In this chapter will be given an outline of the proofs by which the
Mutakallemim attempt to demonstrate that the universe is not eternal.
You must of course not expect that I shall quote their lengthy
arguments verbatim; I only intend to give an abstract of each proof, to
show in what way it helps to establish the theory of the creatio ex
nihilo or to confute the eternity of the universe, and briefly to
notice the propositions they employed in support of their theory. If
you were to read their well-known and voluminous writings, you would
not discover any arguments with which they support their view left
unnoticed in the present outline, but you might find there greater
copiousness of words combined with more grace and elegance of style;
frequently they employ rhyme, rhythm, and poetical diction, and
sometimes mysterious phrases which perhaps are intended to startle
persons listening to their discourses, and to deter those who might
otherwise criticize them. You would also find many repetitions;
questions propounded and, as they believe, answered, and frequent
attacks on those who differ from their opinions.
The First Argument.
Some of the Mutakallemim thought that by proving the creation of one
thing, they demonstrated the creatio ex nihilo in reference to the
entire universe. E.g., Zaid, who from a small molecule had gradually
been brought to a state of perfection, has undoubtedly not effected
this change and development by his own efforts, but owes it to an
external agency. It is therefore clear that an agent is required for
such organization and successive transmutation. A palm-tree or any
other object might equally be selected to illustrate this idea. The
whole universe, they argue, is analogous to these instances. Thus you
see how they believe that a law discovered in one thing may equally be
applied to everything.
The Second Argument.
This argument is likewise based on the belief that the proof by which
the creation of one thing is demonstrated, holds good for the creatio
ex nihilo in reference to the whole universe. E.g., a certain
individual, called Zaid, who one time was not yet in existence,
subsequently came into existence; and if it be assumed that Amr, his
father, was the cause of his existence, Amr himself must likewise have
passed from non-existence into existence; suppose then that Zaid’s
father unquestionably owed his origin to Khaled, Zaid’s grandfather, it
would be found that Khaled himself did not exist from eternity, and the
series of causes could thus be carried back to infinity. But such an
infinite series of beings is inadmissible according to the theory of
the Mutakallemim, as we have shown in our discussion of the eleventh
proposition. In continuing this species of reasoning, you come to a
first man, who had no parent, viz. Adam. Then you will of course ask,
whence came this first man? If, e.g., the reply be given that he was
made out of earth, you will again inquire, “Whence came that earth?”
“Out of water.” “Whence came the water?” The inquiry would be carried
on, either ad infinitum, which is absurd, or until you meet with a
something that came into existence from absolute non-existence; in this
latter case you would arrive at the real truth; here the series of
inquiries ends. This result of the question proves, according to the
opinion of the Mutakallemim, that the whole universe came into
existence from absolute non-existence.
The Third Argument.
The atoms of things are necessarily either joined together or separate,
and even the same atoms may at one time be united at another disunited.
It is therefore evident that the nature of the atoms does not
necessitate either their combination or their separation; for if they
were separate by virtue of their nature they would never join, and if
they were joined by virtue of their nature, they could never again be
separated. Thus there is no reason why atoms should rather be combined
than separate, or vice versâ, why rather in a state of separation than
of combination. Seeing that some atoms are joined, others separate, and
again others subject to change, they being combined at one time and
separated at another, the fact may therefore be taken as a proof that
the atoms cannot combine or separate without an agent. This argument,
according to the opinion of the Mutakallemim, establishes the theory
that the universe has been created from nothing. You have already been
told, that those who employ this argument rely on the first proposition
of the Mutakallemim with its corollaries.
The Fourth Argument.
The whole Universe is composed of substance and accidents; every
substance must possess one accident or more, and since the accidents
are not eternal, the substance, the substratum of the accidents, cannot
be eternal; for that which is joined to transient things and cannot
exist without them is itself transient. Therefore the whole Universe
has had a beginning. To the objection, that the substance may possibly
be eternal while the accidents, though in themselves transient, succeed
each other in an infinite series, they reply that, in this case, an
infinite number of transient things would be in existence, an
eventuality which, according to their theory, is impossible. This
argument is considered by them the best and safest, and has been
accepted by many of them as a strict proof. Its acceptance implies the
admission of the following three propositions, the object of which is
well understood by philosophers. (1) An infinite series of things, of
which the one succeeds when the other has ceased to exist, is
impossible. (2) All accidents have a beginning.—Our opponent, who
defends the theory of the eternity of the universe, can refute this
proposition by pointing to one particular accident, namely to the
circular motion of the sphere; for it is held by Aristotle that this
circular motion is eternal, and, therefore, the spheres which perform
this motion are, according to his opinion, likewise eternal. It is of
no use to prove that all other accidents have a beginning; for our
opponent does not deny this; he says that accidents may supervene an
object which has existed from eternity, and may follow each other in
rotation. He contents himself with maintaining that this particular
accident, viz., circular motion, the motion of the heavenly sphere, is
eternal, and does not belong to the class of transient accidents. It is
therefore necessary to examine this accident by itself, and to prove
that it is not eternal. (3) The next proposition which the author of
this argument accepts is as follows: Every material object consists of
substance and accidents, that is to say, of atoms and accidents in the
sense in which the Mutakallemim use the term. But if a material object
were held to be a combination of matter and form, as has been proved by
our opponent, it would be necessary to demonstrate that the primal
matter and the primal form are transient, and only then the proof of
the creatio ex nihilo would be complete.
