life, by assuring the worst part of mankind that they are just as likely
to be made the objects of the saving grace of God as any others. On the
contrary, it holds out this terrible warning, that by an obstinate
continuance in evil-doing, the wicked may place themselves beyond the
effectual influences of divine grace, and set the seal of eternal death to
their own souls.
3. It shows the mercy of God to be infinite. No one, except those who
place themselves beyond the possibility of salvation by their own evil
deeds, is ever lost. Hence, the mercy of God, which takes in all whose
salvation is within the range of possibility, appears in full-orbed and
unclouded splendour. It could not possibly appear greater, or more
beautiful, than as it presents itself to our view in this scheme.
4. It shows the justice of God to be infinite. This, according to the
above view, is neither limited by, nor does it limit, the mercy of God. It
acts merely upon those who were not, and never could be made, the objects
of mercy; and it acts upon these according to the full measure of their
ill-desert, as well as according to the exigencies of the moral empire of
God. It has no limits, except those which circumscribe and bound the
objects of infinite justice.
5. It not only shows the mercy and justice of God to be as great as can
possibly be conceived, but it also shows the perfect harmony and agreement
which subsists between these sublime attributes of the Divine Being. It
marks out and defines the orbit, in which each revolves in all the
perfection and plenitude of its glory, without the least clashing or
interference with the other.
In conclusion, we would simply ask the candid and impartial reader, Does
any dark or perplexing “cloud still hang over the subject?” Is “there a
difficulty in reconciling the mind to a system,” which exhibits the
character of God, and his government of the world, in so pleasing and so
advantageous a light? Does not a system, which gives so glad and joyous a
response to the demand of God, “Are not my ways equal?” recommend itself
to the affections of the pious mind?
It very clearly seems to us, that, strong as are the convictions of Dr.
Chalmers in favour of “a rigid and absolute predestination,”(216) his
affections cannot always be restrained within the narrow confines of so
dark a scheme. His language, in pleading for the universality of the
gospel offer, contains, it seems to us, as direct, and pointed, and
powerful condemnation of his own scheme as can well be found in the whole
range of theological literature. “There must be,” says he, “a sad
misunderstanding somewhere. The commission put into our hands is to go and
preach the gospel to every creature under heaven; and the announcement
sounded forth in the world from heaven’s vault was, Peace on earth,
_good-will to men_. There is no freezing limitation here, but a largeness
and munificence of mercy boundless as space, free and open as the expanse
of the firmament. We hope, therefore, the gospel, the real gospel, _is as
unlike the views of some of its interpreters, as creation, in all its
boundless extent and beauty, is unlike the paltry scheme of some wretched
scholastic in the middle ages_. The middle age of science and civilization
is now terminated; but Christianity also had its middle age, _and this,
perhaps, is not yet fully terminated. There is still a remainder of the
old spell_, even the spell of human authority, and by which a certain
cramp or confinement has been laid on the genius of Christianity. We
cannot doubt that the time of its complete emancipation is coming, when it
shall break loose from the imprisonment in which it is held; but meanwhile
there is, as it were, a stricture upon it, not yet wholly removed, _and in
virtue of which the largeness and liberality of Heaven’s own purposes have
been made to descend in partial and scanty droppings through the strainers
of an artificial theology, instead of falling, as they ought, in a
universal shower upon the world_.”(217)
Is it possible, that this is the language of a man who believes that
Heaven’s purposes of mercy descend, not upon all men, but only upon the
elect? It is even so. Boundless and beautiful as the goodness of God is in
itself; yet, through the strainers of his theology, is it made to descend
in partial and scanty droppings merely, and not in one universal shower.
It is good-will, not to _men_, but to the _elect_. Such is the “chilling
limitation,” and such the frightful “stricture,” on the genius of
Christianity, from which, in the fervour of his imagination, the great
heart of Chalmers burst into a higher and a more genial element of light
and love.
Alas! how sad and how sudden the descent, when in the very next paragraph
he says: “The names and number of the saved may have been in the view,
_nay, even in the design and destination of God from all eternity_; and
still the distinction is carried into effect, not by means of a gospel
addressed partially and exclusively to them, but by means of a gospel
addressed generally to all. _A partial gospel, in fact, could not have
achieved the conversion of the elect_:” that is to say, though it was the
design and destination of God from all eternity to save only a small
portion of those whom he might have saved; yet he made the offer of
salvation to all, in order to save the chosen few! And if he had not
proclaimed this universal offer, by which “the largeness and munificence”
of his mercy are made to _appear_ as “boundless as space,” the elect could
not have been saved! If so, is it the real goodness of God, then, or
merely the _appearance_ of universal goodness, that leadeth men to
repentance?
“Any charm,” says he, “which there is in Christianity to recall or to
regenerate _some_, lies in those of its overtures which are so framed as
to hold out the offered friendship of God to all:”(218) that is, that
although God intends and seeks to save only a few, he offers the same
salvation to all, to give an efficacious charm to the scheme of
redemption! Indeed, if the Calvinistic scheme of an absolute
predestination be true, then we admit that there is a charm and a glory in
the magnificent delusion, arising from God’s offer of friendship to all,
which is not to be found in the truth. But that scheme, as we have seen,
is not true; and also, that the goodness of God is as boundless and
beautiful in reality, as it could possibly be in appearance.
We agree with Dr. Chalmers, that the goodness of God should be viewed, not
through the medium of predestination, but as it shines forth in the light
of the glorious gospel. We agree with him, that “we ought to proceed on
the obvious representations which Scripture gives of the Deity; and _these
beheld in their own immediate light, untinged by the dogma of
predestination. God waiting to be gracious—God not willing that any should
perish, but that all should come to repentance—God swearing by himself
that he has no pleasure in the death of a sinner, but rather that all
should come unto him and live—God beseeching men to enter into
reconciliation, and this not as elect, but simply and generally as men and
sinners_;—these are the attitudes in which the Father of the human family
sets himself forth unto the world—these the terms in which he speaks to us
from heaven.” It is precisely in this sublime attitude, and in this
transporting light, that we rejoice to contemplate the Father of mercies;
and this view, it must be confessed, is wholly “untinged with the dogma of
predestination.”
Conclusion.
A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE PRINCIPLES AND ADVANTAGES OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM.
There is a lamp within the lofty dome
Of the dim world, whose radiance clear doth show
Its awful beauty; and, through the wide gloom,
Make all its obscure mystic symbols glow
With pleasing light,—that we may see and know
The glorious world, and all its wondrous scheme;
Not as distorted in the mind below,
Nor in philosopher’s, nor poet’s dream,
But as it was, and is, high in the Mind Supreme.—ANON.
Chapter I.
Summary Of The First Part Of The Foregoing System.
The commonly received systems of theology are, it is confessed by their
advocates, attended with manifold inconveniences and difficulties. The
habit of mind by which, notwithstanding such difficulties, it clings to
the great truths of those systems, is worthy of all admiration, and forms
one of the best guarantees of the stability and progress of human
knowledge. For in every department of science the great truths which dawn
upon the mind are usually attended with a cloud of difficulties, and, but
for the habit in question, they would soon be permitted to fade away, and
be lost in their original obscurity. Copernicus has, therefore, been
justly applauded,(219) not only for conceiving, but for firmly grasping
the heliocentric theory of the world, notwithstanding the many formidable
objections which it had to encounter in his own mind. Even the sublime law
of the material universe, before it finally established itself in the mind
of Newton, more than once fell, in its struggles for acceptance, beneath
the apparently insuperable objections by which it was attended; and, after
all, the overpowering evidence which caused it to be embraced, still left
it surrounded by an immense penumbra of difficulties. These, together with
the sublime truth, he bequeathed to his successors. They have retained the
truth, and removed the difficulties. In like manner, admirable though the
habit of clinging to every sufficiently accredited truth may be, yet,
whether in the physical or in the moral sciences, the effort to
disencumber the truth of the difficulties by which its progress is
embarrassed should never be remitted. The scientific impulse, by which a
great truth is grasped, and established upon its own appropriate evidence,
should ever be followed by the subordinate movement, which strives to
remove every obstacle out of the way, and cause it to secure a wider and a
brighter dominion in the human mind. And in proportion as any scheme,
whether in relation to natural or to divine things, shall, without a
sacrifice or mutilation of the truth, divest itself of the darkness which
must ever accompany all one-sided and partial views, will it possess a
decided advantage and superiority over other systems. Since this general
principle will not be denied, let us proceed, in conclusion, to take a
brief survey of the foregoing scheme of doctrine, and determine, if we
can, whether to any truth it has given any such advantage.
It clearly seems free from the stupendous cloud of difficulties that
overhang that view of the moral universe which supposes its entire
constitution and government to be in accordance with the scheme of
necessity. These difficulties pertain, first, to the responsibility of
man; secondly, to the purity of God; and, thirdly, to the reality of moral
distinctions. These three several branches of the difficulty in question
have been respectively considered in the first three chapters of the first
part of the present work; and we shall now briefly recapitulate the views
therein presented, in the three following sections.
Section I.
The scheme of necessity denies that man is the responsible author of sin.
