Know that many branches of science relating to the correct solution of
these problems, were once cultivated by our forefathers, but were in
the course of time neglected, especially in consequence of the tyranny
which barbarous nations exercised over us. Besides, speculative studies
were not open to all men, as we have already stated (Introd. p. 2, and
I. chap, xxxi.), only the subjects taught in the Scriptures were
accessible to all. Even the traditional Law, as you are well aware, was
not originally committed to writing, in conformity with the rule to
which our nation generally adhered, “Things which I have communicated
to you orally, you must not communicate to others in writing.” With
reference to the Law, this rule was very opportune; for while it
remained in force it averted the evils which happened subsequently,
viz., great diversity of opinion, doubts as to the meaning of written
words, slips of the pen, dissensions among the people, formation of new
sects, and confused notions about practical subjects. The traditional
teaching was in fact, according to the words of the Law, entrusted to
the Great Tribunal, as we have already stated in our works on the
Talmud. (Introd. to Mishneh Torah and Introd. to Commen. on the
Mishnah).
Care having been taken, for the sake of obviating injurious influences,
that the Oral Law should not be recorded in a form accessible to all,
it was but natural that no portion of “the secrets of the Law” (i.e.,
metaphysical problems) would be permitted to be written down or
divulged for the use of all men. These secrets, as has been explained,
were orally communicated by a few able men to others who were equally
distinguished. Hence the principle applied by our teachers, “The
secrets of the Law can only be entrusted to him who is a councillor, a
cunning artificer, etc.” The natural effect of this practice was that
our nation lost the knowledge of those important disciplines. Nothing
but a few remarks and allusions are to be found in the Talmud and the
Midrashim, like a few kernels enveloped in such a quantity of husk,
that the reader is generally occupied with the husk, and forgets that
it encloses a kernel.
In addition you will find that in the few works composed by the Geonim
and the Karaites on the unity of God and on such matter as is connected
with this doctrine, they followed the lead of the Mohammedan
Mutakallemim, and what they wrote is insignificant in comparison with
the kindred works of the Mohammedans. It also happened, that at the
time when the Mohammedans adopted this method of the Kalam, there arose
among them a certain sect, called Muʻtazilah, i.e., Separatists. In
certain things our scholars followed the theory and the method of these
Muʻtazilah. Although another sect, the Asha’ariyah, with their own
peculiar views, was subsequently established amongst the Mohammedans,
you will not find any of these views in the writings of our authors;
not because these authors preferred the opinions of the first-named
sect to those of the latter, but because they chanced first to become
acquainted with the theory of the Muʻtazilah, which they adopted and
treated as demonstrated truth. On the other hand our Andalusian
scholars followed the teachings of the philosophers, from whom they
accepted those opinions which were not opposed to our own religious
principles. You will find that they did not adopt any of the methods of
the Mutakallemim; in many respects they approached the view expressed
in the present treatise, as may be noticed in the few works which were
recently written by authors of that school. You should also know that
whatever the Mohammedans, that is, the Muʻtazilah and the Asha’ariyah,
said on those subjects, consists in nothing but theories founded on
propositions which are taken from the works of those Greek and Syrian
scholars who attempted to oppose the system of the philosophers, and to
refute their arguments. The following was the cause of that opposition:
At the time when the Christian Church brought the Greeks and Syrians
into its fold, and promulgated its well-known dogmas, the opinions of
the philosophers were current amongst those nations; and whilst
philosophy flourished, kings became defenders of the Christian faith.
The learned Greek and Syrian Christians of the age, seeing that their
dogmas were unquestionably exposed to severe attacks from the existing
philosophical systems, laid the foundation for this science of
Dogmatics; they commenced by putting forth such propositions as would
support their doctrines, and be useful for the refutation of opinions
opposed to the fundamental principles of the Christian religion.
When the Mohammedans caused Arabic translations of the writings of the
Philosophers to be made, those criticisms were likewise translated.
When the opinions of John the Grammarian, of Ibn Adi, and of kindred
authors on those subjects were made accessible to them, they adopted
them, and imagined that they had arrived at the solution of important
problems. Moreover, they selected from the opinions of the ancient
philosophers whatever seemed serviceable to their purposes, although
later critics had proved that those theories were false; as, e.g., the
theories of atoms and of a vacuum. They believed that the discussions
of those authors were of a general character, and contained
propositions useful for the defence of positive religion. At a
subsequent period the same theories were more fully developed, and
presented an aspect unknown to those Theologians of the Greeks and
other nations who were the immediate successors of the Philosophers. At
a later time, when the Mohammedans adopted certain peculiar theological
theories they were naturally obliged to defend them; and when their new
theories, again became the subject of controversy among them, each
party laid down such propositions as suited their special doctrine.
