbers and much harder fighting, the second expedition of the English
was similar to the first. Both followed Lake Champlain and the
Richelieu; both reached Laprairie, opposite Montreal; both were {146}
forced to retreat without doing any great damage to their enemies.
There is this notable difference, however, that the French were in a
much better state of preparation than they had been during the previous
summer. The garrison at Laprairie now numbered above seven hundred,
while a flying squadron of more than three hundred stood ready to
attack the English on their retreat to the Richelieu. On the whole,
Schuyler was fortunate to escape as lightly as he did. Forty of his
party were killed in a hot battle, but he made his retreat in good
order after inflicting some losses on the French (August 1, 1691).
Although Schuyler's retreat was skilfully conducted, his original
object had been far more ambitious than to save his men from
extermination. The French missed a chance to injure their foe more
seriously than they had done at Schenectady. At the same time, this
second English invasion was so far from successful that the New France
of Frontenac suffered no further attack from the side of Albany.
While Callières and Valrennes were repulsing Peter Schuyler from
Laprairie, the French in another part of Frontenac's jurisdiction were
preparing for the offensive. The centre {147} of this activity was the
western part of Acadia--that is, the large and rugged region which is
watered by the Penobscot and the Kennebec. Here dwelt the Abnakis, a
tribe of Algonquin origin, among whom the Jesuits had established a
mission and made many converts. Throughout Acadia the French had
established friendly relations with the Indians, and as the English
settlements began to creep from New Hampshire to the mouth of the
Kennebec, the interval between the rival zones of occupation became so
narrow as to admit of raiding. Phips's capture of Port Royal had
alarmed some of the Abnakis, but most of them held fast to the French
connection and were amenable to presents. It soon proved that all they
needed was leadership, which was amply furnished by the Baron de
Saint-Castin and Father Thury.
Saint-Castin was a very energetic French trader, of noble birth, who
had established himself at Pentegoet on Penobscot Bay--a point which,
after him, is now called Castine. Father Thury was the chief of the
mission priests in the western part of Acadia, but though an
ecclesiastic he seems to have exalted patriotism above religion. That
he did his best to incite his converts against the {148} English is
beyond question. Urged on by him and Saint-Castin, the savages of the
Penobscot and the Kennebec proceeded with enthusiasm to destroy the
English settlements which lay within their reach. In the course of
successive raids which extended from 1692 to 1694 they descended upon
York, Wells, and Oyster Bay, always with the stealth and swiftness
which marked joint operations of the French and Indians. The
settlements of the English were sacked, the inhabitants were either
massacred or carried into captivity, and all those scenes were
re-enacted which had marked the success of Frontenac's three
war-parties in 1690. Thus New England was exposed to attack from the
side of Acadia no less than from that of Canada. Incidentally Canada
and Acadia were drawn into closer connection by the vigour which
Frontenac communicated to the war throughout all parts of his
government.
But the most vivid event of Frontenac's life after the defence of
Quebec against Phips was the great expedition which he led in person
against the Onondagas. It was an exploit which resembles Denonville's
attack upon the Senecas, with the added interest that Frontenac was in
his seventy-seventh year when {149} he thus carried the war into the
heart of the enemy's country. As a physical _tour de force_ this
campaign was splendid, and it enables us, better than any other event,
to appreciate the magnificent energy which Frontenac threw into the
fulfilment of his task. With over two thousand men, and an equipment
that included cannon and mortars, he advanced from the south shore of
Lake Ontario against the chief stronghold of the Iroquois. At the
portage the Indians would not permit their aged, indomitable Onontio to
walk, but insisted that he should remain seated in his canoe, while
they carried it from the pool below the fall to the dead water above.
All the French saw of the stronghold they had come to attack was the
flame which consumed it. Following the example of the Senecas, the
Onondagas, when they saw that the invader was at hand, set fire to
their palisade and wigwams, gathered up what property was portable, and
took to the woods. Pursuit was impossible. All that could be done was
to destroy the corn and proceed against the settlement of the Oneidas.
