Canadian ocean mail service (_cont._)--Series of disasters to
Allan line steamers.
The year 1859 was a notable one in the history of transportation in
Canada. In May, the steamers of the Allan line commenced their weekly
trips between Liverpool and Quebec. In November, the completion of the
Victoria Bridge over the St. Lawrence carried the lines of the eastern
division of the Grand Trunk into Montreal, thus connecting by
uninterrupted railway communication the cities of Quebec and Portland
with the metropolis, and establishing a continuous line of railway from
the Atlantic seaboard to the western boundary of the provinces. In the
same month, also, the Grand Trunk extended its line across the border as
far as Detroit, bringing, by means of allied systems in the United
States, the cities of Chicago and New Orleans into communication with
the eastern states and with Europe by the railway system along the
shores of the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence.
The system of land transportation between the ports of the Atlantic and
the cities on the Mississippi being thus perfected, and available for
the conveyance of mails between Europe and the heart of North America by
practically continuous conveyance, the postmaster general of Canada,
Sidney Smith, proceeded to Europe to improve, as far as possible, the
communication between the important cities of Great Britain and the
sailing ports of the Canadian vessels, and to arrange for the
exploitation of this transportation system, in the interests of Canada.
Before leaving for England Smith paid a visit to Washington, and laid
before the postmaster general there the advantages offered by the system
under his control. He pointed out that, by the Grand Trunk railway, the
journey between Portland and Chicago was made in forty-nine hours, and
between Quebec and Chicago in forty-five hours, and, by making Cork a
port of call for the mails, the voyage between land and land would be
several hundred miles shorter than by any other route.
Smith's proposition was to convey the United States mails to and from
Europe for the sea postage only, and to allow these mails to be carried
across Canada without charge on the understanding that the Canadian
mails to and from Great Britain should be carried free across the United
States territory during the period of winter when the steamers called at
Portland. The proposition was accepted by the postmaster general of the
United States.
In London, where he arrived at the end of November, Smith submitted his
scheme to the postmaster general,[309] who made the objection that the
sailing arrangements interfered with the plans made for the other
transatlantic mail steamers. Fortunately Smith had the support of the
postmaster general at Washington, who was much impressed with the merits
of the Canadian scheme, and who, in his annual report expressed the
opinion that it would afford the most direct and probably the most
expeditious communication between Chicago and Liverpool.
At the instance of the department at Washington, the general post office
agreed to send by the Canadian steamers the correspondence for both the
eastern and western States, and also agreed to Smith's request for
special trains for the mail service from London to Cork. This special
railway service, with its connecting mail boat service across the Irish
Channel gave the British public a full business day more to prepare
their correspondence for the States.
The mails had, in ordinary course, to be prepared in London early
Wednesday morning to catch the outgoing steamer which left Liverpool the
same evening, but the special train from Dublin to Cork enabled
correspondents to hold over their urgent letters until Wednesday evening
and send them by the evening mail to Ireland, where connection was made
on Thursday morning with the steamer which had left Liverpool on the
previous evening.
But this was not the only, or perhaps the greatest, of the advantages of
the scheme. Transatlantic cables were still in the future, but the
telegraphic systems on both sides of the Atlantic were fully developed,
and messages for New York or Montreal could be addressed to the steamer,
which would deliver them at Father Point, on its way up the St.
Lawrence, from there they were sent by telegraph to their destination.
One of the leading London papers declared that the plan would save two
full days for telegrams, and permit transactions on the stock exchange
in London up to Thursday afternoon to be communicated to the stock
exchanges in the United States on the Saturday of the following week,
and the action taken in these centres transmitted to London by the
Canadian steamers leaving Quebec the same day.
Having completed these arrangements in London, Smith next addressed
himself to the postal administrations of France, Belgium and Prussia. In
the month that had elapsed since the negotiations with London had been
concluded, the steamers had crossed the Atlantic both ways, and the
Canadian postmaster general was able to inform the continental
administrations that on the first voyage the mails from Chicago had
reached London in twelve days, and that the conveyance from New Orleans,
in which France had a special interest, ought to be effected in less
than fifteen days.
