The principal object of management should be to secure the maximum
prosperity for the employer, coupled with the maximum prosperity for
each employee.
The words "maximum prosperity" are used, in their broad sense, to mean
not only large dividends for the company or owner, but the development
of every branch of the business to its highest state of excellence, so
that the prosperity may be permanent. In the same way maximum prosperity
for each employee means not only higher wages than are usually received
by men of his class, but, of more importance still, it also means the
development of each man to his state of maximum efficiency, so that he
may be able to do, generally speaking, the highest grade of work for
which his natural abilities fit him, and it further means giving him,
when possible, this class of work to do.
It would seem to be so self-evident that maximum prosperity for the
employer, coupled with maximum prosperity for the employee, ought to be
the two leading objects of management, that even to state this fact
should be unnecessary. And yet there is no question that, throughout the
industrial world, a large part of the organization of employers, as well
as employees, is for war rather than for peace, and that perhaps the
majority on either side do not believe that it is possible so to arrange
their mutual relations that their interests become identical.
The majority of these men believe that the fundamental interests of
employees and employers are necessarily antagonistic. Scientific
management, on the contrary, has for its very foundation the firm
conviction that the true interests of the two are one and the same; that
prosperity for the employer cannot exist through a long term of years
unless it is accompanied by prosperity for the employee, and vice versa;
and that it is possible to give the workman what he most wants--high
wages--and the employer what he wants--a low labor cost--for his
manufactures.
It is hoped that some at least of those who do not sympathize with each
of these objects may be led to modify their views; that some employers,
whose attitude toward their workmen has been that of trying to get the
largest amount of work out of them for the smallest possible wages, may
be led to see that a more liberal policy toward their men will pay them
better; and that some of those workmen who begrudge a fair and even a
large profit to their employers, and who feel that all of the fruits of
their labor should belong to them, and that those for whom they work and
the capital invested in the business are entitled to little or nothing,
may be led to modify these views.
No one can be found who will deny that in the case of any single
individual the greatest prosperity can exist only when that individual
has reached his highest state of efficiency; that is, when he is turning
out his largest daily output.
The truth of this fact is also perfectly clear in the case of two men
working together. To illustrate: if you and your workman have become so
skilful that you and he together are making two pairs of, shoes in a
day, while your competitor and his workman are making only one pair, it
is clear that after selling your two pairs of shoes you can pay your
workman much higher wages than your competitor who produces only one
pair of shoes is able to pay his man, and that there will still be
enough money left over for you to have a larger profit than your
competitor.
In the case of a more complicated manufacturing establishment, it should
also be perfectly clear that the greatest permanent prosperity for the
workman, coupled with the greatest prosperity for the employer, can be
brought about only when the work of the establishment is done with the
smallest combined expenditure of human effort, plus nature's resources,
plus the cost for the use of capital in the shape of machines,
buildings, etc. Or, to state the same thing in a different way: that the
greatest prosperity can exist only as the result of the greatest
possible productivity of the men and machines of the establishment--that
is, when each man and each machine are turning out the largest possible
output; because unless your men and your machines are daily turning out
more work than others around you, it is clear that competition will
prevent your paying higher wages to your workmen than are paid to those
of your competitor. And what is true as to the possibility of paying
high wages in the case of two companies competing close beside one
another is also true as to whole districts of the country and even as to
nations which are in competition. In a word, that maximum prosperity can
exist only as the result of maximum productivity. Later in this paper
illustrations will be given of several companies which are earning large
dividends and at the same time paying from 30 per cent to 100 per cent
higher wages to their men than are paid to similar men immediately
around them, and with whose employers they are in competition. These
illustrations will cover different types of work, from the most
elementary to the most complicated.
If the above reasoning is correct, it follows that the most important
object of both the workmen and the management should be the training and
development of each individual in the establishment, so that he can do
(at his fastest pace and with the maximum of efficiency) the highest
class of work for which his natural abilities fit him.
These principles appear to be so self-evident that many men may think it
almost childish to state them. Let us, however, turn to the facts, as
they actually exist in this country and in England. The English and
American peoples are the greatest sportsmen in the world. Whenever an
American workman plays baseball, or an English workman plays cricket, it
is safe to say that he strains every nerve to secure victory for his
side. He does his very best to make the largest possible number of runs.
The universal sentiment is so strong that any man who fails to give out
all there is in him in sport is branded as a "quitter," and treated with
contempt by those who are around him.