If, according to this scheme, all things in heaven and earth, the
volitions of the human mind not excepted, be under the dominion of
necessitating causes, then may we well ask, How can man be a free and
responsible agent? To this inquiry the most illustrious advocates of the
scheme in question have not been able to return a coherent or satisfactory
reply. After the search of ages, and the joint labour of all their
gigantic intellects, they have found no position in their system on which
the freedom of the human mind may be securely planted. The position set up
for this purpose by one is pulled down by another, who, in his turn,
indicates some other position only to be demolished by some other advocate
of his own scheme. The more we look into their writings on this subject,
the more irreconcilable seems the conflict of opinion in which they are
among themselves involved. The more closely we contemplate the labour of
their hands, the more clearly we perceive that all their attempts, in
opposition to the voice of heaven and earth, to rear the great
metaphysical tower of necessity, have only ended in an utter confusion of
tongues. So far, indeed, are they from having found and presented any such
view of the freedom and responsibility of man, as shall, by the intrinsic
and overpowering lustre of its evidence, stand some chance to disarm the
enemies of God, that they have not even found one in which they themselves
can rest. The school of the necessitarian is, in reality, a house divided
against itself; and that, too, in regard to the most vital and fundamental
point of its philosophy.
There seems to be one exception to the truth of this general remark: for
there is one scheme or definition of liberty, in which many, if not most,
of the advocates of necessity have concurred; that is, the definition of
Hobbes. As the current of a river, says he, is free to flow down its
channel, provided there be no obstruction in the way; so the human will,
though compelled to act by causes over which it has no control, is free,
provided there be no external impediment to prevent its volition from
passing into effect. This idea of the freedom of the will, though much
older than Hobbes, is primarily indebted to his influence for its
prevalence in modern times; for it descended from Hobbes to Locke, from
Locke to Edwards, and from Edwards to the modern school of Calvinistic
divines.
No matter how we come by our volitions, says Edwards, yet are we perfectly
free when there is no external impediment to hinder our volitions from
passing into effect: that is to say, though our volitions be absolutely
produced by the divine omnipotence itself, or in any other way; yet is the
will free, provided no external cause interpose to prevent its volition
from moving the body. According to this definition of the liberty of the
will, it is not a _property_ of the soul at all, but only an _accidental_
circumstance or condition of the body. In the significant language of
Leibnitz, it is not the freedom of the mind; it is merely “elbow-room.” It
consists not in an attribute, or property, or power of the soul, but only
in the external opportunity which its necessitated volitions may have to
necessitate an effect. We ask, How can the mind be free? and they tell us,
When the body may be so! We inquire about an _attribute_ of the spiritual
principle within, and they turn us off with an answer respecting an
_accident_ of the material principle without! An _ignoratio elenchi_ more
flagrant—a mistaking of the question more palpable—it is surely not
possible to conceive. Yet this definition of the freedom of the will,
though so superficially false, is precisely that which has found the most
general acceptance among necessitarians. Though vehemently condemned by
Calvin himself, unanswerably refuted by Leibnitz, sneered at by Edwards
the younger, and pronounced utterly inadequate by Dr. John Dick; yet, as
we have seen, is it now held up as “the Calvinistic idea of the freedom of
the will.”
We do not wonder that such a definition of free-will should have been
adopted by atheizing philosophers, such as Hume and Hobbes, for example;
because we cannot suppose them to have been penetrated with any very
profound design to uphold the cause of human responsibility, or to
vindicate the immaculate purity of the divine glory. But that it should
have been accepted with such unquestioning simplicity by a large body of
Christian divines, having the great interests of the moral world at heart,
is, we cannot but think, a sufficient ground for the most profound
astonishment and regret; for, surely, to plant the great cause of human
responsibility on a foundation so slender, on a fallacy so palpable, on a
position so utterly untenable, is to expose it to the victorious assaults
of its weakest enemy and invader.
Section II.
The scheme of necessity makes God the author of sin.
The necessitarian, in his attempts to vindicate the purity of God, has not
been more successful than in his endeavours to establish the freedom and
accountability of man. If, according to his scheme, the Supreme Ruler of
the world be the primal cause of all things, the volitions of men
included; it certainly seems exceedingly difficult to conceive, that he is
not implicated in the sin of the world. And this difficulty, so appalling
at first view, remains just as great after all that the most enlightened
advocates of that scheme have advanced as it was before.
We have witnessed the efforts of a Leibnitz, an Edwards, and a Chalmers,
to repel this objection to the scheme of necessity; and if we mistake not,
we have seen how utterly ineffectual they have proved to break its force,
or resist its influence. The sum and substance of that defence is, as we
have seen, that God may do evil that good may come; a defence which,
instead of vindicating the purity of the divine proceeding, represents it
as having been governed by the most corrupt maxim of the most corrupt
system of casuistry the world has ever seen. It darkens, rather than
illuminates, that profound and portentous obscurity of the system of the
world, arising from the origin and existence of moral evil. So far from
removing the difficulty from their scheme, they have only illustrated its
force by the ineffable weakness of the means and methods which that scheme
has necessitated them to employ for its destruction.
Section III.
The scheme of necessity denies the reality of moral distinctions.
For, if all things in the world, the acts of the will not excepted, be
produced by an extraneous agency, it seems clear that it is absurd to
attach praise or blame to men on account of their volitions. Nothing
appears more self-evident than the position, that whatever is thus
produced in us can neither be our virtue nor our vice. The advocates of
necessity, at least those of them who do not admit the inference in
question, invoke the aid of logic to extinguish the light of the principle
on which it is based. But where have they found, or where can they find, a
principle more clear, more simple, or more unquestionable on which to
ground their arguments? Where, in the whole armory of logic, can be found
a principle more unquestionable than this, that no man can be to praise or
to blame for that which is produced in him, by causes over which he had no
control?
We have examined those arguments in detail, and exhibited the principles
on which they proceed. Those principles, instead of being of such a nature
as to subserve the purposes of valid argument, are either insignificant
truisms which prove nothing, or else they reach the point in dispute only
by means of an ambiguity of words. Of the first description is the
celebrated maxim of Edwards, that _the essence of virtue and vice consists
in their nature, and not in their cause_. By which he means, that no
matter how we come by our virtue and vice, though they be produced in us
according to the scheme of necessity, yet are they our virtue and vice. If
a horse should fall from the moon, it would be a horse: for no matter
where it comes from, _a horse is a horse_; or, more scientifically
expressed, the essence of a horse consists in the nature of a horse, and
not in its origin or cause. All this is very true. But then, we no more
believe that horses fall from the moon, than we do that virtue and vice
are produced according to the scheme of necessity.
Of the last description is that other maxim of Edwards, that men are
adjudged virtuous or vicious on account of actions proceeding from the
will, without considering how they come by their volition. True, we may
judge of _external_ actions according as their origin is in the will or
otherwise, without considering how its volitions come to pass; but then
this is because we proceed on the tacit assumption that the will is free,
and not under the dominion of necessitating causes. But the question
relates, not to external actions or movements of the body, but to the
volitions of the mind itself. And this being the case, it does make a vast
difference in our estimate, whether we consider those volitions as coming
to pass freely; or whether, according to the scheme of necessity, we
regard them as being produced by the operation of causes over which we
have no control. In this case, it is impossible for the human mind to
attach praise or blame to them, or view them as constituting either virtue
or vice. For nothing can be plainer than the position, that if anything in
us be produced by the mighty and irresistible operation of an extraneous
agency, it can neither be our virtue nor vice. This principle is so clear,
that logic can neither add to nor detract from the intrinsic lustre of its
evidence. And all the cloudy sophistications of an Edwards, ingenious as
they are, can obscure it only to the minds of those who have not
sufficient penetration to see through the nature of his arguments.
At this point, then, as well as at others, the scheme of necessity,
instead of clearing up the old, has introduced new difficulties into the
system of the world. Instead of diffusing light, it has actually extended
the empire of darkness, by investing in the clouds and mists of its own
raising, some of the brightest elements which enter into its organization.
By scholastic refinements and sophistical devices, it has sought to
overturn and destroy, not the elements of error and confusion, but some of
the clearest and most indestructible intuitional convictions of the human
head and heart.
But great as these difficulties are, we may still be asked to embrace the
scheme from which they flow, on the ground that it is true. Indeed, this
is the course pursued by some of the most enlightened Calvinistic
necessitarians of the present day. Freely admitting that all the attempts
of Leibnitz, of Edwards, and others, to bring the scheme of necessity into
an agreement with the dictates of reason, have left its stupendous
difficulties pretty much where they found them—wrapped in impenetrable
gloom; they nevertheless maintain this scheme, and propose it to our
acceptance, on the sole and sufficient ground of its evidence. If we may
judge from those of their writings which we have seen, this course of
proceeding is getting to be very much the fashion among the Calvinists of
the present day; and they have a great deal to say in praise of simply
adhering to the truth, without being over-solicitous about its
difficulties, or paying too much attention to them. That man, say they, is
in imminent danger of heresy who, instead of receiving the truth with the
simplicity of a little child, goes about to worry himself with its
difficulties. He walks in dark and slippery places. We agree with them in
this, and commend their wisdom: for it presents the only chance which
their system has of retaining its hold on the human mind. But before
accepting this scheme on the ground of its evidence, we have deemed it
prudent to look into the very interior of the scheme itself, and weigh the
evidence on which it is so confidently recommended.