After this, with its maize, had been consumed, Frontenac considered
whether he should attack the Cayugas, but he decided against this {150}
extension of the campaign. Unlike Denonville, he was at war with the
English as well as with the Iroquois, and may have thought it imprudent
to risk surprise at a point so far from his base. While it was
disappointing that the Onondagas did not wait to be destroyed by the
cannon which with so much effort had been brought against them, this
expedition was a useful proof of strength and produced a good moral
effect throughout the colony as well as among the western tribes.
The events of 'William and Mary's War,' as it was known in New England,
show how wide the French zone in North America had come to be.
Frontenac's province extended from Newfoundland to the Mississippi,
from Onondaga to Hudson Bay. The rarest quality of a ruler is the
power to select good subordinates and fill them with his own high
spirit. Judged by this standard Frontenac deserves great praise, for
he never lacked capable and loyal lieutenants. With Callières at
Montreal, Tonty on the Mississippi, Perrot and Du Lhut at
Michilimackinac, Villebon and Saint-Castin in Acadia, Sainte-Hélène at
the siege of Quebec, and Iberville at Hudson Bay, he was well supported
by his staff. At this critical moment the shortcomings of the {151}
French in America were certainly not due to lack of purpose or driving
power. The system under which they worked was faulty, and in their
extremity they resorted to harsh expedients. But there were heroes in
New France, if courage and self-sacrifice are the essence of heroism.
The Peace of Ryswick, which was signed in the year after Frontenac's
campaign against the Onondagas, came as a happy release to Canada
(1697). For nine years the colony had been hard pressed, and a
breathing space was needed. The Iroquois still remained a peril, but
proportionately their losses since 1689 had been far heavier than those
of the French and English. Left to carry on the war by themselves,
they soon saw the hopelessness of their project to drive the French
from the St Lawrence. The English were ready to give them defensive
assistance, even after word came from Europe that peace had been
signed. In 1698 the Earl of Bellomont, then governor of New York,
wrote Frontenac that he would arm every man in his province to aid the
Iroquois if the French made good their threat to invade once more the
land of the Five Nations. Frontenac, then almost on his death-bed,
sent back the characteristic reply {152} that this kind of language
would only encourage him to attack the Iroquois with the more vigour.
The sequel shows that the English at Albany overplayed their part. The
reward of their protection was to be suzerainty, and at this price
protection proved unacceptable to the Iroquois, whose safety lay in the
equipoise of power between the rival whites. Three years later the
Five Nations renewed peace with Onontio; and, though Frontenac did not
live to see the day, he it was who had brought it to pass. His daring
and energy had broken the spirit of the red man. In 1701 Callières,
then governor of New France, held a great council at Montreal, which
was attended by representatives from all the Indian tribes of the West
as well as from the Iroquois. There, amid all the ceremonies of the
wilderness, the calumet was smoked and the hatchet was interred.
But the old warrior was then no more. On returning to Quebec from his
war against the Onondagas he had thrown himself into an active quarrel
with Champigny, the intendant, as to the establishment and maintenance
of French posts throughout the West. To the last Frontenac remained an
advocate of the policy which sought to place France in control {153} of
the Great Lakes and the Mississippi. Champigny complained of the
expense and the Jesuits lamented the immorality which life in the
forest encouraged among young men. It was an old quarrel renewed under
conditions which made the issue more important than ever, for with open
war between French and English it became of vital moment to control
points which were, or might be, strategic.
This dispute with Champigny was the last incident in Frontenac's stormy
life. It remains to the credit of both governor and intendant that
their differences on matters of policy did not make them irreconcilable
enemies. On the 28th of November 1698 Frontenac died at the Château St
Louis after an illness of less than a month. He had long been a hero
of the people, and his friendship with the Récollets shows that he had
some true allies among the clergy. No one in Canada could deny the
value of his services at the time of crisis--which was not a matter of
months but of years. Father Goyer, of the Récollets, delivered a
eulogy which in fervour recalls Bossuet's funeral orations over members
of the royal family. But the most touching valedictory was that from
Champigny, who after many differences had become {154} Frontenac's
friend. In communicating to the Colonial Office tidings of the
governor's death, Champigny says: 'On the 28th of last month Monsieur
le Comte de Frontenac died, with the sentiments of a true Christian.
