A HISTORY, OF THE WAR OF 1812-15 BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN
By Rossiter Johnson
Dodd, Mead and Company Publishers
1882
Dodd, Mead & Company.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
Causes of the War 1. Franklin's Prediction, 1.--British Feeling toward
the United States, 2.--The Unsurrendered Posts, 3.--Indian Troubles,
4.--Impressment of Seamen, 7.--The Decrees and Orders in Council,
13.--Declaration of War, 18.
CHAPTER II.
The Detroit Campaign, 21.--First Bloodshed, 21.--Attitude of
Political Parties, 22.--Plans for Invading Canada, 26.--Capture of
Michilimackinac, 30.--Engagements at the River Raisin and Maguaga,
31.--Battle of Chicago, 32.--Hull's Surrender, 36.
CHAPTER III.
Fights with the Indians, 38.--Tecumseh's Scheme, 38.--Harrison's March
to Fort Wayne, 39.--Defence of Fort Harrison, 41.--Defence of Fort
Madison, 43.--Ball's Fight, 44.
CHAPTER IV.
The Battle of Queenstown, 46.--Fight at Gananoqui, 46.--Expedition
against Ogdensburg, 47.--Elliott captures two War-vessels,
48.--Gathering of Forces on the Niagara, 49.--Battle of Queenstown,
50.--Death of General Brock, 55.
CHAPTER V.
War on the Ocean, 61.--The _President_ and the _Little Belt_,
62.--The _President_ and the _Belvidera_, 64.--Hull's Race, 66.--The
_Constitution_ and the _Guerriere_, 68.--Effect of the Victory, 71.--The
_Wasp_ and the _Frolic_, 73.--The _United States_ and the _Macedonian_,
76.--The _Constitution_ and the _Java_, 79.--Nelson's Prediction, 83.
CHAPTER VI.
Minor Battles in the West, 84.--Winchester's Expedition, 84.--Fight at
Frenchtown, 85.--Massacre at the Raisin, 87.--Siege of Fort Meigs, 90.
CHAPTER VII.
War on the Lakes, 98.--The Armaments, 98.--Preliminary Operations,
99.--Expedition against York, 100.--Death of General Pike, 103.--Capture
of Fort George, 107.--Attack on Sackett's Harbor, 112.--Battle of Stony
Creek, 118.
CHAPTER VIII.
Battle of the Thames, 140--Harrison's Advance, 140.--Proctor's Retreat
141.--Nature of the Ground, 141.--Disposition of the Indians, 143.--The
Battle, 144.--Death of Tecumseh, 146.--Flight of Proctor, 146.--Results
of the Campaign, 148.
CHAPTER IX.
Wilkinson's Expedition, 149.--Armstrong's Plans, 149.--Position of the
Troops, 150.--Descent of the St. Lawrence, 152--Battle of Chrysler's
Field, 154.--Hampton's Defeat, 159.--Cost of the Campaign,
160.--Effects on the Niagara Frontier, 161.--Capture of Fort Niagara,
163.--Destruction of Buffalo and other Villages, 166.
CHAPTER X.
War in the South, 168.--Engagement at Lewistown, 168.--Fight in Delaware
Bay, 169.--Burning of Havre de Grace, Georgetown, and Fredericktown,
171.--Battle at Craney Island, 172.--Destruction of Hampton,
176.--Troubles with the Southern Indians, 178.--Fight at Burnt
Corn Creek, 179.--Massacre at Fort Mims, 182.--Jackson's Campaign,
183.--Fights at Tallus-chatches, Talladega, the Hillabee Towns, Autosse,
and Econochaca, 183.--Dale's Canoe Fight, 188.
CHAPTER XI.
Naval Battles of 1813, 195.--The _Hornet_ and the _Peacock_, 195.--The
_Chesapeake_ and the _Shannon_, 197.--The _Argus_ and the _Pelican_,
201.--The _Enterprise_ and the _Boxer_, 202.--Decatur Blockaded at New
London, 204.--A New Embargo, 206.
