How advanced the past; how primitive the future

No matter how intense the desire to maintain a neutral discourse

and to report facts without attaching teleological conclusions

to them, it turns out that the language of family, probably more

than the language of science, machines, or even art, religion,

sports, and nourishment, involves our very existence. Where

should somebody place himself in order to maintain some degree

of objectivity? Probably at the level of the structural

analysis. Here, everything affecting the status of family and the

condition of morality appears as a network of changing

interrelations among people involved in the practical

experiences of defining what a human being is. It seems, at

times, that we relive experiences of the primitive past: the

child knew only his or her mother; women started giving birth at

an early age (almost right after menarche); children were on

their own as soon as they could minimally take care of

themselves. But we also build an ideal image of the family based

on recollections of the less distant past: permanent marriages

("until death"), respect for parents, mother cooking meals for

which the whole family sits down, father bringing wood for the

family hearth, children learning by participating, assuming

responsibilities as their maturity permitted. This idealized

image is also the bearer of prejudices: women's subservient

role, the authoritarian model passed from one generation to

another, frustration, unfulfilled talents.

So the paradox we experience is that of a primitive future: more

animality (or, if you want a milder term, naturalness) in

comparison to a civilized (or at least idealized) past. There is

no cause for worry, especially in view of the realization that

despite our success in labeling the world (for scientific and

non-scientific purposes), the majority of human behavior is

determined (as already pointed out) independent of labels. Taking

into account that the notion of permanency is related to

relatively stable frames of reference makes it easier to explain

why the high mobility of our age results in changes, both

physical and psychological, that undermine previous

expectations. Losing the discipline of the natural cycle that

affected human work for centuries, human beings freed themselves

from a condition of subservience, while at the same time

generating new constraints reflected in the nature of their

reciprocal relations. What does it mean to become used to

something-environment, family, acquaintances-when this

something is changing fast, and with it, we ourselves?

The Industrial Revolution brought about the experience of

labor-saving machinery, but also of many new dependencies. In

Henri Steele Commanger's words, "Every time-saving machine

required another to fill the time that had been saved." One

might not agree with this description. But it would be hard to

contradict its spirit by taking only a cursory look at all the

contraptions of illiteracy filling the inventory of the modern

household: radio, photo camera, TV set, video recorder, video

cassette player, WalkmanT, CD player, electronic and digital

games, laser disc player, CD-ROM, telephone, computer, modem.

The one-directional communication supported by some of these

machines affected patterns of interaction and resulted in

audiences, but not necessarily in families, at least not in the

sense acknowledged in practical experiences of family life. With

the two-directional communication, supported by digital networks,

human interaction takes on a new dimension. Choices increase. So

do risks.

Once the substance of one's experience is substituted by

mediations, even the rationale for communication changes, never

mind the form. Families separated by virtue of assignments

(war, business) at remote locations, or in pursuit of various

interests (sport, entertainment, tourism), exchange videotapes

instead of writing to each other, or focus on telephone

conversations meant to signal a point of reference, but not a

shared universe of existence and concerns. They discover e-mail

and rationalize messages to a minimum. Or they become a Web

page, available to whoever will surf by. All these

changes-probably more can be acknowledged-took place concomitant

with changes in our expectations and accepted values. With the

increased gamut of choice, attachment to value decreases. When

all emotions come from soap operas, and all identity from the

latest fashion trend, it becomes difficult to defend notions such

as sensitivity and personality. When love is as short as the

random encounter, and faith as convincing as reading a person's

palm or tarot cards, it is impossible to ascertain a notion of

reciprocal responsibility or the moral expectation of

faithfulness. On the other hand, when the need to achieve levels

of efficiency dictated by a scale of humankind never experienced

before and by expectations and desires in continuous expansion is

as critical as we make it, something is given up-or, to put it

the other way around, somebody has to pay for it. With the sense

of globality-of resources, actions, plans- comes the pressure of

integration of everybody into the global market, and the

expectations of consumption attached to it. Many-to-many

communication is not just a matter of bandwidth on digital

networks, but of self-definition, also.

The family used to reflect the perceived infinity of the universe

of existence., despite the family's finite and determined

internal structure. With the awareness of limited resources, in

particular those of the natural support system, comes the

realization that alternative practical experiences of life and

cooperation become necessary in order to generate new pragmatic

frameworks for increased efficiency and enhanced dynamism. The

indefinite expansion of what people want and the progressive

incorporation of higher numbers of human beings into the market

through which affluence, as much as misery, can be achieved,

results in the devaluation of life, love, of values such as

self-sacrifice, faithfulness, fairness. The moral literate

philosophers of the 19th century-Ralph Waldo Emerson, Thomas

Carlyle, William James-thought that the answer lay in our

recognition that the world is not only for enjoyment. One can

imagine a TV debate (interrupted by commercials, of course)

between them and the romantic proponents of the ideology of

progress-John Maynard Keynes, Adam Smith, David Hume. It's safe

to wager that the audience would zap over their literate debate,

while they would enjoy the illiterate 30-second spots. None of

the philosophers would establish a Web site, as none would be

terribly excited about the discussion forums on the Internet-not

a place for intellectual debate. Who would read their elegant

prose? To say more at this point would almost preempt the

argument: The family in the civilization of illiteracy

ascertains new forms of human interaction. It departs from the

expectation of conformity for a model that acknowledges many ways

to live together and, even more important, how we transcend our

own nature in this process. We might, after all, be much more

than we know, or trust that we could become.

The Civilization of Illiteracy · 第 105 / 217 题