Every description of an object by an affirmative attribute, which
includes the assertion that an object is of a certain kind, must be
made in one of the following five ways:—
First. The object is described by its definition, as e.g., man is
described as a being that lives and has reason; such a description,
containing the true essence of the object, is, as we have already
shown, nothing else but the explanation of a name. All agree that this
kind of description cannot be given of God; for there are no previous
causes to His existence, by which He could be defined: and on that
account it is a well-known principle, received by all the philosophers,
who are precise in their statements, that no definition can be given of
God.
Secondly. An object is described by part of its definition, as when,
e.g., man is described as a living being or as a rational being. This
kind of description includes the necessary connection [of the two
ideas]; for when we say that every man is rational we mean by it that
every being which has the characteristics of man must also have reason.
All agree that this kind of description is inappropriate in reference
to God; for if we were to speak of a portion of His essence, we should
consider His essence to be a compound. The inappropriateness of this
kind of description in reference to God is the same as that of the
preceding kind.
Thirdly. An object is described by something different from its true
essence, by something that does not complement or establish the essence
of the object. The description, therefore, relates to a quality; but
quality, in its most general sense, is an accident. If God could be
described in this way, He would be the substratum of accidents: a
sufficient reason for rejecting the idea that He possesses quality,
since it diverges from the true conception of His essence. It is
surprising how those who admit the application of attributes to God can
reject, in reference to Him, comparison and qualification. For when
they say “He cannot be qualified,” they can only mean that He possesses
no quality; and yet every positive essential attribute of an object
either constitutes its essence,—and in that case it is identical with
the essence,—or it contains a quality of the object.
There are, as you know, four kinds of quality; I will give you
instances of attributes of each kind, in order to show you that this
class of attributes cannot possibly be applied to God. (a) A man is
described by any of his intellectual or moral qualities, or by any of
the dispositions appertaining to him as an animate being, when, e.g.,
we speak of a person who is a carpenter, or who shrinks from sin, or
who is ill. It makes no difference whether we say, a carpenter, or a
sage, or a physician; by all these we represent certain physical
dispositions; nor does it make any difference whether we say
“sin-fearing” or “merciful.” Every trade, every profession, and every
settled habit of man are certain physical dispositions. All this is
clear to those who have occupied themselves with the study of Logic.
(b) A thing is described by some physical quality it possesses, or by
the absence of the same, e.g., as being soft or hard. It makes no
difference whether we say “soft or hard,” or “strong or weak”; in both
cases we speak of physical conditions. (c) A man is described by his
passive qualities, or by his emotions; we speak, e.g., of a person who
is passionate, irritable, timid, merciful, without implying that these
conditions have become permanent. The description of a thing by its
colour, taste, heat, cold, dryness, and moisture, belongs also to this
class of attributes. (d) A thing is described by any of its qualities
resulting from quantity as such; we speak, e.g., of a thing which is
long, short, curved, straight, etc.
Consider all these and similar attributes, and you will find that they
cannot be employed in reference to God. He is not a magnitude that any
quality resulting from quantity as such could be possessed by Him; He
is not affected by external influences, and therefore does not possess
any quality resulting from emotion. He is not subject to physical
conditions, and therefore does not possess strength or similar
qualities; He is not an animate being, that He should have a certain
disposition of the soul, or acquire certain properties, as meekness,
modesty, etc., or be in a state to which animate beings as such are
subject, as, e.g., in that of health or of illness. Hence it follows
that no attribute coming under the head of quality in its widest sense,
can be predicated of God. Consequently, these three classes of
attributes, describing the essence of a thing, or part of the essence,
or a quality of it, are clearly inadmissible in reference to God, for
they imply composition, which, as we shall prove, is out of question as
regards the Creator. We say, with regard to this latter point, that He
is absolutely One.
