THE GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED
BY
MOSES MAIMONIDES
TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL ARABIC TEXT
BY
M. FRIEDLÄNDER, Ph.D
SECOND EDITION, REVISED THROUGHOUT
LONDON
GEORGE ROUTLEDGE & SONS LTD
New York: E. P. DUTTON & CO
1910
PREFACE
The first Edition of the English Translation of Maimonides’ Dalalāt
al-Hairin being exhausted without having fully supplied the demand, I
prepared a second, revised edition of the Translation. In the new
edition the three volumes of the first edition have been reduced to one
volume by the elimination of the notes; besides Hebrew words and
phrases have been eliminated or transliterated. By these changes the
translator sought to produce a cheap edition in order to bring the work
of Maimonides within the reach of all students of Theology and Jewish
Literature.
M. FRIEDLÄNDER.
Jews’ College, July 1904.
PREFACE TO VOLUME ONE OF THE FIRST EDITION
In compliance with a desire repeatedly expressed by the Committee of
the Hebrew Literature Society, I have undertaken to translate
Maimonides’ Dalalāt al-Ḥairin, better known by the Hebrew title Moreh
Nebuchim, and I offer the first instalment of my labours in the present
volume. This contains—(1) A short Life of Maimonides, in which special
attention is given to his alleged apostasy. (2) An analysis of the
whole of the Moreh Nebuchim. (3) A translation of the First Part of
this work from the Arabic, with explanatory and critical notes.
Parts of the Translation have been contributed by Mr. Joseph Abrahams,
B.A., Ph.D., and Rev. H. Gollancz—the Introduction by the former, and
the first twenty-five chapters by the latter.
In conclusion I beg to tender my thanks to Rev. A. Loewy, Editor of the
Publications of the Hebrew Literature Society, for his careful revision
of my manuscript and proofs, and to Mr. A. Neubauer, M.A., for his
kindness in supplying me with such information as I required.
M. FRIEDLÄNDER.
Jews’ College, June 1881.
CONTENTS
PAGE
Life of Maimonides xv
Moreh Nebuchim Literature. Analysis of the Guide for the
Perplexed xxvii
Part I.
Introduction—
Dedicatory Letter 1
The Object of the Guide 2
On Similes 4
Directions for the Study of this Work 8
Introductory Remarks 9
CHAPTER.
I The homonymity of Ẓelem 13
II On Genesis iii. 5 14
III On tabnit and temunah 16
IV On raah, hibbit and ḥazah 17
V On Exod. xxiv. 10 18
VI On ish and ishshah, aḥ and aḥot 19
VII On yalad 19
VIII On maḳom 20
IX On kisse 21
X On ʻalah, yarad 22
XI On yashab 23
XII On kam 24
XIII On ʻamad 25
XIV On adam 25
XV On naẓab, yaẓab 25
XVI On Ẓur 26
XVII On Mishnah Ḥagigah ii. 1 27
XVIII On ḳarab, nagaʻ, niggash 27
XIX On male 28
XX On ram, nissa 29
XXI On ʻabar 30
XXII On ba 32
XXIII On Yaẓa, shub 32
XXIV On halak 33
XXV On shaken 34
XXVI On “The Torah speaketh the language of man” 34
XXVII On Targum of Gen. xlvi. 4 35
XXVIII On regel 37
XXIX On ʻaẓeb 39
XXX On akal 39
XXXI, XXXII On the Limit of Man’s Intellect 40, 42
XXXIII to XXXVI On the Study and the Teaching of
Metaphysics 43–52
XXXVII On panim 52
XXXVIII On aḥor 53
XXXIX On leb 54
XL On ruaḥ 55
XLI On nefesh 56
XLII On ḥayyim-mavet 56
XLIII On kanaf 57
XLIV On ʻayin 58
XLV On shamaʻ 58
XLVI, XLVII On the Attribution of Senses and Sensations
to God 59, 63
XLVIII The Targum of shamaʻ and raah 64
XLIX Figurative Expressions applied to Angels 65
L On Faith 67
LI–LX On Attributes 68–89
LI On the Necessity of Proving the Inadmissibility of
Attributes in reference to God 68
LII Classification of Attributes 69
LIII The Arguments of the Attributists 72
LIV On Exod. xxxiii. 13; xxxiv. 7 75
LV On Attributes implying Corporeality, Emotion,
Non-existence and Comparison 78
LVI On Attributes denoting Existence, Life, Power, Wisdom
and Will 79
LVII On the Identity of the Essence of God and His
Attributes 80
LVIII On the Negative Sense of the True Attributes of God 81
LIX On the Character of the Knowledge of God Consisting
of Negations 83
LX On the Difference between Positive and Negative
Attributes 87
LXI On the Names of God 89
LXII On the Divine Names composed of Four, Twelve and
Forty-two Letters 91
LXIII On Ehyeh, Yah and Shaddai 93
LXIV On “The Name of the Lord,” and “The Glory of God” 95
LXV On the phrase “God spake” 96
LXVI On Exod. xxxii. 16 98
LXVII On shabat and naḥ 99
LXVIII On the Terms: The Intellectus, the Intelligens and
the Intelligibile 100
LXIX On the Primal Cause 102
LXX On the attribute rokeb baʻarabot 105
LXXI The Origin of the Kalām 107
LXXII A Parallel between the Universe and Man 113
LXXIII Twelve Propositions of the Kalām 120
LXXIV Proofs of the Kalām for the creatio ex nihilo 133
LXXV Proofs of the Kalām for the Unity of God 138
LXXVI Proofs of the Kalām for the Incorporeality of God 141
Part II.
The Author’s Introduction. The Twenty-Six Propositions
employed by the Philosophers to prove the Existence of God 145
CHAPTER.
I Philosophical proofs for the Existence, Incorporeality,
and Unity of the First Cause 149
II On the Existence of Intelligences or purely Spiritual
Beings 154
III The Author adopts the Theory of Aristotle as least
open to Objections 156
IV The Spheres and the Causes of their Motion 156
V Agreement of the Aristotelian Theory with the Teaching
of Scripture 159
VI What is meant by the Scriptural Term “Angels” 160
VII The Homonymity of the term “Angel” 162
VIII On the Music of the Spheres 163
IX On the Number of the Heavenly Spheres 163
X The Influence of the Spheres upon the Earth manifests
itself in four different ways 164
XI The Theory of Eccentricity Preferable to that of
Epicycles 166
XII On the Nature of the Divine Influence and that of
the Spheres 168
XIII Three Different Theories about the Beginning of the
Universe 171
XIV Seven Methods by which the Philosophers sought to
prove the Eternity of the Universe 174
XV Aristotle does not scientifically demonstrate his
Theory 176
XVI The Author refutes all Objections to Creatio ex
nihilo 178
XVII The Laws of Nature apply to Things Created, but do
not regulate the Creative Act which produces them 178
XVIII Examinations of the Proofs of Philosophers for the
Eternity of the Universe 181
XIX Design in Nature 184
XX The Opinion of Aristotle as regards Design in Nature 189
XXI Explanation of the Aristotelian Theory that the
Universe is the necessary Result of the First Cause 190
XXII Objections to the Theory of the Eternity of the
Universe 192
XXIII The Theory of Creatio ex nihilo is preferable to
that of the Eternity of the Universe 195
XXIV Difficulty of Comprehending the Nature and the Motion
of the Spheres according to the Theory of Aristotle 196
XXV The Theory of Creation is adopted because of its own
Superiority, the Proofs based on Scripture being
Inconclusive 199
XXVI Examination of a passage from Pirḳe di-Rabbi Eliezer
in reference to Creation 200
XXVII The Theory of a Future Destruction of the Universe is
not part of the Religious Belief taught in the Bible 201
XXVIII Scriptural Teaching is in favour of the
Indestructibility of the Universe 202
XXIX Explanation of Scriptural Phrases implying the
Destruction of Heaven and Earth 204
XXX Philosophical Interpretation of Genesis i.-iv. 212
XXXI The Institution of the Sabbath serves (1) to Teach
the Theory of Creation, and (2) to promote Man’s
Welfare 218
XXXII Three Theories concerning Prophecy 219
XXXIII The Difference between Moses and the other Israelites
as regards the Revelation on Mount Sinai 221
XXXIV Explanation of Exodus xxiii. 20 223
XXXV The Difference between Moses and the other Prophets
as regards the Miracles wrought by them 223
XXXVI On the Mental, Physical and Moral Faculties of the
Prophets 225
XXXVII On the Divine Influence upon Man’s Imaginative and
Mental Faculties through the Active Intellect 227
XXXVIII Courage and Intuition reach the highest degree of
Perfection in Prophets 229
XXXIX Moses was the fittest Prophet to Receive and
Promulgate the Immutable Law, which succeeding
Prophets merely Taught and Expounded 231
XL The Test of True Prophecy 232
XLI What is Meant by “Vision” 234
XLII Prophets Received Direct Communication only in Dreams
or Visions 236
XLIII On the Allegories of the Prophets 238
XLIV On the Different Modes in which Prophets Receive
Divine Messages 240
XLV The Various Classes of Prophets 241
XLVI The Allegorical Acts of Prophets formed Parts of
Prophetic Visions 245
XLVII On the Figurative Style of the Prophetic Writings 247
XLVIII Scripture ascribes Phenomena directly produced by
Natural Causes to God as the First Cause of all
things 249
Part III.
