Freedom has been hunted through the world, and is ever exposed to Insult
and injury. It is crushed by conquest; frowned from courts; expelled
from colleges; scorned out of society; flogged in schools; and
anathematised in churches. Mind is her last asylum; and if freedom quail
there, what becomes of the hope of the world, or the worth of human
nature?--W. J. Fox's Lectures to the Working Classes, part 12, p. 65.
We should be prepared to dare all things for truth. If the 'very hopes
of man, the thoughts of his heart, the religion of nations, the manners
and morals of mankind, are all at the mercy of a new generalisation,'
we should be prepared to risk them. If we must choose between truth
and repose, we ought not to hesitate. There is danger in having the
truth--philosophers are obliged to conceal it. Mankind vaunt their love
of truth, but they are not to be trusted. From interest or ignorance
they always persecute, and often kill, the discoverer. Still the
pursuit of truth is a _duty_, and we must find consolation in the heroic
reflection of Burke, that _in all exertions of duty there it something
to be hazarded_. But intellectual daring will never be common while it
is so generally believed to be criminal. We will, therefore, quote some
considerations touching the rightfulness of inquiry.
Without inquiry it is impossible for us to know whether our opinions
are true or false, and various are the pretences employed for declining
investigation: frequently they are masked under vague and metaphorical
phrases: "inquiry implies the weighing of evidence, and might lead to
doubt and perplexity"--"to search into a subject might shake the settled
convictions of the understanding"--to examine opposite arguments, and
contradictory opinions, might contaminate the mind with false views.
'Every one who alleges pretexts like these for declining inquiry, must
obviously begin by assuming that his own opinions are unerringly in the
right. Nothing could justify a man for declining the investigation of
a subject involving important opinions, but the possession of
an understanding free from liability of error. Not gifted with
infallibility, in what way, except by diligent inquiry, can he obtain
any assurance that he is not pursuing a course of injurious action? If
he holds any opinion, he must have acquired it either by examination,
by instillation, rote, or some other process. On the supposition that
he has acquired it by proper examination, the duty on which I am now
insisting has been discharged, and the matter is at an end--but if he
has acquired it in any other manner, the mere plea, that his mind might
become unsettled, can be no argument against the duty of investigation.
For anything he can allege to the contrary, his present opinions are
wrong--and, in that case, the disturbance of his blind convictions,
instead of being an evil, is an essential step towards arriving at the
truth.
'It may possibly be assigned, as a further reason for his declining
inquiry, that he may come to some fallacy which he cannot surmount,
although convinced of its character. If he is convinced of its
character, he must either have grounds for that conviction or not.
If he has grounds, let him examine them, draw them out, try if they are
valid, and then the fallacy will stand exposed. If he has no grounds for
suspecting a fallacy, what an irrational conclusion he confesses himself
to have arrived at! But perhaps he will reply--he may be unable to solve
the difficulty; his mind may become perplexed, and the issue may prove,
after all, that it would have been much better had he remained in his
former strong, though unenlightened, conviction. Why better? If he is in
perplexity let him read, think, consult the learned and the wise, and
in the end he will probably reach a definite opinion on one side or the
other. But if he should still remain in doubt, where is the harm? or
rather, why is it not to be considered a good? The subject is evidently
one which admits strong probabilities on opposite sides. Doubt is
therefore the proper sentiment for the occasion--it is the result of
the best exercise of the faculties--and either positively to believe,
or positively to disbelieve, would imply an erroneous appreciation of
evidence.
In the minds of some people a strong prejudice appears to exist
against that state of the understanding which is termed doubt. A little
reflection, however, will convince any one that on certain subjects
"doubt" is as appropriate a state of the reasoning faculties as belief
or disbelief on others. There are doctrines, propositions, facts,
supported and opposed by every degree of evidence, and amongst them
by that degree of evidence of which the proper effect is to leave the
understanding in an equipoise between two conclusions. In these cages
"doubt" is the appropriate result, which there can be no reason to
shrink from or lament. But it may be further urged, that inquiry might
contaminate the understanding with false views--and, therefore, It is
wise and laudable to abstain from it.
'We can comprehend what is meant by contaminating a man's habits or
disposition, or even imagination. But there is no analogy on these
points in reference to the understanding. There is contamination,
there is evil, in preposterous and obscene images crowding before the
intellectual vision, notwithstanding a full and distinct perception of
their character--but there is no contamination, no evil, in a thousand
false arguments coming before the understanding, if their quality is
clearly discerned. The only possible evil in this case is mistaking
false for true--but the man who shrinks from investigation lest he
should mistake false for true, can have no reason for supposing himself
free from that delusion in his actual opinions. Besides these objections
to inquiry, there are other prejudices of a similar character, forming
serious impediments to the attainment of truth.
'One of these is a _fear that we may search too far, and become
chargeable with presumption in prying into things we ought not to know_.