The French government, to whom Smith offered the same terms for
conveyance by steamer and railway in Canada as had been accepted in the
United States, immediately closed with Smith on these terms, subject to
the consent of Great Britain. In a few days Belgium took similar action,
while Prussia deferred acceptance until the postmaster general of Canada
could confer with the United States.
Entirely satisfied with the success of his mission to the Continent,
Smith returned to London to conclude the transaction by obtaining the
permission of the British post office to act as intermediary for the
payments which would be made by the French and other Continental
governments to Canada for the conveyance of their mails to America.
The necessity for having Great Britain as the intermediary for the
settlement of these accounts arose from the following considerations.
Great Britain had open accounts with all these countries. The mails from
these countries were carried to the United States by British steamers,
for which they became indebted to the British government; while on the
other hand mails from Great Britain for the countries of eastern Europe
and for India, passed over one or other of these countries through their
postal systems, which gave rise to an indebtedness on the part of Great
Britain.
Under conventions with each of them, settlements were made from time to
time. None of this accounting machinery existed between Canada and any
of these countries. The only country in Europe with which Canada had an
open account was Great Britain.
In consequence of Canada's isolation in this respect the only way these
countries could settle their debts to Canada was by direct payments.
This, however, would involve legislation, at least in the case of
France, which would have delayed the beginning of the plans for many
months. Canada, therefore, had but one way open, which was to ask the
British post office to receive from France the amounts due by that
country to Canada, and apply these sums to the account between Great
Britain and Canada.
The favour to Canada appeared slight enough but the British post office
refused to grant it. First, it objected that the arrangements would
involve a great deal of trouble; and afterwards, when driven from that
ground, it took an extraordinary position. The British post office
declared that the British mails exchanged with the United States were
treated in that office as mails carried by packets under contract with
the United States, and that it would be inconvenient and objectionable
to treat French mails, carried by the same Canadian vessels, as mails
conveyed by British packets.
It maintained, furthermore, that the postmaster general of the United
States, having entered into an agreement with the Canadian post office
for the transmission of United States mails by the Canadian vessels,
might very naturally object to any arrangement between the British and
French post offices under which the French mails were paid for as mails
conveyed by Great Britain's packets.
The pettifogging of disobliging illwill could go no further. In no
single respect did the service rendered to the United States by the
British government, in conveying the mails of that country to Great
Britain, differ from the services rendered to the United States by the
Canadian government in the conveyance of the United States mails to
Great Britain by the steamers of the Canadian line. Both were paid by
the United States for the service, and the fact that the British took
pay from the United States no more rendered the Cunard an American line,
than a similar fact regarding the Canadian government made the Canadian
an American line.
Smith, in dwelling upon this point, affected to discover that the ground
of the British official objection, was that the Cunard Company received
a subsidy from the British government, while the Canadian Company did
not. If this were indeed the difficulty at which the British office
stumbled, and the Canadian line could be made British by granting a
subsidy for its maintenance, it was important that it should have
impressed upon it this distinctive mark of British nationality.
But these arguments fell upon deaf ears. The French office tried to
make the British officials see reason, but their success was no better.
The situation became one of real difficulty. The French could have
invoked the assistance of the United States and asked that country to
act as intermediary in the settlement of the account between France and
Canada, but there would have been much delay, as the United States would
almost certainly seek an explanation of the attitude of Great Britain
toward her colony, and that would not have been easy to give.
The British post office, however, suggested a way out of the difficulty.
Taking its stand on the ground that the Canadian steamers were part of
the United States packet service, the British post office held that the
proper course for France was to arrange the matter of payment with the
United States post office. But as the negotiations between the United
States and France might delay the start of the service, the British
expressed its willingness as a temporary measure to take from the French
government the sums due to Canada, and pay them over to whom? To the
Canadian government to whom alone they belonged? Not at all. It would
pay these sums to the postmaster general of the United States.