After all our disputes, you will hardly believe, Monseigneur, how truly
and deeply I am touched by his death. He treated me during his illness
in a manner so obliging that I should be utterly devoid of gratitude if
I did not feel thankful to him.'
There is a well-known portrait of Madame de Frontenac, which may still
be seen at Versailles. Of Frontenac himself no portrait whatever
exists. Failing his likeness from brush or pencil, we must image to
ourselves as best we may the choleric old warrior who rescued New
France in her hour of need. In seeking to portray his character the
historian has abundant materials for the period of his life in Canada,
though we must regret the dearth of information for the years which
separate his two terms of office. There is also a bad gap in our
sources for the period which precedes his first appointment as
governor. What we have from Madame de Montpensier and Saint-Simon is
useful, but their statements {155} are far from complete and provoke
many questions which must remain unanswered. His letters and reports
as governor of Canada exist in considerable numbers, but it must remain
a source of lasting regret that his private correspondence has perished.
Some one has said that talent should be judged at its best and
character at its worst; but this is a phrase which does not help us to
form a true estimate of Frontenac. He touched no heights of genius and
he sank to no depths of crime. In essential respects his qualities lie
upon the surface, depicted by his acts and illustrated by his own words
or those of men who knew him well. Were we seeking to set his good
traits against his bad, we should style him, in one column, brave,
steadfast, daring, ambitious of greatness, far-sighted in policy; and
in the other, prodigal, boastful, haughty, unfair in argument, ruthless
in war. This method of portraiture, however, is not very helpful. We
can form a much better idea of Frontenac's nature by discussing his
acts than by throwing adjectives at him.
As an administrator he appears to least advantage during his first term
of office, when, in the absence of war, his energies were directed
against adversaries within the colony. {156} Had he not been sent to
Canada a second time, his feud with Laval, Duchesneau, and the Jesuits
would fill a much larger space in the canvas than it occupies at
present. For in the absence of great deeds to his credit obstinacy and
truculence might have been thought the essentials rather than the
accidents of his character. M. Lorin, who writes in great detail,
finds much to say on behalf of Frontenac's motives, if not of his
conduct, in these controversies. But viewing his career broadly it
must be held that, at best, he lost a chance for useful co-operation by
hugging prejudices and prepossessions which sprang in part from his own
love of power and in part from antipathy towards the Jesuits in France.
He might not like the Jesuits, but they were a great force in Canada
and had done things which should have provoked his admiration. In any
case, it was his duty to work with them on some basis and not dislocate
the whole administration by brawling. As to Duchesneau, Frontenac was
the broader man of the two, and may be excused some of the petulance
which the intendant's pin-pricks called forth.
Frontenac's enemies were fond of saying that he used his position to
make illicit profits {157} from the fur trade. Beyond question he
traded to some extent, but it would be harsh to accuse him of venality
or peculation on the strength of such evidence as exists. There is a
strong probability that the king appointed him in the expectation that
he would augment his income from sources which lay outside his salary.
Public opinion varies from age to age regarding the latitude which may
be allowed a public servant in such matters. Under a democratic régime
the standard is very different from that which has existed, for the
most part, under autocracies in past ages. Frontenac was a man of
distinction who accepted an important post at a small salary. We may
infer that the king was willing to allow him something from
perquisites. If so, his profits from the fur trade become a matter of
degree. So long as he kept within the bounds of reason and decency,
the government raised no objection. Frontenac certainly was not a
governor who pillaged the colony to feather his own nest. If he took
profits, they were not thought excessive by any one except Duchesneau.