Section IV.
The moral world not constituted according to the scheme of necessity.
In the prosecution of this inquiry, we have appeared to ourselves to find,
that this boasted scheme of necessity is neither more nor less than one
grand tissue of sophisms. We have found, we believe, that this huge
imposition on the reason of man is a vile congregation of pestilential
errors, through which, if the glory of God and his marvellous ways be
contemplated, they must appear most horribly distorted. We have found that
this scheme is as weak and crazy in the mechanism of its internal
structure as it is frightful in its consequences. Instead of that closely
articulated body of thought, which we were led to expect therein, we have
found little more than a jumble of incoherences, a semi-chaotic mass of
plausible blunders. We have seen and shown, we trust, that this grand and
imposing scheme of necessity is, in reality, based on a false
psychology,—directed against a false issue,—supported by false
logic,—fortified by false conceptions,—recommended by false analogies,—and
rendered plausible by a false phraseology. And, besides, we have
ascertained that it originates in a false method, and terminates in a
false religion. As such, we deem it far better adapted to represent the
little, narrow, dark, crooked, and perverted world within, than the great
and all-glorious world of God without. So have we not spared its
deformities.
Section V.
The relation between the human agency and the divine.
Having got rid of the scheme of necessity, which opposed so many obstacles
to the prosecution of our design, we were then prepared to investigate the
great problem of evil: but, before entering on this subject, we paused to
consider the difficulty which, in all ages, the human mind has found in
attempting to reconcile the influence of the Divine Spirit with the
freedom of the will. In regard to this difficulty, it has been made to
appear, we trust, that we need not understand _how_ the Spirit of God
acts, in order to reconcile his influence with the free-agency of man. We
need to know, not how the one Spirit acts on the other, but only what is
done by each, in order to see a perfect agreement and harmony in their
coöperation. The inquiry relates, then, to the precise thing done by each,
and not to the _modus operandi_. Having, in opposition to the commonly
received notion, ascertained this to be the difficulty, we have found it
comparatively easy of solution.
For the improved psychology of the present day, which gives so clear and
steady a view of the simple facts of consciousness, has enabled us to see
what may, and what may not, be produced by an extraneous agency. This
again has enabled us to make out and define the sphere of the divine
power, as well as that of the human; and to determine the point at which
they come into contact, without interfering with or intersecting each
other.
The same means have also shown us, that the opposite errors of Pelagianism
and Augustinism have a common root in a false psychology. The psychology
of the past, which identifies the passive states of the sensibility with
the active states of the will, is common to both of these schemes. From
this common root the two doctrines branch out in opposite directions; the
one on the side of the mind’s activity, and the other on that of its
passivity. Each perceives only one phase of the complex whole, and denies
the reality of the other. With one, the active phase is the whole; with
the other, the passive impression is the whole. Hence the one recognises
the human power alone; while the other causes this power entirely to
disappear beneath the overshadowing influence of the divine.
Now the foregoing system, by availing itself of the psychology of the
present day, not only does not cause the one of these great facts to
exclude the other, but, by showing their logical coherency and agreement,
it removes the temptation that the speculative reason has ever felt to do
such violence to the cause of truth. It embraces the half views of both
schemes, and moulds them into one great and full-orbed truth. In the great
theandric work of regeneration, in particular, it neither causes the human
element to exclude the divine, nor the divine to swallow up the human; but
preserves each in its integrity, and both in their harmonious union and
coöperation. The mutual inter-dependency, and the undisturbed
inter-working, of these all-important elements of the moral world, it aims
to place on a firm basis, and exhibit in a clear light. If this object has
been accomplished, though but in part, or by way of a first approximation
only, it will be conceded to be no small gain, or advantage, to the cause
of truth.
Section VI.
The existence of moral evil consistent with the infinite purity of God.
The relation of the foregoing treatise to the great problem of the
spiritual world, concerning the origin and existence of evil, may be
easily indicated, and the solution it proposes distinguished from that of
others. This may be best done, perhaps, with the aid of logical forms.
The world, created by an infinitely perfect Being, says the sceptic, must
needs be the best of all possible worlds: but the actual world is not the
best of all possible worlds: therefore it was not created by an infinitely
perfect Being. Now, in replying to this argument, no theist denies the
major premiss. All have conceded, that the idea of an infinitely perfect
Being necessarily implies the existence and preservation of the greatest
possible perfection in the created universe. In the two celebrated works
of M. Leibnitz and Archbishop King, both put forth in reply to Bayle, this
admission is repeatedly and distinctly made. This seems to have been
rightly done; for, in the language of Cudworth, “To believe a God, is to
believe the existence of all possible good and perfection in the
universe.”(220)
In this, says Leibnitz, is embosomed all possible good. But how is this
point established? “We judge from the event itself,” says he; “_since God
has made it, it was not possible to have made a better_.”(221) But this is
the language of faith, and not of reason. As an argument addressed to the
sceptic, it is radically unsound; for as a medium of proof, it employs the
very thing in dispute, namely, that God is infinitely perfect. Hence this
is a _petitio principii_, a begging of the question. If this were all that
M. Leibnitz had to offer, he might as well have believed, and remained
silent.
But this was not all. He endeavours to show, that the world is absolutely
perfect, without inferring its perfection from the assumed infinite
perfection of its Author. At first view, this does not appear to be so;
for the sin and misery which overflow this lower part of the world seem to
detract from the perfection and beauty of the whole. Not so, says
Leibnitz: “there are some disorders in the parts, which marvellously
heighten the beauty of the whole; as certain discords, skilfully employed,
render the harmony more exquisite.”(222) Considered as an argument, this
is likewise quite unsatisfactory. It is, in fact, merely the light of the
imagination, playing over the bosom of the cloud; not the concentrated
blaze of the intelligence, dispelling its gloom. And besides, this analogy
proceeds on a false principle; inasmuch as it supposes that God has
himself introduced sin into the world, with a view to its happy effects.
We could sooner believe, indeed, that the principle of evil had introduced
harmony into the world in order to heighten the frightful effects of its
discord, than that the principle of all good had produced the frightful
discord of the world, in order to enhance the effects of its harmony. But
we shall let all such fine sayings pass. Perhaps they were intended as the
ornaments of faith, rather than as the radiant armour and the invincible
weapons of reason.
Though Leibnitz frequently insists, that “the permission of evil tends to
the good of the universe,”(223) he does not always seem to mean that evil
would be better than holiness in its stead; but that the permission of sin
is not so great an inconvenience as would be its universal prevention. “We
ought to say,” says he, “that God permits sin, because otherwise he would
himself do a worse action (_une action pire_) than all the sin of his
creatures.”(224) But what is this worse, this more unreasonable action of
which God would be guilty, if he should prevent all sin? One bad feature
thereof would be, according to Leibnitz, that it would interfere with the
freedom of the will. In his “Abrégé de la Controverse,” he says: “We have
added, after many good authors, that it is in conformity with the general
order and good, for God to leave to certain creatures an occasion for the
exercise of their liberty.” This argument comes with a bad grace from one
who has already denied the liberty of the will; and, indeed, from the very
form of his expression, Leibnitz seems to have adopted it from authority,
rather than from a perception of any support it derives from his own
principles. He asserts the freedom of the will, it is true, but he does
this, as we have seen, only in opposition to the “absolute necessity” of
Hobbes and Spinoza; according to whom nothing in the universe could
possibly have been otherwise than it is. In his “Reflexions sur le Livre
de Hobbes,” he says, that although the will is determined in all cases by
the divine omnipotence, yet is it free from an absolute or mathematical
necessity, “because _the contrary volition might happen without implying a
contradiction_.” True, the contrary volition might happen without implying
a contradiction; for God himself might cause it to exist. And if, by his
almighty and irresistible power, he should cause it to exist, the will
would still be free in Leibnitz’s sense of the word; since its contrary
might have happened. Hence, according to this definition of liberty, if
God should, in all cases, determine the will to good, it would
nevertheless be free; since the contrary determination might have been
produced by his power. In other words, if such be the liberty of the will,
no operation of the Almighty could possibly interfere therewith; as no
volition produced by him would have rendered it impossible for him to have
caused the opposite volition, if he had so chosen and exerted his
omnipotence for that purpose. This defence of the divine procedure, then,
has no foundation in the scheme of Leibnitz; and the only thing he can say
in its favour is, that after the authority “of many good authors,” we have
added it to our own views.
Archbishop King, too, as is well known, assumes the ground that God
permits sin, on account of the greater inconvenience that would result to
the world from an interference with the freedom of the will. But so
extravagant are his views respecting this freedom, that the position in
question is one of the weakest parts of his system. The mind chooses
objects, says he, not because they please it; but they are agreeable and
pleasant to the mind, because it chooses them. Surely, such a liberty as
this, consisting in a mere arbitrary or capricious movement of the soul,
that owns not the guidance of reason, or wisdom, or anything apparently
good, cannot possess so great a value that the moral good of the universe
should be permitted to suffer, rather than that it should be interfered
with or restrained.