Smith, the postmaster general of Canada, contended no further. He
thanked the postmaster general of England for his consideration, and
addressed himself to the director of the French posts, and to the
postmaster general in Washington. But the director was completely
puzzled, and sought an explanation of the British post office.
Disclaiming the right to interfere in any agreement between the British
and Canadian offices, he declared himself unable to understand why this
payment should be made to the United States, or how it could possibly
happen that the United States should have any right to claim any sea
rate. He set out all the facts of the case, and after looking them over
carefully, he repeated that he did not understand why the amount paid by
the French government to the British office for conveyance under the
British flag by Canadian packets should be paid over to the United
States office.[310]
By the middle of February 1860, Smith was back in the United States,
and at Washington. Within a day he concluded arrangements by which,
among the other matters, the United States post office agreed to accept
the sums due to Canada by France and the other Continental countries.
Provision was also made for the exceptional handling of correspondence
for New Orleans and other southern cities by the officials of the
Canadian service.
The matter of accounting having been arranged on this basis the Canadian
line began to be employed extensively on both sides of the Atlantic. Two
changes were made in 1860, which augmented its efficiency. As it was
found that Cork was out of the way of steamers from Quebec to Liverpool,
in May, Londonderry, at the north of Ireland was substituted as the last
port of call.
This change had the additional advantage that it enabled the steamers to
take a later mail from Scotland, and it avoided the rivalry with the
Cunard and Inman lines, which made Cork their port of call in Ireland.
The other amelioration in this arrangement was the taking on and the
disembarkation of mails at Riviere du Loup, a point on the St. Lawrence
one hundred and twenty miles below Quebec. The extension of the Grand
Trunk railway to this point shortened the sea-voyage by some hours, as
the stretch of water between Quebec and Riviere du Loup present
difficulties, and not infrequently dangers, which prevent rapid travel.
With the arrangements thus complete, the St. Lawrence route was much
superior to any other as far as the Canadian mails were concerned. In
1863, four-fifths of the mail carried between Canada and Britain were
carried by the Canadian steamers, the remainder being taken by the
Cunards. In order to participate in the exchange between Great Britain
and the United States, it was necessary to make its arrangements conform
with the arrangements made by those countries.
Under this scheme, the week was divided into two parts, Great Britain
providing for the total conveyance for one of the parts and the United
States the other. Thus the United States took upon itself the
accumulated mails for the first three days of the week from England, and
the Cunard steamers, which left England on Saturday, took those of the
last part.
There was an American steamer which sailed from Southampton on
Wednesday, which took all the mails for the United States that could be
gathered at that point until the time of its departure, and the Canadian
steamer, which was adopted by the American post office, took those which
could be gathered at Liverpool for the sailing from that point on
Thursday and at Londonderry on the following day.
The Canadian steamers offered great advantages to northern England and
to Ireland and Scotland. In the conveyance from this side of the
Atlantic, the arrangements were reversed, the British steamers sailing
from New York on Wednesday, and the American later in the week. The
Allan Company were fortunate in securing Saturday as their sailing day
from Quebec, as their steamers were able to take a large American mail
as well as nearly all that from Canadian offices.
Most of the foreign correspondence of Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa,
Illinois, Minnesota and Indiana were carried by the Canadian route,
while, during the winter months, half the mail from New England and a
large volume from New York were despatched by this line. By the
arrangements with the post offices of France, Belgium and Prussia, a
considerable quantity of mails were exchanged by this line between the
United States and nearly every country in Europe.
The achievement of the Canadian steamship line, in the face of unusual
difficulties, was a matter of pride to the people of Canada, and the
postmaster general, who had exhibited noteworthy energy in exploiting
the possibilities of the service, dwelt with much satisfaction, in his
several reports to the legislature, on the measure of success attained
in competition with the lines running to the ports of the United States.
