The logics of actions

Between the relatively monolithic and uniform ideal of a literate

society convinced of the virtues of logic, and the pluralistic

and heterogeneous reality of partial literacies that transfer

logic to machines, one can easily distinguish a change in

direction. Persons with a rather adequate literate culture,

educated in the spirit of rationality guarded by classic or

formal logic, are at a loss when facing the sub-literacies of

specialized practical endeavors, or the illogical inferences made

within new fields of human self-constitution. Let us put their

attitude in some perspective. At various stages in human

evolution-for instance, transition from scavenging to hunting, or

from hunting and foraging to herding and agriculture-people

experienced the effects of the erosion of some behavioral codes

and projected their new condition in new practical patterns. One

type of cohesion represented in the declining behavioral code was

replaced by another; one logic, deferring the code, was followed

by others. When interaction among groups of different types of

cohesion occurred, logic was severely challenged. Sometimes, as

a result, one logic dominated; other times, compromise was

established. Primitive stages are remarkably adaptive to the

environment.

Our stage, remote in many ways from the wellspring (Ursprung),

consists of an appropriated environment within which the effort

is to provide a pragmatic framework for high efficiency. Logic,

rhetoric, heuristics, and dialectics interact inside this

framework. In other words, human evolution goes from sensorial

anchoring in the natural world to an artificial (human crafted)

world superimposed on the concrete reality-and eventually

extended into artificial life, one from among the most recently

established fields of scientific inquiry. Within this world,

humans no longer restrict the projection of their natural and

intellectual condition through one (or very few) comprehensive

sign systems. Quite to the contrary, the effort is towards

segmentation, with the aim of reaching not global cohesion, but

local cohesiveness, corresponding to local optima. The

complexity and the nature of the changes within this system

result in the need for a strategy of segmentation, and a logic,

or several, supporting it. In the interaction between a language

and the humans constituted in it, as the embodiment of their

biological characteristics and of their experience, logical

conflicts are not excluded. After all, the logic of actions,

influenced by heuristics as well, and the logic inherent to

literacy are not identical.

Actions bring to mind agents of action and thus the logic

integrated in tools and artifacts. The assumption that the same

logic housed in language is involved in the expression leading

to the making of tools and other objects related to people's

activity went unchallenged for a long time. Even today,

designers and engineers are educated according to an ideal of

literacy that is expected to reflect in their work the

rationality exemplified in the literate use of language.

Complementing most of the development of humankind's language,

drawings have expressed ideas about how to make things and how

to perform some operations that are part of our continuous

experience of self- constitution in practical activity. Each

drawing embodies the logic of the future artifact, no matter how

useful or even how ephemeral. There is a large record of literate

work from which logical aspects of thinking can be derived.

There is a rather small record of drawing, and not too many

surviving artifacts. They were conceived for precise practical

experiences and usually did not outlast the experience, or the

person who embodied it. Roads, houses, tools, and other objects

indeed survived, but it is not until better tools for drawing

itself and better paper became available that a library of

engineering was established.

As a hybrid between art and science, engineering accepts the

logic of scientific discovery only in order to balance it

against the logic of aesthetic expectations. In the pragmatic

framework of the civilization of illiteracy, engineering

definitely has a dominant position in respect to the

self-constitution of the human being in language- based practical

experiences. This is due to the impact it has on the efficiency

of human practical experiences and on their almost endless

diversification.

There is a phase of conflict, a phase of accommodation, and a

phase of complementarity when some means (such as language and

the means for visualization used by designers and engineers)

replace others, if they do not render them useless. In our time

of experiences involving many more people than ever, of

distributive transactions, of heterogeneity, and of interactions

that go beyond the linearity of the sequence, the structural

characteristics of literacy interfere with the new dynamics of

human development as this is supported by very powerful

technologies embodying a variety of logical possibilities. At

this time, the implicit logic of literacy and the new logics (in

the plural) collide in the pragmatic framework.

Within the logic of the literate discourse, followed volens

nolens in this book, it should be clear that the attempt to

salvage literacy is the attempt to maintain linear relations,

determinism, hierarchy (of values), centralization-which fostered

literacy-in a framework requiring non-linearity,

decentralization, distributed modes of practical experiences,

and unstable value (among others). The two frameworks are

logically incompatible. This does not mean that literacy has to

be discarded altogether, or that it will disappear, as cuneiform

notation and pictographic writing did, or that it will be

replaced by drawing or by computer-based language processing. The

linear will definitely satisfy a vast number of practical

activities; so will deterministic explanations and centralism

(political, religious, technological, etc.), and even an elitist

sense of value. But instead of being a universal standard, or

even a goal (to linearize everything that is not linear, to

ascertain sequences of cause and effect, to find a center and

practice centrality), it will become part of a complex system of

relations, free of hierarchy-or at least with fast changing

hierarchies-valueless, adaptive, extremely distributed.

Of no less significance is the type of logic (and for that

matter, rhetoric, heuristics, and dialectics) housed in

language, i.e., projected from the universe of human

self-constitution in the system of inferences, knowledge, and

awareness of the being characteristic of literate frameworks of

practical experiences. Language successfully captured a

dualistic logic indebted to the values of truth and falsehood,

and supported experiences embodied in the abstract character of

logical rationality. It was complemented by logical symbolism

and logical calculus, very successful in formalizing dualism,

and in eliminating logical models not fitting the dualistic

structure.

Literacy instilled bivalent logic as another of its invisible

layers-something is written or not, the written is right or

wrong-allowing only quite late, and actually in the realm of

logical formalism, the appearance of multi-valued schemes. The

non-linearity, vagueness, and fuzziness characteristic of the

post-industrial pragmatic framework opened avenues of high human

efficiency, better adapted to the scale of humankind that

required efficiency and eventually made efficiency its major

goal. Literacy is ill endowed for supporting multi-valued logic,

although it was always tempted to step in its vast territories.

Even some of the disciplines built around and in extension of

literacy (such as history, philosophy, sociology) are not able

to integrate a logic different from the one seated in the

practical experience of reading and writing. This explains, for

instance, computationalism as a new horizon for science, within

which multi-valued logic can be simulated even if the computer's

underlying structure is that of Boolean logic. The literate

argument of science and multimedia's non-linear heuristic path to

science are fundamentally different. Each requires a different

logic and results in a different interaction between those who

constitute their identity in the practical experience of

scientific experiments and those who constitute their identity in

co- participation.

It took longer in the world of predicative logic and in the

science based on analytic power to accept fuzzy logic and to

integrate it in new artifacts, than it took in the world of

non-predicative logic and in the science based on the power of

synthesis. Within the universe of non-predicative language,

fuzzy logic made it into the design of control mechanisms for

high-speed trains, as well as into new efficient toasters. It was

accepted in Japan while it was still debated among experts in the

Western world, until 1993, when a washing machine integrating

fuzzy logic was introduced in the market. This fact can go on

record as more than a mere example in a discussion regarding the

implications of the global economy for the various language

systems and the logical coordinating mechanisms specific to

each.

Progress in understanding and emulating human thinking shows a

progression from a literacy-based model to a model rooted in the

new pragmatic framework. Rule- based, pattern-matching systems

generalize predicate calculus; neural networking is devoted to

mimicking the way minds work, in a synthetic neuron-plex array;

fuzzy logic addresses the limitations of Boolean calculus and

the nondeterminism of neural networks, and concentrates on

modeling imprecision, ambiguity, and undecidability as these are

embodied in new human practical experiences.

The Civilization of Illiteracy · 第 48 / 217 题