But these are merely _argumenta ad hominem_. There are “many good authors”
who, although they maintain neither of the above views of liberty, insist
that it is better for God to permit sin, than to interfere with the
freedom of his creatures. But is it clear, that greater inconveniences
would have arisen from such an interference, than from the frightful reign
of all the sin and misery that have afflicted the world? If God can so
easily prevent all sin, and secure all holiness, by restraining the
liberty of his creatures, is it clear, that in preferring their
unrestrained freedom to the highest moral good of the universe, he makes a
choice worthy of his infinite wisdom? In other words, is it not more
desirable that moral evil should everywhere disappear, and the beauty of
holiness everywhere shine forth, than that the creature should be left to
abuse his liberty by the introduction of sin and death into the world?
Besides, it is admitted by all the authors in question, that God sometimes
interposes the arm of his omnipotence, in order to the production of
holiness. Now, in such an exertion of his power, he either interferes with
the freedom of the creature, or he does not. If he does not interfere with
that freedom, why may he not produce holiness in other cases also, without
any such interference? And if, in some cases, he does interfere therewith,
in order to secure the holiness of his creatures, why should he not, in
all cases, prefer their highest moral good to so fatal an abuse of their
prerogatives? Is his proceeding therein merely arbitrary and capricious,
or is it governed by the best of reasons? Undoubtedly by the best of
reasons, say all the authors in question: but then, when we come to this
point of the inquiry, they always tell us, that those reasons are
profoundly concealed in the unsearchable depths of the divine wisdom; that
is to say, they believe them to be the best, not because they have seen
and considered them, but because they are the reasons of an infinitely
perfect mind. Now, all this is very well; but it is not to the purpose. It
is to retire from the arena of logic, and fall back on the very point in
dispute for support. It is not to argue; it is simply to drop the weapons
of our warfare, and oppose the shield of faith to the shafts of the
adversary.
It is also contended by Leibnitz and King, as well as many other good
authors, that there is an established order, or system of laws, in the
government of the world; into which so great a confusion would be
introduced by the interposition of divine power to prevent all sin, that
some had better be permitted. This, which Leibnitz so positively asserts,
is thrown out as a conjecture by Bishop Butler.(225) But in the present
controversy, it is not to the point. For here the question is concerning
the order and government of the moral world itself. And this being the
question, it is not admissible for one of the parties to say, that the
proposed plan for the government of the world is not the best, because it
would interfere with and disturb the arrangements of that which is
established. This is clearly to beg the question. It is to assume that the
established method is the best, and therefore should not have been
superseded by another; but this is the very point in dispute.
The truth is, that the theist has assailed the sceptic in his strong and
impregnable point, and left the vulnerable part of his system untouched.
This may be easily seen. The objection of the sceptic is thus stated by
Leibnitz: Whoever can prevent the sin of another, and does not, but rather
contributes to it by his concourse and by the occasions he gives rise to,
though he possesses a perfect knowledge, is an accomplice. God can prevent
the sin of his intelligent creatures: but he does it not, though his
knowledge be perfect, and contributes to it by his concourse and the
occasions to which he gives rise: therefore he is an accomplice. Now
Leibnitz admits the minor, and denies the major, premiss of this argument.
He should have done the contrary. For, admitting that God might easily
prevent sin, and cause holiness to reign universally, what had he left to
oppose to the attacks of the sceptic but the shield of faith? He might
say, indeed, as he often does, that God voluntarily permits sin, because
it is a part and parcel of the best possible universe. But how easy for
the sceptic to demand, What good purpose does it answer? Can it add to the
holiness or happiness of the universe? Cannot these high ends, these
glorious purposes of the Divine Being, be as well attained by the
universal rectitude and purity of his creatures, as by any other means?
Cannot the Supreme Ruler of the world, in the resources of his infinite
mind, bring as much good out of holiness as can be brought out of sin? And
if so, why permit sin in order to the good of the creation? Are not the
perfect holiness and happiness of each and every part of the moral world
better for each and every part thereof than are their contraries? And if
so, are they not better for the whole? By this reply, the theist is, in
our opinion, disarmed, and the sceptic victorious. Hence we say, that the
former should have conceded the major, and denied the minor, premiss of
the above argument; that is, he should have admitted, that whoever can
prevent the sin of another, but, instead of so doing, contributes to it by
his concourse, is an accomplice: and he should have denied that God, being
able to produce holiness in the place of sin, both permits and contributes
to the reign of the latter in his dominions. The theist should have denied
this, we say, if he would have raised the ever-blessed God above all
contact with sin, and placed his cause upon high and impregnable ground,
far above the attacks of the sceptic. But as it is, he has placed that
cause upon false grounds, and thereby exposed it to the successful shafts
of the adversary.
Another reason assigned by Leibnitz(226) and King(227) for the permission
of moral evil is, that if God should interpose to prevent it, this would
be to work a constant and universal miracle. But if such a thing were
possible, why should he not work such a miracle? By these authors
themselves it is conceded, that the Almighty often works a miracle for the
production of moral good; and, this being the case, why should he not
exhibit this miracle on the most grand and magnificent scale of which it
is possible to conceive? In other words, why should he not render it
worthy of his infinite wisdom, and power, and goodness? Is it not by a
like miracle, by a like universal interposition of his power, that the
majestic fabric of the material globe is upheld, and the sublime movement
of all its countless orbs continually carried on? And if so, are not the
order and harmony of the moral universe as worthy such an exercise of his
omnipotence as are the regularity and beauty of the material? We defend
the Divine Author and Preserver of all things on no such grounds. We say
that a universal holiness is not produced by the omnipresent energy of his
power, not because this would be to work a miracle, but because it would
be to work a contradiction.
But we are becoming weary of such replies. The very question is, _Why_ is
there not a universal interposition of the divine power? and the reply,
Because this would be a universal interposition of the divine power! What
is all this but a grand attempt to solve the awful mystery of the world,
which ends in the assurance that God does not universally interpose to
prevent sin, because he does not universally interpose to prevent it? Or,
in fewer words, that he does not, because he does not?
Since sin exists, says the sceptic, it follows that God is either unable
or unwilling to prevent it. “Able, but _unwilling_,” replies the theist.
Such is the answer which has come down to us from the earliest times; from
a Lactantius to a Leibnitz, and from a Leibnitz to a M’Cosh. No wonder
that in all this time they have not been able to find the reason why God
is unwilling to prevent sin; since, in truth and reality, he is infinitely
more than willing to do so.
But, saying that he is willing, shall we concede that he is unable? By no
means: for such language implies that the power of God is limited, and he
is omnipotent. We choose to impale ourselves upon neither horn of the
dilemma. We are content to leave M. Bayle upon the one, and M. Voltaire
upon the other, while we bestow our company elsewhere. In plain English,
we neither reply unwilling nor unable.
We do say, however, that although God is infinitely willing to secure the
existence of universal holiness, to the exclusion of all sin, yet such a
thing is not an object of power, and therefore cannot be produced by
omnipotence itself. The production of holiness by the application of power
is, as we have seen, an absurd and impossible conceit, which may exist in
the brain of man, but which can never be embodied in the fair and orderly
creation of God. It can no more be realized by the Divine Omnipotence than
a mathematical absurdity can be caused to be true.
Hence, we no longer ask why God permits sin. This were to seek a ground
and reason of that which has no existence, except in the imagination of
man. God does not permit sin. He chooses it not, and he permits it not, as
an essential part of the best possible universe. Sin is that which his
soul abhors, and which all the perfections of his nature, his infinite
power and wisdom, no less than his holiness, are pledged to wipe out from
the face of his creation. He does not cause, he does not tolerate sin, on
account of its happy effects, or on account of the uses to which it may be
turned. The only word he has for such a thing is _woe_; and the only
attitude he bears toward it is one of eternal and inexorable vengeance.
All the schemes of men make light of sin; but God is in earnest,
infinitely and immutably in earnest, in the purpose to root out and
destroy the odious thing, that it may have no place amid the glory of his
dominions.
As sin did not originate by his permission, so it does not continue by his
sufferance. He permits it, indeed, in that he permits the existence of
beings capable of sinning; and he permits the existence of such beings in
the very act of permitting the existence of those who are capable of
knowing, and loving, and serving him. An infinitely good Being, says M.
Bayle, would not have conferred on his creature the fatal power to do
evil. But he did not reflect that a power to do good is, _ex necessitate
rei_, a power to do evil. Surely, a good Being would bestow on his
creature the power to do good—the power to become like himself, and to
partake of the incommunicable blessedness of a holy will. But if he would
bestow this, he would certainly confer power to do evil; for the one is
identical with the other. And sin has arisen, not from any power conferred
for that purpose, but from that which constitutes the brightest element in
the sublime structure and glory of the moral world. It arises, not from
any imperfection in the work of God, but from that without which it would
have been infinitely less than perfect.
