The sentiments of Hume, Brown, Comte, and Mill, in relation to the
antagonism between liberty and necessity.
Mr. Hume has disposed of the question concerning liberty and necessity, by
the application of his celebrated theory of cause and effect. According to
this theory, the idea of power, of efficacy, is a mere chimera, which has
no corresponding reality in nature, and should be ranked among the
exploded prejudices of the human mind. “One event follows another,” says
he; “but we never can observe any tie between them. They seem _conjoined_,
but never _connected_.”(44)
We shall not stop to examine this hypothesis, which has been so often
refuted. We shall merely remark in passing, that it owes its existence to
a false method of philosophizing. Its author set out with the doctrine of
Locke, that all our ideas are derived from sensation and reflection; and
because he could not trace the idea of power to either of these sources,
he denied its existence. Hence we may apply to him, with peculiar force,
the judicious and valuable criticism which M. Cousin has bestowed upon the
method of Locke. Though Mr. Hume undertakes, as his title-page declares,
to introduce the inductive method into the science of human nature, he
departed from that method at the very first step. Instead of beginning, as
he should have done, by ascertaining the ideas actually in our minds, and
noting their characteristics, and proceeding to trace them up to their
sources, he pursued the diametrically opposite course. He first determined
and fixed the origin of all our ideas; and every idea which was not seen
to arise from this preëstablished origin, he declared to be a mere
chimera. He thus caused nature to bend to hypotheses; instead of
anatomizing and studying the world of mind according to the inductive
method, he pursued the high _a priori_ road, and reconstructed it to suit
his preëstablished origin of human knowledge. This was not to study and
interpret the work of God “in the profound humiliation of the human
soul;”(45) but to re-write the volume of nature, and omit those parts
which did not accord with the views and wishes of the philosopher. In the
pithy language of Sir William Hamilton, he “did not anatomize, but
truncate.”
If this doctrine be true, it is idle to talk about free-agency, for there
is no such thing as agency in the world. It is true, there is a thing
which we call volition, or an act of the mind; but this does not produce
the external change by which it is followed. The two events co-exist, but
there is no connecting tie between them. “They are _conjoined_, but not
connected.” In short, according to this scheme, all things are equally
free, and all equally necessary. In other words, there is neither freedom
nor necessity in the usual acceptation of the terms; and the whole
controversy concerning them, which has agitated the learned for so many
ages, dwindles down into a mere empty and noisy logomachy. Indeed, this is
the conclusion to which Mr. Hume himself comes; expressly maintaining that
the controversy in question has been a dispute about words. We are not to
suppose from this, however, that he forbears to give a definition of
liberty. His idea of free-agency is precisely that of Hobbes, and so many
others before him. “By liberty,” says he, “we can only mean a power of
_acting or not acting according to the determination of the will_: that
is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also
may.”(46) Such he declares is all that can possibly be meant by the term
_liberty_; and hence it follows that any other idea of it is a mere dream.
The coolness of this assumption is admirable; but it is fully equalled by
the conclusion which follows. If we will observe these two circumstances,
says he, and thereby render our definition intelligible, Mr. Hume is
perfectly persuaded “that all mankind will be found of one opinion with
regard to it.” If Mr. Hume had closely looked into the great productions
of his own school, he would have seen the utter improbability, that
necessitarians themselves would ever concur in such a notion of
liberty.(47)
If Mr. Hume’s scheme were correct, it would seem that nothing could be
stable or fixed; mind would be destitute of energy to move within its own
sphere, or to bind matter in its orbit. All things would seem to be in a
loose, disconnected, and fluctuating state. But this is not the view which
he had of the matter. Though he denied that there is any connecting link
among events, yet he insisted that the connexion subsisting among them is
fixed and unalterable. “Let any one define a cause,” says he, “without
comprehending, as part of the definition, a _necessary connexion_ with its
effect; and let him show distinctly the origin of the idea expressed by
the definition, and I shall readily give up the whole controversy.”(48)
This is the philosopher who has so often told us, that events are
“conjoined, not connected.”
The motives of volition given, for example, and the volition invariably
and inevitably follows. How then, may we ask, can a man be accountable for
his volitions, over which he has no power, and in which he exerts no
power? This question has not escaped the attention of Mr. Hume. Let us see
his answer. He admits that liberty “is essential to morality.”(49) For “as
actions are objects of our moral sentiment so far only as they are
indications of the internal character, passions, and affections, it is
impossible that they can give rise either to praise or blame, when they
proceed, not from these principles, but are derived altogether from
external violence.” It is true, as we have seen, that if our external
actions, the motions of the body, proceed not from our volitions, but from
external violence, we are not responsible for them. This is conceded on
all sides, and has nothing to do with the question. But suppose our
external actions are inevitably connected with our volitions, and our
volitions as inevitably connected with their causes, how can we be
responsible for either the one or the other? This is the question which
Mr. Hume has evaded and not fairly met.
Mr. Hume’s notion about cause and effect has been greatly extended by its
distinguished advocate, Dr. Thomas Brown; whose acuteness, eloquence, and
elevation of character, have given it a circulation which it could never
have received from the influence of its author. Almost as often as divines
have occasion to use this notion, they call it the doctrine of Dr. Brown,
and omit to notice its true atheistical paternity and origin.
