Durham's report on the post office--Effects of rebellion of
1837 on the service--Ocean steamships to carry the mails--The
Cunard contract--Reduction of Transatlantic postage.
The long controversy which had agitated the legislatures of the
provinces was approaching its end. The decision on the constitutional
point was given in their favour, though they did not know it; but the
specific thing for which they had contended, they were constrained to
relinquish.
The Upper Canada legislature which had commenced the agitation, and
elaborated the argument against the constitutional standing of the
British post office in the colonies, had become convinced that the
provincial system, which they demanded, was not in the interest of
either the mother country or the colonies. They therefore asked the
British government to put the stamp of legality on the existing system,
by suitable legislation in the imperial parliament.
But the argument of Upper Canada had done its work too well, and it
became the turn of the British government to employ it, to show the
impossibility of meeting the desires of Upper Canada. The difficulty
now, however, was not one of principle, but of ways and means.
The British government were quite willing that the colonial legislatures
should have full information as to the financial operations of their
post offices, and that the surplus revenue, if any, should be divided
among them. All they required was that the colonial legislatures should
by concurrent action devise the means by which the ends in view might be
effected. The British parliament was, in the opinion of the law
officers, precluded from interposing its authority in the settlement of
the difficulty.
Durham, who was sent out to Canada as high commissioner to inquire into,
and, if possible, remedy the defects in the system of government, which
kept the colonies in a chronic state of dissatisfaction, was directed to
give his attention to the condition of affairs in the post office.
In his general report, he dealt briefly with this topic, expressing full
sympathy with the colonial view, and giving it as his opinion that if
his proposition for a union of the provinces should be adopted the
control of the post office should be given up to the colonies.[253] But
he added the recommendation that, whatever arrangements of a political
nature might be made, the management of the post office throughout the
whole of British North America should be conducted by one general
establishment. This suggestion was not realized until the confederation
of the provinces in 1867.
The rebellion in Upper and Lower Canada in 1837 and the following year
was productive of much embarrassment to the post office. Many of the
postmasters, particularly in Lower Canada, were open sympathisers with
the rebels, and, through the opportunities afforded by their post office
duties, assisted largely in the carrying out of their leaders' schemes.
Stayner had realized the impolicy of many of the appointments to post
offices in Lower Canada. But as the local government was continually
appointing to the highest offices men who were conspicuous in the
support they lent to the views of Papineau, he did not conceive himself
warranted in noticing facts which were ignored by the governor.
There were at least from thirty to forty postmasters besides several
mail couriers in Lower Canada implicated in the rebellion. The governor
general in Lower Canada, and the lieutenant governor in Upper Canada
gave their attention to the conditions, each after his manner.
Gosford, the governor general, having been informed of the disloyalty of
the postmasters at Stanstead and Lacolle, suggested that these officials
should be dismissed as soon as it could be done without prejudice to the
service.[254]
Bond Head, the lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, directed the local
surveyor to dismiss the postmaster at Lloydtown instantly, for having,
as he said, sent to Mackenzie a series of traitorous resolutions to
which the postmaster had attached his name as corresponding secretary of
the West King and Tecumseth Political Union. Head explained to Stayner
that he was aware that the usual course was to have the dismissal made
by the deputy postmaster general, but as he desired to produce a certain
moral effect by instant punishment, he was compelled to act through
Stayner's agent.
Furthermore, Bond Head asked that Stayner should delegate to Berezy,
the surveyor, the power to dismiss peremptorily any person connected
with the post office whom the lieutenant governor should judge to have
failed in loyalty. Head was an arbitrary personage, who never gladly
suffered the execution of his wishes to linger after their utterance.
A painful instance of the hardships inflicted upon innocent men in times
of political turmoil was the dismissal of Howard, the postmaster of
Toronto.[255] His offence was not disloyalty. Even Bond Head would not
venture to say that he was disloyal--but merely that his friendships
were so far inclusive as to embrace men of widely differing political
opinions.
James Howard had been connected with the post office in Toronto for
eighteen years, during eight of which he had been postmaster. Testimony
abounded as to his zeal and efficiency as a public official. Stayner
reported to the postmaster general that Howard was a man of excellent
character, and one of the best officers in the service.
An aspect of Howard's conduct, which won Stayner's warm commendation,
was his withholding himself from all forms of political activity.