CHAPTER XII.
Privateers, 207.--Their Number and Importance, 207.--Jefferson's Opinion
of them, 208.--A London Journal's Prediction, 211.--Some of their
Captures, and some of their Battles, 212.--The _Yankee's_ Laughable
Exploit, 222.
CHAPTER XIII.
Peace Negotiations, 223.--Campaign against the Creeks, 223.--Condition
of Affairs at the Opening of the Third Year, 223.--Congressional
Appropriations, 224--Russian Offers of Mediation, 225.--Jackson's
Preparations, 227.--Battles of Emucfau, Enotachopco, and Horseshoe Bend,
227.
CHAPTER XIV.
Brown's Campaign on the Niagara, 231.--The March to Buffalo,
231.--Capture of Fort Erie, 232.--Battle of Chippewa, 234.--Brown's
Plans, 238.--Battle of Lundy's Lane, 240.--Siege of Fort Erie by the
British, 245.
CHAPTER XV.
The Second Invasion of New York, 251.--Fight at La Colie Mill,
251.--Ship-building, 253.--Yeo's Attack on Oswego, 254.--Affairs at
Charlotte and Poultneyville, 255.--Fight at Sandy Creek, 257.--Izard's
Failure on the Niagara, 258.--Expedition against Michilimackinac,
250.--Prevost's Advance into New York, 260.--Its Purpose, 261.--Battle
of Plattsburg, 265.
CHAPTER XVI.
Operations Along the Coast, 268.--Capture of Eastport and Castine,
268.--Occupation of Territory in Maine, 269.--Destruction of the Frigate
_Adams_, 270.--Bombardment of Stonington, 271.--Affairs at Wareham,
Scituate, and Boothbay, 273.
CHAPTER XVII.
The Washington Campaign, 274.--Ross's Expedition against Washington,
276.--Battle of Bladensburg, 278.--Destruction of the Capital,
282.--Capitulation of Alexandria, 283.--Comments of the London Times,
284.--Expedition against Baltimore, 285.--Death of Sir Peter
Parker, 286.--Battle of North Point, 286.--Death of General Ross,
287.--Bombardment of Fort McHenry, 288.--How a Famous Song was written,
289.
CHAPTER XVIII.
Naval Battles of 1814, 290,--Porter's Cruise in the Essex, 290.--His
Campaign against the Typees, 296.--Destruction of the British Whaling
Interest in the Pacific, 310.--Battle with the Phoebe and the Cherub,
312.--The Peacock and the Epervier, 320.--The Wasp and the Reindeer,
321.--The Wasp and the Avon, 322.--Destruction of the General Armstrong,
323.--Loss of the President, 325.--The Constitution Captures the Cyane
and the Levant, 325.--The Hornet and the Penguin, 325.
CHAPTER XIX.
The Hartford Convention, 326.--Attitude of the Federalists, Real and
Imputed, 326.--The Convention at Hartford, 328.--Its Popular Reputation,
330.--What General Scott did not say at Chippewa, 330.
CHAPTER XX.
The Campaign on the Gulf Coast, 332.--British Occupation of Pensacola,
332.--Negotiations with Lafitte, 333.--Expedition against Mobile,
333.--Capture of Pensacola, 334.--Defence of New Orleans, 336.--The
Battles before the City, 337.--Defeat of the British, 344.--Losses, 345.
CHAPTER XXI.
Peace, 346.--The Treaty of Ghent, 346.--Treatment of Prisoners,
348.--Losses and Gains by the War, 349.--Conclusion, 350.
A HISTORY OF THE WAR OF 1812-15.
{001}
CHAPTER I.--CAUSES OF THE WAR.