Their arguments undoubtedly involved certain principles which concerned
the three communities—Jews, Christians, and Mohammedans, such as the
creatio ex nihilo, which afforded support to the belief in miracles and
to various other doctrines. There are, however, other subjects of
belief which the Christians and Mohammedans have undertaken to defend,
such as the doctrine of the Trinity in the theological works of the
former, and “the Word” in the works of some Mohammedan sects; in order
to prove the dogmas which they thus desired to establish, they were
compelled to resort to certain hypotheses. It is not our object to
criticize things which are peculiar to either creed, or books which
were written exclusively in the interest of the one community or the
other. We merely maintain that the earlier Theologians, both of the
Greek Christians and of the Mohammedans, when they laid down their
propositions, did not investigate the real properties of things; first
of all they considered what must be the properties of the things which
should yield proof for or against a certain creed; and when this was
found they asserted that the thing must be endowed with those
properties; then they employed the same assertion as a proof for the
identical arguments which had led to the assertion, and by which they
either supported or refuted a certain opinion. This course was followed
by able men who originated this method, and adopted it in their
writings. They professed to be free from preconceived opinions, and to
have been led to a stated result by actual research. Therefore when
philosophers of a subsequent date studied the same writings they did
not perceive the true character of the arguments; on the contrary, they
found in the ancient works strong proofs and a valuable support for the
acceptance or the rejection of certain opinions, and thus thought that,
so far as religious principles were concerned, there was no necessity
whatever to prove or refute any of their propositions, and that the
first Mutakallemim had discussed those subjects with the sole object of
defeating certain views of the philosophers, and demonstrating the
insufficiency of their proofs. Persons who hold this opinion, do not
suspect how much they are mistaken; for the first Mutakallemim tried to
prove a proposition when it was expedient to demonstrate its truth; and
to disprove it, when its rejection was desirable, and when it was
contrary to the opinion which they wished to uphold, although the
contradiction might only become obvious after the application of a
hundred successive propositions. In this manner the earlier
Mutakallemim effected a radical cure of the malady! I tell you,
however, as a general rule, that Themistius was right in saying that
the properties of things cannot adapt themselves to our opinions, but
our opinions must be adapted to the existing properties.
Having studied the works of these Mutakallemim, as far as I had an
opportunity, just as I had studied the writings of the philosophers
according to the best of my ability, I found that the method of all
Mutakallemim was the same in its general characteristics, namely, they
assume that the really existing form of things proves nothing at all,
because it is merely one of the various phases of the things, the
opposite of which is equally admissible to our minds. In many instances
these Theologians were guided by their imagination, and thought that
they were following the dictates of the intellect. They set forth the
propositions which I shall describe to you, and demonstrated by their
peculiar mode of arguing that the Universe had a beginning. The theory
of the creatio ex nihilo being thus established, they asserted, as a
logical consequence, that undoubtedly there must be a Maker who created
the Universe. Next they showed that this Maker is One, and from the
Unity of the Creator they deduced His Incorporeality. This method was
adopted by every Mohammedan Mutakallem in the discussion of this
subject, and by those of our co-religionists who imitated them and
walked in their footsteps. Although the Mutakallemim disagree in the
methods of their proofs, and employ different propositions in
demonstrating the act of creation or in rejecting the eternity of the
Universe, they invariably begin with proving the creatio ex nihilo, and
establish on that proof the existence of God. I have examined this
method, and find it most objectionable. It must be rejected, because
all the proofs for the creation have weak points, and cannot be
considered as convincing except by those who do not know the difference
between a proof, a dialectical argument, and a sophism. Those who
understand the force of the different methods will clearly see that all
the proofs for the creation are questionable, because propositions have
been employed which have never been proved. I think that the utmost
that can be effected by believers in the truth of Revelation is to
expose the shortcomings in the proofs of philosophers who hold that the
Universe is eternal, and if forsooth a man has effected this, he has
accomplished a great deed! For it is well known to all clear and
correct thinkers who do not wish to deceive themselves, that this
question, namely, whether the Universe has been created or is eternal,
cannot be answered with mathematical certainty; here human intellect
must pause. We shall have occasion to speak more fully on this subject,
but for the present it may suffice to state that the philosophers have
for the last three thousand years been continually divided on that
subject, as far as we can learn from their works and the record of
their opinions.