"People in our department," wrote Stayner to Howard, some years before,
"cannot too carefully abstain from identifying themselves with factions
or parties of any kind."
Secure in the approbation of his chief, Howard, following his natural
inclination, moved quietly through the troubled times, which were
heading for an outbreak, and delivered the letters to Loyalist and
Reformer, to Tory and Radical, with even-handed indifference. It would
seem, too, that in the choice of his friends, he exhibited a like
insensibility to the explosive possibilities of some of their opinions.
A few days after the public disturbances began, it was intimated to
Howard that his general attitude towards affairs was not quite
satisfactory, and he at once demanded an investigation. There was
nothing to investigate. But a hint was conveyed to him that he was too
intimate with "those people."
It was decided to have the correspondence of suspects placed under
surveillance. But the duty was not confided to Howard. Letters supposed
to contain information of the rebels were sent to the bank of Upper
Canada, where they were subjected to scrutiny.
On December 13, 1837, eight days after the rebellion broke out, at
Montgomery's Tavern, Toronto, Howard was removed from his office by the
orders of the lieutenant governor. He was replaced by Berezy, the post
office inspector, who throughout the rebellion was active as the
confidential agent of Bond Head. Howard appealed to the lieutenant
governor, protesting his perfect loyalty, and declaring that so far from
concerning himself with politics, he had never voted in his life.
No statement could have been more unfortunate. Head, always a partisan,
was unable to understand how a man could suppose himself to be loyal,
and confess to such a degree of indifference, when the safety of the
country was at stake. The admonition of the deputy postmaster general
was pleaded. Bond Head would not listen. Friends of the government, of
the tried qualities of Fitzgibbon, vouched for Howard's loyalty. It was
to no purpose.
The lieutenant governor declared that he had his reasons for believing,
not only that Howard favoured the disaffected party, but that he had
actually become "subservient to the execution of the treasonable plans."
No evidence has ever been produced to support these accusations. But
Head, in his flamboyant style, prated about the struggle being waged
between monarchy and democracy, and contrasted Howard's indifference
with the zealous devotion of the chief justice and one of the judges,
who, shedding the ermine, took up their muskets in the defence of the
country--and their jobs and perquisites.
Head indulged himself in several similar excesses of authority, always
justifying himself on the ground that he was a protagonist in a death
struggle with the arch-enemy Democracy. When quiet was restored, Howard
renewed his appeals for redress, but the clique surrounding the governor
contrived to frustrate all his efforts in that direction.
In the spring of 1839, a robbery of the mails took place on the grand
route, at a point between Kingston and Gananoque, under circumstances of
peculiar aggravation.[256] The robbers, who lived on an island in the
St. Lawrence, within the territory of the state of New York, made no
attempt at concealment. They openly declared that this was only the
first of a series of similar interferences with the courier passing
between Upper and Lower Canada.
The New York state authorities, who were appealed to, were powerless to
act, but the secretary of state at Albany intimated that it would not
be regarded as a breach of amity if the Canadian officials arrested the
robbers on the island. In view, however, of the excitement which
prevailed at that period on both sides of the border, it was thought
prudent to refrain from so provocative a proceeding.
While Durham was occupied with his preparations for his mission to
Canada, events occurred which were not only of unsurpassed importance to
communication between Europe and America, but which seemed to promise a
strengthening of the relations between the mother country and her
colonies.
In April 1838, two steamships sailed from the United Kingdom for New
York--the "Great Western" from Bristol, and the "Sirius" from Cork--and
reached their destination safely, the former in fifteen days, and the
latter in seventeen days.[257]
As the voyages were made in the face of stiff, westerly winds, the speed
of the "Great Western" and the "Sirius" gave much satisfaction, and it
was accepted as settled that thereafter steam would be the motive power
in the faster vessels employed in the transatlantic trade.
The rapidity with which this conviction established itself was
remarkable. There is nothing surprising in the immediate recognition of
this new achievement of steam by speculative publicists, who saw in the
events only the realization of their visions, but the British treasury,
the arcanum of conservative caution, yielded with almost equal readiness
to the argument provided by the two vessels.
The British consul at New York was the first to bring to official
attention the importance of this advance in the art of navigation. By
the return of one of the vessels, he suggested to the colonial office
that all official despatches and commercial letters for the Canadas
should be directed to the consulate at New York. He undertook to assort
the correspondence, and forward it to Montreal and Toronto by queen's
messengers.