_Franklin's Prediction--British Feeling toward the United States--The
Unsurrendered Posts--Indian Troubles--Impressment of Seamen--The Decrees
and Orders in Council--Declaration of War._
|The offender, says an Italian proverb, never forgives; and it is a
singular fact that the deepest resentments and the most implacable
hatreds are not those arising from a sense of injuries received,
but from injuries inflicted. The victim of a deliberate wrong seldom
treasures up a purpose of revenge, or demands anything more than a
restoration of his rights; but the oppressor always hates those who have
escaped from his oppression.
That wise old philosopher, Ben Franklin, who died within seven years
after the acknowledgment of our country as a separate nation in 1783,
foresaw, even then, what did not take place till more than twenty years
after his death. He declared that the war which had just closed in the
surrender of Cornwallis was only the war of Revolution, and that the war
of Independence was yet to be fought. {002}When, in June, 1785, George
III. received John Adams as United States Minister at his court,
he said: "I was the last man in the kingdom, Sir, to consent to the
independence of America; but, now it is granted, I shall be the last man
in the world to sanction a violation of it." If the King was sincere
in this declaration, he must have had--as Lincoln said of himself when
President--very little influence with the Administration; for, almost
from the first, there was systematic disregard of the rights of the
new nation, with an evident purpose to humiliate her people and cripple
their commerce.
It was hard for the British Ministry and British commanders to realize
that those whom they had so lately attempted to chastise as rebels, that
they might again tax them as subjects, were now, after their triumph in
a long war, and by the terms of a solemn treaty, entitled to the same
privileges on the ocean, and the same courtesies in diplomacy, that
were accorded to the oldest nation of Europe. They knew as little of the
spirit of the American people and the mighty destinies within the coming
century, as of the resources of the vast continent which lay behind that
thin line of civilization along the Atlantic coast.
This failure to realize, or reluctance to admit, that the people of
America were no longer British sub{003}jects, and that the United
States was an independent nation, was forcibly illustrated in England's
disregard, for thirty years, of an important portion of the Treaty of
1783. It was there stipulated that the military posts on our western
frontier should be surrendered to our Government. Yet not only did the
British forces retain possession of them, but from them they supplied
the Indians with arms and ammunition, and instigated savage hostilities
against the American settlements. Attempts have been made to deny this,
but the proof is unquestionable.
Lord Dorchester, Governor of Canada, called a council of the Indian
tribes, engaged to supply them with munitions of war, encouraged them to
enmity against the United States, and gave them to understand that
they would have the co-operation of his Government. These facts were
published in British newspapers, and when the British Minister was asked
to account for them, he could give no satisfactory answer. In pursuance
of this policy, when war broke out, in 1812, the English commanders not
only employed Indian allies, but offered and paid a regular bounty for
American scalps. It seems incredible that such things could have been
done, only seventy years ago, by one of the most enlightened governments
on earth. And yet in our own day we have seen the performance repeated,
{004}when the English in South Africa armed the native savages with
the best English rifles, that they might make war upon the peaceful and
industrious Boers of the Transvaal Republic.
But our people had a grievance, of more than twenty years' standing,
which was even more serious than this. While the frontiersman was
contending with British treachery and Indian ferocity, which combined
to hinder the development of our inland resources, the American
sailor--then the best in the world, as was proved by the result of the
war--was confronted by a monstrous policy intended to check our growing
commerce and recruit the English navy at our expense.
England was at this time the greatest commercial nation in the world.
Her merchant ships and whalers were found on every sea, gathering and
distributing the productions of every land. In herself she was but an
island, not larger than one of our States--a very beautiful and fertile
island, it is true; but if her jurisdiction had not extended beyond its
borders, she would have been hardly more important than Switzerland or
Sweden. But in her colonies and her commerce she was powerful. And now
the finest of those colonies, casting off her authority in the only
successful rebellion ever waged against it, were rapidly building up
a mercantile marine {005}that threatened to rival her own. They had
thousands of miles of seacoast, with innumerable fine harbors; they
had behind them, not a crowded island, but a virgin continent; the
construction of their government and society was such that the poorest
man before the mast might not unreasonably hope some day to command a
ship. With all this, they were not involved in the wars which were then
distracting Europe.