When the same workman returns to work on the following day, instead of
using every effort to turn out the largest possible amount of work, in a
majority of the cases this man deliberately plans to do as little as he
safely can to turn out far less work than he is well able to do in many
instances to do not more than one-third to one-half of a proper day's
work. And in fact if he were to do his best to turn out his largest
possible day's work, he would be abused by his fellow-workers for so
doing, even more than if he had proved himself a "quitter" in sport.
Under working, that is, deliberately working slowly so as to avoid doing
a full day's work, "soldiering," as it is called in this country,
"hanging it out," as it is called in England, "ca canae," as it is
called in Scotland, is almost universal in industrial establishments,
and prevails also to a large extent in the building trades; and the
writer asserts without fear of contradiction that this constitutes the
greatest evil with which the working-people of both England and America
are now afflicted.
It will be shown later in this paper that doing away with slow working
and "soldiering" in all its forms and so arranging the relations between
employer and employs that each workman will work to his very best
advantage and at his best speed, accompanied by the intimate cooperation
with the management and the help (which the workman should receive) from
the management, would result on the average in nearly doubling the
output of each man and each machine. What other reforms, among those
which are being discussed by these two nations, could do as much toward
promoting prosperity, toward the diminution of poverty, and the
alleviation of suffering? America and England have been recently
agitated over such subjects as the tariff, the control of the large
corporations on the one hand, and of hereditary power on the other hand,
and over various more or less socialistic proposals for taxation, etc.
On these subjects both peoples have been profoundly stirred, and yet
hardly a voice has been raised to call attention to this vastly greater
and more important subject of "soldiering," which directly and
powerfully affects the wages, the prosperity, and the life of almost
every working-man, and also quite as much the prosperity of every
industrial, establishment in the nation.
The elimination of "soldiering" and of the several causes of slow
working would so lower the cost of production that both our home and
foreign markets would be greatly enlarged, and we could compete on more
than even terms with our rivals. It would remove one of the fundamental
causes for dull times, for lack of employment, and for poverty, and
therefore would have a more permanent and far-reaching effect upon these
misfortunes than any of the curative remedies that are now being used to
soften their consequences. It would insure higher wages and make shorter
working hours and better working and home conditions possible.
Why is it, then, in the face of the self-evident fact that maximum
prosperity can exist only as the result of the determined effort of each
workman to turn out each day his largest possible day's work, that the
great majority of our men are deliberately doing just the opposite, and
that even when the men have the best of intentions their work is in most
cases far from efficient?
There are three causes for this condition, which may be briefly
summarized as:
First. The fallacy, which has from time immemorial been almost universal
among workmen, that a material increase in the output of each man or
each machine in the trade would result in the end in throwing a large
number of men out of work.
Second. The defective systems of management which are in common use, and
which make it necessary for each workman to soldier, or work slowly, in
order that he may protect his own best interests.
Third. The inefficient rule-of-thumb methods, which are still almost
universal in all trades, and in practicing which our workmen waste a
large part of their effort.
This paper will attempt to show the enormous gains which would result
from the substitution by our workmen of scientific for rule-of-thumb
methods.
To explain a little more fully these three causes:
First. The great majority of workmen still believe that if they were to
work at their best speed they would be doing a great injustice to the
whole trade by throwing a lot of men out of work, and yet the history of
the development of each trade shows that each improvement, whether it be
the invention of a new machine or the introduction of a better method,
which results in increasing the productive capacity of the men in the
trade and cheapening the costs, instead of throwing men out of work make
in the end work for more men.
The cheapening of any article in common use almost immediately results
in a largely increased demand for that article. Take the case of shoes,
for instance. The introduction of machinery for doing every element of
the work which was formerly done by hand has resulted in making shoes at
a fraction of their former labor cost, and in selling them so cheap that
now almost every man, woman, and child in the working-classes buys one
or two pairs of shoes per year, and wears shoes all the time, whereas
formerly each workman bought perhaps one pair of shoes every five years,
and went barefoot most of the time, wearing shoes only as a luxury or as
a matter of the sternest necessity. In spite of the enormously increased
output of shoes per workman, which has come with shoe machinery, the
demand for shoes has so increased that there are relatively more men
working in the shoe industry now than ever before.
The workmen in almost every trade have before them an object lesson of
this kind, and yet, because they are ignorant of the history of their
own trade even, they still firmly believe, as their fathers did before
them, that it is against their best interests for each man to turn out
each day as much work as possible.
Under this fallacious idea a large proportion of the workmen of both
countries each day deliberately work slowly so as to curtail the output.