By avoiding the delays to which the regular couriers were subject, and
taking advantage, wherever possible, of the steamboats running on the
inland waters and of the railroads, which were beginning to be
constructed throughout the eastern states, the messengers would be able
to provide a greatly accelerated service. The answers to letters sent
from London or Liverpool to Canada should be back in those cities in
from thirty to thirty-five days--approximately the time taken by the
Halifax packets on a single trip.
The British post office saw reasons for declining the proposal, so far
as it regarded commercial correspondence. It was, however, prepared to
transmit official despatches by this means, and to arrange for their
conveyance from New York in the manner indicated by the consul.
The people of Halifax--who had always regarded with a jealous eye the
disposition of the inland British colonies, to use the port of New York
in preference to their own--managed, at this juncture in the history of
ocean transport, by an appeal to imperial considerations to make a
strong case for their port. By a happy chance, the "Sirius" on its first
homeward voyage, overtook the mail packet from Halifax, and the captain
of the packet, impressed by the higher speed of the steam vessel,
induced the captain of the "Sirius" to take the mails, with the result
that their arrival was advanced by several days.
Joseph Howe and some other gentlemen from the Maritime provinces who
happened to be passengers on the sailing packet when this incident
occurred, were struck with this demonstration of the superiority of
steam, and discussed among themselves whether this fact might not
indicate the means of overcoming, in favour of Halifax, the advantage
enjoyed by the port of New York.
On the arrival of Howe in London, a meeting was called of men interested
in the subject, and it was resolved to press their views on the
attention of the government. Several of the gentlemen wrote to the
colonial secretary, and a memorial of a more formal character was
submitted, bearing the signatures of Howe, as representative of Nova
Scotia, and of William Crane, a member of the legislature of New
Brunswick, as representative of that province.[258]
The views and arguments were of a character similar to those employed by
imperial federation leagues since that period--the shorter sea voyage,
the fostering of common interests among the provinces, and the
desirability of an interchange within the empire of news and
correspondence, uncontaminated by passage through a foreign channel.
At that period, the last of these points had a peculiar timeliness. The
rebellion in Upper Canada had just been subdued, but the embers were
ready to blaze up afresh with the first favouring breeze; while in Lower
Canada the outbreak was still unchecked. The fast sailing packets on the
New York-Liverpool route so far outsailed the post office packets which
ran to Halifax, that the news carried by way of New York was sometimes
weeks in advance of that which arrived by the Halifax packets.
As American popular sympathies, as distinct from official sympathy at
Washington and Albany, lay mainly with the rebels, and as newspaper
publishers were in general less scrupulous as to the veracity of their
news than they are to-day, it often happened that the British public,
and even the government in Downing Street, were grossly misled as to the
movement of events in the Canadas. The truth reached England eventually,
but it had the proverbial difficulty in catching up with the nimble
fiction, which had earlier circulation.
In September the treasury made its decision.[259] In the early part of
that month, the Great Western Steamship Company, which was organized in
1836 for the purpose of providing a steam service between Great Britain
and America, and which had been for some months past demonstrating the
entire feasibility of this class of service, applied to the government
for a contract for the conveyance of the mails to New York.
But the plea of Howe and Crane for a direct service prevailed. On
September 24 the treasury announced the substitution of steam vessels
for the sailing packets on the Halifax route, and directed that tenders
should be invited for such a service as the admiralty and post office
considered most suitable.
The treasury deprecated the haste with which the plans were being pushed
forward, suggesting that a winter's experience would be valuable in
dealing with so important a matter. But there were strong reasons for
avoiding unnecessary delay. Relations with the United States were
causing some anxiety, and as regards transatlantic correspondence, that
country stood in a position of advantage, which it seemed the business
of Great Britain to equalize as far as possible.
Tenders were invited for a steam packet service between Liverpool and
Halifax in November. But none of those submitted satisfied the
conditions prescribed by the government. Samuel Cunard, of Halifax, who
had had a large experience as a contractor for packet services, visited
England, and as the result of negotiations, entered into a contract with
the admiralty.
The contract called for two trips monthly each way between Liverpool and
Halifax, and for trips of the same frequency between Halifax and Boston,
and between Pictou on the gulf of St. Lawrence and Quebec: the vessels
to be employed to be of three hundred horse power for the transatlantic
service, and of one hundred and fifty horse power for the other two
routes. The contract was signed on May 4, 1839, the rate of payment
being L55,000 a year.