The Author’s Introduction and Apology for Publishing, contrary
to the Teaching of the Mishnah, an Interpretation of Ezek. i. 251
CHAPTER.
I The “Four Faces” are Human Faces with four different
peculiarities 252
II The Ḥayyot and the Ofannim 252
III Further Explanation of the Ḥayyot and the Ofannim
derived from Ezek. x. 255
IV The rendering of Ofan by Gilgal in the Targum of
Jonathan 256
V The Vision of Ezekiel is divided into three stages:
(1) Ḥayyot (=the Spheres); (2) Ofannim (=Earthly
elements); and (3) the man above the Ḥayyot
(=Intelligences) 257
VI On the Difference between the Vision of Ezekiel and
that of Isaiah (vi.) 258
VII The Different Ways in which the Prophet perceived the
Three Parts of the Mercabah (Chariot) 259
VIII Man has the Power to Control his Bodily Wants and
Earthly Desires 261
IX The Material Element in Man Prevents him from
Attaining Perfection 264
X God is not the Creator of Evil 265
XI Man is the Cause of his own Misfortunes 267
XII Three Kinds of Evil: (1) That caused by the Nature
of Man; (2) Caused by Man to Man; (3) Caused by
Man to himself 267
XIII The Universe has No other Purpose than its own
Existence 272
XIV It is the Will of the Creator that the Spheres
regulate the Affairs of Mankind 277
XV Impossible Things are not ascribed to the Creator,
but it is difficult to Prove the Impossibility in
each Individual Case 279
XVI On God’s Omniscience 280
XVII Five Theories concerning Providence 282
XVIII Every Individual Member of Mankind enjoys the
Influence of Divine Providence in proportion to
his Intellectual Perfection 289
XIX It is an ancient Error to Assume that God takes no
Notice of Man 290
XX God’s Knowledge is Different from Man’s Knowledge 292
XXI The Creator’s knowledge of His Production is Perfect 295
XXII Object of the Book of Job, and Explanation of the
First Two Chapters 296
XXIII Job and his Friends Discuss the various Theories
concerning Providence 299
XXIV On Trials and Temptation 304
XXV The Actions of God are Not Purposeless 307
XXVI The Divine Precepts Serve a certain Purpose 310
XXVII The Object of the Divine Precepts is to Secure the
Well-being of Man’s Soul and Body 312
XXVIII This Object is easily seen in some Precepts, whilst
in others it is only known after due Reflection 313
XXIX On the Sabeans or Star-worshippers 315
XXX It is one of the Objects of the Law of Moses to
Oppose Idolatry 320
XXXI The Law Promotes the Well-being of Man by teaching
Truth, Morality and Social Conduct 321
XXXII Why did God give Laws to Oppose Idolatry instead of
Uprooting it directly? 322
XXXIII Another chief Object of the Law is to Train Man in
Mastering his Appetites and Desires 327
XXXIV The Law is based on the ordinary condition of man 328
XXXV Division of the Precepts into Fourteen Classes 329
XXXVI First Class of Precepts, to Know, Love and Fear God 331
XXXVII Second Class, Laws concerning Idolatry 332
XXXVIII Third Class, Moral Precepts 338
XXXIX Fourth Class, Laws relating to Charity 339
XL Fifth Class, Compensation for Injury and the Duty of
Preventing Sin 342
XLI Sixth Class, Punishment of the Sinner 344
XLII Seventh Class, Equity and Honesty 350
XLIII Eighth Class, Sabbath and Festival 352
XLIV Ninth Class, Prayer, Tefillin, Ẓiẓit and Mezuzah 354
XLV Tenth Class, The Temple, its Vessels and its Ministers 355
XLVI Eleventh Class, Sacrifices 359
XLVII Twelfth Class, Distinction between Clean and Unclean;
and on Purification 366
XLVIII Thirteenth Class, Dietary Laws 370
XLIX Fourteenth Class, Marriage Laws 372
L On Scriptural Passages with seemingly Purposeless
Contents 380
LI How God is worshipped by a Perfect Man 384
LII On the Fear of God 391
LIII Explanation of Ḥesed (Love), Mishpat (Judgment), and
Ẓedaḳah (Righteousness) 392
LIV On True Wisdom 393
Index of Scriptural Passages 399
Index of Quotations from the Targumim 409
Index of Quotations from the Midrashim 409
Index of Quotations from the Talmud 410
Index of References to Other Works of Maimonides 411
Index of References to Works of Science and Philosophy 412
Alphabetical Index 412
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES
“Before the sun of Eli had set the sun of Samuel had risen.” Before the
voice of the prophets had ceased to guide the people, the Interpreters
of the Law, the Doctors of the Talmud, had commenced their labours, and
before the Academies of Sura and of Pumbadita were closed, centres of
Jewish thought and learning were already flourishing in the far West.
The circumstances which led to the transference of the head-quarters of
Jewish learning from the East to the West in the tenth century are thus
narrated in the Sefer ha-kabbalah of Rabbi Abraham ben David:
“After the death of Hezekiah, the head of the Academy and Prince of the
Exile, the academies were closed and no new Geonim were appointed. But
long before that time Heaven had willed that there should be a
discontinuance of the pecuniary gifts which used to be sent from
Palestine, North Africa and Europe. Heaven had also decreed that a ship
sailing from Bari should be captured by Ibn Romahis, commander of the
naval forces of Abd-er-rahman al-nasr. Four distinguished Rabbis were
thus made prisoners—Rabbi Ḥushiel, father of Rabbi Ḥananel, Rabbi
Moses, father of Rabbi Ḥanok, Rabbi Shemarjahu, son of Rabbi Elḥanan,
and a fourth whose name has not been recorded. They were engaged in a
mission to collect subsidies in aid of the Academy in Sura. The captor
sold them as slaves; Rabbi Ḥushiel was carried to Kairuan, R.