The king recalled him not because he was venal, but because he was
quarrelsome.
Assuming the standards of his own age, a {158} reasonable plea can also
be made on Frontenac's behalf respecting the conduct of his wars.
'Man's inhumanity to man makes countless thousands mourn' in our own
day no less than in the seventeenth century; while certain facts of
recent memory are quite lurid enough to be placed in comparison with
the border raids which, under Frontenac, were made by the French and
their Indian allies. It is dreadful to know that captured Iroquois
were burned alive by the French, but after the Lachine massacre and the
tortures which French captives endured, this was an almost inevitable
retaliation. The concluding scenes of King Philip's War prove, at any
rate, that the men of New England exercised little more clemency
towards their Indian foes than was displayed by the French. The
Puritans justified their acts of carnage by citations from the Old
Testament regarding the Canaanites and the Philistines. The most
bitter chronicler of King Philip's War is William Hubbard, a Calvinist
pastor of Ipswich. On December 19, 1675, the English of Massachusetts
and Connecticut stormed the great stronghold of the Narragansetts. To
quote John Fiske: 'In the slaughter which filled the rest of that
Sunday afternoon till the sun went down behind a {159} dull gray cloud,
the grim and wrathful Puritan, as he swung his heavy cutlass, thought
of Saul and Agag, and spared not. The Lord had delivered up to him the
heathen as stubble to his sword. As usual the number of the slain is
variously estimated. Of the Indians probably not less than a thousand
perished.'
For the slaughter of English women and children by French raiders there
was no precedent or just provocation. Here Frontenac must be deemed
more culpable than the Puritans. The only extenuating circumstance is
that those who survived the first moments of attack were in almost all
cases spared, taken to Canada, and there treated with kindness.
Writers of the lighter drama have long found a subject in the old man
whose irascibility is but a cloak for goodness of heart. It would be
an exaggeration to describe Frontenac as a character of this type, for
his wrath could be vehement, and benevolence was not the essential
strain in his disposition. At the same time, he had many warm impulses
to his credit. His loyalty to friends stands above reproach, and there
are little incidents which show his sense of humour. For instance, he
once fined a woman for lampooning him, but {160} caused the money to be
given to her children. Though often unfair in argument, he was by
nature neither mean nor petty. In ordinary circumstances he remembered
_noblesse oblige_, and though boastfulness may have been among his
failings, he had a love of greatness which preserved him from sordid
misdemeanours. Even if we agree with Parkman that greatness must be
denied him, it yet remains to be pointed out that absolute greatness is
a high standard attained by few. Frontenac was a greater man than most
by virtue of robustness, fire, and a sincere aspiration to discharge
his duty as a lieutenant of the king.
He doubtless thought himself ill-used in that he lacked the wealth
which was needed to accomplish his ambitions at court. But if fortune
frowned upon him at Versailles, she made full compensation by granting
him the opportunity to govern Canada a second time. As he advanced in
years his higher qualities became more conspicuous. His vision
cleared. His vanities fell away. There remained traces of the old
petulance; but with graver duties his stature increased and the strong
fibre of his nature was disclosed. For his foibles he had suffered
much throughout his whole life. {161} But beneath the foibles lay
courage and resolve. It was his reward that in the hour of trial, when
upon his shoulders rested the fate of France in America, he was not
found wanting.
[1] Étienne da Carheil was the most active of the Jesuit missionaries
in Canada during the period of Frontenac. After fifteen years among
the Iroquois at Cayuga (1668-83) he returned for three years to Quebec.
He was then sent to Michilimackinac, where he remained another fifteen
years. Shortly after the founding of Detroit (1701) he gave up life in
the forest. Despite the great hardships which he endured, he lived to
be ninety-three. None of the missionaries was more strongly opposed to
the brandy trade.
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
Of the literature on Frontenac and his period the greater part is in
French. The books in English to which attention may be specially
called are:
Parkman, Francis: _Count Frontenac and New France under Louis XIV_.