This rate underwent a rapid series of augmentations. Two months after
the contract was made L5000 a year was added to the rate on
consideration that the vessels should leave the American ports, as well
as Liverpool, on fixed dates. On September 1, 1841, the decision was
reached that vessels of a larger size than in the service should be
employed, and to secure these the rate was raised to L80,000.
Two years later, in consequence of representations by the contractors
that the amount of payment was insufficient to enable them to carry on
the service, L10,000 was added to the subsidy; and further additions
were made as the result of changes in the arrangements, which will be
detailed in their proper place.
In addition to the provision for the exchange of mails by the Cunard
steamers, between Great Britain and Canada and the United States,
arrangements were made for subsidiary services to Newfoundland and
Bermuda. Halifax, indeed, was being made the pivotal point of the most
extensive scheme ever attempted for the distribution of mails. All the
communications between Great Britain and the North American continent
were comprised in the plans.
The first trip by steamer between Liverpool and Halifax was made by the
"Britannia," which left Liverpool on July 1, 1840. The vessel reached
Halifax after a passage of twelve and a half days. The mails for Canada
were carried overland from Halifax to Pictou, from which point they were
delivered at Quebec five and a half days after their landing at Halifax.
As the vessel conveying the mails up the St. Lawrence from Pictou to
Quebec was delayed a day in the gulf by fog, there was reason for hope
that the passage from Liverpool to Quebec would not materially exceed
fifteen days.
The post office authorities at Halifax bent every effort to make the
enterprise a success. As an instance of their zealous energy, the
"Britannia," on its September sailing, reached Halifax on a morning at
seven o'clock. At a quarter to nine the mails for Canada were on their
way to Pictou; at ten the "Britannia" set out for Boston; and by noon
the vessels for Newfoundland and Bermuda had left for their
destinations.
Prince Edward Island did not at once enjoy the full benefits of these
efficient operations, but by a slight improvement in the arrangements,
the island was put on an equal footing with the other colonies.
The scheme, however, admirable as it was in conception, and successful
as it appeared to be in operation, had weaknesses, which were revealed
by time--weaknesses which before many years led to its abandonment.
The test of the success of such a scheme lay in its capability to
provide adequately for the exchanges with Canada. The mails to and from
Upper and Lower Canada were not only much greater in volume than those
exchanged with the other provinces, but owing to the existing political
conditions in the Canadas, were at the time of greater importance; and,
if, owing to any lack of co-operation on the part of the provinces
participating in the transmission of the mails between Halifax and
Quebec, or through other causes, these mails required a notably greater
length of time in their passage by the Halifax route than they would
have taken if landed at a port in the United States, the Halifax route
must be considered a failure.
This is exactly what happened. When the British government decided to
give the scheme a trial, it reminded the provinces concerned that there
were several months in every year when the mails must be carried between
Halifax and Quebec overland, and that this could be done successfully
only if the roads in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Quebec, over which
the mails must pass, were put in a condition to permit of fast travel by
carriage, night as well as day.
At the time--1840--the steamships began to run to Halifax, the situation
as regards the land routes was as follows: the distance from Halifax to
Quebec--seven hundred miles--was rarely covered by the mail couriers in
less than ten days. In the depth of winter, when the sleighing was good,
and advantage could be taken of the ice road on the St. John river
between Fredericton and the mouth of the Madawaska river, the journey
was made in some hours less than six days.
But it was seldom that conditions combined to make so fast a journey
possible, and it was not considered prudent to reckon on an average of
less than ten days. In the spring and autumn this length of time was
often greatly exceeded. Stayner, who went over the route in the autumn
of 1838, after calculating the effect of all practicable ameliorations,
did not believe that the time could be reduced to less than seven days.
As against this possible time, there was the fact that the journey from
New York to Quebec occupied only six and a half days in winter.
The farther west the point of comparison was carried, moreover, the
greater the disadvantage at which Halifax stood. The shortest time to be
anticipated in conveying the mails from Halifax to Montreal, after all
improvements had been made, was nine days. The courier from New York,
who had but half the distance to travel, delivered his mails in Montreal
in five days. Toronto, the capital of Upper Canada, and the entrepot for
the thriving and rapidly-spreading settlements in the west, was still
more easily reached from New York than from Halifax. The journey from
Halifax to Toronto covered a distance of one thousand two hundred and
twelve miles, and occupied more than two weeks. New York was only five
hundred and forty miles from Toronto, and the mails were carried between
the two places in seven days in winter.