Shemarjahu was left in Alexandria, and R. Moses was brought to Cordova.
These slaves were ransomed by their brethren and were soon placed in
important positions. When Rabbi Moses was brought to Cordova, it was
supposed that he was uneducated. In that city there was a synagogue
known at that time by the name of Keneset ha-midrash, and Rabbi Nathan,
renowned for his great piety, was the head of the congregation. The
members of the community used to hold meetings at which the Talmud was
read and discussed. One day when Rabbi Nathan was expounding the Talmud
and was unable to give a satisfactory explanation of the passage under
discussion, Rabbi Moses promptly removed the difficulty and at the same
time answered several questions which were submitted to him. Thereupon
R. Nathan thus addressed the assembly:—‘I am no longer your leader;
that stranger in sackcloth shall henceforth be my teacher, and you
shall appoint him to be your chief.’ The admiral, on hearing of the
high attainments of his prisoner, desired to revoke the sale, but the
king would not permit this retraction, being pleased to learn that his
Jewish subjects were no longer dependent for their religious
instruction on the schools in the East.”
Henceforth the schools in the West asserted their independence, and
even surpassed the parent institutions. The Caliphs, mostly opulent,
gave every encouragement to philosophy and poetry; and, being generally
liberal in sentiment, they entertained kindly feelings towards their
Jewish subjects. These were allowed to compete for the acquisition of
wealth and honour on equal terms with their Mohammedan fellow-citizens.
Philosophy and poetry were consequently cultivated by the Jews with the
same zest as by the Arabs. Ibn Gabirol, Ibn Ḥasdai, Judah ha-levi,
Ḥananel, Alfasi, the Ibn Ezras, and others who flourished in that
period were the ornament of their age, and the pride of the Jews at all
times. The same favourable condition was maintained during the reign of
the Omeyades; but when the Moravides and the Almohades came into power,
the horizon darkened once more, and misfortunes threatened to destroy
the fruit of several centuries. Amidst this gloom there appeared a
brilliant luminary which sent forth rays of light and comfort: this was
Moses Maimonides.
Moses, the son of Maimon, was born at Cordova, on the 14th of Nisan,
4895 (March 30, 1135). Although the date of his birth has been recorded
with the utmost accuracy, no trustworthy notice has been preserved
concerning the early period of his life. But his entire career is a
proof that he did not pass his youth in idleness; his education must
have been in harmony with the hope of his parents, that one day he
would, like his father and forefathers, hold the honourable office of
Dayyan or Rabbi, and distinguish himself in theological learning. It is
probable that the Bible and the Talmud formed the chief subjects of his
study; but he unquestionably made the best use of the opportunities
which Mohammedan Spain, and especially Cordova, afforded him for the
acquisition of general knowledge. It is not mentioned in any of his
writings who were his teachers; his father, as it seems, was his
principal guide and instructor in many branches of knowledge. David
Conforte, in his historical work, Ḳore ha-dorot, states that Maimonides
was the pupil of two eminent men, namely, Rabbi Joseph Ibn Migash and
Ibn Roshd (Averroes); that by the former he was instructed in the
Talmud, and by the latter in philosophy. This statement seems to be
erroneous, as Maimonides was only a child at the time when Rabbi Joseph
died, and already far advanced in years when he became acquainted with
the writings of Ibn Roshd. The origin of this mistake, as regards Rabbi
Joseph, can easily be traced. Maimonides in his Mishneh Tora, employs,
in reference to R. Isaac Alfasi and R. Joseph, the expression “my
teachers” (rabbotai), and this expression, by which he merely describes
his indebtedness to their writings, has been taken in its literal
meaning.
Whoever his teachers may have been, it is evident that he was well
prepared by them for his future mission. At the age of twenty-three he
entered upon his literary career with a treatise on the Jewish
Calendar. It is unknown where this work was composed, whether in Spain
or in Africa. The author merely states that he wrote it at the request
of a friend, whom he, however, leaves unnamed. The subject was
generally considered to be very abstruse, and to involve a thorough
knowledge of mathematics. Maimonides must, therefore, even at this
early period, have been regarded as a profound scholar by those who
knew him. The treatise is of an elementary character.—It was probably
about the same time that he wrote, in Arabic, an explanation of Logical
terms, Millot higgayon, which Moses Ibn Tibbon translated into Hebrew.
The earlier period of his life does not seem to have been marked by any
incident worth noticing. It may, however, be easily conceived that the
later period of his life, which was replete with interesting incidents,
engaged the exclusive attention of his biographers. So much is certain,
that his youth was beset with trouble and anxiety; the peaceful
development of science and philosophy was disturbed by wars raging
between Mohammedans and Christians, and also between the several
Mohammedan sects. The Moravides, who had succeeded the Omeyades, were
opposed to liberality and toleration; but they were surpassed in
cruelty and fanaticism by their successors. Cordova was taken by the
Almohades in the year 1148, when Maimonides was about thirteen years
old. The victories of the Almohades, first under the leadership of the
Mahadi Ibn Tamurt, and then under Abd-al-mumen, were, according to all
testimonies, attended by acts of excessive intolerance. Abd-al-mumen
would not suffer in his dominions any other faith but the one which he
himself confessed. Jews and Christians had the choice between Islam and
emigration or a martyr’s death. The Sefer ha-ḳabbalah contains the
following description of one of the persecutions which then occurred:
“After the death of R. Joseph ha-levi the study of the Torah was
interrupted, although he left a son and a nephew, both of whom had
under his tuition become profound scholars. ‘The righteous man (R.
Joseph) was taken away on account of the approaching evils.’ After the
death of R. Joseph there came for the Jews a time of oppression and
distress. They quitted their homes, ‘Such as were for death, to death,
and such as were for the sword, to the sword; and such as were for the
famine, to the famine, and such as were for the captivity, to the
captivity’; and—it might be added to the words of Jeremiah (xv.
2)—‘such as were for apostasy, to apostasy.’ All this happened through
the sword of Ibn Tamurt, who, in 4902 (1142), determined to blot out
the name of Israel, and actually left no trace of the Jews in any part
of his empire.”
Ibn Verga in his work on Jewish martyrdom, in Shebeṭ Jehudah, gives the
following account of events then happening:—“In the year 4902 the
armies of Ibn Tamurt made their appearance. A proclamation was issued
that any one who refused to adopt Islam would be put to death, and his
property would be confiscated. Thereupon the Jews assembled at the gate
of the royal palace and implored the king for mercy. He answered—‘It is
because I have compassion on you, that I command you to become
Muslemim; for I desire to save you from eternal punishment.’ The Jews
replied—‘Our salvation depends on our observance of the Divine Law; you
are the master of our bodies and of our property, but our souls will be
judged by the King who gave them to us, and to whom they will return;
whatever be our future fate, you, O king, will not be held responsible
for it.’ ‘I do not desire to argue with you,’ said the king; ‘for I
know you will argue according to your own religion. It is my absolute
will that you either adopt my religion or be put to death.’ The Jews
then proposed to emigrate, but the king would not allow his subjects to
serve another king. In vain did the Jews implore the nobles to
intercede in their behalf; the king remained inexorable. Thus many
congregations forsook their religion; but within a month the king came
to a sudden death; the son, believing that his father had met with an
untimely end as a punishment for his cruelty to the Jews, assured the
involuntary converts that it would be indifferent to him what religion
they professed. Hence many Jews returned at once to the religion of
their fathers, while others hesitated for some time, from fear that the
king meant to entrap the apparent converts.”
