This chapter is even more recondite than the preceding. Know that the
negative attributes of God are the true attributes: they do not include
any incorrect notions or any deficiency whatever in reference to God,
while positive attributes imply polytheism, and are inadequate, as we
have already shown. It is now necessary to explain how negative
expressions can in a certain sense be employed as attributes, and how
they are distinguished from positive attributes. Then I shall show that
we cannot describe the Creator by any means except by negative
attributes. An attribute does not exclusively belong to the one object
to which it is related; while qualifying one thing, it can also be
employed to qualify other things, and is in that case not peculiar to
that one thing. E.g., if you see an object from a distance, and on
enquiring what it is, are told that it is a living being, you have
certainly learnt an attribute of the object seen, and although that
attribute does not exclusively belong to the object perceived, it
expresses that the object is not a plant or a mineral. Again, if a man
is in a certain house, and you know that something is in the house, but
not exactly what, you ask what is in that house, and you are told, not
a plant nor a mineral. You have thereby obtained some special knowledge
of the thing; you have learnt that it is a living being, although you
do not yet know what kind of a living being it is. The negative
attributes have this in common with the positive, that they necessarily
circumscribe the object to some extent, although such circumscription
consists only in the exclusion of what otherwise would not be excluded.
In the following point, however, the negative attributes are
distinguished from the positive. The positive attributes, although not
peculiar to one thing, describe a portion of what we desire to know,
either some part of its essence or some of its accidents; the negative
attributes, on the other hand, do not, as regards the essence of the
thing which we desire to know, in any way tell us what it is, except it
be indirectly, as has been shown in the instance given by us.
After this introduction, I would observe that,—as has already been
shown—God’s existence is absolute, that it includes no composition, as
will be proved, and that we comprehend only the fact that He exists,
not His essence. Consequently it is a false assumption to hold that He
has any positive attribute; for He does not possess existence in
addition to His essence; it therefore cannot be said that the one may
be described as an attribute [of the other]; much less has He [in
addition to His existence] a compound essence, consisting of two
constituent elements to which the attribute could refer; still less has
He accidents, which could be described by an attribute. Hence it is
clear that He has no positive attribute whatever. The negative
attributes, however, are those which are necessary to direct the mind
to the truths which we must believe concerning God; for, on the one
hand, they do not imply any plurality, and, on the other, they convey
to man the highest possible knowledge of God; e.g., it has been
established by proof that some being must exist besides those things
which can be perceived by the senses, or apprehended by the mind; when
we say of this being, that it exists, we mean that its non-existence is
impossible. We then perceive that such a being is not, for instance,
like the four elements, which are inanimate, and we therefore say that
it is living, expressing thereby that it is not dead. We call such a
being incorporeal, because we notice that it is unlike the heavens,
which are living, but material. Seeing that it is also different from
the intellect, which, though incorporeal and living, owes its existence
to some cause, we say it is the first, expressing thereby that its
existence is not due to any cause. We further notice, that the
existence, that is the essence, of this being is not limited to its own
existence; many existences emanate from it, and its influence is not
like that of the fire in producing heat, or that of the sun in sending
forth light, but consists in constantly giving them stability and order
by well-established rule, as we shall show: we say, on that account, it
has power, wisdom, and will, i.e., it is not feeble or ignorant, or
hasty, and does not abandon its creatures; when we say that it is not
feeble, we mean that its existence is capable of producing the
existence of many other things; by saying that it is not ignorant, we
mean “it perceives” or “it lives,”—for everything that perceives is
living—by saying “it is not hasty, and does not abandon its creatures,”
we mean that all these creatures preserve a certain order and
arrangement; they are not left to themselves; they are not produced
aimlessly, but whatever condition they receive from that being is given
with design and intention. We thus learn that there is no other being
like unto God, and we say that He is One, i.e., there are not more Gods
than one.
It has thus been shown that every attribute predicated of God either
denotes the quality of an action, or—when the attribute is intended to
convey some idea of the Divine Being itself, and not of His actions—the
negation of the opposite. Even these negative attributes must not be
formed and applied to God, except in the way in which, as you know,
sometimes an attribute is negatived in reference to a thing, although
that attribute can naturally never be applied to it in the same sense,
as, e.g., we say, “This wall does not see.” Those who read the present
work are aware that, notwithstanding all the efforts of the mind, we
can obtain no knowledge of the essence of the heavens—a revolving
substance which has been measured by us in spans and cubits, and
examined even as regards the proportions of the several spheres to each
other and respecting most of their motions—although we know that they
must consist of matter and form; but the matter not being the same as
sublunary matter, we can only describe the heavens in terms expressing
negative properties, but not in terms denoting positive qualities. Thus
we say that the heavens are not light, not heavy, not passive and
therefore not subject to impressions, and that they do not possess the
sensations of taste and smell; or we use similar negative attributes.
All this we do, because we do not know their substance. What, then, can
be the result of our efforts, when we try to obtain a knowledge of a
Being that is free from substance, that is most simple, whose existence
is absolute, and not due to any cause, to whose perfect essence nothing
can be superadded, and whose perfection consists, as we have shown, in
the absence of all defects. All we understand is the fact that He
exists, that He is a Being to whom none of His creatures is similar,
who has nothing in common with them, who does not include plurality,
who is never too feeble to produce other beings, and whose relation to
the universe is that of a steersman to a boat; and even this is not a
real relation, a real simile, but serves only to convey to us the idea
that God rules the universe; that is, that He gives it duration, and
preserves its necessary arrangement. This subject will be treated more
fully. Praised be He! In the contemplation of His essence, our
comprehension and knowledge prove insufficient; in the examination of
His works, how they necessarily result from His will, our knowledge
proves to be ignorance, and in the endeavour to extol Him in words, all
our efforts in speech are mere weakness and failure!