Halifax is five hundred and fifty miles nearer Liverpool than is New
York, and consequently gained two days on the ocean voyage. But, in
point of time, the odds were hopelessly against Halifax, as the landing
port for the Canadian mails. The obvious political reasons, however, for
maintaining Halifax as the port of exchange between the North American
provinces, as a whole, and the mother country, provoked a determined
effort to remove, as far as possible, the natural obstacles which seemed
to prevent the achievement of that end.
Inquiry was directed first to the question of the best route. From
Halifax to Fredericton, the first important point at which the courier
arrived on his western journey, there were alternative routes, both of
which had been used in the conveyance of the mails to Canada. Since the
war of 1812, the courier had travelled along the northern shore of the
bay of Fundy, passing Truro, Dorchester and the bend of the Petitcodiac,
now Moncton.
This route was adopted first to avoid the necessity of the mails
crossing the bay of Fundy from Annapolis to St. John, with the risks of
falling in with American privateers, but after the termination of the
war, it was continued from choice.
The earlier route, from Halifax to Windsor and along the Annapolis
valley to Annapolis, still had its advocates, however; and inquiry was
made as to the advisability of returning to it. Under certain ideal
conditions, a better journey could be made by this route, but as these
involved heavy additional expense, and a nicety of connection between
the couriers and the packet boat at Annapolis, which was frequently
unattainable, the proposition was rejected.
The real difficulties for the courier began when he left Fredericton on
his journey to Quebec. The route lay along the shore of the St. John
river to the point where the Madawaska empties into it; thence in a
generally northern direction until the St. Lawrence is reached at the
head of the portage.
At this period--1840--there was no road whatever over any part of this
section of the route, though in 1839, a road called the Royal Road was
in course of construction between Fredericton and Grand Falls. The
schemes for the building of a road were embarrassed by the fact that for
nearly one hundred miles, the proposed road lay in the territory claimed
by the state of Maine, with the resulting risk that the expenditure upon
it might be lost.
The only mode of travel from Fredericton northward to the mouth of the
Madawaska was by canoe in summer. In the winter, when the ice was well
set, travel was very easy. But during the early spring and late autumn,
the floating ice made the journey in this part of the country one of
great hardship. On a trip made in April 1842, it required three men and
twelve horses to carry over this section a mail weighing not more than
seven or eight hundred pounds.
The Special Council of Quebec, which was in existence in 1838-1840,
owing to the suppression of the legislature due to suspension of the
constitution of 1791 in Lower Canada, at the urgent instance of
Sydenham, appropriated L5000 for a road over the portage between the St.
Lawrence and the St. John rivers. The legislature of New Brunswick also
made a liberal grant for the section lying in that province.
It is evident, therefore, that Halifax stood at an insurmountable
disadvantage as compared with the New York route during the winter
season. But, at least so far as concerned eastern Canada, the provincial
route was not greatly inferior to that through the United States, during
the period of open navigation on the St. Lawrence. The passage from
Liverpool to Quebec did not usually exceed sixteen days, and to Montreal
eighteen days.
An essential link in this conveyance was the overland route from Halifax
to Pictou. As this service furnished the connection between the steamers
on the Atlantic and those on the St. Lawrence, it was of the first
importance that the route should be traversed at a high rate of speed.
The route had been in use for many years for the exchange of local
mails, but the means of conveyance, which were sufficient for that
purpose, were entirely inadequate to the requirements of the ocean mail
service.
Cunard--who had every motive for expediting not only the mails, but the
passengers and freight passing to and from the Canadas--drew attention
to the necessity for ample provision for the new conditions. Unless he
were able to afford a fast and comfortable conveyance at a moderate
charge to his Canadian passengers, he could not hope to hold the
business. As it was desirable that he should be able to exercise control
over this part of the passage, he offered to provide the service between
Halifax and Pictou on terms, which were accepted by the deputy
postmaster general of Nova Scotia.
The service afforded left little to be desired in point of efficiency.
Four horse stages ran over the route three times each way weekly in
summer, and twice weekly in winter; the trip was to be made within
seventeen hours, and the charge to passengers was not to exceed L2
10_s_. The charge for each person had been, until the contract was made,
L6.