From such records it appears that during these calamities some of the
Jews fled to foreign countries, some died as martyrs, and many others
submitted for a time to outward conversion. Which course was followed
by the family of Maimon? Did they sacrifice personal comfort and safety
to their religious conviction, or did they, on the contrary, for the
sake of mere worldly considerations dissemble their faith and pretend
that they completely submitted to the dictates of the tyrant? An answer
to this question presents itself in the following note which Maimonides
has appended to his commentary on the Mishnah: “I have now finished
this work in accordance with my promise, and I fervently beseech the
Almighty to save us from error. If there be one who shall discover an
inaccuracy in this Commentary or shall have a better explanation to
offer, let my attention be directed unto it; and let me be exonerated
by the fact that I have worked with far greater application than any
one who writes for the sake of pay and profit, and that I have worked
under the most trying circumstances. For Heaven had ordained that we be
exiled, and we were therefore driven about from place to place; I was
thus compelled to work at the Commentary while travelling by land, or
crossing the sea. It might have sufficed to mention that during that
time I, in addition, was engaged in other studies, but I preferred to
give the above explanation in order to encourage those who wish to
criticise or annotate the Commentary, and at the same time to account
for the slow progress of this work. I, Moses, the son of Maimon,
commenced it when I was twenty-three years old, and finished it in
Egypt, at the age of thirty[-three] years, in the year 1479 Sel.
(1168).”
The Sefer Ḥaredim of R. Eleazar Askari of Safed contains the following
statement of Maimonides:—“On Sabbath evening, the 4th of Iyyar, 4925
(1165), I went on board; on the following Sabbath the waves threatened
to destroy our lives.... On the 3rd of Sivan, I arrived safely at Acco,
and was thus rescued from apostasy.... On Tuesday, the 4th of
Marḥeshvan, 4926, I left Acco, arrived at Jerusalem after a journey
beset with difficulties and with dangers, and prayed on the spot of the
great and holy house on the 4th, 5th, and 6th of Marḥeshvan. On Sunday,
the 9th of that month, I left Jerusalem and visited the cave of
Machpelah, in Hebron.”
From these two statements it may be inferred that in times of
persecution Maimonides and his family did not seek to protect their
lives and property by dissimulation. They submitted to the troubles of
exile in order that they might remain faithful to their religion.
Carmoly, Geiger, Munk, and others are of opinion that the treatise of
Maimonides on involuntary apostasy, as well as the accounts of some
Mohammedan authors, contain strong evidence to show that there was a
time when the family of Maimon publicly professed their belief in
Mohammed. A critical examination of these documents compels us to
reject their evidence as inadmissible.—After a long period of trouble
and anxiety, the family of Maimon arrived at Fostat, in Egypt, and
settled there. David, the brother of Moses Maimonides, carried on a
trade in precious stones, while Moses occupied himself with his studies
and interested himself in the communal affairs of the Jews.
It appears that for some time Moses was supported by his brother, and
when this brother died, he earned a living by practising as a
physician; but he never sought or derived any benefit from his services
to his community, or from his correspondence or from the works he wrote
for the instruction of his brethren; the satisfaction of being of
service to his fellow-creatures was for him a sufficient reward.
The first public act in which Maimonides appears to have taken a
leading part was a decree promulgated by the Rabbinical authorities in
Cairo in the year 1167. The decree begins as follows:—“In times gone
by, when storms and tempests threatened us, we used to wander about
from place to place; but by the mercy of the Almighty we have now been
enabled to find here a resting-place. On our arrival, we noticed to our
great dismay that the learned were disunited; that none of them turned
his attention to the needs of the congregation. We therefore felt it
our duty to undertake the task of guiding the holy flock, of inquiring
into the condition of the community, of “reconciling the hearts of the
fathers to their children,” and of correcting their corrupt ways. The
injuries are great, but we may succeed in effecting a cure, and—in
accordance with the words of the prophet—‘I will seek the lost one, and
that which has been cast out I will bring back, and the broken one I
will cure’ (Micah iv. 6). When we therefore resolved to take the
management of the communal affairs into our hands, we discovered the
existence of a serious evil in the midst of the community,” etc.
It was probably about that time that Maimon died. Letters of condolence
were sent to his son Moses from all sides, both from Mohammedan and
from Christian countries; in some instances the letters were several
months on their way before they reached their destination.
The interest which Maimonides now took in communal affairs did not
prevent him from completing the great and arduous work, the Commentary
on the Mishnah, which he had begun in Spain and continued during his
wanderings in Africa. In this Commentary he proposed to give the
quintessence of the Gemara, to expound the meaning of each dictum in
the Mishnah, and to state which of the several opinions had received
the sanction of the Talmudical authorities. His object in writing this
work was to enable those who are not disposed to study the Gemara, to
understand the Mishnah, and to facilitate the study of the Gemara for
those who are willing to engage in it. The commentator generally
adheres to the explanations given in the Gemara, and it is only in
cases where the halakah, or practical law, is not affected, that he
ventures to dissent. He acknowledges the benefit he derived from such
works of his predecessors as the Halakot of Alfasi, and the writings of
the Geonim, but afterwards he asserted that errors which were
discovered in his works arose from his implicit reliance on those
authorities. His originality is conspicuous in the Introduction and in
the treatment of general principles, which in some instances precedes
the exposition of an entire section or chapter, in others that of a
single rule. The commentator is generally concise, except when occasion
is afforded to treat of ethical and theological principles, or of a
scientific subject, such as weights and measures, or mathematical and
astronomical problems. Although exhortations to virtue and warnings
against vice are found in all parts of his work, they are especially
abundant in the Commentary on Abot, which is prefaced by a separate
psychological treatise, called The Eight Chapters. The dictum “He who
speaketh much commits a sin,” elicited a lesson on the economy of
speech; the explanation of ʻolam ha-ba in the treatise Sanhedrin (xi.
1) led him to discuss the principles of faith, and to lay down the
thirteen articles of the Jewish creed. The Commentary was written in
Arabic, and was subsequently translated into Hebrew and into other
languages. The estimation in which the Commentary was held may be
inferred from the following fact: When the Jews in Italy became
acquainted with its method and spirit, through a Hebrew translation of
one of its parts, they sent to Spain in search of a complete Hebrew
version of the Commentary. R. Simḥah, who had been entrusted with the
mission, found no copy extant, but he succeeded, through the influence
of Rabbi Shelomoh ben Aderet, in causing a Hebrew translation of this
important work to be prepared.—In the Introduction, the author states
that he has written a Commentary on the Babylonian Talmud treatise
Ḥullin and on nearly three entire sections, viz., Moëd, Nashim, and
Nezikin. Of all these Commentaries only the one on Rosh ha-shanah is
known.