Being neutrals, of course they enjoyed those advantages which England
has never been slow to reap when she herself has been a neutral while
her neighbors were at war. Their ships could carry goods which in any
other ships would have been seized by hostile cruisers. England was
now--as she truly said, in extenuation of her depredation on American
commerce--struggling for her very existence, against mighty armies led
by the ablest general that had appeared since Alexander. Many of the
most desirable ports were closed to her merchantmen, her entire coast
was declared by Napoleon to be under blockade; and it was exasperating
in the last degree to see these misfortunes redounding to the advantage
of a people whom she had so lately treated as rebels and outlaws, whose
military prowess she had affected to despise, until it had disarmed
her legions and conquered an honorable peace. {006}The motive that
controlled British policy was plainly revealed in an editorial article
which appeared in the London _Independent Whig_ (January 10th, 1813),
after the war had been begun and the British public had been astounded
by the capture of two or three of their finest frigates. "Accustomed, as
we have hitherto been, to a long and uninterrupted tide of success upon
the watery element, and claiming an absolute and exclusive sovereignty
over the ocean, to be defeated there, where we securely rested our
proudest hopes and wishes, might reasonably be expected to check our
insolence and mortify our pride. In this view of the case, and if we
could not flatter ourselves that it would have the effect of inducing us
to abate somewhat of our unwarrantable pretensions, and listen to terms
of moderation and forbearance, our regret would be sensibly diminished;
since even the misfortune, severe as it is, might be converted into a
great and lasting benefit to the nation at large. But the mischief will
not confine itself here; the charm of the invincibility of the British
navy, like that of the Grecian warrior, being destroyed, the terror
that has long preceded our flag, and commanded the abject homage of
surrounding nations, will henceforward be dissipated, and every maritime
power with whom we may be involved in war will fight with redoubled
zeal, ar{007}dently and anxiously hoping to lower our ascendency
and establish the freedom of the seas." That was it exactly; they were
afraid somebody would establish the freedom of the seas, and at that
time the Americans seemed most likely to do it.
During the Napoleonic wars, in the early years of the present century,
England's navy consisted of about one thousand vessels. As she was
recruiting this vast squadron by perpetual press-gangs, and maintaining
its discipline by unstinted flogging, while at the same time the
flourishing merchant marine of the United States was paying more liberal
wages to men before the mast than could be obtained on the English
merchantmen, it might have been expected that the number of desertions
would only be limited by the number of opportunities to desert. Many
of the deserters undoubtedly found employment on American ships, where
British captains soon established the custom of searching for and
reclaiming them. This was a gross violation of the sovereignty of the
United States, for the deck of an American vessel is to all intents and
purposes American territory; yet our Government permitted it, and only
complained of what were considered its incidental abuses.
The troubles that followed from this beginning remind us of the fable of
the camel and the tailor. {008}England's next step was to claim that no
British subject had a right to enter any military or marine service
but the British, and that any who did so might be taken by British
authorities wherever found--just as if they were deserters.
But presently it appeared that something more was needed in order to
give Great Britain the full benefit of these assumptions. An English
war-vessel stops an American merchantman on the high sea, and sends an
officer with armed men on board to inspect the crew and take off any
that are British subjects. The officer selects some of the ablest seamen
he finds, and claims them. Immediately a dispute arises; the seamen
say they are American citizens--or at least not British subjects; the
officer says they were born subjects of the English king, and can never
throw off their allegiance. Here is a question of fact, and by all the
principles of law and justice it would devolve upon the officer to prove
his claim. But as the purpose was, not to do justice, but to recruit the
British navy, the admission of any such principle would hardly answer
the purpose. So the British Government set up the doctrine that the
burden of proof rested with the accused; that is, any sailor who
was unable to prove on the spot, to the satisfaction of the boarding
officer, that he was _not_ a British subject, was to be {009}considered
as such, and carried off to serve against his will on a British ship.