The defenders of this doctrine are directly opposed, in regard to a
fundamental point, to all other necessitarians. Though they deny the
existence of all power and efficacy, they still hold that human volitions
are necessary; while other necessitarians ground their doctrine on the
fact, that volitions are produced by the most powerful, the most
efficacious motives. They are not only at war with other necessitarians,
they are also at war with themselves. Let us see if this may not be
clearly shown.
According to the scheme in question, the mind does not act upon the body,
nor the body upon the mind; for there is no power, and consequently no
action of power, in the universe. Now, it is known that it was the
doctrine of Leibnitz, that two substances so wholly unlike as mind and
matter could not act upon each other; and hence he concluded that the
phenomena of the internal and external worlds were merely “_conjoined_,
not _connected_.” The soul and body run together—to use his own
illustration—like two independent watches, without either exerting any
influence upon the movements of the other. Thus arose his celebrated, but
now obsolete fiction, of a preëstablished harmony. Now, if the doctrine of
Hume and Brown be true, this sort of harmony subsists, not only in
relation to mind and body, but in relation to all things in existence.
Mind never acts upon body, nor mind upon mind. Hence, this doctrine is but
a generalization of the preëstablished harmony of Leibnitz, with the
exception that Mr. Hume did not contend that this wonderful harmony was
established by the Divine Being. Is it not wonderful that so acute a
metaphysician as Dr. Brown should not have perceived the inseparable
affinity between his doctrine and that of Leibnitz? Is it not wonderful
that, instead of perceiving this affinity, he should have poured ridicule
and contempt upon the doctrine of which his own was but a generalization?
Mr. Mill, another able and strenuous advocate of Mr. Hume’s theory of
causation, has likewise ranked the preëstablished harmony of Leibnitz, as
well as the system of occasional causes peculiar to Malebranche, among the
fallacies of the human mind. Thus they are at war with themselves, as well
as with their great coadjutors in the cause of necessity.
M. Comte, preëminently distinguished in every branch of science, has taken
the same one-sided view of nature as that which is exhibited in the theory
under consideration; but he does not permit himself to be encumbered by
the inconsistencies observable in his great predecessors. On the contrary,
he boldly carries out his doctrine to its legitimate consequences, denying
the existence of a God, the free-agency of man, and the reality of moral
distinctions.
Mr. Mill also refuses to avail himself of the notion of liberty
entertained by Hobbes and Hume, in order to lay a foundation for human
responsibility. He sees that it really cannot be made to answer such a
purpose. He also sees, that the doctrine of necessity, as usually
maintained, is liable to the objections urged against it, that “it tends
to degrade the moral nature of man, and to paralyze our desire of
excellence.”(50) In making this concession to the advocates of liberty, he
speaks from his own “personal experience.” The only way to escape these
pernicious consequences, he says, is to keep constantly before the mind a
clear and unclouded view of the true theory of causation, which will
prevent us from supposing, as most necessitarians do, that there is a real
connecting link or influence between motives and volitions, or any other
events. So strong is the prejudice (as he calls it) in favour of such
connection, that even those who adopt Mr. Hume’s theory, are not
habitually influenced by it, but frequently relapse into the old error
which conflicts with the free-agency and accountability of man, and hence
an advantage which their opponents have had over them.
These remarks are undoubtedly just. There is not a single writer, from Mr.
Hume himself, down to the present day, who has been able either to speak
or to reason in conformity with his theory, however warmly he may have
embraced it. Mr. Mill himself has not been more fortunate in this respect
than many of his distinguished predecessors. It is an exceedingly
difficult thing, by the force of speculation, to silence the voice of
nature within us. If it were necessary we might easily show, that if we
abstract “the common prejudice,” in regard to causation, it will be as
impossible to read Mr. Mill’s work on logic, as to read Mr. Hume’s
writings themselves, without perceiving that many of its passages have
been stripped of all logical coherency of thought. The defect which he so
clearly sees in the writings of other advocates of necessity, not
excepting those who embrace his own paradox in relation to cause and
effect, we can easily perceive in his own.
The doctrine of causation, under consideration, annihilates one of the
clearest and most fundamental distinctions ever made in philosophy; the
distinction between _action_ and _passion_, between _mind_ and _matter_.
Matter is passive, mind is active. The very first law of motion laid down
in the Principia, a work so much admired by M. Comte and Mr. Mill, is
based on the idea that matter is wholly inert, and destitute of power
either to move itself, or to check itself when moved by anything _ab
extra_. This will not be denied. But is mind equally passive? Is there
nothing in existence which rises above this passivity of the material
world? If there is not, and such is the evident conclusion of the doctrine
in question, then all things flow on in one boundless ocean of passivity,
while there is no First Mover, no Self-active Agent in the universe.
Indeed, Mr. Mill has expressly declared, that the distinction between
agent and patient is illusory.(51) If this be true, we are persuaded that
M. Comte has been more successful in delivering the world from the being
of a God, than Mr. Mill has been in relieving it from the difficulties
attending the scheme of necessity.