The post office during the Revolution--Its suppression.
But the time was well past when the question as to what was or what was
not an allowable tax possessed any but an academic interest. Though the
stamp act was repealed a few months after it went into operation, the
trouble it aroused was not allayed. The gratitude of the colonists which
followed upon the repeal gave way to renewed irritation when it was
found that the ministry in London had only postponed, not definitely
abandoned, its schemes of taxation, and the late triumph gave vigour to
the determination of the colonists to continue their resistance.
Step followed step. All went to widen the breach, and diminish the
chances of a peaceful settlement. The post office soon became involved.
As we have seen, the ministry endeavoured to convict the colonists of,
at least, inconsistency when they objected to the stamp act, while
tolerating the post office. Franklin explained what seemed to him the
points of difference between the two things, without convincing the
ministry.
The colonists had fully shared Franklin's opinions, but the attitude of
the ministry caused them to look more thoughtfully into the matter. They
finally agreed that the ministry might be right in insisting that the
post office charges were a tax, and refused to use the institution any
longer. Finlay found that everywhere the view prevailed that the post
office was unconstitutional, and it was becoming hazardous to patronize
it.
While Finlay was in the southern states the Boston tea riots took place,
and before he reached New York on his return home, Franklin had been
dismissed, and he had been appointed to replace Franklin.
The reasons which led to Franklin's removal have been frequently stated.
They must be related again in order to complete the narrative. Franklin
had become possessed, by means still unrevealed, of a number of private
letters written by Hutchinson, governor of Massachusetts, and Oliver,
the lieutenant governor, to a friend in England. The letters dealt with
the condition of affairs in the colony, and discussed the situation
with the full freedom which a confidential correspondence is apt to
encourage.
Hutchinson and Oliver dwelt upon the turbulent disposition of Boston,
expressed grave doubts as to the possibility of allowing the full
measure of English liberty in the colonies, and asserted the necessity
of a military force to support the government. When these letters were
brought to Franklin, he saw the advantage that a knowledge of them would
give the colonists in the struggle then going on, and as the agent for
Massachusetts, he asked for permission to send the letters to the colony
for perusal by a few of the leading men. Permission was granted on
Franklin's express undertaking, that the letters should not be printed
or copied.
In Boston, the letters were passed from hand to hand among the popular
leaders, and were finally discussed at a secret sitting of the assembly.
The assembly adopted resolutions strongly condemnatory of Hutchinson and
Oliver, as sowers of discord between the mother country and the
colonies, declared the letters to be incitements to oppression on the
part of the ministry, and petitioned the king to remove Hutchinson and
Oliver from their government.
The publication of the letters gave rise to great astonishment in
England, and one of the consequences, before Franklin confessed his part
in the transaction, was a duel between a brother of the person to whom
the letters were written, and a gentleman whom he accused of disclosing
them to the public. In England Franklin met with universal condemnation,
and he was at once dismissed from his position as deputy postmaster
general in America.
It is noteworthy as illustrating, partly Franklin's good nature, and
partly the apparent inability of the officials of the post office to
understand the state of mind of the ministry, that in spite of his
dismissal or of the reasons for it, Franklin remained on good terms with
the heads of the post office.
There was some delay in settling the accounts of Franklin with the post
office, but that was due to a lack of promptness on the part of
Foxcroft, Franklin's official associate, in rendering the accounts. When
the balance due by Franklin was paid, his relations with the post office
did not entirely cease; for he offered himself, and was accepted, as one
of the sureties for Foxcroft on the re-appointment of the latter as
joint deputy postmaster general with Hugh Finlay.
For some time previous to the events which led to Franklin's removal
from the service, plans were being considered for putting the
administration of the post office on a better footing. Although New York
was, by the terms of the act of 1710, made the official headquarters of
the service, it had not been so up till this time. There seems to have
been no fixed official residence. In 1749, the deputy postmaster general
resided in Virginia, and his predecessor in North Carolina. Franklin and
Foxcroft both happened to live in Philadelphia, and that city
accordingly became the headquarters of the postal system.