“All divines admit,” says Bayle, “that God can infallibly produce a good
act of the will in a human soul without depriving it of the use of
liberty.”(228) This is no longer admitted. We call it in question. We deny
that such an act can be produced, either with or without depriving the
soul of liberty. We deny that it can be produced at all: for whatever God
may produce in the human soul, this is not, this cannot be, the moral
goodness or virtue of the soul in which it is produced. In other words, it
is not, and it cannot be, an object of praise or of moral approbation in
him in whom it is thus caused to exist. His virtue or moral goodness can
exist only by reason, and in case of an exercise of his own will. It can
no more be the effect of an extraneous force than two and two can be made
equal to five.
In conclusion, the plain truth is, that the actual universe is not in the
best of all possible conditions; for we might conceive it to be better
than it is. If there were no sin and no suffering, but everywhere a purity
and bliss as great as it is possible to conceive, this would be a vast
improvement in the actual state of the universe. Such is the magnificent
dream of the sceptic; and, as we have seen, it is not without truth and
justice that he thus dreams. But with this dream of his, magnificent as it
is, there is connected another which is infinitely false: for he imagines
that the sublime spectacle of a world without sin, that the beatific
vision of a universe robed in stainless splendour might have been realized
by the Divine Omnipotence; whereas, this could have been realized only by
the universal and continued coöperation of the whole intelligent creation
with the grand design of God. On the other hand, the theist, by conceding
the error and contesting the truth of the sceptic, has inextricably
entangled himself in the toils of the adversary.
The only remaining question which the sceptic has to ask is, that since
God might have prevented moral evil by the creation of no beings who he
foresaw would sin, why did he create such beings? Why did he not leave all
such uncreated, and call into existence only such as he foreknew would
obey his law, and become like himself in purity and bliss? This question
has been fully answered both from reason and revelation. We have shown
that the highest good of the universe required the creation of such
beings. We have shown that it is by his dealings with the sinner that the
foundation of his spiritual empire is secured, and its boundaries
enlarged. In particular, we have shown, from revelation, that it is by the
redemption of a fallen world that all unfallen worlds are preserved in
their allegiance to his throne, and kept warm in the bosom of his
blessedness.
If the sceptic should complain that this is to meet him, not with weapons
drawn from the armory of reason, but from that of revelation, our reply is
at hand: he has no longer anything left to be met. His argument, which
assumes that a Being of infinite power could easily cause holiness to
exist, has been shown to be false. This very assumption, this major
premiss, which has been so long conceded to him, has been taken out of his
hands, and demolished. Hence, we do not oppose the shield of faith to his
argument; we hold it in triumph over his exploded sophism. We merely
recall our faith, and exult in the divine glory which it so magnificently
brings to view, and against which his once blind and blundering reason has
now no more to say.
Chapter II.
Summary Of The Second Part Of The Foregoing System.
Having reconciled the existence of sin with the purity of God, and refuted
the objections against the principles on which that reconciliation is
based, we next proceeded to the second part of the work, in which the
natural evil, or suffering, that afflicts humanity, is shown to be
consistent with his goodness. This part consists of five chapters, of
whose leading principles and position we shall now proceed to take a rapid
survey in the remaining sections of the present chapter.
Section I.
God desires the salvation of all men.
The fact that all men are not saved, at first view, seems inconsistent
with the goodness of the Divine Being, and the sincerity of his endeavours
for their conversion. We naturally ask, that if God could so easily cause
all men to turn and live, why should he in vain call upon them to do so?
Is he really sincere in the use of means for the salvation of all, since
he permits so many to hold out in their rebellion and perish? In other
words, if he really and sincerely seeks the salvation of all, why are not
all saved? This is confessedly one of the most perplexing and confounding
difficulties which attach to the commonly received systems of theology. It
constitutes one of those profound obscurities from which, it is admitted,
theology has not been able to extricate itself, and come out into the
clear light of the divine glory.
By many theologians this difficulty, instead of being solved, is most
fearfully aggravated. Luther, for example, finds it so great, that he
denies the sincerity of God in calling upon sinners to forsake their evil
ways and live; and that, as addressed to the finally impenitent, his
language is that of mockery and scorn. And Calvin imagines that such
exhortations, as well as the other means of grace offered to all, are
designed, not for the real conversion of those who shall finally perish,
but to enhance their guilt, and overwhelm them in the more fearful
condemnation. If it were possible to go even one step beyond such
doctrines, that step is taken by President Edwards: for he is so far from
supposing that God really intends to lead all men into a conformity with
his revealed will, that he contends that God possesses another and a
secret will by which, for some good purpose, he chooses their sin, and
infallibly brings it to pass. If any mind be not appalled by such
doctrines, and chilled with horror, surely nothing can be too monstrous
for its credulity, provided only it relate to the divine sovereignty.
The Arminian with indignation rejects such views of the divine glory. But
does he escape the great difficulty in question? If God forms the design,
says he, not to save all men, he is not infinitely good; but yet he admits
that God actually refuses to save some. Now, what difference can it make
whether God’s intention not to save all be evidenced by a preëxisting
design, or by a present reality? Is not everything that is done by him, or
left undone, in pursuance of his eternal purpose and design? What, then,
in reference to the point in question, is the difference between the
Arminian and the Calvinist? _Both admit that God could easily save all men
if he would_; that is, render all men holy and happy. But the one says
that he did not design to save all, while the other affirms that he
actually refuses to save some. Surely, if we may assume what is conceded
by both parties, the infinite goodness of God is no more disproved by a
scheme of salvation limited in its design, than by a scheme of salvation
limited in its execution. Hence, it is admitted by many Arminians
themselves, that their own scheme merely mitigates and softens down,
without removing, the appalling difficulty in question.
There are many exceptions to this remark. One of the most memorable of
these is the judgment which Robert Hall(229) pronounces concerning the
solution of this difficulty by the “Wonderful Howe.” This solution, as we
have seen, labours under the same defect with those of its predecessors,
in that it rejects the truth that a necessary holiness is a contradiction
in terms. Instead of following the guidance of this truth, he wanders amid
the obscurities of the subject, becomes involved in numerous
self-contradictions, and is misled by the deceitful light of false
analogies.
We shall not here reproduce his inconsistencies and self-contradictions.
We shall simply add, that although he, too, attempts to show why it is for
the best that all should not be saved, he frequently betrays the feeble
and unsatisfactory nature of the impression which his own reasons made
upon his mind. For the light of these _reasons_ soon fades from his
recollection; and, like all who have gone before him, when he comes to
contemplate the subject from another point of view, he declares that the
reasons of the thing he has endeavoured to explain, are hid from the human
mind in the profound depths of the divine wisdom.
If we would realize, then, that God sincerely desires the salvation of all
men, we must plant ourselves on the truth, that holiness, which is of the
very essence of salvation, cannot be wrought in us by an extraneous force.
It is under the guidance of this principle, and of this principle alone,
that we can find our way out from the dark labyrinth of error and
self-contradiction, in which others are involved, into the clear and
beautiful light of the gospel, that God “will have all men to be saved,
and come unto a knowledge of the truth.” It is with the aid of this
principle, and of this alone, that we may hear the sublime teachings of
the divine wisdom, unmingled with the discordant sounds of human folly.
Section II.
The sufferings of the innocent, and especially of infants, consistent with
the goodness of God.
By the Calvinistic school of divines it is most positively and
peremptorily pronounced that the innocent can never suffer under the
administration of a Being of infinite goodness. They cannot possibly allow
that such a Being would permit one of his innocent creatures to suffer;
but they can very well believe that he can permit them both to sin and to
suffer. Is not this to strain at a gnat, and swallow a camel?
Having predetermined that the innocent never suffer, they have felt the
necessity of finding some sin in infants, by which their sufferings might
be shown to be deserved, and thereby reconciled with the divine goodness.
This has proved a hard task. From the time of Augustine down to the
present day, it has been diligently prosecuted; and with what success, we
have endeavoured to show. The series of hypotheses to which this effort
has given rise, are, perhaps, as wild and wonderful as any to be found in
the history of the human mind. We need not again recount those dark dreams
and inventions in the past history of Calvinism. Perhaps the hypothesis of
the present day, by which it endeavours to vindicate the suffering of
infants, will seem scarcely less astonishing to posterity, than those
exploded fictions of the past appear to this generation.
According to this hypothesis, the infant world deserves to suffer, because
the sin of Adam, their federal head and representative, is imputed to
them. It is even contended that this constitution, by which the guilt or
innocence of the world was suspended on the conduct of the first man, is a
bright display of the divine goodness, since it was so likely to be
attended with a happy issue to the human race. Likely to be attended with
a happy issue! And did not the Almighty foresee and know, that if the
guilt of the world were made to depend on the conduct of Adam, it would
infallibly be attended with a fatal result?
We have examined, at length, the arguments of an Edwards to show that such
a divine scheme and constitution of things is a display or manifestation
of goodness. Those arguments are, perhaps, as ingenious and plausible as
it is possible for the human intellect to invent in the defence of such a
cause. When closely examined and searched to the bottom, they certainly
appear as puerile and weak as it is possible for the human imagination to
conceive.