In the year 1172 Maimonides wrote the Iggeret Teman, or Petaḥ-tiḳvah
(“Letter to the Jews in Yemen,” or “Opening of hope”) in response to a
letter addressed to him by Rabbi Jacob al-Fayumi on the critical
condition of the Jews in Yemen. Some of these Jews had been forced into
apostasy; others were made to believe that certain passages in the
Bible alluded to the mission of Mohammed; others again had been misled
by an impostor who pretended to be the Messiah. The character and style
of Maimonides’ reply appear to have been adapted to the intellectual
condition of the Jews in Yemen, for whom it was written. These probably
read the Bible with Midrashic commentaries, and preferred the easy and
attractive Agadah to the more earnest study of the Halakah. It is
therefore not surprising that the letter contains remarks and
interpretations which cannot be reconciled with the philosophical and
logical method by which all the other works of Maimonides are
distinguished. After a few complimentary words, in which the author
modestly disputes the justice of the praises lavished upon him, he
attempts to prove that the present sufferings of the Jews, together
with the numerous instances of apostasy, were foretold by the prophets,
especially by Daniel, and must not perplex the faithful. It must be
borne in mind, he continues, that the attempts made in past times to do
away with the Jewish religion, had invariably failed; the same would be
the fate of the present attempts; for “religious persecutions are of
but short duration.” The arguments which profess to demonstrate that in
certain Biblical passages allusion is made to Mohammed, are based on
interpretations which are totally opposed to common sense. He urges
that the Jews, faithfully adhering to their religion, should impress
their children with the greatness of the Revelation on Mount Sinai, and
of the miracles wrought through Moses; they also should remain firm in
the belief that God will send the Messiah to deliver their nation, but
they must abandon futile calculations of the Messianic period, and
beware of impostors. Although there be signs which indicate the
approach of the promised deliverance, and the times seem to be the
period of the last and most cruel persecution mentioned in the visions
of Daniel (xi. and xii.), the person in Yemen who pretends to be the
Messiah is an impostor, and if care be not taken, he is sure to do
mischief. Similar impostors in Cordova, France, and Africa, have
deceived the multitude and brought great troubles upon the Jews.—Yet,
inconsistently with this sound advice the author gives a positive date
of the Messianic time, on the basis of an old tradition; the
inconsistency is so obvious that it is impossible to attribute this
passage to Maimonides himself. It is probably spurious, and has,
perhaps, been added by the translator. With the exception of the rhymed
introduction, the letter was written in Arabic, “in order that all
should be able to read and understand it”; for that purpose the author
desires that copies should be made of it, and circulated among the
Jews. Rabbi Naḥum, of the Maghreb, translated the letter into Hebrew.
The success in the first great undertaking of explaining the Mishnah
encouraged Maimonides to propose to himself another task of a still
more ambitious character. In the Commentary on the Mishnah, it was his
object that those who were unable to read the Gemara should be made
acquainted with the results obtained by the Amoraim in the course of
their discussions on the Mishnah. But the Mishnah, with the Commentary,
was not such a code of laws as might easily be consulted in cases of
emergency; only the initiated would be able to find the section, the
chapter, and the paragraph in which the desired information could be
found. The halakah had, besides, been further developed since the time
when the Talmud was compiled. The changed state of things had suggested
new questions; these were discussed and settled by the Geonim, whose
decisions, being contained in special letters or treatises, were not
generally accessible. Maimonides therefore undertook to compile a
complete code, which would contain, in the language and style of the
Mishnah, and without discussion, the whole of the Written and the Oral
Law, all the precepts recorded in the Talmud, Sifra, Sifre and Tosefta,
and the decisions of the Geonim. According to the plan of the author,
this work was to present a solution of every question touching the
religious, moral, or social duties of the Jews. It was not in any way
his object to discourage the study of the Talmud and the Midrash; he
only sought to diffuse a knowledge of the Law amongst those who,
through incapacity or other circumstances, were precluded from that
study. In order to ensure the completeness of the code, the author drew
up a list of the six hundred and thirteen precepts of the Pentateuch,
divided them into fourteen groups, these again he subdivided, and thus
showed how many positive and negative precepts were contained in each
section of the Mishneh torah. The principles by which he was guided in
this arrangement were laid down in a separate treatise, called Sefer
ha-miẓvot. Works of a similar kind, written by his predecessors, as the
Halakot gedolot of R. Shimon Kahira, and the several Azharot were,
according to Maimonides, full of errors, because their authors had not
adopted any proper method. But an examination of the rules laid down by
Maimonides and of their application leads to the conclusion that his
results were not less arbitrary; as has, in fact, been shown by the
criticisms of Naḥmanides. The Sefer ha-miẓvot was written in Arabic,
and thrice translated into Hebrew, namely, by Rabbi Abraham ben Ḥisdai,
Rabbi Shelomoh ben Joseph ben Job, and Rabbi Moses Ibn Tibbon.
Maimonides himself desired to translate the book into Hebrew, but to
his disappointment he found no time.
This Sefer ha-miẓvot was executed as a preparation for his principal
work, the Mishneh Torah, or Yad ha-ḥazakah, which consists of an
Introduction and fourteen Books. In the Introduction the author first
describes the chain of tradition from Moses to the close of the Talmud,
and then he explains his method in compiling the work. He distinguishes
between the dicta found in the Talmud, Sifre, Sifra, or Tosefta, on the
one hand, and the dicta of the Geonim on the other; the former were
binding on all Jews, the latter only as far as their necessity and
their utility or the authority of their propounders was recognized.
Having once for all stated the sources from which he compiled his work,
he did not deem it necessary to name in each case the authority for his
opinion or the particular passage from which he derived his dictum. Any
addition of references to each paragraph he probably considered useless
to the uninformed and superfluous to the learned. At a later time he
discovered his error, he being himself unable to find again the sources
of some of his decisions. Rabbi Joseph Caro, in his commentary on the
Mishneh Torah, termed Keseph Mishneh, remedied this deficiency. The
Introduction is followed by the enumeration of the six hundred and
thirteen precepts and a description of the plan of the work, its
division into fourteen books, and the division of the latter into
sections, chapters, and paragraphs.
According to the author, the Mishneh Torah is a mere compendium of the
Talmud; but he found sufficient opportunities to display his real
genius, his philosophical mind, and his ethical doctrines. For in
stating what the traditional Law enjoined he had to exercise his own
judgment, and to decide whether a certain dictum was meant to be taken
literally or figuratively; whether it was the final decision of a
majority or the rejected opinion of a minority; whether it was part of
the Oral Law or a precept founded on the scientific views of a
particular author; and whether it was of universal application or was
only intended for a special period or a special locality. The first
Book, Sefer ha-maddaʻ, is the embodiment of his own ethical and
theological theories, although he frequently refers to the Sayings of
our Sages, and employs the phraseology of the Talmud. Similarly, the
section on the Jewish Calendar, Hilkot ha-ʻibur, may be considered as
his original work. In each group of the halakot, its source, a certain
passage of the Pentateuch, is first quoted, with its traditional
interpretation, and then the detailed rules follow in systematic order.
The Mishneh Torah was written by the author in pure Hebrew; when
subsequently a friend asked him to translate it into Arabic, he said he
would prefer to have his Arabic writings translated into Hebrew instead
of the reverse. The style is an imitation of the Mishnah; he did not
choose, the author says, the philosophical style, because that would be
unintelligible to the common reader; nor did he select the prophetic
style, because that would not harmonize with the subject.
Ten years of hard work by day and by night were spent in the
compilation of this code, which had originally been undertaken for “his
own benefit, to save him in his advanced age the trouble and the
necessity of consulting the Talmud on every occasion.” Maimonides knew
very well that his work would meet with the opposition of those whose
ignorance it would expose, also of those who were incapable of
comprehending it, and of those who were inclined to condemn every
deviation from their own preconceived notions. But he had the
satisfaction to learn that it was well received in most of the
congregations of Israel, and that there was a general desire to possess
and study it. This success confirmed him in his hope that at a later
time, when all cause for jealousy would have disappeared, the Mishneh
Torah would be received by all Jews as an authoritative code. This hope
has not been realized. The genius, earnestness, and zeal of Maimonides
are generally recognized; but there is no absolute acceptance of his
dicta. The more he insisted on his infallibility, the more did the
Rabbinical authorities examine his words and point out errors wherever
they believed that they could discover any. It was not always from base
motives, as contended by Maimonides and his followers, that his
opinions were criticised and rejected. The language used by Rabbi
Abraham ben David in his notes (hasagot) on the Mishneh Torah appears
harsh and disrespectful, if read together with the text of the
criticised passage, but it seems tame and mild if compared with
expressions used now and then by Maimonides about men who happened to
hold opinions differing from his own.