It was determined in England that, after the 10th of October, 1773, New
York should be the permanent administrative centre. A central office was
to be established, a general secretary appointed, and suitable clerical
assistance provided for the carrying on of the work of administration.
When Finlay was made joint deputy postmaster general in Franklin's
place, he continued to act as travelling surveyor.
But the plans under contemplation did not come to maturity. Already
measures were on foot which in a short time deprived the post office of
its business in America. In March 1774, the colonists began a movement
to establish a postal system, which would be independent of the regular
post office.
The committee of correspondence in Boston, which was the organ through
which the opponents of government carried on their work, wrote to the
committee in Salem introducing William Goddard, and suggesting the
advisability of establishing a post office in America.[86]
The present post office, it was stated, was founded on an act of the
British parliament for raising a revenue from the colonies without their
consent, and for that reason was as obnoxious as any other revenue act.
The post office was being used as a precedent against the colonies when
they contested the right of parliament to tax them, and furthermore, was
now being employed to prevent the dissemination of popular intelligence.
Goddard, for whom the Boston committee bespoke good will, would explain
to their associates in Salem by what means certain newspapers identified
with the people's cause were prevented from circulating.
Goddard was not ill-fitted to take the lead in the agitation against the
post office. He was the son of the postmaster of New London, and had
been himself for two years postmaster of Providence, and in this way was
quite familiar with the details of work in a post office. Moreover,
during his residence in Providence, and afterwards in Philadelphia and
Baltimore, he was constantly engaged in newspaper enterprises.
As Goddard's schemes were, for the most part, unsuccessful, his wits
never lost the edge that adversity usually gives. His grievance was that
the post office charged rates so excessive on the newspapers he wished
to circulate that he was unable to send them to his readers throughout
the colonies.
What measure of truth there was in Goddard's statements we have no means
of ascertaining. But there was no doubt that the charge might be true,
without the post office exceeding its legal rights. The fact was that
newspapers had no special legal standing under the post office act.
That act was passed in 1710, when newsletters in manuscript were in
service and newspapers were too few and unimportant to engage the
attention of the post office or of parliament at the time the law was
being framed. Consequently no express provision was made for them in the
act. If newspapers were to be carried by the post office under the
authority of the act, it could only be by treating them as letters, and
a glance at the scale of charges will show the impossibility of
newspapers bearing so burdensome a tax.
The newspapers of that day were inconsiderable in size compared with
those that are now published, but few even at that time would weigh less
than an ounce, and an ounce letter passing between New York and
Philadelphia called for a postal charge of three shillings or
seventy-two cents. This sum was the lowest charge in the scale for ounce
letters passing between any two places of importance in America.
Clearly newspapers could not circulate by means of the post office if
they were to be regarded as letters. But as they were not mentioned in
the act, newspapers had at least the advantage of not being subject to
the postmaster general's monopoly. Publishers were free to turn to
account any means of conveyance that happened to be available, for the
distribution of their newspapers. Unfortunately, however, this freedom
was of little benefit at that period, as there were no courier services
regularly operating between the towns in America.
There was nothing for it but for publishers to take advantage of the
postal system if this were at all possible, and the possibility appeared
through one of those curious devices, which are the derision of logical
foreigners, but which afford a means of escape from the inconveniences
of a law, which it is not desired to alter at the time.
In England, where the situation of newspaper publishers was the same as
it was in America, the privilege of franking newspapers for transmission
through the mails was conferred upon certain officials of the post
office, called clerks of the road. Clothed with this privilege the
clerks of the road bargained with publishers for the conveyance of their
newspapers in the ordinary mails, and put the proceeds into their own
pockets.
It was a practice that was not regarded as in any way irregular. The
post office was quite aware that its vehicles were being used for the
conveyance of newspapers, from which it received no revenue, and it
congratulated itself that it had hit upon a contrivance for serving the
public without having to tamper with the act under which it operated.