Indeed, no coherent hypothesis can be invented on this subject, so long as
the mind of the inventor fails to recognise the impossibility of excluding
all sin from the moral system of the universe: for if all sin, then all
suffering, likewise, may be excluded; and we can never understand why
either should be permitted; much less can we comprehend why the innocent
should be allowed to suffer. But having recognised this impossibility, we
have been conducted to three grounds, on which, it is believed, the
sufferings of the innocent may be reconciled with the goodness of God.
First, the sufferings of the innocent, in so far as they are the
consequences of sin, serve to show its terrific nature, and tend to
prevent its introduction into the world. If this end could have been
accomplished by the divine power, such a provision would have been
unnecessary, and all the misery of the world only so much “suffering in
waste.” Secondly, the sufferings of the innocent serve as a foil to set
off and enhance the blessedness of eternity. They are but a short and
discordant prelude to an everlasting harmony. Thirdly, difficulties and
trials, temptations and wants, are indispensable to the rise of moral good
in the soul of the innocent; for if there were no temptation to wrong,
there could be no merit in obedience, and no virtue in the world.
Suffering is, then, essential to the moral discipline and improvement of
mankind. On the one or the other of these grounds, it is believed that
every instance in which suffering falls upon the innocent, or falls not as
a punishment of sin, may be vindicated and reconciled with the goodness of
God.
Section III.
The sufferings of Christ consistent with the divine goodness.
The usual defences of the atonement are good, so far as they go, but not
complete. The vicarious sufferings of Christ are well vindicated on the
ground, that they are necessary to cause the majesty and honour of the
divine law to be respected; but this defence, though sound, has been left
on an insecure foundation; for it has been admitted that God, by the word
of his power, might easily have caused his laws to be universally
respected and obeyed. Hence, according to this admission, the sufferings
of Christ might have been easily dispensed with, and were not necessary in
order to maintain the honour and glory of the divine government. According
to this admission, they were not necessary, and consequently not
consistent with the goodness of God.
Again: by distinguishing between the _administrative_ and the
_retributive_ justice of God, and showing that the vicarious sufferings of
Christ were a satisfaction to the first, and not to the last, we
annihilate the objections of the Socinian. By means of this view of the
satisfaction rendered to the divine justice, we think we have placed the
great doctrine of the atonement in a clearer and more satisfactory light
than usual. We have shown that the vicarious sufferings of the INNOCENT
are so far from being inconsistent with the divine justice, that they are,
in fact, free from the least shadow or appearance of hardship either to
him or to the world. Nay, that they are a bright manifestation of the
divine goodness both to himself and to those for whom he suffered; the
brightest manifestation thereof, indeed, which the universe has ever
beheld.
Section IV.
The eternity of future punishment consistent with the goodness of God.
The genuine Calvinist, if he reason consecutively from some of the
principles of his system, can never escape the conclusion that all men
will be saved: for so long as he denies the ability of men to obey without
the efficacious grace of God, and affirms that this grace is not given to
such as shall finally perish, it must follow that their punishment is
unjust, and that their eternal punishment were an act of cruelty and
oppression greater than it is possible for the imagination of man to
conceive.
It was precisely from such premises, as we have seen, that John Foster
denied the eternal duration of future punishment. His logic is good; but
even an illogical escape from such a conclusion were better than the
rejection of one of the great fundamental doctrines of revealed religion.
By having shown his premises to be false, we demolished the very
foundation of his arguments. But, not satisfied with this, we pursued
those arguments into all their branches and ramifications, and exposed
their futility. By these means we have removed the objections and solved
the difficulties pertaining to this doctrine of revealed religion. In one
word, we have shown that it is not inconsistent with the dictates of
reason, or with the principle of the divine goodness.
We have shown that the eternal punishment of the wicked is deserved, and
therefore demanded by the divine justice; that they serve to promote the
highest moral interests of the universe, and are consequently imposed by
the divine goodness itself. We have shown, that in the administration of
his eternal government, the infliction of an endless punishment is even
more consistent with goodness than the use of temporal punishment in the
management of a temporal government; for the first, besides being eternal
in duration, is unbounded in extent. Thus reason itself, when disenchanted
of its strong Calvinistic prejudices and its weak Socinian
sentimentalities, utters no other voice than that which proceeds from
revelation; and this it echoes rather than utters. In plainer words,
though reason does not prove or establish the eternity of future
punishment, it has not one syllable to say against its wisdom, its
justice, or its goodness.
Section V.
The true doctrine of election and predestination consistent with the
goodness of God.
The Calvinists endeavour to support their scheme of election and
predestination by means of analogies drawn from the unequal distribution
of the divine favours, which is observable in the natural economy and
government of the world. But the two cases are not parallel. According to
the one, though the divine favours are unequally distributed, no man is
ever required to render an account of more than he receives. Whereas,
according to the other, countless millions of human-beings are doomed to
eternal misery for the non-observance of a law which they never had it in
their power to obey. This is to judge them, not according to what they
receive, but according to what they receive not, and cannot obtain. It is
to call them to give an account of talents never committed to their
charge. The difference between the two cases is, indeed, precisely that
between the conduct of a munificent prince who bestows his favours
unequally, but without making unreasonable demands, and the proceeding of
a capricious tyrant who, while he confers the most exalted privileges and
honours on one portion of his subjects, consigns all the rest, not more
undeserving than they, to hopeless and remediless destruction; and that,
too, for the non-performance of an impossible condition. Is it not
wonderful that two cases so widely and so glaringly different, should have
been so long and so obstinately confounded by serious inquirers after
truth?
The Calvinistic scheme of predestination, it is pretended, derives support
from revelation. The ninth chapter of Romans which, from the time of
Augustine down to the present day, has been so confidently appealed to in
its support, has, as we have seen, no relation to the subject. It relates,
not to the election of individuals to eternal life, but of a nation to the
enjoyment of external privileges and advantages. This is so plain, that
Dr. Macknight, though an advocate of the Calvinistic dogma of
predestination, refuses to employ that portion of Scripture in support of
his doctrine.
Nor does the celebrated passage of the eighth chapter of the same epistle
touch the point in controversy. We might well call in question the
Calvinistic interpretation of that passage, if this were necessary; but we
take it in their own sense, and show that it lends no support to their
views. The Calvinists themselves being the interpreters, that passage
teaches that God, according to his eternal purpose, chose or selected a
certain portion out of the great mass of mankind as the heirs of eternal
life. Granted, then, that a certain portion of the human race were thus
made the objects of a peculiar favour, and prospectively endowed with the
greatest of all conceivable blessings. But _who_ were thus chosen, or
selected? and on _what principle_ was the election made? In regard to this
point, it is not pretended by them that the passage in question utters a
single syllable. They themselves being the judges, this Scripture merely
affirms that a certain portion of mankind are chosen or elected to eternal
life; while in regard to the ground, or the reason, of their election, it
is most perfectly and profoundly silent.
Hence it leaves us free to assume the position, that those persons were
elected or chosen who God foresaw would, by a coöperation with his Spirit,
make their calling and election sure. And being thus left free, this is
precisely the position in which we choose to plant ourselves, in order to
vindicate the divine glory against the awful misrepresentations of
Calvinism: for, in the first place, this view harmonizes the passage in
question with other portions of the divine record, and allows us, without
the least feeling of self-contradiction, to embrace the sublime word, that
God “will have all men to be saved;” and that if any are not made the
heirs of his great salvation, it is because his grace would have proved
unavailing to them.
Secondly, this view not only harmonizes two classes of seemingly opposed
texts of Scripture, but it also serves to vindicate the unbounded glory of
the divine goodness. It shows that the goodness of God is not partial in
its operation; neither taking such as it leaves, nor leaving such as it
takes; but embracing all of the same class, and that class consisting of
all who, by wicked works, do not place themselves beyond the possibility
of being saved. Unlike Calvinism, it presents us, not with the spectacle
of a mercy which might easily save all, but which, nevertheless,
contenting itself with a few only, abandons the rest to the ravages of the
never-dying worm.
Thirdly, at the same time that it vindicates the glory of the divine
mercy, it rectifies the frightful distortion of the divine justice, which
is exhibited in the scheme of Calvinism. According to this scheme, all
those who are not elected to eternal life are set apart as the objects on
which the Almighty intends to manifest the glory of his justice. But how
is this glory, or his justice, manifested? Displayed, we are told, by
dooming its helpless objects to eternal misery for the non-performance of
an impossible condition! A _display_ of justice this, which, to the human
mind, bears every mark of the most appalling cruelty and oppression. _A
display of justice stamped with the most terrific features of its
opposite_; so that no human mind can see the glory of the one, for the
inevitable manifestation of the other! No wonder that Calvinists
themselves so often fly from the defence of such a display of the divine
justice, and hide themselves in the unsearchable clouds and darkness of
the divine wisdom. This being of course a display for eternity, and not
for time, they may there await the light of another world to clear away
these clouds, and reveal to them the great mystery of such a manifestation
of the divine justice. But whether that light will bring to view the great
mystery of the divine wisdom therein displayed, or the great secret of
human folly therein concealed, we can hardly say remains to be seen. The
view we take presents a glorious display of the divine justice for _time_
as well as for eternity.