The Fifth Argument.
This argument is based on the theory of Determination, and is made much
of by the Mutakallemim. It is the same as the theory which I explained
in discussing the tenth proposition. Namely, when they treat either of
the Universe in general, or of any of its parts, they assume that it
can have such properties and such dimensions as it actually has; that
it may receive such accidents as in reality are noticed in it, and that
it may exist in such a place and at such a time as in fact is the case;
but it may be larger or smaller, may receive other properties and
accidents, and come to existence at an earlier or a later period, or in
a different place. Consequently, the fact that a thing has been
determined in its composition, size, place, accident and time—a
variation in all these points being possible—is a proof that a being
exists which freely chooses and determines these divers relations; and
the circumstance that the Universe or a part of it requires a being
able to make this selection, proves that the Universe has been created
ex nihilo. For there is no difference which of the following
expressions is used: to determine, to make, to create, to produce, to
originate, or to intend; these verbs have all one and the same meaning.
The Mutakallemim give a great many examples, both of a general and a
special character. They say it is not more natural for earth to be
under water than to be above water; who then determined its actual
position? Or, is it more natural that the sun is round than that it
should be square or triangular; for all qualities have the same
relation to a body capable of possessing them. Who then determined one
particular quality? In a similar way they treat of every individual
being; when, e.g., they notice flowers of different colours, they are
unable to explain the phenomenon, and they take it as a strong proof in
favour of their theory; they say, “Behold, the earth is everywhere
alike, the water is alike; why then is this flower red and that one
yellow?” Some being must have determined the colour of each, and that
being is God. A being must therefore exist which determines everything,
both as regards the Universe generally, and each of its parts
individually. All this is the logical consequence of the tenth
proposition. The theory of determination is moreover adopted by some of
those who assume the eternity of the Universe, as will be explained
below. In conclusion, I consider this to be the best argument; and in
another part I shall more fully acquaint you with the opinion I have
formed concerning the theory of Determination.
The Sixth Argument.
One of the modern Mutakallemim thought that he had found a very good
argument, much better than any advanced hitherto, namely, the argument
based on the triumph of existence over non-existence. He says that,
according to the common belief, the existence of the Universe is merely
possible; for if it were necessary, the Universe would be God—but he
seems to forget that we are at issue with those who, whilst they
believe in the existence of God, admit at the same time the eternity of
the Universe.—The expression “A thing is possible” denotes that the
thing may either be in existence or not in existence, and that there is
not more reason why it should exist than why it should not exist. The
fact that a thing, the existence of which is possible, actually does
exist—although it bears the same relation to the state of existence as
to that of non-existence—proves that there is a Being which gave the
preference to existence over non-existence. This argument is very
forcible; it is a modified form of the foregoing argument which is
based on the theory of determination. He only chose the term
“preference” instead of “determination,” and instead of applying it to
the properties of the existing being he applies it to “the existence of
the being itself.” He either had the intention to mislead, or he
misunderstood the proposition, that the existence of the Universe is
possible. Our opponent who assumes the eternity of the Universe,
employs the term “possible,” and says, “the existence of the Universe
is possible” in a sense different from that in which the Mutakallem
applies it, as will be explained below. Moreover it may be doubted
whether the conclusion, that the Universe owes its origin to a being
which is able to give preference to existence over non-existence, is
correct. For we may apply the terms “preference” and “determination” to
anything capable of receiving either of two properties which are
contrary or opposed to each other; and when we find that the thing
actually possesses one property and not the other, we are convinced
that there exists a determining agent. E.g., you say that a piece of
copper could just as well be formed into a kettle as into a lamp; when
we find that it is a lamp or a kettle, we have no doubt that a deciding
and determining agent had advisedly chosen one of the two possible
forms; for it is clear that the substance of copper existed, and that
before the determination took place it had neither of the two possible
forms which have just been mentioned. When, however, it is the question
whether a certain existing object is eternal, or whether it has passed
from non-existence into existence, this argument is inadmissible; for
it cannot be asked who decided in favour of the existence of a thing,
and rejected its non-existence, except when it has been admitted that
it has passed from non-existence into existence; in the present case
this is just the point under discussion. If we were to take the
existence and the non-existence of a thing as mere objects of
imagination, we should have to apply the tenth proposition which gives
prominence to imagination and fiction, and ignores the things which
exist in reality, or are conceived by the intellect. Our opponent,
however, who believes in the eternity of the Universe, will show that
we can imagine the non-existence of the universe as well as we can
imagine any other impossibility. It is not my intention to refute their
doctrine of the creatio ex nihilo: I only wish to show the
incorrectness of their belief that this argument differs from the one
which precedes; since in fact the two arguments are identical, and are
founded on the well-known principle of determination.