The privilege of franking newspapers, which was enjoyed by the clerks of
the road in England, was also conferred upon the deputy postmasters
general in America, and colonial newspapers were distributed by the post
office under arrangements similar to those described. While the act
itself made no provision for the conveyance and delivery of newspapers,
this peculiar plan offered great advantages to the publisher.
There was, however, one serious objection to it. Not resting on the law,
but on the good will of those in authority, it could be terminated at
any time, and the post office might legally charge sums as high as the
postage on letters for the conveyance of newspapers. With this power in
its hands the post office had complete control over the fortunes of
newspaper publishers. If for any reason it desired to suppress a
newspaper, all that was necessary was to cancel the special arrangement
between the deputy postmaster general and the publisher, and leave to
the latter the option of paying letter rates or of finding some other
means of conveyance.
Whether this power was exercised in Goddard's case, is not known; that
it would be, if considered necessary, is beyond doubt. In 1737, the
clerks of the road in England were directed to take particular care that
no newspapers were sent by the post office which contained reflections
on the government,[87] and to assure themselves on the point, they were
to send no newspapers into the country at all, except such as were
purchased from a single dealer named in the order, whose loyalty and
judgment were not open to question. The possession of this power by the
government was quite sufficient to arouse reasonable apprehensions.
Goddard appears to have succeeded in his mission to Salem, as a few days
later the committee of that town, responding to the letter from Boston,
declared that the act of the British parliament establishing the post
office in America, was dangerous in principle and demanded peremptory
opposition.[88] A considerable sum was raised for the fund to set up a
colonial post office, although Salem was in financial straits at the
time.
Having succeeded in the first part of his campaign, Goddard went a step
forward, and drew up a plan for an independent American post office, and
laid it before the committees of correspondence in all the colonies.[89]
His proposition was that the colonial post office should be established
and maintained by subscription, and that its control should be vested in
a committee to be appointed annually by the subscribers. This committee
would appoint postmasters and post riders, and fix the rates of postage.
The immediate management of the service was to be under the direction of
a postmaster general to be selected by ballot, and who should hold his
office by a yearly tenure.
Goddard set about procuring subscribers for his scheme, and, it would
seem, with much success. In the meantime, however, events were taking
place which brought into being a body of more authority than the
committees of correspondence, and this body took over the establishment
of an American post office.
The punitive measures of the ministry which followed upon the Boston
riots had the unexpected result of uniting all the colonies into common
cause with Boston. In September 1774, the delegates of the colonies
assembled in congress at Philadelphia, and by degrees took upon
themselves all the functions of government. On the 29th of May, 1775,
the question of providing for the speedy and secure conveyance of
intelligence was submitted to the congress, and a committee, of which
Benjamin Franklin was the leading member, was directed to make a
report.[90]
With the report before it, on July 26, the congress resolved[91] to
appoint a postmaster general for the United Colonies, whose office would
be at Philadelphia, and who was empowered to appoint a secretary and as
many postmasters as seemed to him proper and necessary. A line of posts
should be established from Falmouth to Savannah, with as many cross
posts as the postmaster general saw fit.
Goddard was a candidate for the position of postmaster general, but
Benjamin Franklin was chosen. Goddard's friends then made an effort to
secure to him the secretaryship. In this, also, he was disappointed, as
Franklin selected his son-in-law, Bache, for the place, an appointment
which brought down upon Franklin a charge of nepotism.
It seems certain, however, that in no case would he have entrusted the
secretaryship to Goddard. Goddard had been postmaster of Providence, and
when he relinquished the office, he was a defaulter for a considerable
amount.[92] As the loss from Goddard's defalcation fell partly upon
Franklin, as joint deputy postmaster general, the latter would be
reluctant to place him a second time in a position of responsibility.