Maimonides received many complimentary letters, congratulating him upon
his success; but likewise letters with criticisms and questions
respecting individual halakot. In most cases he had no difficulty in
defending his position. From the replies it must, however, be inferred
that Maimonides made some corrections and additions, which were
subsequently embodied in his work. The letters addressed to him on the
Mishneh Torah and on other subjects were so numerous that he frequently
complained of the time he had to spend in their perusal, and of the
annoyance they caused him; but “he bore all this patiently, as he had
learned in his youth to bear the yoke.” He was not surprised that many
misunderstood his words, for even the simple words of the Pentateuch,
“the Lord is one,” had met with the same fate. Some inferred from the
fact that he treated fully of ʻOlam ha-ba, “the future state of the
soul,” and neglected to expatiate on the resurrection of the dead, that
he altogether rejected that principle of faith. They therefore asked
Rabbi Samuel ha-levi of Bagdad to state his opinion; the Rabbi
accordingly discussed the subject; but, according to Maimonides, he
attempted to solve the problem in a very unsatisfactory manner. The
latter thereupon likewise wrote a treatise “On the Resurrection of the
Dead,” in which he protested his adherence to this article of faith. He
repeated the opinion he had stated in the Commentary on the Mishnah and
in the Mishneh Torah, but “in more words; the same idea being
reiterated in various forms, as the treatise was only intended for
women and for the common multitude.”
These theological studies engrossed his attention to a great extent,
but it did not occupy him exclusively. In a letter addressed to R.
Jonathan, of Lunel, he says: “Although from my birth the Torah was
betrothed to me, and continues to be loved by me as the wife of my
youth, in whose love I find a constant delight, strange women whom I at
first took into my house as her handmaids have become her rivals and
absorb a portion of my time.” He devoted himself especially to the
study of medicine, in which he distinguished himself to such a degree,
according to Alkifti, that “the King of the Franks in Ascalon wanted to
appoint him as his physician.” Maimonides declined the honour.
Alfadhel, the Vizier of Saladin king of Egypt, admired the genius of
Maimonides, and bestowed upon him many distinctions. The name of
Maimonides was entered on the roll of physicians, he received a
pension, and was introduced to the court of Saladin. The method adopted
in his professional practice he describes in a letter to his pupil, Ibn
Aknin, as follows: “You know how difficult this profession is for a
conscientious and exact person who only states what he can support by
argument or authority.” This method is more fully described in a
treatise on hygiene, composed for Alfadhel, son of Saladin, who was
suffering from a severe illness and had applied to Maimonides for
advice. In a letter to Rabbi Samuel Ibn Tibbon he alludes to the amount
of time spent in his medical practice, and says: “I reside in Egypt (or
Fostat); the king resides in Cairo, which lies about two Sabbath-day
journeys from the first-named place. My duties to the king are very
heavy. I am obliged to visit him every day, early in the morning; and
when he or any of his children or the inmates of his harem are
indisposed, I dare not quit Cairo, but must stay during the greater
part of the day in the palace. It also frequently happens that one or
two of the royal officers fall sick, and then I have to attend them. As
a rule, I go to Cairo very early in the day, and even if nothing
unusual happens I do not return before the afternoon, when I am almost
dying with hunger; but I find the antechambers filled with Jews and
Gentiles, with nobles and common people, awaiting my return,” etc.
Notwithstanding these heavy professional duties of court physician,
Maimonides continued his theological studies. After having compiled a
religious guide—Mishneh Torah—based on Revelation and Tradition, he
found it necessary to prove that the principles there set forth were
confirmed by philosophy. This task he accomplished in his Dalalāt
al-ḥaïrin, “The Guide for the Perplexed,” of which an analysis will be
given below. It was composed in Arabic, and written in Hebrew
characters. Subsequently it was translated into Hebrew by Rabbi Samuel
Ibn Tibbon, in the lifetime of Maimonides, who was consulted by the
translator on all difficult passages. The congregation in Lunel,
ignorant of Ibn Tibbon’s undertaking, or desirous to possess the most
correct translation of the Guide, addressed a very flattering letter to
Maimonides, requesting him to translate the work into Hebrew.
Maimonides replied that he could not do so, as he had not sufficient
leisure for even more pressing work, and that a translation was being
prepared by the ablest and fittest man, Rabbi Samuel Ibn Tibbon. A
second translation was made later on by Jehudah Alḥarizi. The Guide
delighted many, but it also met with much adverse criticism on account
of the peculiar views held by Maimonides concerning angels, prophecy,
and miracles, especially on account of his assertion that if the
Aristotelian proof for the Eternity of the Universe had satisfied him,
he would have found no difficulty in reconciling the Biblical account
of the Creation with that doctrine. The controversy on the Guide
continued long after the death of Maimonides to divide the community,
and it is difficult to say how far the author’s hope to effect a
reconciliation between reason and revelation was realized. His
disciple, Joseph Ibn Aknin, to whom the work was dedicated, and who was
expected to derive from it the greatest benefit, appears to have been
disappointed. His inability to reconcile the two antagonistic elements
of faith and science, he describes allegorically in the form of a
letter addressed to Maimonides, in which the following passage occurs:
“Speak, for I desire that you be justified; if you can, answer me. Some
time ago your beloved daughter, the beautiful and charming Kimah,
obtained grace and favour in my sight, and I betrothed her unto me in
faithfulness, and married her in accordance with the Law, in the
presence of two trustworthy witnesses, viz., our master, Abd-allah and
Ibn Roshd. But she soon became faithless to me; she could not have
found fault with me, yet she left me and departed from my tent. She
does no longer let me behold her pleasant countenance or hear her
melodious voice. You have not rebuked or punished her, and perhaps you
are the cause of this misconduct. Now, ‘send the wife back to the man,
for he is’—or might become—‘a prophet; he will pray for you that you
may live,’ and also for her that she may be firm and steadfast. If,
however, you do not send her back, the Lord will punish you. Therefore
seek peace and pursue it; listen to what our Sages said: ‘Blessed be he
who restores to the owner his lost property’; for this blessing applies
in a higher degree to him who restores to a man his virtuous wife, the
crown of her husband.” Maimonides replied in the same strain, and
reproached his “son-in-law” that he falsely accused his wife of
faithlessness after he had neglected her; but he restored him his wife
with the advice to be more cautious in future. In another letter
Maimonides exhorts Ibn Aknin to study his works, adding, “apply
yourself to the study of the Law of Moses; do not neglect it, but, on
the contrary, devote to it the best and the most of your time, and if
you tell me that you do so, I am satisfied that you are on the right
way to eternal bliss.”
Of the letters written after the completion of the “Guide,” the one
addressed to the wise men of Marseilles (1194) is especially
noteworthy. Maimonides was asked to give his opinion on astrology. He
regretted in his reply that they were not yet in the possession of his
Mishneh Torah; they would have found in it the answer to their
question. According to his opinion, man should only believe what he can
grasp with his intellectual faculties, or perceive by his senses, or
what he can accept on trustworthy authority. Beyond this nothing should
be believed. Astrological statements, not being founded on any of these
three sources of knowledge, must be rejected. He had himself studied
astrology, and was convinced that it was no science at all. If some
dicta be found in the Talmud which appear to represent astrology as a
true source of knowledge, these may either be referred to the rejected
opinion of a small minority, or may have an allegorical meaning, but
they are by no means forcible enough to set aside principles based on
logical proof.