The Seventh Argument.
One of the modern Mutakallemim says that he is able to prove the
creation of the Universe from the theory put forth by the philosophers
concerning the immortality of the soul. He argues thus: If the world
were eternal the number of the dead would necessarily be infinite, and
consequently an infinite number of souls would coexist, but it has long
since been shown that the coexistence of an infinite number of things
is positively impossible. This is indeed a strange argument! One
difficulty is explained by another which is still greater! Here the
saying, well known among the Arameans, may be applied: “Your guarantee
wants himself a guarantee.” He rests his argument on the immortality of
the soul, as though he understood this immortality, in what respect the
soul is immortal, or what the thing is which is immortal! If, however,
he only meant to controvert the opinion of his opponent, who believed
in the eternity of the Universe, and also in the immortality of the
soul, he accomplished his task, provided the opponent admitted the
correctness of the idea which that Mutakallem formed of the
philosopher’s view on the immortality of the soul. Some of the later
philosophers explained this difficulty as follows: the immortal souls
are not substances which occupy a locality or a space, and their
existence in an infinite number is therefore not impossible. You must
bear in mind that those abstract beings which are neither bodies nor
forces dwelling in bodies, and which in fact are ideals—are altogether
incapable of being represented as a plurality unless some ideals be the
cause of the existence of others, and can be distinguished from each
other by the specific difference that some are the efficient cause and
others the effect; but that which remains of Zaid [after his death] is
neither the cause nor the effect of that which is left of Amr, and
therefore the souls of all the departed form only one being as has been
explained by Ibn Bekr Ibn Al-zaig, and others who ventured to speak on
these profound subjects. In short, such intricate disciplines, which
our mind can scarcely comprehend, cannot furnish any principles for the
explanation of other subjects.—It should be noted that whoever
endeavours to prove or to disprove the eternity of the Universe by
these arguments of the Mutakallemim, must necessarily rely on one of
the two following propositions, or on both of them; namely on the tenth
proposition, according to which the actual form of a thing is merely
one of many equally possible forms, and which implies that there must
be a being capable of making the special selection; or on the eleventh
proposition which rejects the existence of an infinite series of things
coming successively into existence. The last-named proposition is
demonstrated in various ways, e.g., they advert to a class of transient
individuals, and to a certain particular date. From the theory which
asserts the eternity of the Universe, it would follow that the
individuals of that class up to that particular date are infinite in
number; a thousand years later the individuals of that class are
likewise infinite in number; the last number must exceed the previous
one by the number of the individuals born in those thousand years, and
consequently one infinite number would be larger than another. The same
argument is applied to the revolutions of the heavenly sphere, and in
like manner it is shown that one infinite number of revolutions would
be larger than another; the same result is obtained when revolutions of
one sphere are compared with those of another moving more slowly; the
revolutions of both spheres [though unequal] would be infinite in
number. Similarly they proceed with all those accidents which are
subject to destruction and production; the individual accidents that
have passed into non-existence are counted and represented as though
they were still in existence, and as though they were things with a
definite beginning; this imaginary number is then either increased or
reduced. Yet all these things have no reality and are mere fictions.
Abunazar Alfarabi in criticizing this proposition, has exposed all its
weak points, as you will clearly perceive, when you study his book on
the changeable beings earnestly and dispassionately. These are the
principal arguments of the Mutakallemim in seeking to establish the
creatio ex nihilo. Having thus proved that the Universe is not eternal,
they necessarily infer that there is an Agens who created it in
accordance with His intention, desire and will. They then proceed to
prove the unity of that Agens as I am going to point out in the next
chapter.