Notwithstanding the claims he would seem to have created for himself by
his work in organizing the colonial post office, Goddard had to be
contented with the surveyorship of the posts.[93]
Shortly after the service had been put in operation, the continental
congress discussed whether it would not be advisable to suppress the
king's post office.[94] Those in favour of the measure argued that the
ministerial posts were no longer necessary to the people; that they
merely subserved the interests of the enemy, and that the postmasters
held their offices by an illegal tenure. On the other hand, it was urged
that, closely watched as they were, the ministerial posts could not lend
themselves to harm, and that they furnished the people with so many more
means of communication.
The argument which finally prevailed, however, was presented by the
opponents of the proposition. They pointed out that this would be an
extreme and irretrievable measure, an act of hostility, which would not
be warranted by the position in which they stood. All that the colonies
desired, they declared, was a return to the conditions which prevailed
in 1763, when the conquest of Canada removed the last of the obstacles
which impeded their progress, and the relations of the colonies with the
mother country seemed permanently and satisfactorily established. Late
advices from England indicated that parliament was showing a renewed
spirit of conciliation, and any course was to be deprecated which would
prevent an easy return to the old conditions.
The matter was laid over, but it was settling itself in another way.
Great Britain was recognizing the futility of persisting in its efforts
to maintain the post office in the colonies. As early as March 1775, the
home office advised its deputies in America that all that was to be
expected from the postmasters in the colonies was that they should act
with discretion to the best of their abilities and judgment.[95] It
ceased for the time to give positive directions.
Finlay, who, at some personal risk, had gone to New York to make up his
accounts, reported that the post office was doing but little business,
as the rebels were opening and rifling the mails, and were notifying the
loyally disposed that it was unconstitutional to use the king's post
office.
There was swift punishment visited upon erroneous constitutional views
at that time. Finlay foresaw that the post office could not long
continue, and he proposed that the work of distributing the mails should
be done on one of the war vessels in New York harbour.[96] At last, on
Christmas day 1775, the secretary of the post office at New York gave
public notice that on account of the interruptions to the couriers in
several parts of the country the inland service would cease from that
date, and thus was closed an important chapter in the history of the
British post office in North America.[97]
With the outbreak of the war, the postal connection between New York and
Montreal instantly ceased. When this event took place the service to and
from Canada was in a very efficient state. Two couriers travelled each
week between Montreal and New York, one passing by way of lake George,
and the other pursuing the route through Skenesborough (now Whitehall);
and post offices were opened at Crown Point and Fort Edward.
It was far, however, from the wishes of the provincial congress of New
York to allow the communication with Canada to be broken. This body,
after a conference with Price, a gentleman from Montreal, despatched a
letter to the merchants of that place, expressing their strong desire
that the intercourse existing between New York and Canada should be
maintained.[98] They disclaimed any intention of aiming at independence,
protested their loyalty to the king, and their attachment to the house
of Hanover, which they ranked "among our most singular blessings."
All congress desired was the rights belonging to them as British
subjects. They proposed to establish a postal courier between New York
and either Ticonderoga or Crown Point, leaving it to Canadians to open a
communication between Montreal and such of these two places as might be
decided upon.
When the American troops, continuing their advance northward, captured
Montreal, Franklin established a post office there, appointing as
postmaster George Measam, who afterwards entered the American
service.[99] In the ledger kept by Franklin, as postmaster general of
the United Colonies, the account of the postmaster of Montreal appears
in its place among the colonial post offices. The postage on letters
from New York to Montreal was fixed at four pennyweight, and to Quebec
at five pennyweight.[100]
Until relief arrived, Finlay was confined within the walls of Quebec,
and Foxcroft's usefulness was equally curtailed by the fact that he and
Dashwood, the departmental secretary, were held prisoners at New
York.[101] While the British were being thus deprived of all the usual
means of communication, the American service was being put in a high
state of efficiency.