But these successes were bought at a heavy price. In the weekly race
across the Atlantic, much was sacrificed to speed. Risks were taken
which, with the imperfect knowledge then existing of the sailing route,
could lead to but one result. Vessel after vessel was lost under
circumstances that excited a growing horror and resentment among all
classes of the people. During the seven years between June 1, 1857, and
February 22, 1864, no less than eight of the finest vessels in the
service went down, carrying with them many hundreds of human beings.
The first mishap took place within six months of the commencement of the
service by the Allan line. In November 1856, the "Canadian," in her
course up the St. Lawrence, ran ashore, owing to either the negligence
or the ignorance of the pilot. She was got off without injury. But the
"Canadian" was less fortunate in June 1857, when, from the same cause,
she again ran ashore. This time it was impossible to free her, and she
had to be abandoned, a total loss. The year 1858 passed without trouble
of any kind, and as the voyages were increased from fortnightly to
weekly, confidence was high that the superiority of the Canadian line
was to be demonstrated, and the supremacy of the Atlantic wrested from
the Cunards.
But with the inauguration of the weekly service, and of the declared
competition with the steamers sailing in and out of New York, a series
of disasters commenced, which threw a shadow over the whole enterprise.
In the five years following the establishment of weekly service, the
Canadian line lost more first class vessels than all the other companies
engaged in transatlantic conveyance, and during the same period, as if
to remove any doubt as to the locality to which these disasters were
attributed, every vessel lost went down on this side of the
Atlantic.[311]
In the winter of 1859, two of the finest vessels of the line were lost,
and with them a great number of lives. The winter route of the Allan
steamers between Liverpool and Portland ran westward from Ireland to
Cape Race, the south-eastern extremity of Newfoundland, thence to the
waters between Sable Island and Nova Scotia, the coast of which the
steamers skirted for its whole length. After getting clear of Cape
Sable, the southerly point of Nova Scotia, vessels had a deep water
passage for the rest of the voyage.
The Nova Scotia coast was a source of much anxiety to navigators. The
"Columbia," the only vessel of the Cunard line which was lost until this
time, was wrecked on this coast, as were also the "Humboldt" of the
American line and the "City of Manchester" of the Inman line. It was on
this coast also that the two Allan ships were wrecked. On the 29th of
November, the "Indian," on her way out from Liverpool, ran ashore on the
"Deal Ledges" near the fishing hamlet of Marie Joseph. Parting
amidships, some sixty of her passengers were lost. It was made clear
that the captain had taken every precaution after leaving Cape Race, but
he had been misled by defective charts.
Three months later, on the 20th of February, 1860, the "Hungarian" went
down among the rocks off Cape Sable, and not a soul on board was saved.
This steamer was the pride of the fleet. She was a new vessel, and had a
record of three consecutive passages in twenty-seven days and
twenty-three hours. The facts disclosed by the investigation were few.
But it did transpire that the captain was noted for a certain dash
rather than for seamanly prudence. It was said that by his skill in
shaving sharp corners and scudding over shoals, and by his recklessness
in keeping up a head of steam, he had converted the slowest of the
Canadian steamers into the fastest.
News of the disaster to the "Hungarian" soon reached Montreal. It was
melancholy news for the city, and public grief was soon followed by
popular anger with the Allan Company and with the postmaster general.
Smith was denounced by the legislature as _particeps criminis_ in the
destruction of the lives which had been lost on the "Hungarian."
A parliamentary investigation was ordered into the circumstances, and
the report[312] of the committee is instructive in the information it
gives on the coast lights, and on the problems, which the substitution
of iron for wood in the construction of steam vessels raised for those
dealing with questions of navigation.