Almost every labor union has made, or is contemplating making, rules
which have for their object curtailing the output of their members,
and those men who have the greatest influence with the working-people,
the labor leaders as well as many people with philanthropic feelings who
are helping them, are daily spreading this fallacy and at the same time
telling them that they are overworked.
A great deal has been and is being constantly said about "sweat-shop"
work and conditions. The writer has great sympathy with those who are
overworked, but on the whole a greater sympathy for those who are under
paid. For every individual, however, who is overworked, there are a
hundred who intentionally under work--greatly under work--every day of
their lives, and who for this reason deliberately aid in establishing
those conditions which in the end inevitably result in low wages. And
yet hardly a single voice is being raised in an endeavor to correct this
evil.
As engineers and managers, we are more intimately acquainted with these
facts than any other class in the community, and are therefore best
fitted to lead in a movement to combat this fallacious idea by educating
not only the workmen but the whole of the country as to the true facts.
And yet we are practically doing nothing in this direction, and are
leaving this field entirely in the hands of the labor agitators (many of
whom are misinformed and misguided), and of sentimentalists who are
ignorant as to actual working conditions.
Second. As to the second cause for soldiering--the relations which exist
between employers and employees under almost all of the systems of
management which are in common use--it is impossible in a few words to
make it clear to one not familiar with this problem why it is that the
ignorance of employers as to the proper time in which work of various
kinds should be done makes it for the interest of the workman to
"soldier."
The writer therefore quotes herewith from a paper read before The
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, in June, 1903, entitled "Shop
Management," which it is hoped will explain fully this cause for
soldiering:
"This loafing or soldiering proceeds from two causes. First, from the
natural instinct and tendency of men to take it easy, which may be
called natural soldiering. Second, from more intricate second thought
and reasoning caused by their relations with other men, which may be
called systematic soldiering."
"There is no question that the tendency of the average man (in all walks
of life) is toward working at a slow, easy gait, and that it is only
after a good deal of thought and observation on his part or as a result
of example, conscience, or external pressure that he takes a more rapid
pace."
"There are, of course, men of unusual energy, vitality, and ambition who
naturally choose the fastest gait, who set up their own standards, and
who work hard, even though it may be against their best interests. But
these few uncommon men only serve by forming a contrast to emphasize the
tendency of the average."
"This common tendency to 'take it easy' is greatly increased by bringing
a number of men together on similar work and at a uniform standard rate
of pay by the day."
"Under this plan the better men gradually but surely slow down their
gait to that of the poorest and least efficient. When a naturally
energetic man works for a few days beside a lazy one, the logic of the
situation is unanswerable."
"Why should I work hard when that lazy fellow gets the same pay that I
do and does only half as much work?"
"A careful time study of men working under these conditions will
disclose facts which are ludicrous as well as pitiable."
"To illustrate: The writer has timed a naturally energetic workman who,
while going and coming from work, would walk at a speed of from three to
four miles per hour, and not infrequently trot home after a day's work.
On arriving at his work he would immediately slow down to a speed of
about one mile an hour. When, for example, wheeling a loaded
wheelbarrow, he would go at a good fast pace even up hill in order to be
as short a time as possible under load, and immediately on the return
walk slow down to a mile an hour, improving every opportunity for delay
short of actually sitting down. In order to be sure not to do more than
his lazy neighbor, he would actually tire himself in his effort to go
slow."
"These men were working under a foreman of good reputation and highly
thought of by his employer, who, when his attention was called to this
state of things, answered: 'Well, I can keep them from sitting down, but
the devil can't make them get a move on while they are at work.'"
"The natural laziness of men is serious, but by far the greatest evil
from which both workmen and employers are suffering is the systematic
soldiering which is almost universal under all of the ordinary schemes
of management and which results from a careful study on the part of the
workmen of what will promote their best interests."
"The writer was much interested recently in hearing one small but
experienced golf caddy boy of twelve explaining to a green caddy, who
had shown special energy and interest, the necessity of going slow and
lagging behind his man when he came up to the ball, showing him that
since they were paid by the hour, the faster they went the less money
they got, and finally telling him that if he went too fast the other
boys would give him a licking."
"This represents a type of systematic soldiering which is not, however,
very serious, since it is done with the knowledge of the employer, who
can quite easily break it up if he wishes."
"The greater part of the systematic soldiering, however, is done by the
men with the deliberate object of keeping their employers ignorant of
how fast work can be done."