A few words will suffice to prove that nothing can be more irrational
and absurd. We have already shown that true opinions are conducive to
the welfare of mankind--and the prosecution of inquiry is therefore a
process from which we have everything to hope and nothing to fear, and
to which there are no limits but such as the nature of our own faculties
pre scribes.
'A second prejudice--that _we may contract guilt, if, in the course of
our researches, we miss the right conclusion, and had therefore better
let inquiry alone_--is still more influential in preventing those
investigations which it is our duty to make. As our opinions on any
subject are not voluntary acts, but involuntary effects, in whatever
conclusions our researches terminate they can involve us in no
culpability. All that we have to take care of is, to bestow on every
subject an adequate and impartial attention. Having done this, we have
discharged our duty; and it would be irrational and unmanly to entertain
any apprehension for the result.
'In fact, there is the grossest inconsistency in the prejudice now under
consideration. If we may contract guilt by searching after truth, wo may
equally do so by remaining in our present state The reason alleged in
the prejudice itself, and the only reason which can be assigned with any
plausibility, why we may commit an offence by embarking in any inquiry,
is that we may, by so doing, miss the right conclusion, or, in other
words, fall into error--for no one would seriously contend that we
incur any moral culpability by an investigation which conducts us to the
truth. But it is obvious that we may equally miss the right conclusion
by remaining in our actual opinions. It is, then, incumbent on us to
ascertain whether we are committing an offence by remaining in them--in
other words, it is necessary to examine whether those opinions are true.
Thus the reasons assigned for not inquiring, lead to the conclusion that
it is necessary to inquire.
'The third prejudice is that acquiescence in received opinions, or
forbearing to think for ourselves, shows a degree of humility highly
proper and commendable--if closely examined will be found usually
to evince nothing but a great degree of indolent presumption, or
intellectual cowardice. There is often, in truth, as great a measure of
presumption in this species of acquiescence as in the boldest hypothesis
which human invention can start. That received and established opinions
are true, is one of those sweeping conclusions which would require
very strong reasons, and often elaborate research, to justify. On
what grounds are they considered to be true by one who declines
investigation? Because (on the most favourable supposition) they have
been handed down to us by our predecessors, and have been held
with unhesitating faith by a multitude of illustrious men. But what
comprehensive reasons are these? What investigation would it require to
shew that they were valid? As the whole history of mankind teems with
instances of the transmission of the grossest errors from one generation
to another, and of their having been countenanced by the concurrence of
the most eminent of our race--how, without examination, can we show that
this particular instance is an exception from the general lot?
'From the necessity of using our own judgment, or, in other words, of
arriving at a conclusion for ourselves, we cannot be absolved. Far from
being a virtue, blind acquiescence in the opinions of others is, in most
cases, a positive vice, tending to stop all advancement in knowledge,
and all improvement in practice.
From the preceding it is evident that the inquirer may enter on his task
with full confidence that he is embarking in no criminal, or forbidden,
or presumptuous enterprise, but is, on the contrary, engaging in
the discharge of a duty. Let him be as circumspect as he pleases in
collecting his facts and deducing his conclusions, cautious in the
process, but fearless in the result. Let him be fully aware of his
liability to error, of the thousand sources of illusions, of the limited
powers of the individual, of the paramount importance of truth--but let
him dismiss all apprehensions of the issue of an investigation conducted
with due application of mind and rectitude of purpose.'*
* Extracts of Summary, by Aliquis. of arguments on the Duty
of Inquiry, from the 'Pursuit of Truth, and other Essays, by
S. Bailey, in Reasoner No. 12.
Marcus Antoninus, indeed, said 'I seek after truth, by which no man yet
was ever injured.' But there is a great practical mistake here. There is
danger in truth---and the admission should be plainly made. Men, where
forewarned, make the choice more manfully. We have been wisely told by
Emerson, that the cherished thoughts and institutions of mankind are
at the mercy of a new generalisation--rest, commodity, reputation.
Inconvenience, and suspense, are the consequences of the partizanship
of truth. Certain political truths annihilate the interests of whole
classes. Certain social truths war with life-cherished prejudices.
Certain sanitary truths reduce the value of all city property. Certain
scientific truths ruin the working classes by thousands. In a wiser
state of society this could be prevented, but our present business is
with what is. It is therefore idle to conceal the truth--that there is
danger in truth. Pope's dictum, that party is the madness of many for
the gain of a few, is inversely true of truth. Truth is the ultimate
benefit of many, but the immediate ruin of the few. Here, however, comes
to our aid the wise and far-seeing aphorism of Burke--'In all exertions
of duty there is something to be hazarded'--and the brave man and wise
friend of mankind will risk the fate which surely awaits him--the fate
of Galileo, Newton, Salomon de Caus, Volta, Fulton, Winser, Arkwright,
Gall, and all who present themselves, with truth in their hands, at the
door of this great bedlam called the world--the fate of being received
with stones and hisses.