Neither Sable Island nor Cape Sable, on the winter route, were provided
with lighthouses; and the lower St. Lawrence was most inadequately
furnished with the indispensable guides for sailing by night. From
Forteau Bay on the straits of Belle Isle, a vessel ran four hundred and
fifty miles before it passed a lighthouse, and it then entered a stretch
of one hundred and twenty miles which it was obliged to make without the
assistance of lights.
On the comparative merits of iron and wooden vessels, expert opinion was
unanimous in favour of wooden vessels. It was considered that, in the
event of a vessel being wrecked or stranded, there was less liability of
loss of life in the wooden vessel. There was also the effect of the
material of which the vessels were built on the working of the compass.
In iron vessels, the compasses were a source of great and continued
anxiety.
Before the vessels proceeded to sea, the local attraction from the ship
was neutralized by magnets and, thus adjusted, the compasses acted with
tolerable accuracy while the vessel was at sea and beyond the influence
of land attraction. But when approaching the land the compasses were not
to be depended upon. There was, it was asserted, an attraction from the
land, but whether the mass of iron in the vessel was first acted upon by
the land attraction, was a problem of which the existing state of
science did not afford a solution.
The Cunard line at this time--1860--consisted of ten vessels. Only two
were of iron; and it was noted that the irregular action of the compass
on the iron vessel "Persia," after it left Cape Race, led the vessel
into danger which was only averted by unusual care with the soundings.
The committee of the legislature concluded by expressing a fear that,
until new light had been thrown on the susceptibilities and workings of
the mysterious magnetic forces, it might be necessary to abandon the
construction of iron vessels.
Misfortune continued to dog the course of the Canadian steamers. In 1861
two more vessels were lost--both on the St. Lawrence route.
The "Canadian," the second of the name, launched in 1860, set out from
Quebec for Liverpool on the 1st of June. Reaching the straits of Belle
Isle two days later she encountered a heavy gale and great masses of
ice. About eight miles from Cape Bauld, the northernmost point of
Newfoundland, the vessel was struck by a sunken floe, which tore a hole
in her side under the water-line, and she sank in two hours. Twenty-nine
of the passengers and crew were drowned, including James Panton, the
mail officer, who neglected the means of safety in his endeavours to
save the mail.
The only criticism made by the board of trade court was that the straits
route being a perilous one except at the height of the season, the
sailing instructions which gave masters a discretion of taking this
route after the 20th of May ought to be amended by fixing the earliest
date at a month later.
At the end of the season--on the 5th of November--the "North Briton" ran
ashore in an attempt to make the passage between the Island of Anticosti
and the Mingan Islands. The circumstances that the vessel entered the
passage an hour after midnight, with a heavy sea running, were noted by
the marine court. But they confined themselves to a censure on the
captain for some lack of vigilance, not considering it necessary to
deprive him of his certificate.
Again there was a burst of public indignation, and a demand that the
government should dissociate themselves from the contract. The
postmaster general pleaded that such action would, in the eyes of the
foreign governments, be tantamount to a confession that Canadians had
lost faith in their route. He assured the legislature that he was
bringing effective pressure on the Allan Company to compel them to
perform their contract satisfactorily.
The complete immunity from accident during 1862 seemed to indicate that
the measures forced upon the company by the postmaster general were
successful. But the faith of the Canadian in the superior advantages of
their route was soon to be put to further trials.
Between the 27th of April, 1863, and the 22nd of February, 1864--a scant
ten months--three vessels of the line were lost. The first of these, the
"Anglo-Saxon," which crashed into the rocky coast of Newfoundland, a few
miles above Cape Race, gave some point to the observations of the
commission as to the disturbing influences operating upon the compasses
of vessels as they approached land.
The "Anglo-Saxon" left Liverpool on the 16th of April, and for the first
nine days made an uneventful voyage. A clear, bright day on the 26th
gave the captain an opportunity to make observations, and ascertain the
ship's position; and as the weather was steady, he was able to run under
full steam and sail.