In this, as in other respects, the colonists were fortunate in having
the services of Franklin. In August, following upon the proclamation of
independence, Franklin was directed to arrange a system of
communications whereby post riders were placed at intervals of
twenty-five or thirty miles over the whole stretch from Falmouth (now
Portland) to Georgia, the mails being carried from post to post from one
end of the country to the other, three times a week.[102]
The riders were to travel night as well as day, and there was to be no
more delay at the changing posts than was necessary to pass the mails
from one rider to the other. Three advice boats, also, were employed to
run from North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia to the place of
assembly of the continental congress.
After the royal post office was driven off the mainland, it took refuge
on one of the war vessels, which lay in New York harbour. The postmaster
of New York received and opened the mails on board the ship, and all
letters were advertised, so that they might be obtained either directly
or through friends. The Americans, however, had a keen sense of the
importance of communications, and from the beginning of the struggle,
made every effort to intercept the packets.
Early in May 1775, while the more cautious Americans were opposing any
step that would lead to extremities, Finlay reported that he was on
board the ship "King Fisher," and that a vessel manned by sixty resolute
fellows was cruising about Sandy Hook, in the hope of intercepting the
packet "Mercury," which was due to arrive.[103]
In consequence of the burning of Falmouth by a British naval expedition,
letters of marque and reprisal were issued in November by the province
of Massachusetts Bay; and in the following March, the continental
congress sanctioned the fitting out of private armed vessels to prey
upon British commerce.[104] Seaport towns were enjoined that on no
account should they furnish provisions to war vessels coming to them.
The ministry were under no delusions as to the situation. At the end of
September, the packets were withdrawn from general post office duty,
armed as for war, and placed at the orders of the war office. The
movements of the packets were clothed with secrecy, and it was only when
the vessels were bound for Halifax that the public were notified that a
mail was being despatched. From Halifax, the mails were taken by the
first opportunity to Boston or New York.
The attitude of the post office to all these preparations for war was
very curious. It seemed incapable of understanding why exceptional
measures were necessary at that time. A steady murmur of discontent was
kept up against the war office. Remonstrance after remonstrance was
directed against the commander-in-chief for the detention of the packets
beyond what seemed a reasonable delay, and there was continual complaint
against the restrictions placed upon the post office.
Until the middle of the year 1776, although the service had been on a
complete war footing for some months past, there had been no actual
clash between the British and American vessels. The correspondence,
however, reveals a state of great anxiety for the safety of the
despatches, and as the vessels put out, the masters were placed under
strict injunctions to sink the mails if there was any likelihood of
capture.
The first recorded engagement in which the packets on any of the North
American stations were concerned, took place on the 17th of July. The
master of the "Lord Hyde" reported[105] that on his passage from
Falmouth to New York, he saw at four o'clock in the morning of that day
a ship and a brig three or four leagues distant. They spoke to one
another, and then gave chase to the packet. The ship fell out of sight,
but the brig followed hard, and at four in the afternoon came up with
the packet and began to fire, at the same time running a red English
ensign to the topmast head.
The master of the packet, seeing no chance for escape, shortened sail
and prepared for action. The brig came up alongside, replacing the
English ensign by a flag of thirteen stripes with a small union in it,
and without more ado poured into the packet a broadside from eight
carriage guns, and a number of swivels and small arms. The packet
returning the fire, a warm engagement followed for an hour and a half at
a distance of fifty or sixty yards. The brig then bore away. The packet
was much shattered in her sails and rigging, but wonderful to relate,
the only casualties were the slight wounding of five persons.
The "Sandwich" packet, which left New York on the 20th of August,
reported[106] an encounter with a fast schooner bearing the New England
colours, a white field with a pine tree in the middle. After some
manoeuvring, in which it appeared that the plan of the schooner was to
keep in the wake of the packet outside the range of the latter's guns,
but near enough to take advantage of the superior weight of her own
guns, the packet managed to bring the schooner into an action which
lasted for nearly two hours. The rigging, sails and masts of both
vessels were much damaged, but the packet came out of the encounter
without any person being even wounded.