The English naval commanders were now fully equipped for this new
method of recruiting, and it soon became the practice for them to board
American merchantmen and take off as many of the best sailors as they
happened to be in need of at the time, with very little reference
to their nationality. Some of the men thus forcibly carried off were
released by order of the Admiralty, on the application of the American
Consul, with the apology that, as English and Americans spoke the
same language and were of the same race, it was often difficult to
distinguish between them. But as a matter of fact the sailors thus
impressed included men of nearly every European nationality--Germans,
Swedes, Danes, Portuguese, and even negroes. In 1811 it was believed
that more than six thousand American sailors were serving under
compulsion in the British navy; and Mr. Lyman, United States Consul at
London, estimated the number at fourteen thousand.
This was only the natural result of the original error committed by
our Government when it admit ted the right to search for and carry away
deserters. And the impressments took place not only on the high seas but
often within the three miles from shore to which a maritime country's
jurisdiction extends, {010}and sometimes in the very harbors of the
United States. Coasting and fishing schooners were robbed of their men,
and occasionally fired upon and plundered; while of larger vessels bound
for distant waters, the crews were sometimes so depleted by visit from a
British man-of-war that the voyage was broken up and the ship compelled
to return to port.
The greatest of these outrages was the capture of the _Chesapeake_, a
United States frigate, by the British man-of-war _Leopard_, June 23d,
1806. The _Chesapeake_, which had just left Hampton Roads for a cruise,
had not been put in fighting trim; not a single gun was ready for use.
Her commander, Commodore James Barron, refused to permit a search for
British deserters, and the _Leopard_ thereupon fired several broadsides
into her, when she struck her flag. Three of her crew were killed, and
eighteen wounded. The _Leopard_ carried away four of her men, claiming
them as deserters; but it was afterward proved that three of them
were Americans, and they were released, while the fourth was tried and
executed at Halifax.
When the _Chesapeake_ returned to Norfolk, Va., with the news,
it created the greatest excitement the country had seen since the
Revolutionary war. Indignation meetings were held, and the people seemed
almost unanimous in a desire to plunge at {011}once into war. A schooner
was sent to England by our Government, carrying instructions to the
American Minister to demand apology and reparation. These were made,
after a fashion; but the English Government refused to give up the
right of search. President Jefferson, who thought anything, under any
circumstances, was better than war, issued a proclamation ordering all
British vessels of war then in United States waters to leave at once.
Meanwhile, England had attempted to revive what was known as "the rule
of 1756." During the war of that year she had tried to establish a rule
that neutral nations were not at liberty to trade with the colonies of
a belligerent power from which, in times of peace, they were excluded
by the parent state. For instance, if in time of peace France permitted
none but her own vessels to trade at the ports of certain of her
colonies, she should not be allowed, when at war, to have that trade
carried on for her in vessels belonging to a neutral nation; and if such
vessels attempted it, they should be liable to capture and confiscation
by cruisers of the nation which was at war with France. Such a
regulation of course belongs to the domain of international law, and
cannot be established by one nation alone. This rule had been frequently
disregarded by England herself, and had never received the sanction of
{012}other powers; but by orders in council, of November 6th, 1793, she
secretly instructed her naval commanders to enforce it against American
vessels trading to the French colonies of the West Indies. The United
States Government sent commissioners to London, English commissioners
were appointed to meet them, and a treaty of "amity, commerce, and
navigation" was concluded, which was ratified by both governments in
1795. Yet the capture and condemnation of American vessels went on
almost as before.