The debility of which Maimonides so frequently complained in his
correspondence, gradually increased, and he died, in his seventieth
year, on the 20th Tebeth, 4965 (1204). His death was the cause of great
mourning to all Jews. In Fostat a mourning of three days was kept; in
Jerusalem a fast was appointed; a portion of the tochaḥah (Lev. xxvi.
or Deut. xxix.) was read, and also the history of the capture of the
Ark by the Philistines (1 Sam. iv.). His remains were brought to
Tiberias. The general regard in which Maimonides was held, both by his
contemporaries and by succeeding generations, has been expressed in the
popular saying: “From Moses to Moses there was none like Moses.”
THE MOREH NEBUCHIM LITERATURE
I. The Arabic Text.—The editio princeps, the only edition of the
original text of the Guide (in Arabic, Dĕlil, or Dalalat al-ḥaïrin),
was undertaken and executed by the late S. Munk. Its title is: Le Guide
des Égarés, traité de Théologie et de Philosophie par Moïse ben Maimon,
publié pour la première fois dans l’original Arabe, et accompagné d’une
traduction Française et de notes critiques, littéraires et
explicatives, par S. Munk (Paris, 1850–1866). The plan was published,
1833, in Reflexions sur le culte des anciens Hébreux (La Bible, par S.
Cahen, vol. iv.), with a specimen of two chapters of the Third Part.
The text adopted has been selected from the several MSS. at his
disposal with great care and judgment. Two Leyden MSS. (cod. 18 and
221), various MSS. of the Bibliothèque Nationale (No. 760, very old;
761 and 758, written by R. Saadia Ibn Danan), and some MSS. of the
Bodleian Library were consulted. In the notes which accompany the
French translation, the various readings of the different MSS. are
fully discussed. At the end of the third volume a list is added of
“Variantes des Manuscrits Arabes et des deux Versions Hébraïques.”
The library of the British Museum possesses two copies of the Arabic
text; the one Or. 1423 is complete, beautifully written, with
explanatory notes in the margin and between the lines. The name of the
copyist is not mentioned, nor the date when it has been written. The
volume has in the beginning an incomplete index to the Scriptural
passages referred to in the Guide, and at the end fragments of Psalm
cxli. in Arabic and of astronomical tables.
The second copy of the Dalalat al-ḥaïrin is contained in the MS. Or.
2423, written in large Yemen Rabbinic characters. It is very
fragmentary. The first fragment begins with the last paragraph of the
introduction; there are a few marginal notes in Hebrew.
In the Bodleian Library there are the following copies of the Dalalat
al-ḥaïrin according to the Catal. of Hebr. MSS. by Dr. A. Neubauer:—
No. 1236. The text is preceded by Jehudah al-Charizi’s index of the
contents of the chapters, and by an index of Biblical quotations. In
the margin there are notes, containing omissions, by different hands,
two in Arabic characters. The volume was written 1473.
No. 1237. The Arabic text, with a few marginal notes containing various
readings; the text is preceded by three Hebrew poems, beginning, De’i
holek, Bi-sedeb tebunot; and Binu be-dat Mosheh. Fol. 212 contains a
fragment of the book (III., xxix.).
No. 1238. Text with a few marginal notes.
No. 1239. The end of the work is wanting in this copy. The second part
has forty-nine chapters, as the introduction to Part II. is counted as
chapter i.; Part III. has fifty-six chapters, the introduction being
counted as chapter i., and chapter xxiv. being divided into two
chapters. The index of passages from the Pentateuch follows the
ordinary mode of counting the chapters of the Guide.
No. 1240. Arabic text transcribed in Arabic characters by Saadiah b.
Levi Azankoṭ for Prof. Golius in 1645.
No. 1241. First part of the Dalalat al-ḥaïrin, written by Saadiah b.
Mordecai b. Mosheh in the year 1431.
No. 1242 contains the same Part, but incomplete.
Nos. 1243, 1244, 1245, and 1246 contain Part II. of the Arabic text,
incomplete in Nos. 1245 and 1246.
Nos. 1247, 1248, and 1249 have Part III.; it is incomplete in Nos. 1248
and 1249. No. 1249 was written 1291, and begins with III., viii.
A fragment of the Arabic text, the end of Part III., is contained in
No. 407, 2.
No. 2508 includes a fragment of the original (I. ii.–xxxii.), with a
Hebrew interlineary translation of some words and a few marginal notes.
It is written in Yemen square characters, and is marked as “holy
property of the Synagogue of Alsiani.”
A fragment (I. i.) of a different recension from the printed is
contained in 2422, 16. On the margin the Commentaries of Shem-ṭob and
Ephodi are added in Arabic.
A copy of the Dalalat is also contained in the Berlin Royal Library MS.
Or. Qu., 579 (105 Cat. Steinschneider); it is defective in the
beginning and at the end.
The Cairo Genizah at Cambridge contains two fragments: (a) I. lxiv. and
beginning of lxv.; (b) II. end of xxxii. and xxxiii. According to Dr.
H. Hirschfeld, Jewish Quarterly Review (vol. xv. p. 677), they are in
the handwriting of Maimonides.
The valuable collection of MSS. in the possession of Dr. M. Gaster
includes a fragment of the Dalalat-al-ḥaïrin (Codex 605). II.
xiii.–xv., beginning and end defective.
II. Translations. a. Hebrew.—As soon as European Jews heard of the
existence of this work, they procured its translation into Hebrew. Two
scholars, independently of each other, undertook the task: Samuel Ibn
Tibbon and Jehudah al-Ḥarizi. There is, besides, in the Moreh ha-moreh
of Shemṭob Palquera an original translation of some portions of the
Moreh. In the Sifte yeshenim (No. 112) a rhymed translation of the
Dalalat by Rabbi Mattityahu Kartin is mentioned. Ibn Tibbon’s version
is very accurate; he sacrificed elegance of style to the desire of
conscientiously reproducing the author’s work, and did not even neglect
a particle, however unimportant it may appear. Ibn Tibbon went in his
anxiety to retain peculiarities of the original so far as to imitate
its ambiguities, e.g., meẓiut (I. lviii.) is treated as a masculine
noun, only in order to leave it doubtful whether a pronoun which
follows agrees with meẓiut, “existence,” or with nimẓa, “existing
being,” both occurring in the same sentence (Br. Mus. MS. Harl. 7586,
marg. note by Ibn Tibbon). When he met with passages that offered any
difficulty he consulted Maimonides. Ḥarizi, on the other hand, was less
conscientious about words and particles, but wrote in a superior style.
Vox populi, however, decided in favour of the version of Ibn Tibbon,
the rival of which became almost forgotten. Also Abraham, the son of
Moses Maimonides, in Milḥamoth ha-shem, describes Ḥarizi’s version as
being inaccurate. Most of the modern translations were made from Ibn
Tibbon’s version. There are, therefore, MSS. of this version almost in
every library containing collections of Hebrew books and MSS. It has
the title Moreh-nebuchim. The British Museum has the following eight
copies of Ibn Tibbon’s version:—
Harl. 7586 A. This codex was written in the year 1284, for Rabbi
Shabbatai ben Rabbi Mattityahu. In the year 1340 it came into the
possession of Jacob b. Shelomoh; his son Menaḥem sold it in the year
1378 to R. Mattityahu, son of R. Shabbatai, for fifty gold florins. It
was again sold in the year 1461 by Yeḥiel ben Joab. There is this
peculiarity in the writing, that long words at the end of a line are
divided, and written half on the one line, half on the next; in words
which are vocalized, pataḥ is frequently found for ḳameẓ. There are
numerous various readings in the margin. The text is preceded by a
poem, written by Joseph Ibn Aknin, pupil of Maimonides, in praise of
his master, and beginning Adon yiẓro. This poem is attributed to R.