Fourthly, this view not only shows the justice and the mercy of God,
separately considered, in the most advantageous light, but it exhibits the
sublime harmony which subsists between them. It presents not, like
Calvinism, a mercy limited by justice, and a justice limited by mercy; but
it exhibits each in its absolute perfection, and in its agreement with the
other: for, according to this view, the claim of mercy extends to all who
may be saved, and that of justice to those who may choose to remain
incorrigibly wicked. Hence, the claim of the one does not interfere with
that of the other; nor can we conceive how either could be more gloriously
displayed. We behold the infinite amplitude, as well as the ineffable,
unclouded splendour of each divine perfection, without the least
disturbance or collision between them. In the very act of punishment, the
tender mercy of God, which is over all his works, concurs, and inflicts
that suffering which is demanded by the good of the universe. The torment
of the lost, is “the wrath of the Lamb.” The glory of the redeemed, is the
pity of the Judge. Hence, instead of that frightful conflict which the
scheme of Calvinism presents, we behold a reconciliation and agreement
among the divine attributes, worthy the great principle of order, and
harmony, and beauty in the universe.
Section VI.
The question submitted.
We must now take leave of the reader. We have honestly endeavoured to
construct a Theodicy, or to vindicate the divine glory as manifested in
the constitution and government of the moral world. We have endeavoured to
reconcile the great fundamental doctrines of God and man with each other,
as well as with the eternal principles of truth. It has likewise been our
earnest aim, to evince the harmony of the divine attributes among
themselves, as well as their agreement with the condition of the universe.
In one word, we have aimed to repel the objections, and solve the
difficulties which have been permitted to obscure the glory of the Divine
Being; whether those difficulties and objections have seemed to proceed
from the false philosophy of his enemies, or the mistaken views and
misguided zeal of his friends. How far we have succeeded in this attempt,
no less arduous than laudable, it is not for us to determine. We shall,
therefore, respectfully submit the determination of this point to the calm
and impartial judgment of those who may possess both the desire and the
capacity to think for themselves.
THE END.
FOOTNOTES
1 Johnson’s Works, vol. iv, p. 286.
2 Institutes, b. ii, c. iii.
3 Scott’s Luther and Ref., vol. i, pp. 70, 71.
4 Institutes, b. i, c. xv.
5 Ibid., b. ii, c. ii.
6 Ibid.
7 Dick’s Theology.
8 Bondage of the Will, sec. xxvi.
9 Ibid.
10 Progress of Ethical Philosophy, note O. Indeed, this distinction
appears quite as clearly in the writings of Augustine, as it does in
those of Luther, or Calvin, or Hobbes. He repeatedly places our
liberty and ability in this, that we can “keep the commandments _if
we will_,” which is obviously a mere freedom from external
co-action. See Part ii, ch. iv, sec. 2.
11 Literary Remains, p. 65.
12 Ethique, premiere partie, prop. xxvi.
13 Ibid., prop. xxxiv.
14 Ethique, Des Passions, prop. ii and Scholium.
15 Œuvres de Spinoza, tome ii, 350.
16 Introduction to the “Œuvres de Spinoza,” by M. Saisset.
17 Book ii, chapters 21, 27.
18 Disquisitions and Introduction, p. 5.
19 Helvetius on the Mind, p. 44.
20 Mr. Stewart says: “Dr. Hartley was, I believe, one of the first (if
not the first) who denied that our consciousness is in favour of our
free-agency.”—_Stewart’s Works_, vol. v, Appendix. This is evidently
a mistake. In the above passage, Leibnitz, with even more point than
Hartley, denies that our consciousness is in favour of free-agency.
21 Essais de Theodicee, p. 99.
22 “Hobbes defines a free-agent,” says Stewart, “to be ‘he that can do
if he will, and forbear if he will.’ The same definition has been
adopted by Leibnitz, by Collins, by Gravezende, by Edwards, by
Bonnet, and by all later necessitarians.” The truth is, as we have
seen, that instead of adopting, Leibnitz has very clearly refuted,
the definition of Hobbes. Mr. Harris, in his work entitled “The
Primeval Man,” has also fallen into the error of ascribing this
definition of liberty to Leibnitz. Surely, these very learned
authors must have forgotten, that Leibnitz wrote a reply to Hobbes,
in which he expressly combats his views of liberty.
23 Essais de Theodicee, pp. 5, 6.
24 Id., p. 8.
25 Inquiry, part ii, sec. viii.
26 Day’s Examination of Edwards on the Will, sec. v, pp. 80, 81.
27 Inquiry, part iv, sec. 9.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., sec. 7.
30 Institutes of Theology, vol. ii, part iii, chap. i.
31 Lectures on Theology, by the late Rev. John Dick, D. D.
32 Dissertation, p. 41.
33 Dick’s Lectures, vol. ii, p. 157.
34 History of the Reformation, b. v.
35 Hill’s Divinity, ch. ix, sec. iii.
36 The Divine Government, Physical and Moral, b. iii, ch. i, sec. iii.
37 Id., b. iii, ch. i, sec. ii.
38 Ibid.
39 The Divine Government, Physical and Moral, b. iii, ch. i, sec. ii.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 The Divine Government, Physical and Moral, b. iii, ch. i, sec. ii.
44 Hume’s Works, Liberty and Necessity.
45 Bacon.
46 Of Liberty and Necessity.
47 Although Mr. Hume gives precisely the same definition of liberty as
that advanced by Hobbes, Locke, and Edwards, he had the sagacity to
perceive that this related not to the freedom of the will, but only
of the body. Hence he says, “In short, if motives are not under our
power or direction, which is confessedly the fact, we can _at bottom
have_ NO LIBERTY.” We are not at all surprised, therefore, at the
reception which Hume gave to the great work of President Edwards, as
set forth in the following statement of Dr. Chalmers, concerning the
appendix to the “Inquiry.” “The history of this appendix,” says he,
“is curious. It has only been subjoined to the later editions of his
work, and did not accompany the first impression of it. Several
copies of this impression found their way into this country, and
created a prodigious sensation among the members of a school then in
all its glory. I mean the metaphysical school of our northern
metropolis, whereof Hume, and Smith, and Lord Kames, and several
others among the more conspicuous infidels and semi-infidels of that
day, were the most distinguished members. They triumphed in the book
of Edwards, as that which set a conclusive seal on their
principles,” &c.—_Institutes of Theology_, vol. ii, ch. ii.
48 Of Liberty and Necessity.
49 Ibid.
50 Mill’s Logic, pp. 522, 523.
51 Mill’s Logic, book ii, chap. v, sec. 4.
52 Metaphysics of Ethics.
53 Knapp’s Theology, p. 520.
54 Reid’s Works, note, p. 611.
55 Id., p. 599, note.
56 Progress of Ethical Philosophy, p. 275.
57 Mœhler’s Symbolism, p. 117
58 Novum Organum, book i, aph. 69.
59 Institutes, book i, chap. xviii.
60 Institutes, book i, chap. xvi.
61 Id., book ii, chap. iv.
62 Id., book i, chap. xviii.
63 Id., book iii, chap. xxiii.
64 Id., book iii, chap. xxiii, sec. 4, 7.
65 Institutes, book i, chap. xiv, sec. 16.
66 Theodice, p. 365.
67 Institutes, book i, chap. xiv.
68 Institutes, book iii, ch. xxiii.
69 Id., book i, ch. xviii.
70 See Mœhler’s Symbolism.
71 Théodicée, p. 85.
72 Id., p. 264.
73 Théodicée, pp. 89, 90.
74 Progress of Ethical Philosophy, p. 114.
75 Inquiry, p. 246
76 Inquiry, part iv, sec. ix.
77 Letter vii.
78 Inquiry, part iv, sec. ix.
79 Edwards’s Works, vol. vii, p. 406.
80 Théodicée, p. 327.
81 Howe’s Works, p. 1142.
82 On the Will, part iv, sec. ix.
83 Emmons’s Works, vol. iv, p. 372.
84 Ibid., p. 388.
85 Ibid., p. 327.
86 Institutes of Theology, vol. ii, chap. iii.
87 Emphatically as this conclusion is stated by Spinoza, and harshly as
it is thrust by him against the moral sense of the reader, he could
not himself find a perfect rest therein. Nothing can impart this to
the reflective and inquiring mind but truth. Hence, even Spinoza
finds himself constrained to speak of the duty of love to God, and
so forth; all of which, according to his own conclusion, is
irrelative nonsense.
88 Original Sin, part ii, chap. i, sec. i.
89 Original Sin, part ii, ch. i, sec. i.
90 Inquiry, part iv, sec. i.
91 They are accustomed to boast, that no man ever excelled Edwards in
the _reductio ad absurdum_. But we believe no one has produced a
more striking illustration of his ability in the use of this weapon,
than that which we have just adduced. For if we contend, that every
act is to be judged according to its own nature, whether it be good
or evil, he will demonstrate, that we render virtue impossible, and
exclude it entirely from the world. On the other hand, if we shift
our position, and contend that no act is to be judged according to
its own nature, but according to the goodness or badness of its
origin or cause, he will also reduce this position, diametrically
opposite though it be to the former, to precisely the same
absurdity; namely, that it excludes all virtue out of the world, and
banishes it from the universality of things! Surely, this _reductio
ad absurdum_ is a most formidable weapon in his hands; since he
wields it with such destructive fury against the most opposite
principles, and seems himself scarcely less exposed than others to
its force.
