CHAPTER III. LOGICAL TRUTH

All men know something of truth. Happily it is the first impulse of

childhood, and nature teaches us its pleasure before reason instructs us

in its truth. In infancy we own its beauty, in manhood its power. There

is nothing, says Cicero, sweeter to man than the light of truth. Truth,

observes Godwin, is the native element of an intellectual nature. It

has been wisely remarked, said Lord Kames, that truth is to the

understanding what beauty is to the eye, or music to the ear.

Philosophy sanctions what unsophisticated feelings suggested. He that

has made but a little progress beyond ignorance and privilege, cannot be

edified by anything but truth.** Truth, like a mathematical point, has

had various descriptions; and it may be useful to select those which

graduate to its logical definition. Bulwer tells us, that 'the agitation

of thought is the beginning of truth.' Locke, Lord Kames, Mill, and

others, agree that truth, or falsehood, is an affair of language. An

assertion which represents things as they really are, is a truth--an

assertion that represents things what in reality they are _not_, is a

falsehood.

** Mr. Hobhouse: Note 15. to 4th Canto of Childe Harold.

Truth, in sculpture, means an exact similitude of some living form,

chiselled in stone or marble. Truth, in painting, is a natural

representation on canvass of some person, or object. In the same

manner, moral 'truth is an exact image of things set forth in speech,

or writing.' The logical definition of truth is given in these

words:--'Truth is that which admits of proof,'* that is, an assertion or

denial which can be substantiated by facts.

* Chambers' Information.

A fact is commonly called a truth, but this practice leads to great

confusion in reasoning. A fact is only an element in truth, A logical

truth is a proposition supported by facts. Facts compose the premises

of an argument--a truth is the inference from the facts. Unless this

distinction is observed, recourse must be had to the expedient of

calling a fact a particular truth, and an induction from facts a general

truth. Or we must adopt this distinction, that a moral truth, that is,

the truth of parlance, is the coincidence of language with reality; and

a logical truth, a proposition which admits of demonstration.

A lady, who has given intellectual laws to many whom I address, has

said--'A truth I consider to be an ascertained fact, which truth would

be changed into an error the moment the fact on which it rested was

disproved.' But that which can be disproved cannot be an '_ascertained_

fact.' Allowing, however, the relevancy of this definition of a truth,

it would, in a treatise on logic, be considered as a definition only

of a particular truth. Many such truths are required to make a logical

truth.

A Logic of Facts; Or, Every-day Reasoning · 第 3 / 16 章