Next morning it was foggy; and John Young--a former commissioner of
public works, and one of the chief advocates of the Canadian ocean
service--asked the captain if it was his intention to make Cape Race.
The captain said it was not, as by noon they would be twenty miles south
of the Cape. About eleven o'clock Young's attention was directed to what
appeared to be a huge iceberg close at hand. He ran towards the deck,
but before he could reach it the ship struck, and he found himself
facing a precipitous mass of rock so lofty that in the fog he could not
see the top of it.
Instead of being sixteen or seventeen miles south of Cape Race, the
vessel was four miles above it. Though they were so close to land that
many passengers saved themselves by creeping along the mast to the
shore, 238 passengers were drowned, including the captain, whose faulty
seamanship had brought about the calamity.
This shore is the most dangerous on the north Atlantic. Besides the
magnetic influences, there is an underplay of powerful currents, which
makes navigation in these waters difficult and dangerous. The
Newfoundland government published a list in 1901 showing that
seventy-seven vessels, great and small, had been lost on the Cape or
within a few miles to the north or west of it.
Not quite two months later than the disaster of April 27, 1863, while
excitement in Canada was still running high, the public were dumbfounded
by the news of another disaster. The "Norwegian," a vessel built only
two years, left Liverpool on the 4th of June. On the 10th she entered a
dense fog which continued at short intervals until the 13th. At noon
that day the fog lifted and the steamer put on full steam. At two
o'clock in the morning land was sighted, which the captain took to be
Newfoundland.
The ship's course was altered in accordance with that view, and although
the fog fell densely, speed was not reduced. At seven o'clock there was
a cry of breakers, and before the steamer could be checked or turned,
she struck heavily upon the rocks of St. Paul's Island, a point in the
Gulf of St. Lawrence, a few miles north of Cape Breton. The ship's
position was so dangerous that the passengers were landed on the island.
Afterwards the cargo and mails were secured.
The public were bewildered by the accumulation of disasters. The captain
of the "Norwegian" was especially known as a careful and skilful
navigator, and there was a persistent and vigorously expressed demand on
the Allan Company for an explanation. To their plea of the danger of the
route, the answer was that the "Hungarian," "Indian," and "Anglo-Saxon"
were wrecked on a route over which the Cunard steamers had been passing
in safety for years.
Iron vessels accordingly came in for condemnation. Except two, all the
Cunard steamers were of wood, and these iron vessels were run only
between Liverpool and New York, over a route all the way on the broad
ocean.
The wreck of the "African" of the Cunard line on the coast of
Newfoundland, which took place about this time, under circumstances
similar to those attending the loss of the "Anglo-Saxon," showed, it was
claimed, the superiority of the wooden vessels, when overtaken by
accident. She was pierced in several places, but was not smashed as an
iron hull would have been. Consequently, when the vessel got free of the
rocks it was able to reach St. Johns where it put in for repairs.
The remainder of the summer of 1863 passed without incident, and a
considerable part of the winter, when on the 22nd of February, 1864, the
"Bohemian" in her passage to Portland, struck on Alden's Rock, close to
her destination, and overturned, sinking within an hour and a half. The
passengers and crew numbered 317 persons, and of these forty-three were
drowned by the capsizing of one of the lifeboats. The court of inquiry
attributed the catastrophe to the neglect of the captain to take the
ordinary precautions, when confronted with a perilous situation, and he
was deprived of his certificate for twelve months.
During the period between the wreck of the "Canadian" the first, in
1857, and the sinking of the "Bohemian" in 1864, there were thirteen
vessels lost, of all lines engaged in the transatlantic trade, and of
these eight were of the Canadian line.
The Canadian government and the Allan Company were subjected to a
pitiless condemnation; and, with a change of administration in 1863, the
new government lost no time in taking steps to end the contract.