But accommodation such as this necessarily entailed considerable
expense, and the compensation to Cunard under the contract was so great
as seriously to embarrass the financial position of the post office in
Nova Scotia. This amount--L1550 per annum--was L1265 in excess of what
had been paid for this route before the British mails were carried over
it.
The revenues of the provincial post office were quite unequal to this
demand upon, them, and relief was sought from the legislature. That body
agreed to contribute L550, and Canada was asked to add L750 to that sum.
When Howe reported the facts to the postmaster general, the latter was
disposed to tax him with having acted without consideration, and
Sydenham was asked to give his opinion of the bargain.
The governor general laid the subject before the post office commission,
which was then sitting, and they denounced the whole arrangement. The
rate was extravagant, and the service provided for was entirely beyond
the necessities of the ocean mails. As the steamers were to sail only
twice a month, an express conveyance of that frequency was all that was
required.
As for Canada's being at any expense for this service, the commission
scouted the idea. The Cunard contract called for the transportation of
mails between Great Britain and Canada, which was to be effected by two
steamers, one running between Liverpool and Halifax, and the other
between Pictou and Quebec. Any expense there might be for overland
conveyance should fall upon the packet postage, that is, it should be a
charge upon the postage collected by the British post office for the
transmission of letters between Great Britain and Canada.
The British post office took a somewhat curious course in the
difficulty. It resented the criticism of the commissioners, and
sanctioned the agreement made by the deputy in Halifax, for a term of
eight years. It made no effort to convince the Canadian authorities of
the error in their views, which would indeed have been impossible; and,
on the other hand, it refused to allow the additional expense to be
thrown upon the packet postage. There was but one alternative--Nova
Scotia must bear the whole charge. And that was the decision of the
postmaster general.
The resentment throughout Nova Scotia at the injustice of this decision,
and the manifest inability of the provincial post office to carry the
added burden determined the postmaster general to make an effort to put
an end to the situation. In 1842 he sent an officer of the department to
Halifax to inquire into the whole provincial system, instructing him to
give his special attention to the question of the expediency of
continuing the use of the port of Halifax as the entrepot for the
Canadian mails.
The thing to be avoided was the long carriage by land, and the agent was
directed to consider the ports of St. John, New Brunswick and Boston
with this end in view. Boston was regarded with particular favour on
account of the railway lines, which were being extended inland from that
port. St. John was dismissed from consideration on a report from the
admiralty that until some progress had been made in the survey of the
bay of Fundy, especially of its tides and soundings, it would be very
hazardous to send the mails by that route.
On the question of the comparative advantages of the Halifax and Boston
routes there was practical unanimity in Canada. All classes of the
mail-using public were agreed as to the superiority of the Boston route.
The editors of newspapers complained that the British newspapers on
which they depended for their foreign news--newspapers which were
transmitted by way of Halifax--were useless by the time they reached
Canada, as the news they contained had been received from New York or
Boston several days earlier.
As for the objection to having the exchange of mails between Great
Britain and Canada carried on through a foreign country, the publishers
made light of it. The mails from England for India, were carried across
the Continent through France and Italy; and there was no reason why the
mails from England for Canada should not be carried through the United
States.
These views were strongly presented by Stayner, and reinforced by the
secretary of the post office, who laid them before the postmaster
general. The Cunards also rendered assistance to the same end. They
represented to the postmaster general that the service proved to be much
more expensive than they had anticipated when they undertook the
contract, and that the steamer on the St. Lawrence was a very heavy
burden. In discussing the question of an increased subsidy, the company
expressed their willingness to regard relief from the river service as
equivalent to L10,000 a year.
These concurrent appeals, together with the fact that the change in the
seat of government from Kingston to Montreal, established the governor
in the city which would derive the maximum of benefit from the Boston
connection, decided the government to make Boston the landing port for
the Canadian mails; and the British minister at Washington was
instructed to open negotiations for an arrangement by which the British
mails would be permitted to cross the territory of the United
States.[260]
It had long been an object of desire with the United States government
to retain the hold its geographical situation has given it upon the
correspondence between Great Britain and Canada. Before steam service
was a practicable scheme, the president in a message to congress
suggested that, to that end, the sailing packets should be put under
post office regulations, and a greater degree of security to the mails
thereby effected.