Fourthly. A thing is described by its relation to another thing, e.g.,
to time, to space, or to a different individual; thus we say, Zaid, the
father of A, or the partner of B, or who dwells at a certain place, or
who lived at a stated time. This kind of attribute does not necessarily
imply plurality or change in the essence of the object described; for
the same Zaid, to whom reference is made, is the partner of Amru, the
father of Becr, the master of Khalid, the friend of Zaid, dwells in a
certain house, and was born in a certain year. Such relations are not
the essence of a thing, nor are they so intimately connected with it as
qualities. At first thought, it would seem that they may be employed in
reference to God, but after careful and thorough consideration we are
convinced of their inadmissibility. It is quite clear that there is no
relation between God and time or space. For time is an accident
connected with motion, in so far as the latter includes the relation of
anteriority and posteriority, and is expressed by number, as is
explained in books devoted to this subject; and since motion is one of
the conditions to which only material bodies are subject, and God is
immaterial, there can be no relation between Him and time. Similarly
there is no relation between Him and space. But what we have to
investigate and to examine is this: whether some real relation exists
between God and any of the substances created by Him, by which He could
be described? That there is no correlation between Him and any of His
creatures can easily be seen; for the characteristic of two objects
correlative to each other is the equality of their reciprocal relation.
Now, as God has absolute existence, while all other beings have only
possible existence, as we shall show, there consequently cannot be any
correlation [between God and His creatures]. That a certain kind of
relation does exist between them is by some considered possible, but
wrongly. It is impossible to imagine a relation between intellect and
sight, although, as we believe, the same kind of existence is common to
both; how, then, could a relation be imagined between any creature and
God, who has nothing in common with any other being; for even the term
existence is applied to Him and other things, according to our opinion,
only by way of pure homonymity. Consequently there is no relation
whatever between Him and any other being. For whenever we speak of a
relation between two things, these belong to the same kind; but when
two things belong to different kinds though of the same class, there is
no relation between them. We therefore do not say, this red compared
with that green, is more, or less, or equally intense, although both
belong to the same class—colour; when they belong to two different
classes, there does not appear to exist any relation between them, not
even to a man of ordinary intellect, although the two things belong to
the same category; e.g., between a hundred cubits and the heat of
pepper there is no relation, the one being a quality, the other a
quantity; or between wisdom and sweetness, between meekness and
bitterness, although all these come under the head of quality in its
more general signification. How, then, could there be any relation
between God and His creatures, considering the important difference
between them in respect to true existence, the greatest of all
differences. Besides, if any relation existed between them, God would
be subject to the accident of relation; and although that would not be
an accident to the essence of God, it would still be, to some extent, a
kind of accident. You would, therefore, be wrong if you applied
affirmative attributes in their literal sense to God, though they
contained only relations; these, however, are the most appropriate of
all attributes, to be employed, in a less strict sense, in reference to
God, because they do not imply that a plurality of eternal things
exists, or that any change takes place in the essence of God, when
those things change to which God is in relation.
Fifthly. A thing is described by its actions; I do not mean by “its
actions” the inherent capacity for a certain work, as is expressed in
“carpenter,” “painter,” or “smith”—for these belong to the class of
qualities which have been mentioned above—but I mean the action the
latter has performed—we speak, e.g., of Zaid, who made this door, built
that wall, wove that garment. This kind of attributes is separate from
the essences of the thing described, and, therefore, appropriate to be
employed in describing the Creator, especially since we know that these
different actions do not imply that different elements must be
contained in the substance of the agent, by which the different actions
are produced, as will be explained. On the contrary, all the actions of
God emanate from His essence, not from any extraneous thing superadded
to His essence, as we have shown.
What we have explained in the present chapter is this: that God is one
in every respect, containing no plurality or any element superadded to
His essence: and that the many attributes of different significations
applied in Scripture to God, originate in the multitude of His actions,
not in a plurality existing in His essence, and are partly employed
with the object of conveying to us some notion of His perfection, in
accordance with what we consider perfection, as has been explained by
us. The possibility of one simple substance excluding plurality, though
accomplishing different actions, will be illustrated by examples in the
next chapter.