Oliver Mowat, the new postmaster general, on the 12th of August, 1863,
presented a report to the executive council recounting the attempts of
the Canadian government to establish a Canadian line of steamers from
1853, when the first contract was made with the Liverpool firm of
Mackeen, McLarty and Company. The contract with this firm called for a
fortnightly service in summer and monthly in winter, with screw steamers
of not less than 1200 tons, the subsidy from which was to be L24,000 a
year.
In consequence of the default of the contractors, a new contract was
made with Hugh Allan. The frequency of the service, and the amount of
the subsidy remained unchanged, but Allan engaged to employ vessels of
1750 tons, instead of 1200.
On the 12th of October, 1857, a new contract was entered into with Allan
for weekly service to commence on the 1st of May, 1859. The size of the
vessels required was again increased, and the new steamers had to be
built to 2000 tons. The subsidy was to be L55,000. By 1860, three
vessels had been lost, and Allan, having found that the loss in carrying
on the weekly service was far beyond his calculations, notified the
government of his intention to terminate.
The government, believing that it was essential to hold public
confidence in the route, and that this could be best done by enabling
the contractor to provide larger and more powerful vessels to replace
those which had been lost, determined to offer a much larger subsidy,
and to stipulate for vessels of 2300 tons. A new contract embodying
these conditions was made, and the compensation was fixed at L104,000.
In brief this was the situation when Mowat became postmaster general,
though there had been negotiations between Smith and the Allan Company
for a reduction of the subsidy. With the sanction of the government,
Mowat cancelled the contract on April 1, 1864, and began negotiations
for a new contract.
Mowat perceived that, unless there was to be a lapse in the service on
the 1st of April, he must make his arrangements with Allan, since there
was no other vessel owner in a position to take up the service on the
termination of the contract. Mowat was the less reluctant to renew an
engagement with Allan, as he recognized the courage, energy and
perseverance of the latter, and was convinced that Allan's experience
would give him a great advantage over any other contractor.
The new contract contained provisions which were a confession that the
government had been far from blameless for the losses of the several
vessels of the Allan line. The mail steamers were expressly forbidden to
approach Cape Race when the weather was so foggy or tempestuous as to
make it dangerous to do so; when the presence of fog or ice should
render it perilous to run at full speed the captain was to be impressed
with the duty of slackening speed or of stopping the vessel as the
occasion dictated, and the time so lost was to be allowed to the
contractor in addition to the time specified for the length of the
voyage.
Other precautions were taken by the contractor. The first vessel
lost--the "Canadian" in June 1857--was cast on shore by the incompetency
of the pilot, and the contractor made it his business to secure the best
pilots, instead of taking the first that presented himself, as the
practice had been. Another vessel was wrecked on a dangerous shore of
the Island of Anticosti. This channel was thereafter abandoned by the
vessels of the line.
As a consequence of these provisions and precautions, aided, doubtless,
by greater care on the part of the sailing masters, accidents to the
vessels ceased altogether. During the twenty-five years that ensued
there was but one vessel lost. The outstanding feature of the whole
business was the dogged resolution of Allan to justify his faith in the
possibility of the Canadian route, and in his ultimate success he
rendered an incalculable service to Canada.
FOOTNOTES:
[309] _Sess. Papers_, Canada, 1860, No. 8, contain all the papers
bearing on the continental negotiations narrated.
[310] A lengthy review of the papers included in the _Sess. Papers_, No.
8, of 1860, appears in the _Toronto Leader_, the leading government
organ of March 8, 1860. The writer notes that "Lord Elgin and Rowland
Hill seem to have been firmly convinced, in their own minds, that a
Canadian steamer is an American steamer," and observes that "the English
officials shifted the grounds of their objections several times, till
finally, as rheumatism is said to do after shifting from one part of the
body to the other, they vanished altogether before the force of Mr.
Smith's arguments, till nothing but naked obstinacy remained."
[311] P.M.G.'s report to council, December 7, 1863 (_Sess. Papers_,
Canada, 1864, No. 28).
[312] _Journals of Assembly_, Canada, 1860, App. 14.