"So universal is soldiering for this purpose that hardly a competent
workman can be found in a large establishment, whether he works by the
day or on piece work, contract work, or under any of the ordinary
systems, who does not devote a considerable part of his time to studying
just how slow he can work and still convince his employer that he is
going at a good pace."
"The causes for this are, briefly, that practically all employers
determine upon a maximum sum which they feel it is right for each of
their classes of employees to earn per day, whether their men work by
the day or piece."
"Each workman soon finds out about what this figure is for his
particular case, and he also realizes that when his employer is
convinced that a man is capable of doing more work than he has done, he
will find sooner or later some way of compelling him to do it with
little or no increase of pay."
"Employers derive their knowledge of how much of a given class of work
can be done in a day from either their own experience, which has
frequently grown hazy with age, from casual and unsystematic observation
of their men, or at best from records which are kept, showing the
quickest time in which each job has been done. In many cases the
employer will feel almost certain that a given job can be done faster
than it has been, but he rarely cares to take the drastic measures
necessary to force men to do it in the quickest time, unless he has an
actual record proving conclusively how fast the work can be done."
"It evidently becomes for each man's interest, then, to see that no job
is done faster than it has been in the past. The younger and less
experienced men are taught this by their elders, and all possible
persuasion and social pressure is brought to bear upon the greedy and
selfish men to keep them from making new records which result in
temporarily increasing their wages, while all those who come after them
are made to work harder for the same old pay."
"Under the best day work of the ordinary type, when accurate records are
kept of the amount of work done by each man and of his efficiency, and
when each man's wages are raised as he improves, and those who fail to
rise to a certain standard are discharged and a fresh supply of
carefully selected men are given work in their places, both the natural
loafing and systematic soldiering can be largely broken up. This can
only be done, however, when the men are thoroughly convinced that there
is no intention of establishing piece work even in the remote future,
and it is next to impossible to make men believe this when the work is
of such a nature that they believe piece work to be practicable. In most
cases their fear of making a record which will be used as a basis for
piece work will cause them to soldier as much as they dare."
"It is, however, under piece work that the art of systematic soldiering
is thoroughly developed; after a workman has had the price per piece of
the work he is doing lowered two or three times as a result of his
having worked harder and increased his output, he is likely entirely to
lose sight of his employer's side of the case and become imbued with a
grim determination to have no more cuts if soldiering can prevent it.
Unfortunately for the character of the workman, soldiering involves a
deliberate attempt to mislead and deceive his employer, and thus upright
and straightforward workmen are compelled to become more or less
hypocritical. The employer is soon looked upon as an antagonist, if not
an enemy, and the mutual confidence which should exist between a leader
and his men, the enthusiasm, the feeling that they are all working for
the same end and will share in the results is entirely lacking.
"The feeling of antagonism under the ordinary piece-work system becomes
in many cases so marked on the part of the men that any proposition made
by their employers, however reasonable, is looked upon with suspicion,
and soldiering becomes such a fixed habit that men will frequently take
pains to restrict the product of machines which they are running when
even a large increase in output would involve no more work on their
part."
Third. As to the third cause for slow work, considerable space will
later in this paper be devoted to illustrating the great gain, both to
employers and employees, which results from the substitution of
scientific for rule-of-thumb methods in even the smallest details of the
work of every trade. The enormous saving of time and therefore increase
in the output which it is possible to effect through eliminating
unnecessary motions and substituting fast for slow and inefficient
motions for the men working in any of our trades can be fully realized
only after one has personally seen the improvement which results from a
thorough motion and time study, made by a competent man.
To explain briefly: owing to the fact that the workmen in all of our
trades have been taught the details of their work by observation of
those immediately around them, there are many different ways in common
use for doing the same thing, perhaps forty, fifty, or a hundred ways of
doing each act in each trade, and for the same reason there is a great
variety in the implements used for each class of work. Now, among the
various methods and implements used in each element of each trade there
is always one method and one implement which is quicker and better than
any of the rest.
And this one best method and best implement can only be discovered or
developed through a scientific study and analysis of all of the methods
and implements in use, together with accurate, minute, motion and time
study. This involves the gradual substitution of science for rule of
thumb throughout the mechanic arts.
This paper will show that the underlying philosophy of all of the old
systems of management in common use makes it imperative that each
workman shall be left with the final responsibility for doing his job
practically as he thinks best, with comparatively little help and advice
from the management. And it will also show that because of this
isolation of workmen, it is in most cases impossible for the men working
under these systems to do their work in accordance with the rules and
laws of a science or art, even where one exists.