The third engagement was a more serious affair. The packet "Harriott,"
on the New York station, was attacked on the 17th of September by a
privateer of twelve guns and over one hundred men. The packet, which was
armed and equipped in the same manner as the other packets on this
station, had twelve guns, but only forty-five men. Of these five were
killed, including the captain, and nine were wounded. Through the
gallantry of the mate, Spargo, the packet managed to avoid capture. For
his good conduct on this occasion, Spargo was made master of the
"Harriott."
On the 1st of March, 1778, the "Harriott," in violation, it would seem,
of the instructions given to all the masters of packets to avoid a
fight, if possible, captured the American vessel "Sea Nymph," of one
hundred and twenty tons burden, laden with gunpowder, saltpetre, gun
flints and other wares, and brought it into New York.[107]
While the packet boats were thus occupied in foiling the enemy's
attempts upon them, the course of events had restored to the post office
a footing on land in America. The arrival of assistance from England in
May enabled Carleton to attack the American force which had held Quebec
in siege since the November previous, and the retreat of the Americans
which ensued was not stayed until they had been driven entirely out of
Canada.
Finlay, who had spent the winter in Quebec, and who has been credited
with one of the best anonymous accounts which have come down to us of
the conditions of the city during the siege, at once prepared to resume
his duties as deputy postmaster general. New York, also, fell again into
the hands of the British, owing to the withdrawal of Washington's army
in September, before the superior forces of Howe.
Here Foxcroft, the deputy postmaster general, and Dashwood, the
departmental secretary, were prisoners of war; and Antill, the
postmaster of New York, had taken up quarters in one of the war vessels
in the harbour. Antill lost no time in returning to the city; and
Foxcroft and Dashwood were set free by an exchange for two American
officers which took place shortly after.[108]
Like Finlay, Foxcroft made preparations for the resumption of business;
but for both Finlay and Foxcroft an unexpected thing happened. Vessels
with mails began to arrive at Quebec and New York, but the mails were
not taken to the post office, although the statute laid it upon
shipmasters as their duty to deliver the mails at the post office before
they broke bulk.[109] On the arrival of the vessels, the
commanders-in-chief directed the masters to send the letters up to their
headquarters, where they were gone over by confidential officers, on
whom were imposed the duties of handling the incoming mails.
The reason of this step will be sufficiently obvious, although the post
office professed that they had never seen any good purpose served by it.
Even where there was no suggestion of disloyalty among the citizens,
there were infinite possibilities of harm in the unguarded utterances,
which are constantly occurring in familiar letters. Matters, which it is
of the highest importance to keep concealed from the enemy, may be
within the knowledge of every citizen, and it becomes necessary either
to induce or to compel citizens not to write of such matters.
But it was not only against the undesigned harm which loyal people might
do, that it was necessary to guard. There was good reason to suspect
that in Quebec, as well as in New York, there was a considerable
proportion of English speaking people who were by no means well affected
towards the government, and who would not hesitate to impart to the
enemy any information which they thought might be of assistance.
The king, in his instructions to Carleton[110] as governor, enjoined him
to signify to the loyal merchants and planters the necessity for caution
against allowing their letters to become the means of conveying
information to the enemy, and directed him to use every possible effort
to frustrate the schemes of the disloyal carried on through the medium
of correspondence.
The method employed by the governor to forestall danger from this source
was the simple one of standing guard over the channel through which
correspondence must ordinarily pass. In this way, he would discover many
of the disaffected, and at the same time show such people the danger to
them of being implicated in matters of that kind.
To merchants, however, the governor's course was a great inconvenience.
All their letters were delayed, and many not delivered at all, for the
governor's staff had neither the training in post office work, nor the
sense of the importance of mercantile correspondence necessary to assure
the merchants of the safety of their letters, when these passed out of
the accustomed courses. The merchants remonstrated against the
governor's action, and called upon Finlay to assert the determination of
the post office to secure respect for the act, which was being violated
by the governor.
Finlay was a man of tact, and a member of the governor's executive
council as well, and he counselled patience to the merchants. They
acquiesced for a time, hoping that the governor's surveillance over
their correspondence would be relaxed, but the governor continued firm.