In the early European wars of this century, the days of paper
blockade--a blockade which consists merely in a proclamation, without
the presence of armed vessels to enforce it--were not yet over, and on
May 16th, 1806, England declared the whole coast of the Continent, from
Brest to the mouth of the Elbe, to be in a state of blockade. Napoleon
retaliated by issuing from Berlin a counter decree, dated November
21st, 1806, which declared the entire coast of Great Britain to be under
blockade, and prohibited any vessel which sailed from a British port
from entering a Continental port. England then, by orders in council,
published November 17th, 1807, prohibited all neutral trade with France
and her allies, except in vessels that had first entered a British port.
As paper and ink were cheap, and {013}by this time so little was left of
the rights of neutrals that it was hardly worth while to regard them at
all, Napoleon tried his hand at one more decree. Under date of Milan,
December 17th, 1807, he proclaimed that any vessel which should submit
to search by British cruisers, or pay any tax to the British Government,
should be forfeit as good prize.
These so-called measures of retaliation--which became famous as the
"orders in council," and the "Berlin and Milan decrees"--had very
little effect upon the people who were at war, but they laid some of the
heaviest penalties of war upon the one maritime nation that was at
peace with all. Instead of resorting to war at once, the United
States Government, being as well able as any other to issue a foolish
proclamation, laid an embargo, December 22d, 1807, upon all shipping
in American ports, prohibiting exportations therefrom. This measure
met with violent opposition in New England, which was more largely
interested in commerce than any other part of the country. The coast of
New England presented innumerable harbors, and her forests were full of
the finest ship-timber, while in agriculture she could not compete
with the States having richer soils and a less rigorous climate.
Cotton-spinning was in its infancy, and the manufactures that were to
employ her water-powers had not been {014}developed. She naturally and
properly looked to the carrying trade as her best means of livelihood.
The orders in council and the Berlin and Milan decrees imposed great
risks and unjust restrictions upon it, but did not altogether destroy
it; the embargo suppressed it at once.
In March, 1809, Congress repealed the embargo, and substituted a system
of non-importation and non-intercourse with France and Great Britain.
Voyages to their dominions, and trade in articles produced by them, were
prohibited; but it was provided that whenever either of those nations
should repeal its decrees against neutral commerce, the restriction
should be removed as to that nation.
This at last produced some effect, and the French Government revoked the
Berlin and Milan decrees, the revocation to take effect on the 1st of
November, 1810; the letter of the French Minister communicating the fact
to the American Minister adding that it was "clearly understood that
the English orders in council were to be revoked at the same time." In
August of that year, Hon. William Pinkney, United States Minister at
London, laid this before the British Government, but was told that the
English decrees would be revoked "after the French revocation should
have actually taken place." This was a most palpable evasion, since
it {015}is very common for treaties and governmental orders to contain
clauses which render them operative only in certain contingencies, and
it was the easiest thing in the world for England to give her revocation
precisely the same form as that of France, when each would have put the
other in force on the date named. If any further proof had been
wanted that the British Government was determined to suppress American
commerce, at least till her own ships could resume the carrying trade of
the world, it was supplied when in 1812 Lord Castlereagh, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, declared officially that "the decrees of Berlin and
Milan must not be repealed singly and specially, in relation to the
United States, but must be repealed also as to all other neutral
nations; and that in no less extent of a repeal of the French decrees
had the British Government pledged itself to repeal the orders in
council." That is, the rights of the United States as a neutral nation
were not to be regarded by England, unless the United States could
induce or compel France to regard not only these rights but those of all
other neutral nations!
With this tangle of orders, decrees, and proclamations, with an
important part of the Treaty of 1783 unfulfilled, with unlawful
impressments daily taking place on the high seas, and with no
disposition on the part of the chief aggressor to right these wrongs,
{016}it is difficult to see how negotiations could have been continued
longer, or the alternative of war avoided. On the first day of June,
1812, President Madison sent a message to Congress, in which he set
forth the facts that necessitated war; Congress accordingly declared war
on the 18th, and the next day the President proclaimed it. On the 23d,
before this news was received, England revoked her orders in council,
thus removing one of the grievances, but still leaving those which amply
justified the declaration.