The United States government consequently were prepared to accept very
moderate terms. They based their offer on the terms of the contract
between the British and French governments for the conveyance of the
Indian mails from Calais on the Channel to Marseilles on the
Mediterranean. The British government paid the French government two
francs per ounce of letters and ten centimes for each newspaper
transmitted across French territory, and as the distance from Boston to
St. Johns in Lower Canada was rather less than half that from Calais to
Marseilles, they proposed that the British government should pay them
half the rates paid to the French government.
These rates were regarded by the postmaster general of England as
unusually favourable, and the proposal of the United States government
was at once accepted. Under this arrangement, the postmaster general
calculated that, besides the great saving in time that would be
effected, there would be a reduction in the charges for the inland
conveyance of the mails to and from Canada of L4600 per annum.
The course of conveyance across the territory of the United States was
to be, in summer, from Boston to Burlington, Vermont, towards which a
railway line was approaching completion, and from Burlington to St.
Johns by steamer on lake Champlain. In the winter, the mails were to be
carried from Boston to Highgate, Vermont, where they would be taken over
by couriers attached to the Canadian post office. The time occupied
would, under usual conditions, be forty-eight hours between Boston and
St. Johns, and fifty-three hours between Boston and Highgate.
Thus was the great experiment brought to its appointed end. It had its
origin in one of those imperial impulses, which seem to come most
frequently from the colonies, and which now and then carry the Briton
off his feet. But, as conditions stood, the scheme was foredoomed to
failure. It was not until the construction of the Canadian Pacific
railway in 1889, across the state of Maine between Montreal and St.
John, that a Canadian ocean port was able to enter into successful
competition with a United States port, as the point of exchange for
mails passing between Great Britain and Canada.
While the plans for substituting steam for sailing vessels were being
brought to maturity, the question of a substantial reduction in the
postage between Great Britain and the colonies in North America were
being discussed.[261] Stayner pointed out that it would be useless to
enter upon an expensive scheme for reducing the time occupied in
conveying the mails between Great Britain and Canada, unless the postage
were brought down to a figure that would place the steamship service
within reach of the farmers in western Canada.
As Sydenham observed, the new settlers, while living in great material
comfort, had little money at their disposal. To them it was an
impossibility to pay the postage--four shillings or more--which had
accumulated on a letter on its way from the inland parts of the United
Kingdom to the backwoods in which they were making homes for themselves.
They were served, and far from inefficiently, by the American ocean
sailing packets, which left Liverpool weekly for New York; and unless
the steam line were able to provide for the exchange of their letters at
rates as low as they were paying, they would no more patronize the new
line than they had the ten-gun sailing brigs, by which the British
packet service was then carried on.
Stayner, with full knowledge of the conditions he had to meet, was
convinced that the first step towards an effective reform was to sweep
away the cumulative rates made up of the inland charges in the United
Kingdom, the ocean postage and the inland colonial charge; and replace
them by one fixed rate which would carry the letter from any post office
in the United Kingdom to any post office in the colonies. When he first
laid the proposition before the postmaster general, the Duke of
Richmond, he recommended that this uniform rate should be two shillings
a single letter.
But after some years' opportunity for reflection, aided beyond doubt by
the argument of Rowland Hill for penny postage in Great Britain, Stayner
concluded that his proposed rate was too high, and that, at one shilling
and sixpence, or even one shilling and threepence, the increased
patronage of the line by the public in the motherland and the colonies,
would bring about an actual augmentation of the revenue.
How great the reduction in the charges would be, if Stayner's
proposition were carried into effect, may be gathered from the fact that
one of the elements making up the total postage was much in excess of
the whole sum suggested by Stayner. On the supposition that the
steamships landed the Canadian mails at Halifax, every letter brought by
that means to Toronto would be subject to a charge of two shillings and
ninepence for the conveyance from Halifax to Toronto, to say nothing of
the shilling charge for its passage from Liverpool to Halifax, and the
postage from the office of posting in the United Kingdom to Liverpool.
While negotiations with Cunard were still in progress, and the colonies
waited expectantly for what was to be achieved by the new service,
Stayner was much surprised and gratified to receive from the general
post office in London a circular addressed to the postmasters in the
United Kingdom stating that the postmaster general had decided to do
away altogether with the inland rate or rather to incorporate it with
the ocean rate which thenceforward would be one shilling.