Le Sieur, William Dawson: _Count Frontenac_ in the 'Makers of Canada'
series.
Winsor, Justin: _Cartier to Frontenac_.
Stewart, George: 'Frontenac and his Times' in the _Narrative and
Critical History of America_, edited by Justin Winsor, vol. iv.
In French the most important works are:
Lorin, Henri: _Le Comte de Frontenac_.
Myrand, Ernest: _Frontenac et ses Amis; Phips devant Québec_.
Rochemonteix, Le Père Camille de: _Les Jésuites et la Nouvelle France_,
vol. iii.
Gosselin, L'Abbé: _La Vie de Mgr Laval_.
Sulte, B.: _Histoire des Canadiens-Français_.
Ferland, L'Abbé: _Cours d'Histoire du Canada_.
Faillon, L'Abbé: _Histoire de la Colonie Française en Canada_, vol. iii.
Gagnon, Ernest: _Le Fort et le Château Saint-Louis_.
{163}
Garneau, F.-X.: _Histoire du Canada_, edited by Hector Garneau.
Among the original sources for this period the following are likely to
be found in any large library:
_Jugements et Deliberations du Conseil Souverain_.
_Edits et Ordonnances_.
_Relations des Jésuites._ Ed. Thwaites.
_Memoires et Documents pour servir à l'histoire des origines françaises
des pays d'outre-mer_, ed. P. Margry.
_Les Lettres de La Hontan_.
_Histoire de l'Hôtel-Dieu de Québec, par la mère Juchereau de
Saint-Denis_.
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INDEX
Abnakis, the, raid New England settlements, 147-8.
Aillebout de Mantet, d', 118, 119.
Andros, Sir Edmund, his Indian policy, 89, 90, 109.
Bellomont, Earl of, and Frontenac, 151.
Bernières, Abbé de, 59.
Bienville, François Le Moyne de, 118.
Brucy, Perrot's chief agent, 49.
Callières-Bonnevue, Louis Hector de, 116, 150; at the defence of
Quebec, 128; repulses Schuyler's invasion, 146; makes peace with the
Iroquois, 152.
Canada. See New France.
Cannehoot, a Seneca chief, 138.
Carheil, Étienne de, a Jesuit missionary, 139 n.
Cataraqui, Frontenac's conference with Iroquois at, 41-4.
Champigny, intendant, his relations with Frontenac, 152-4.
Champlain, Samuel de, 8.
Château St Louis, 9, 34.
Clermont, Chevalier de, killed at Quebec, 129.
Colbert, minister of Louis XIV, 30; and New France, 54, 58, 62, 65-8.
Courcelles, Sieur de, governor of New France, 34.
Coureurs de bois, the, 12-13, 46, 49.
Denonville, Marquis de, governor of New France, 103-4; his
correspondence with Dongan, 104-6, 108; fails to cope with the
Iroquois, 103-11, 135-136, 138; recalled, 115-16.
Dongan, Thomas, governor of New York, 90-1, 96, 97, 104-5, 109.
Duchesneau, Jacques, intendant, 51-2, 64; his relations with Frontenac,
52-3, 63-70, 80, 94; and the coureurs de bois, 79-80.
Du Lhut, Daniel Greysolon, explorer and pioneer, 77-81, 106, 109, 150.
Fénelon, Abbé, espouses Perrot's cause against Frontenac, 48-9, 50, 74.
Five Nations. See Iroquois.
Fort Frontenac, 38, 43, 44, 45, 76, 98, 106-7; destroyed, 135-6.
France, under the Bourbons, 1-4, 11, 29 n., 31-2, 85, 90; her policy in
New France, 5, 10-11, 68; the Thirty Years' War, 19-21; the outbreak of
the Fronde, 21; the dispute between Gallicans and Ultramontanes, 55-7;
war with Holland, 85, 90; war with Britain, 114; her colonial system
compared with that of Britain, 131-4. See New France.