Such being the nature of this theory, how can we employ it as an axiom
and establish on it the existence of the Creator? In that case the
existence of God would be uncertain; if the universe had a beginning,
God does exist; if it be eternal, God does not exist; the existence of
God would therefore remain either an open question, or we should have
to declare that the creation had been proved, and compel others by mere
force to accept this doctrine, in order thus to be enabled to declare
that we have proved the existence of God. Such a process is utterly
inadmissible. The true method, which is based on a logical and
indubitable proof, consists, according to my opinion, in demonstrating
the existence of God, His unity, and His incorporeality by such
philosophical arguments as are founded on the theory of the eternity of
the Universe. I do not propose this method as though I believed in the
eternity of the Universe, for I do not follow the philosophers on this
point, but because by the aid of this method these three principles,
viz., the existence of God, His unity and His incorporeality can be
fully proved and verified, irrespectively of the question whether the
universe has had a beginning or not. After firmly establishing these
three principles by an exact proof, we shall treat of the problem of
creation and discuss it as fully as possible. You are at liberty to
content yourself with the declaration of the Mutakallemim, and to
believe that the act of creation has been demonstrated by proof; nor
can there be any harm if you consider it unproven that the universe had
a beginning, and accept this theory as supported by the authority of
the Prophets. Before you learn our opinion on prophecy, which will be
given in the present work, do not ask, how could the belief in prophecy
be justified, if it were assumed that the universe was eternal. We will
not now expatiate on that subject. You should, however, know that some
of the propositions, started and proved by the Radicals, i.e., the
Mutakallemim, in order to prove the act of creation, imply an order of
things contrary to that which really exists, and involve a complete
change in the laws of nature; this fact will be pointed out to you, for
it will be necessary to mention their propositions and their
argumentation. My method, as far as I now can explain it in general
terms, is as follows. The universe is either eternal or has had a
beginning; if it had a beginning, there must necessarily exist a being
which caused the beginning; this is clear to common sense; for a thing
that has had a beginning, cannot be the cause of its own beginning,
another must have caused it. The universe was, therefore, created by
God. If on the other hand the universe were eternal, it could in
various ways be proved that apart from the things which constitute the
universe, there exists a being which is neither body nor a force in a
body, and which is one, eternal, not preceded by any cause, and
immutable. That being is God. You see that the proofs for the
Existence, the Unity and the Incorporeality of God must vary according
to the propositions admitted by us. Only in this way can we succeed in
obtaining a perfect proof, whether we assume the eternity or the
creation of the universe. For this reason you will find in my works on
the Talmud, whenever I have to speak of the fundamental principles of
our religion, or to prove the existence of God, that I employ arguments
which imply the eternity of the universe. I do not believe in that
eternity, but I wish to establish the principle of the existence of God
by an indisputable proof, and should not like to see this most
important principle founded on a basis which every one could shake or
attempt to demolish, and which others might consider as not being
established at all; especially when I see that the proofs of the
philosophers are based on those visible properties of things, which can
only be ignored by persons possessing certain preconceived notions,
while the Mutakallemim establish their arguments on propositions which
are to such an extent contrary to the actual state of things as to
compel these arguers to deny altogether the existence of the laws of
nature. When I shall have to treat of the creation, I shall in a
special chapter prove my opinion to some extent, and shall attain the
same end which every one of the Mutakallemim had in view, yet I shall
not contradict the laws of nature, or reject any such part of the
Aristotelean theory as has been proved to be correct. Even the most
cogent of the proofs offered by the Mutakallemim respecting the act of
creation, has only been obtained by reversing the whole order of things
and by rejecting everything fully demonstrated by the philosophers. I,
however, shall be able to give a similar proof without ignoring the
laws of nature and without being forced to contradict facts which have
been clearly perceived. I find it necessary to mention to you the
general propositions of the Mutakallemim, by which they prove the act
of creation, the Existence of God, His Unity and His Incorporeality. I
intend to explain their method, and also to point out the inferences
which are to be drawn from each proposition. After this, I shall
describe those theories of the philosophers which are closely connected
with our subject, and I shall then explain their method.
Do not ask me to prove in this work the propositions of the
philosophers, which I shall briefly mention to you; they form the
principal part of Physics and Metaphysics. Nor must you expect that I
should repeat the arguments of the Mutakallemim in support of their
propositions, with which they wasted their time, with which the time of
future generations will likewise be wasted, and on which numerous books
have been written. Their propositions, with few exceptions, are
contradicted by the visible properties of things, and beset with
numerous objections. For this reason they were obliged to write many
books and controversial works in defence of their theories, for the
refutation of objections, and for the reconciliation of all apparent
contradictions, although in reality this object cannot be attained by
any sophistical contrivance. As to the propositions of the philosophers
which I shall briefly explain, and which are indispensable for the
demonstration of the three principles—the Existence, the Unity, and the
Incorporeality of God, they will for the greater part be admitted by
you as soon as you shall hear them and understand their meaning; whilst
in the discussion of other parts reference must be made for their
proofs to works on Physics and Metaphysics, and if you direct your
attention to such passages as will be pointed out to you, you will find
everything verified that requires verification.
I have already told you that nothing exists except God and this
universe, and that there is no other evidence for His Existence but
this universe in its entirety and in its several parts. Consequently
the universe must be examined as it is; the propositions must be
derived from those properties of the universe which are clearly
perceived, and hence you must know its visible form and its nature.
Then only will you find in the universe evidence for the existence of a
being not included therein. I have considered it, therefore, necessary
to discuss first in a merely colloquial manner, in the next chapter,
the totality of existing things, and to confine our remarks to such as
have been fully proved and established beyond all doubt. In subsequent
chapters I shall treat of the propositions of the Mutakallemim, and
describe the method by which they explain the four fundamental
principles. In the chapters which will follow, I propose to expound the
propositions of the philosophers and the methods applied by them in
verifying those principles. In the last place, I shall explain to you
the method applied by me in proving those four principles, as I have
stated to you.