This was beyond any anticipations Stayner had formed, and he lost no
time in apprizing the public in Canada of the boon conferred upon them.
There was rejoicing in Canada over the prospect of easy communication
with the mother country, and the postmaster general received many
commendations on his statesmanlike measure.[262]
But the rejoicing was not of long continuance. With the first intimation
at the general post office of the announcement made in Canada there was
despatched a letter from the secretary informing Stayner that he had
quite mistaken the purport of the circular. Though sent to Stayner for
his information, it was not intended to apply to Canada. The intention
was merely to take off the British inland postage, and to leave the
colonial inland postage to be collected as before. The reduction, in
reality, amounted to very little, as the bulk of the postage on letters
from Great Britain to Canada passing by way of Halifax had been that
part levied for the conveyance from Halifax to the office of delivery in
Canada.
Stayner was in no way to blame for the interpretation he placed on the
circular, and he had the satisfaction of knowing that his misconception
made the continuance of the high postage impossible. The public on both
sides of the ocean had tasted the blessings of communication with their
relatives on the other side, at an expense not considered beyond their
means, and they were determined not to have the benefit withdrawn.
Accordingly when Poulett Thomson, afterwards Earl of Sydenham, came out
as governor general with special instructions to remove all legitimate
causes of dissatisfaction, he addressed himself to this question, and
after a conference with Stayner, wrote to the colonial secretary urging
the adoption of the shilling rate.
The colonial secretary submitted the governor general's views to the
postmaster general, and in practical coincidence with the sailing of the
first steamer under the Cunard contract, instructions were issued to
make the total charge on letters to the British North American colonies
one shilling, if the letter was addressed to Halifax, and one shilling
and twopence, if its destination was inland, however distant.[263]
At the same time, a change of great importance was made in the principle
on which the postage was based. It had been the practice to charge
postage, according to the number of enclosures the letter contained.
When penny postage was introduced in England a few months previously,
one of the features of the new plan was the establishment of the weight
principle in determining the charge on a letter, in substitution of the
principle under which letters were taxed according to the number of
their contents.
The operation of the new plan in Great Britain caused much confusion and
loss in the correspondence with the colonies. The British or Irish
people, who had become accustomed to having their postage fixed by the
application of the rate of one penny for each half ounce, could not in
many cases be made to understand why the same principle did not apply to
their letters to their friends and relatives beyond the seas.
Hence many letters weighing less than half an ounce were sent to Canada,
which on examination were found to contain enclosures, and the postage
was, in accordance with the regulations, doubled or even trebled, though
their weight would not call for a charge of more than one shilling and
twopence.
Poulett Thomson drew attention to the obvious embarrassment occasioned
by the application of the two different principles, and he had the
satisfaction of finding a ready acquiescence in his views on the part of
the postal authorities at home. Accordingly, by the treasury minute of
July 6th, 1840, the rate on letters conveyed by direct packet from any
post office in the United Kingdom to Halifax was made one shilling the
half ounce. If, for any other post office, the rate was one shilling and
twopence.
FOOTNOTES:
[253] _Report on the affairs of British North America_ (Oxford, 1912),
p. 143.
[254] Stayner to governor general's secretary, December 8, 1837 (_Can.
Arch._, Br. P.O. Transcripts).
[255] Maberly to postmaster general, March 29, 1838, and accompanying
papers (_Can. Arch._, Br. P.O. Transcripts), and Q. 402-409 _passim_.
[256] _Can. Arch._, Q. 416, p. 49.
[257] Colonial office to post office, May 25, 1838 (_Can. Arch._, Br.
P.O. Transcripts).
[258] _Speeches and Public Letters of Joseph Howe_, 1909, I. 188.
[259] The succession of measures taken regarding the Cunard service may
be followed in the Br. P.O. Transcripts for 1838-1839-1840.
[260] Maberly to postmaster general, April 3 and September 28, 1844,
with accompanying papers (Br. P.O. Transcripts).
[261] The papers on the reduction of the ocean postage rates are
gathered together as accompaniments to a letter from Mr. Poulett
Thomson, the governor general, to Lord Russell, of April 16, 1840. See
Q. 271, p. 224.
[262] Stayner to Maberly, May 12, 1839, and accompanying documents (Br.
P.O. Transcripts).
[263] Treasury Minute, July 6, 1840 (Br. P.O. Transcripts).