Frontenac, Comte de, his birth and parentage, 17-18; his early career,
18-21, 26 n.; his marriage and domestic affairs, 21-6, 113; selected by
Turenne to assist Venice in the defence of Crete, 26-8; gossip
concerning his appointment as governor of New France, 28-30; his
arrival in Quebec, 33-4; summons the Three Estates, 35-7, 44-5; his
tour of inspection and conference with the Iroquois, 38-44, 95; his
quarrel with Perrot, 45-50; and Laval, 51-3, 55, 58-63; and Duchesneau,
52-3, 63-70, 80; and the Sulpicians, 54; his antagonism towards the
Jesuits, 54-5, 57-8, 69-70, 81-3; favours the Récollets, 55; upholds
the brandy traffic, 61-3; his influence with the Indians, 72-3, 93-4;
encourages exploration, 74-5, 79; supports the coureurs de bois, 80;
his recall, 70-2; an estimate of his work, 72-4, 83-86, 93-4; his
return to New France, 112-15, 116, 135-6; his campaign against New
England, 117-19, 121; his reply to Phips, 125-7; his Indian policy,
135-7, 138, 141; at war with the Iroquois, 137-42, 144, 148-50; his
expedition against the Onondagas and Oneidas, 148-50; his reply to
Bellomont's threat, 151-2; his dispute with Champigny, 152-3; his
death, 153-4; his character, 24, 25-26, 31, 32, 44, 57, 58, 150,
154-161.
Frontenac, Madame de, 22-5, 154.
Goyer, Father, 115; pronounces eulogy on Frontenac, 153.
Grangula, an Onondaga chief, 99-102, 109.
Great Britain, 29 n., 90; and war with France, 114, 142; her colonial
system, 131-4. See New England States.
Hébert, Louis, a seigneur of New France, 14.
Hennepin, Father, his rescue, 78.
Hertel, François, his raid on English settlements, 118, 119-121.
Holland, and war with France, 29 n., 85, 90; and the fur trade, 89.
Howard of Effingham, Lord, governor of Virginia, 96.
Hubbard, William, and King Philip's War, 158-9.
Hudson Bay, the struggle between French and English on, 105-6.
Hurons, the, 139.
Iberville, Pierre Le Moyne d', 118, 150.
Illinois, the, 93, 95-6.
Iroquois, the, and Frontenac, 40, 41-4, 93, 95, 137-8; their power and
political sagacity, 87-9, 97, 109-10; and the fur trade, 92-3, 95-6; a
menace to New France, 94, 95-6, 111; their relations with the English,
96, 97; and La Barre, 95, 98-102; and Denonville, 106-7, 109, 110; at
war with New France, 137-42, 149; make peace, 152.
Jesuits, the, in New France, 8, 53-4; and Frontenac, 54-5, 57-8, 69-70,
82-3; and the brandy traffic, 61-3.
King Philip's War, 158-9.
Kondiaronk, a Huron chief, 110-111, 139.
La Barre, Lefebvre de, governor of New France, 91, 92, 135; fails to
cope with the Iroquois peril, 94, 95-6, 97, 98-102; recalled, 103.
La Chesnaye, massacre at, 111, 135.
Lachine, massacre by Iroquois at, 111, 135.
La Durantaye, and the Iroquois, 106, 109.
La Hontan, Baron, quoted, 99-102.
Lamberville, his influence with the Iroquois, 97, 109.
Laprairie, English raids on, 123, 146.
La Salle, and Frontenac, 40-1, 45, 74-7, 92, 93; and La Barre, 96.
Laval, François de, bishop of Quebec, 6-7, 8-9, 34, 51-3; and
Frontenac, 51-3, 55, 58-63; and the brandy traffic, 61-2.
Le Ber, Jacques, 47-8.
Le Moyne, Charles, interpreter, 43, 95, 97, 102. See Bienville,
Iberville, and Sainte-Hélène.
Louis XIV, his interest in New France, 30, 50, 60, 62, 67, 85, 117; and
the Church, 56, 58.
