We have already stated several times that the prophetic books never
attribute to God anything which ordinary men consider a defect, or
which they cannot in their imagination combine with the idea of the
Almighty, although such terms may not otherwise be different from those
which were employed as metaphors in relation to God. Indeed all things
which are attributed to God are considered in some way to be
perfection, or can at least be imagined [as appertaining to Him].
We must now show why, according to this principle, the senses of
hearing, sight and smell, are attributed to God, but not those of taste
and touch. He is equally elevated above the use of all the five senses;
they are all defective as regards perception, even for those who have
no other source of knowledge; because they are passive, receive
impressions from without, and are subject to interruptions and
sufferings, as much as the other organs of the body. By saying that God
sees, we mean to state that He perceives visible things; “He hears” is
identical with saying “He perceives audible things”; in the same way we
might say, “He tastes and He touches,” in the sense of “He perceives
objects which man perceives by means of taste and touch.” For, as
regards perception, the senses are identical; if we deny the existence
of one sensation in God, we must deny that of all other sensations,
i.e., the perceptions of the five senses; and if we attribute the
existence of one sensation to Him, i.e., the perception appertaining to
one of the senses, we must attribute all the five sensations.
Nevertheless, we find in Holy Writ, “And God saw” (Gen. vi. 5); “And
God heard” (Num. xi. 1); “And God smelt” (Gen. viii. 21); but we do not
meet with the expressions, “And God tasted,” “And God touched.”
According to our opinion the reason of this is to be found in the idea,
which has a firm hold in the minds of all men, that God does not come
into contact with a body in the same manner as one body comes into
contact with another, since He is not even seen by the eye. While these
two senses, namely, taste and touch, only act when in close contact
with the object, by sight, hearing, and smell, even distant objects are
perceived. These, therefore, were considered by the multitude
appropriate expressions [to be figuratively applied to God]. Besides,
the object in figuratively applying the sensations to Him, could only
have been to express that He perceives our actions; but hearing and
sight are sufficient for that, namely, for the perception of what a man
does or says. Thus our Sages, among other admonitions, gave the
following advice and warning: “Know what is above thee, a seeing eye,
and a hearing ear.” (Mishnah Abot, ii. 1.)
You, however, know that, strictly speaking, the condition of all the
sensations is the same, that the same argument which is employed
against the existence of touch and taste in God, may be used against
sight, hearing, and smell; for they all are material perceptions and
impressions which are subject to change. There is only this difference,
that the former, touch and taste, are at once recognized as
deficiencies, while the others are considered as perfections. In a
similar manner the defect of the imagination is easily seen, less
easily that of thinking and reasoning. Imagination (raʻayon) therefore,
was never employed as a figure in speaking of God, while thought and
reason are figuratively ascribed to Him. Comp. “The thoughts which the
Lord thought” (Jer. xlix. 20); “And with his understanding he stretched
out the heavens” (ib. x. 12). The inner senses were thus treated in the
same way as the external; some are figuratively applied to God, some
not. All this is according to the language of man; he ascribes to God
what he considers a perfection, and does not ascribe to Him what he
considers a defect. In truth, however, no real attribute, implying an
addition to His essence, can be applied to Him, as will be proved.