92 Inquiry, part iv, sec. x.
93 Religious Affections, part iii, sec. ii.
94 Ibid.
95 Dr. Woods.
96 Ibid.
97 Inquiry of President Edwards, part iv, sec. 1.
98 Institutes of Theology, part iii, chap. i.
99 President Edwards.
100 Dr. Chalmers.
101 Psychology, p. 247.
102 History of Ancient Philosophy, vol. iii, p. 555.
103 Ibid.
104 President Edwards’s Works, vol. ii, p. 16.
105 Id., vol. v, pp. 10, 11.
106 Id., vol. iv, p. 82.
107 Ibid.
108 Inquiry, p. 17.
109 Inquiry, part i, sec. iii.
110 Id., part i, sec. iv.
111 Inquiry, pp. 54, 55.
112 Inquiry, p. 55.
113 Id., p. 50.
114 Inquiry, p. 54.
115 Id., p. 55.
116 Inquiry, p. 77.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Id., p. 78.
120 Id., p. 79.
121 Théodicée.
122 Inquiry, p. 277.
123 Id., pp. 50, 51.
124 Remarks upon Collins’s Philosophical Inquiry.
125 Inquiry, p. 198.
126 Edwards’s Inquiry, p. 178.
127 See Examination of Edwards on the Will.
128 Discours de la Conformité de la Foi avec la Raison.
129 See Examination of Edwards on the Will, sec. ix.
130 President Day on the Will, p. 160.
131 Inquiry, p. 203.
132 Dissertation, p. 181.
133 Inquiry of Edwards, p. 222.
134 Edwards’s Inquiry, p. 222.
135 A different view of the Pelagian doctrine on this point is given by
Wiggers, and yet we suppose that both authors are in the right. The
truth seems to me, that Pelagius, as usually happens to those who
take one-sided views of the truth, has asserted contradictory
positions.
136 The way of Life, chap. iii, sec. ii.
137 Knapp’s Theology, vol. ii, p. 471. Note by the translator.
138 Institutes, b. iii, ch. xxiv.
139 Ibid.
140 Essais de Théodicée.
141 Cudworth’s Intellectual System.
142 Starkie on Evidence.
143 Théodicée.
144 See Chapter III.
145 Compare Chap. III.
146 Intellectual System, vol. ii, p. 328.
147 Id., vol. ii, p. 149.
148 Cudworth’s Intellectual System, vol. ii, p. 338.
149 Dwight’s Sermons, vol. i, pp. 254-412. Dick’s Lec., p. 248.
150 Witherspoon, as quoted in “New and Old Theology,” issued by the
Presbyterian Board of Publication.
151 D’Aubigne’s History of the Reformation, book xiii.
152 Old and New Theology, p. 38.
153 The writer here speaks from personal experience.
154 Old and New Theology, p. 40.
155 Pensées, I. Partie, art. iv, sec. vii.
156 Old and New Theology.
157 Examination of Edwards on the Will.
158 Theology, vol. i, p. 358.
159 Ibid.
160 Butler’s Analogy, part i, chap. ii.
161 Robert Hall, a profound admirer of Howe, has pronounced his attempt
to reconcile the sincerity of God with the universal offer of
salvation, to be one of his great master-pieces of thought and
reasoning.
162 Hagenbach’s History of Doctrines, vol. ii, p. 259.
163 Institutes, book iii, chap. xxiv, sec. xvii.
164 Institutes, book iii, chap. xxiv, sec. xvi.
165 Id., sec. xiii.
166 We do not intend to investigate the subject of a limited atonement
in the present work, because it is merely a metaphysical off-shoot
from the doctrine of election and reprobation, and must stand or
fall with the parent trunk. The strength of this we purpose to try
in a subsequent chapter.
167 Lectures on Theology, vol. i, p. 458.
168 Lectures on Theology, p. 458.
169 Edwards’s Works, vol. ii, p. 548.
170 Edwards on Original Sin, part iv, chap. iii, p. 543.
171 Encheir., c. 46, 47. See also remarks by the American editor and
translator.
172 See p. 284.
173 If God, out of the abundance of his compassion, imputes the sins of
parents only to the third or fourth generation, how has it happened
that Adam’s transgression is imputed to all his posterity, and
punished throughout all generations? Is there any consistency, or
harmony, in such views respecting the government of the world?
174 Wiggers’s Presentation, note by translator, p. 285.
175 Edwards on Original Sin, part iv, ch. iii.
176 Institutes, book ii, ch. i.
177 Divine Attributes.
178 Sermon on Original Sin.
179 Original Sin, part i, ch. ii.
180 Original Sin, part i, ch. ii.
181 Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles, article ix.
182 Ibid.
183 Edwards on Original Sin, part iv, ch. iii.
184 See Knapp’s Theology, vol. ii, art. ix, sec. 76; also Wiggers’s
Presentation of Augustinism and Pelagianism, chap. xix, p. 268.
185 Harmonie de la Raison et de la Religion.
186 Ibid., Almeyda.
187 Wiggers’s Presentation of Augustinism and Pelagianism, chap. iv.
188 Sermon on Compassion.
189 Butler’s Analogy, part i, chap. iii.
190 Analogy, chap. v.
191 Id., chap. v, p. 178.
192 Part i, chap. vi.
193 Part i, chap. ii.
194 This language of Bacon is applied by him to the empirical and
rational faculties of the human mind.
195 Butler’s Analogy, part ii, chap. v.
196 Analogy.
197 Ibid.
198 Letter on the Duration of Future Punishment, pp. 19, 20.
199 Letter, &c., pp. 15-18.
200 Robert Hall supposes that Edwards must have found it in Owen. He
might have found it in a hundred earlier writers.
201 Wiggers’s Presentation, p. 210—Note by Translator.
202 Wiggers’s Presentation, p. 210—Note by Trans.
203 Freedom of the Will, p. 38.
204 Letter, pp. 21, 22.
205 Jeremy Bentham.
206 On one point we fully concur with Mr. Foster, (see Letter, p. 27:)
“As to religious teachers, if this tremendous doctrine be true,
surely it ought to be almost continually proclaimed as with the
blast of a trumpet, inculcated and reiterated, with ardent passion,
in every possible form of terrible illustration; no remission of the
alarm to thoughtless spirits.”
But if it be so incumbent on religious teachers, who believe this
awful tenet, thus to proclaim it to a perishing world, is it not
equally incumbent on them not to speak on such a subject at all
until they have taken the utmost pains to form a correct opinion
concerning it? If the man who merely proclaims this doctrine in the
usual quiet way of preachers, while he sees his fellow-men perishing
around, is guilty of criminal neglect, what shall we say of the
religious teacher who, without having devoted much time to the
investigation of the subject, exerts his powers and his influence to
persuade his fellow-men that it is all a delusion, and that the idea
of endless misery is utterly inconsistent with the goodness of God?
How many feeble outcries and warnings of those who are so terribly
rebuked by Mr. Foster, may be silenced and forever laid to rest by
his eloquent declamation against the doctrine in question, and how
many souls may be thereby betrayed and led on to their own eternal
ruin! Yet, wonderful as it may seem, Mr. Foster tells us that his
opinion on this awful subject has not been the result of “a
protracted inquiry.” In the very letter from which we have so
frequently quoted, he says: “I have perhaps been too content to let
an opinion (or impression) admitted in early life dispense with
protracted inquiry and various reading.” Now, is this the way in
which a question of this kind should be decided,—a question which
involves the eternal destiny of millions of human beings? Is it to
be decided, not by protracted inquiry, but under the influence of an
“impression admitted in early life?”
207 Surely a very singular doctrine to be found in a prophecy.
208 Institutes, book iii, ch. xxi.
209 Ibid.
210 Wiggers, ch. xvi.
211 Wiggers’s Presentation, ch. xvi.
212 Institutes, book iii, ch. xxi.
213 Hill’s Divinity, p. 525.
214 Id., p. 526.
215 Hill’s Divinity, p. 562.
216 Institutes of Theology.
217 Institutes of Theology, vol. ii, ch. vii.
218 Institutes of Theology, vol. ii, ch. vii.
219 Whewell’s History of the Inductive Sciences, vol. i.
220 Intellectual System, vol. ii, p. 349.
221 Théodicée, Abrégé de la Controverse.
222 Ibid.
223 Abrégé de la Controverse.
224 Reflexions sur le Livre de Hobbes.
225 Analogy, part i, chap. vii.
226 Remarques sur Le Livre de M. King, sec. xvi.
227 Origin of Evil, vol. ii, ch. v, sec. v.
228 Dictionary, Article Paulicians.
229 It is not exactly just to rank Hall among the Arminians. His scheme
of doctrine, if scheme it may be called, is, like that of so many
others, a heterogeneous mixture of Calvinism and Arminianism—a
_mixture_, and not an _organic compound_, of the conflicting
elements of the two systems.