Marlborough, Duke of, 90.
Mazarin, Cardinal, 21.
Meulles, intendant, and La Barre, 91, 92, 97, 102.
Michilimackinac, 13, 78.
Mohawks, the, 145.
Mohegans, the, 145.
Montpensier, Duchesse de, 22-23; and Frontenac, 24.
Montreal, its position in New France, 39-40, 141.
New Amsterdam, and the Iroquois, 89.
New England States, contrasted with New France, 15, 130-4; and the
Iroquois, 89-90, 104-5, 151-2; at war with New France, 123-30, 138,
151-152; and the Abnaki raids, 147-8.
New France, in 1672, 1, 8, 14-16, 83; status of the governor and
intendant, 5, 9-10, 11; the fur trade, 8; the seigneurial system,
11-12, 14-15; the coureurs de bois, 12-13; the creation of parishes,
58-61; the brandy traffic, 61-3; population and trade during 1673-83,
84-5; the Iroquois peril, 87, 89, 90, 91, 94, 97, 111, 137-40, 142-143,
149; in 1689, 114, 115; at war with New England, 119-123, 128-30,
145-6; her weakness, 130-4; from 1690 to 1693, 142-4, 150; and Acadia,
147-8.
Oneidas, the, 149. See Iroquois.
Onondagas, the, 98-103, 149. See Iroquois.
Ottawas, the, 139, 140, 141.
Ourehaoué, a Cayuga chief, 137.
Parkman, on Frontenac, 36, 160; on Hertel, 120-1.
Perrot, François, governor of Montreal, 39-40; his quarrel with
Frontenac, 45-50.
Perrot, Nicolas, interpreter, 13 n., 106, 138-9, 140, 150.
Phips, Sir William, his attack on Quebec, 123-30.
Portneuf, his raid, 119.
Port Royal, surrendered to Phips, 124, 127.
Quebec, 91; Phips's siege of, 123-30.
Récollets, the, and Frontenac, 53-4, 55.
Repentigny de Montesson, 118.
Richelieu, Cardinal, minister to Louis XIII, 18-19, 20, 21, 131.
Rouville, Hertel de, 118.
Ryswick, Peace of, 151.
Saint-Castin, Baron de, raids New England settlements, 147, 148, 150.
Sainte-Hélène, Jacques Le Moyne de, 118, 119, 129, 150.
Schenectady, raided by the French, 119, 121, 122, 140.
Schuyler, John, his abortive raid into New France, 123, 145.
Schuyler, Peter, his invasion defeated at Laprairie, 145-6.
Seignelay, Marquis de, 70.
Senecas, the, 107-8. See Iroquois.
Sovereign Council, composition and jurisdiction of, 9-10; and
Frontenac, 65-8.
Sulpicians, the, in New France, 39, 53-4.
Superior Council, 9. See Sovereign Council.
Talon, Jean, 6, 34; supports Perrot against Frontenac, 50.
Thury, Father, encourages Abnaki raids on English settlements, 147-8.
Tonty, Henri de, explorer, 76-7, 92, 93, 106, 109, 150.
Turgot, Anne Robert Jacques, 6 and note.
Urfé, Abbé d', supports Perrot against Frontenac, 50.
Valrennes, at Laprairie, 146.
Vaudreuil, governor of New France, 81.
Verchères, Madeleine de, 144.
West India Company, its trading monopoly, 84.
'William and Mary's War,' 150. See under New France and New England
States.
Printed by T. and A. Constable, Printers to His Majesty
at the Edinburgh University Press
THE CHRONICLES OF CANADA
THIRTY-TWO VOLUMES ILLUSTRATED
Edited by GEORGE M. WRONG and H. H. LANGTON
THE CHRONICLES OF CANADA
PART I
THE FIRST EUROPEAN VISITORS
1. THE DAWN OF CANADIAN HISTORY
By Stephen Leacock.
2. THE MARINER OF ST MALO
By Stephen Leacock.