Each season as the vessels began to come up the river, orders were
issued for the renewal of the unpopular practice.
What took place at Quebec was repeated at New York; and during the short
period of the British occupation of Philadelphia, in that city, also.
The postmaster of Philadelphia, who had retired to England when the
British office was closed in 1775, returned on hearing that the city was
again in the king's hands, but only to find that the letters were
delivered to the commander-in-chief, who distributed them not only to
the army and navy, but also to the merchants, and no steps were taken to
collect the postage.[111]
At that time, and indeed until a quite recent date, the postage on
letters was not paid until the delivery of them was effected, and when,
as during the war of the Revolution, the mails were diverted from their
usual channel, the post office was unable to collect anything to meet
the expenses it was incurring.
To-day, owing to the greater cohesiveness among the departments of
government, the post office would rest content in the fact that the loss
of revenue was due to the action of the government as a whole, and could
not be imputed to any failure on its own part, but, at that time, it
viewed the situation as a private institution would. The loss of revenue
seemed to affect it alone, and again and again the post office declared
to the war office that, unless the revenue was maintained, it would be
obliged to cut off the internal services between Montreal and Quebec.
There was another matter arising out of the governor's lack of
confidence in the English-speaking people in Canada which was a source
of much inconvenience to the deputy postmaster general. It has been the
practice in Canada to grant exemption to postmasters from the billeting
of the troops upon them. The barracks which had been erected in Montreal
were destroyed by fire, and it was necessary that the soldiers should be
provided for by the citizens. But the duty was grudgingly undertaken,
and indeed the disfavour with which the soldiers were regarded in
Montreal was one of the chief grounds of complaint on the part of the
governors.
Exemption from billeting was an ancient privilege of postmasters. In
several of the colonies it was expressly granted, and the continental
congress relieved its postmasters from all military duties. In Canada
the advantages the post office was able to offer to its postmasters were
small and insignificant, and one of the most valued privileges was the
assurance of relief from billeting.
The postmaster of Montreal complained to Finlay that, in disregard of
the understanding on which he had accepted the postmastership, an
officer and his servant had been quartered upon him and he demanded
their removal. Finlay, nothing doubting, laid the postmaster's letter
before the governor, who, to Finlay's surprise, took exception to what
he termed the extraordinary and peremptory tone of the letter, and
commanded Finlay to dismiss the postmaster.[112]
To Finlay this order was a great embarrassment, as suitable postmasters
were difficult to find, and, besides, the postmaster had accepted the
office merely to oblige Finlay. Finlay laid these facts before the
governor and pleaded for a reconsideration, but the governor was
inexorable. Carleton relinquished the governorship at this time, and
Finlay appealed to Haldimand, who succeeded Carleton, but with no better
success.
The post office encountered the same kind of ill-will here as elsewhere
from the military authorities. With the greatest vigilance on their
part, much correspondence was passing backward and forward of which they
could know nothing, and the suspicions natural under the circumstances
were heightened by what they knew of the opinions of many of the people.
The regularity of the trips between Quebec and Montreal, which were
resumed soon after the Americans had withdrawn from the country, seemed
to Haldimand a source of danger. Although there was no large hostile
force in the province, affairs were still unsettled, and a mail courier
whose movements were known in every detail could easily be waylaid by
the marauding parties which infested the long route on the banks of the
St. Lawrence. Haldimand would have preferred holding the regular service
in suspense until peace was obtained, depending on occasional expresses
to maintain necessary communications.
During the year 1777 there was no material change in the situation. When
the British occupied New York in the autumn of 1776, the monthly trips
between England and New York were resumed. But the activity of the
privateers was greatly increased; and while none of the packets on the
New York station were taken, the "Swallow" on its way to Lisbon in
February was captured by the war vessel which had carried Franklin to
France,[113] and the "Weymouth," which was taking the mails from the
West Indies was obliged to strike to the "Oliver Cromwell" of New
London, a privateer carrying twenty guns and one hundred and fifty-three
men.[114]
France, though not at war with England, saw in the revolt of the
colonies an opportunity for revenge for late humiliations, and she
strained the laws of neutrality to the utmost in her effort to assist
the Americans. Cruisers bearing American names, but armed with French
guns, and manned by French sailors ranging the channel, wrought havoc
with British merchant shipping, and carried their prizes into the
harbours of Normandy and Brittany.