The writer asserts as a general principle (and he proposes to give
illustrations tending to prove the fact later in this paper) that in
almost all of the mechanic arts the science which underlies each act of
each workman is so great and amounts to so much that the workman who is
best suited to actually doing the work is incapable of fully
understanding this science, without the guidance and help of those who
are working with him or over him, either through lack of education or
through insufficient mental capacity. In order that the work may be done
in accordance with scientific laws, it is necessary that there shall be
a far more equal division of the responsibility between the management
and the workmen than exists under any of the ordinary types of
management. Those in the management whose duty it is to develop this
science should also guide and help the workman in working under it, and
should assume a much larger share of the responsibility for results than
under usual conditions is assumed by the management.
The body of this paper will make it clear that, to work according to
scientific laws, the management must take over and perform much of the
work which is now left to the men; almost every act of the workman
should be preceded by one or more preparatory acts of the management
which enable him to do his work better and quicker than he otherwise
could. And each man should daily be taught by and receive the most
friendly help from those who are over him, instead of being, at the one
extreme, driven or coerced by his bosses, and at the other left to his
own unaided devices.
This close, intimate, personal cooperation between the management and
the men is of the essence of modern scientific or task management.
It will be shown by a series of practical illustrations that, through
this friendly cooperation, namely, through sharing equally in every
day's burden, all of the great obstacles (above described) to obtaining
the maximum output for each man and each machine in the establishment
are swept away. The 30 per cent to 100 per cent increase in wages which
the workmen are able to earn beyond what they receive under the old type
of management, coupled with the daily intimate shoulder to shoulder
contact with the management, entirely removes all cause for soldiering.
And in a few years, under this system, the workmen have before them the
object lesson of seeing that a great increase in the output per man
results in giving employment to more men, instead of throwing men out of
work, thus completely eradicating the fallacy that a larger output for
each man will throw other men out of work.
It is the writer's judgment, then, that while much can be done and
should be done by writing and talking toward educating not only workmen,
but all classes in the community, as to the importance of obtaining the
maximum output of each man and each machine, it is only through the
adoption of modern scientific management that this great problem can be
finally solved. Probably most of the readers of this paper will say that
all of this is mere theory. On the contrary, the theory, or philosophy,
of scientific management is just beginning to be understood, whereas the
management itself has been a gradual evolution, extending over a period
of nearly thirty years. And during this time the employees of one
company after another, including a large range and diversity of
industries, have gradually changed from the ordinary to the scientific
type of management. At least 50,000 workmen in the United States are now
employed under this system; and they are receiving from 30 per cent to
100 per cent higher wages daily than are paid to men of similar caliber
with whom they are surrounded, while the companies employing them are
more prosperous than ever before. In these companies the output, per man
and per machine, has on an average been doubled. During all these years
there has never been a single strike among the men working under this
system. In place of the suspicious watchfulness and the more or less
open warfare which characterizes the ordinary types of management, there
is universally friendly cooperation between the management and the men.
Several papers have been written, describing the expedients which have
been adopted and the details which have been developed under scientific
management and the steps to be taken in changing from the ordinary to
the scientific type. But unfortunately most of the readers of these
papers have mistaken the mechanism for the true essence. Scientific
management fundamentally consists of certain broad general principles, a
certain philosophy, which can be applied in many ways, and a description
of what any one man or men may believe to be the best mechanism for
applying these general principles should in no way be confused with the
principles themselves.
It is not here claimed that any single panacea exists for all of the
troubles of the working-people or of employers. As long as some people
are born lazy or inefficient, and others are born greedy and brutal, as
long as vice and crime are with us, just so long will a certain amount
of poverty, misery, and unhappiness be with us Also. No system of
management, no single expedient--within the control of any man or any
set of men can insure continuous prosperity to either workmen or
employers. Prosperity depends upon so many factors entirely beyond the
control of any one set of men, any state, or even any one country, that
certain periods will inevitably come when both sides must suffer, more
or less. It is claimed, however, that under scientific management the
intermediate periods will be far more prosperous, far happier, and more
free from discord and dissension. And also, that the periods will be
fewer, shorter and the suffering less. And this will be particularly
true in any one town, any one section of the country, or any one state
which first substitutes the principles of scientific management for the
rule of thumb.
That these principles are certain to come into general use practically
throughout the civilized world, sooner or later, the writer is
profoundly convinced, and the sooner they come the better for all the
people.