It thus appears that the immediate and specific causes of the war of
1812 between the United States and Great Britain were complex; but the
general cause, the philosophic reason, was simply the determined purpose
manifested by England to nullify and render valueless the political
independence gained by the American colonies in the Revolution.
Since the inauguration of President Jefferson, in 1801, the Government
had been in the hands of the Republicans, and all measures looking
toward war with England were opposed by the party out of power--the
Federalists. The young reader must not be confused by the change of
names which political parties have undergone between that day and this.
The Republican party of Jefferson's day was {017}the predecessor of what
is now called the Democratic party; while the Republican party of our
own day is to some extent the successor of the Federal party of that
day. Presidents Washington and Adams were Federalists, or what would now
be called Republicans; Presidents Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe were
Republicans, or what would now be called Democrats.
The Federalists in Congress protested against the declaration of war;
and this protest was repeated in every possible form by the Federal
newspapers, by mass-meetings, in numerous political pamphlets, and even
in many pulpits. The opposition was especially strong in the New England
States. The arguments of those who opposed the war were, that the
country was not prepared for such a struggle, could not afford it,
and would find it a hopeless undertaking; that the war policy had been
forced upon Madison's administration by the Republican party, in order
to strengthen that party and keep it in power; that if we had cause
for war with England, we had cause for war with France also, and it was
unreasonable to declare war against one of those powers and not against
both. The last argument was the one most vehemently urged, and the war
party was denounced and sneered at as making our Government a tool
of France. {018}There was a certain amount of truth in each of these
propositions. The country was poorly prepared for war at all, least of
all with the most powerful of nations. Madison probably had been given
to understand that unless he recommended a declaration of war, he need
not expect a renomination at the hands of his party. And we certainly
had cause of war with France, whose cruisers had captured or destroyed
many of our merchantmen. But the position of the Federalists on this
question furnishes a singular example of the fact that an argument may
sometimes be true in each of its parts, and yet incorrect in its grand
conclusion. It seldom happens that any people are prepared for a just
and defensive war; they begin their preparations for such a contest
after the necessity is upon them. While a portion of the Republican
party were undoubtedly actuated by selfish motives, as is the case
with some portion of every party, the greater part were unquestionably
patriotic, and advocated war because they believed it to be necessary.
The crowning argument--that the United States had a grievance
against France as well as England, and should make war on both if on
either--would have been unanswerable if it had been a moral warfare that
was in question. But in military matters it is necessary to consider
what is practicable as well as what is logi{019}cal. For our
Government to attempt to fight England and France at the same time,
would have been simply suicidal. A good general strives to divide his
foes, instead of uniting them. The shrewd thing to do was, to declare
war against one only, and by saying nothing of any grievance against the
other, make of that other either an ally or a neutral. Then if the
war was successful on our part, it would put an end to the outrages
complained of, not only on the part of the nation with whom we had
fought, but also on that of the other; or if not, a war with the
second offender would almost necessarily have the same result. The
only question was, with which of those great European powers we should
attempt to cope in battle. It was not difficult to decide. England was
by far the greater offender. Not only had she done more than France to
cripple our commerce, but she still held military posts on our frontier
which she had solemnly agreed to give up, and kept the savages in
a state of perpetual hostility to our western pioneers. England had
colonies contiguous to our territory on the north, which we might make
the battle-ground; France had no territory that would serve us for such
a purpose. England was the power that our people had been compelled to
fight thirty years before, to escape from oppression; France was
the power that {020}had assisted us in that war. Mr. Madison's
Administration was right in the conclusion that war could no longer be
avoided, if the United States was to maintain an honorable place among
nations; and right in the determination to wage it against England
alone. But for the manner in which it began and conducted that war, the
Administration was open to the severest criticism.