Some regard, however, had to be paid to appearances so long as France
had not actually broken with England; and it was not until the alliance
between the Americans and the French was consummated in February 1778,
that the hands of the French were quite free.
From that time England's position on the sea was changed greatly for the
worse, and the record of the packet service was one of almost unbroken
disaster. On the 15th of June the packet "Le Despencer" on her way from
Falmouth to New York, was set upon by two privateers, the "Nancy" with
sixteen guns and one hundred and twenty men, and another having fourteen
guns and one hundred and fifteen men. After an hour's fighting, in which
his vessel was disabled, the captain of the "Le Despencer" was obliged
to yield to superior force.[115]
In September, the "Duke of York," on one of the North American stations,
was taken by a French frigate of thirty-six guns;[116] and in the same
month, the "Harriott" and the "Eagle," the one bound for New York, and
the other for Carolina, both fell as prizes to the "Vengeance," a
privateer of twenty guns and one hundred and ten men, belonging to Paul
Jones' fleet and commanded by a Frenchman, Captain Ricot.[117]
From the year 1779 until 1782, nine packets on the several North
American stations were captured, and seven were more or less seriously
damaged. Some idea of the extent to which the packet service was
crippled during the war of the Revolution may be gathered from the fact
that of the five vessels on the New York station in 1777, four were
taken and one damaged. Of the six on the West Indian station, four were
taken and one damaged, and of the three on the Carolina station two were
taken.[118] The importance of these facts in their influence on the
outcome of the war has not so far received the attention the subject
merits.
FOOTNOTES:
[86] _Pickering Papers_, vol. 39 (_Mass. Hist. Soc._).
[87] G.P.O., _Document in Record Room_.
[88] _Pickering Papers_, vol. 33.
[89] _Ibid._, vol. 53.
[90] _Journals, Continental Congress_, II. 71.
[91] _Ibid._, II. 208.
[92] Foxcroft to Todd, _C. O._ 5, vol. 135.
[93] _Am. Arch._, fourth series, VI. 1012.
[94] _Journals, Continental Congress_, III. 488.
[95] G.P.O., _American Letter-Book_, 1773-1783, p. 62.
[96] _C. O._ 5, vol. 135.
[97] _Am. Arch._, fourth series, IV. 453.
[98] _Ibid._, II. 1294.
[99] _Am. Arch._, fifth series, I. 725.
[100] Placard signed by Franklin, _Papers Cont. Cong._, no. 61, p. 121.
[101] _C. O._ 5, vol. 135.
[102] _Journals, Continental Congress_, V. 719.
[103] Finlay to Todd, _C. O._ 5, vol. 135.
[104] _The American Revolution_, by C. H. Van Tyne, p. 69.
[105] _C. O._ 5, vol. 135.
[106] _C. O._ 5, vol. 135.
[107] G.P.O., _Treasury_, IX. 298-299.
[108] _Hist. MSS. Com._, 1904, Amer., I. 70.
[109] _C. O._ 5, vols. 136 and 137; also _Can. Arch._, B. 43, p. 95 and
G.P.O., _Treasury_, X. 14.
[110] _Can. Arch._, M. 230, p. 116, Art. 49.
[111] G.P.O., _Treasury_, X. 20-22.
[112] _Can. Arch._, B. series, CC. 8
[113] _C. O._ 5, vol. 134.
[114] _Ibid._, 136.
[115] _C. O._ 5, vol. 136.
[116] G.P.O., _Treasury_, IX. 345.
[117] _Ibid._
[118] _Ibid._, X. 171.