Yehudah ha-Levi (Luzzatto, in his Divan, Betulat-bat-Yehudah, p. 104).
At the end the copyist adds an epigram, the translation of which is as
follows:—
“The Moreh is finished—Praise to Him who formed and created
everything—written for the instruction and benefit of the few whom the
Lord calleth. Those who oppose the Moreh ought to be put to death; but
those who study and understand it deserve that Divine Glory rest upon
them, and inspire them with a spirit from above.”
Harl. 7586 B. This codex, much damaged in the beginning and at the end,
contains the version of Ibn Tibbon, with marginal notes, consisting of
words omitted in the text, and other corrections. The version is
followed by the poems Ḳarob meod, etc., and De’i holek, etc.
Harl. 5507 contains the Hebrew version of Ibn Tibbon, with the
translator’s preface and marginal notes, consisting of various readings
and omissions from the text. The work of Maimonides is followed by Ibn
Tibbon’s Vocabulary (millot-zarot), Mesharet-mosheh, ʻArugot
ha-mezimmah, Millot higgayon, Ruaḥ-ḥen, Alfarabi’s Hatḥalot, a
Hebrew-Italian vocabulary of logical terms, and an explanation of
koṭeb. The passage in Part I., chap. lxxi., which refers to
Christianity, has been erased.
Harl. 5525 was the property of Shimshon Kohen Modon. The MS. begins
with Ḥarizi’s Kavvanat ha-peraḳim; then follows the text, with a few
marginal notes of a later hand, mostly adverse criticisms and
references to ʻArama’s ʻAḳedah and the Biblical commentaries of
Abarbanel. There is also a note in Latin. The text is followed by Ibn
Tibbon’s Vocabulary (Millot-zarot) and Masoret ha-pesuḳim (Index to the
Biblical quotations in the Moreh). In a poem, beginning Moreh asher
mennu derakav gabehu, the Moreh is compared to a musical instrument,
which delights when played by one that understands music, but is
spoiled when touched by an ignorant person.
Add. 27068 (Almanzi coll.). At the end the following remark is added:
I, Samuel Ibn Tibbon, finished the translation of this work in the
month of Tebet 4965 (1205). The text is preceded by the well-known
epigrams, De’i holek and Moreh-nebuchim sa shelomi; the last page
contains the epigram Ḳarob meod. There are some notes in the margin,
mostly referring to various readings.
Add. 14763. This codex, written 1273 at Viterbo, contains the preface
of Ḥarizi to his translation of the Moreh and his index of contents,
Ibn Tibbon’s version with a few marginal notes of different hands,
including some remarks of the translator, and the contents of the
chapters. The codex contains besides the following treatises:
Commentary of Maimonides on Abot; Comm. of Maim. on Mishnah Sanhedrin
x. 1; Letter of Maimonides on the Resurrection of the Dead; Vocabulary
of difficult words by Samuel Ibn Tibbon; Maimonides’ Letter to the wise
men of Marseilles; his Letter to Rabbi Jonathan; Keter-malkut,
Mesharet-mosheh, Ruaḥ-ḥen, Otot ha-shamayim, translated from the Arabic
by Samuel Ibn Tibbon; Hatḥalot ha-nimẓaot, of Alfarabi; Sefer
ha-ḥappuaḥ, Mishle ḥamishim ha-talmidim; on the seven zones of the
earth; a fragment of a chronicle from the exile of Babylon down to the
fourth year of the Emperor Nicepheros of Constantinople, and a poem,
which begins asher yishal, and has the following sense:—“If one asks
the old and experienced for advice, you may expect his success in all
he undertakes; but if one consults the young, remember the fate of
Rehoboam, son of Solomon.”
Add. 14764. In addition to the Hebrew version of Ibn Tibbon (from end
of I. xxvii.) with a few marginal notes and index, the codex contains
at the end of Part I. an Index of references made by the author to
explanations given in preceding or succeeding chapters. At the end of
the text the statement is added, that the translation was finished in
the month of Tebet 968 (1208). The Moreh is followed by Ruaḥ-ḥen, and
Ibn Tibbon’s Vocabulary of millot-zarot (incomplete), and is preceded
by four poems in praise of the Moreh, beginning Shim’u nebone leb,
Moreh nebuchim sa shelomi, De’i holek and Nofet maḥkim.
Bibl. Reg. 16 A, xi. This codex, written in Prov. curs. characters in
the year 1308, has in front a fragment of III. i., then follows the
poem of Meshullam, beginning Yehgu mezimmotai (Grätz Leket-shoshannim,
p. 151), and other poems.
The following MS. copies of Ibn Tibbon’s version are included in the
Oxford Bodleian Library; the numbers refer to Dr. Neubauer’s catalogue
of the MSS.:—
1250. An index of the passages from the Bible referred to in the work,
and an index of the contents precede the version. The marginal notes
contain chiefly omissions.
1251. This codex was written in 1675. The marginal notes contain
omissions and explanations.
1252. The marginal notes contain the translator’s remarks on I. lxxiv.
4, and III. xlvii. The version is followed by Ibn Tibbon’s vocabulary,
and his additional remarks on the reasons for the commandments. The MS.
was bought by Samuel ben Moses from a Christian after the pillage of
Padua, where it had belonged to a Synagogue of foreigners (lo’azim); he
gave it to a Synagogue of the same character at Mantua.
1253. The marginal notes include that of the translator on III. xlvii.
1254. 1. Text with marginal notes containing omissions.
1255. The marginal notes include those of the translator on I. xlvi.
and lxxiv. 5.
1256. The marginal notes contain various readings, notes relating to
Ḥarizi’s translation and the Arabic text; on fol. 80 there is a note in
Latin. There are in this codex six epigrams concerning the Moreh.
1257. Text incomplete; with marginal notes.
Fragments of the Version are contained in the following codices: 2047,
3, p. 65; 2283, 8; 2309, 2, and 2336.
Among the MS. copies of the Moreh in the Bibl. Nat. in Paris, there is
one that has been the property of R. Eliah Mizraḥi, and another that
had been in the hands of Azariah de Rossi (No. 685 and No. 691); the
Günzburg Library (Paris) possesses a copy (No. 771), that was written
1452 by Samuel son of Isaac for Rabbi Moses de Leon, and Eliah del
Medigo’s copy of the Moreh is in the possession of Dr. Ginsburg
(London); it contains six poems, beginning Moreh nebuchim sa; Emet
moreh emet; Bi-leshon esh; Mah-baʻaru; Kamu more shav.
The editio princeps of this version has no statement as to where and
when it was printed, and is without pagination. According to Fürst
(Bibliogr.) it is printed before 1480. The copy in the British Museum
has some MS. notes. Subsequent editions contain besides the Hebrew text
the Commentaries of Shem-ṭob and Efodi, and the index of contents by
Ḥarizi (Venice, 1551, fol.); also the Comm. of Crescas and Vocabulary
of Ibn Tibbon (Sabionetta, 1553, fol.; Jessnitz, 1742, fol. etc.); the
Commentaries of Narboni and S. Maimon (Berlin, 1791); the commentaries
of Efodi, Shem-ṭob, Crescas and Abarbanel (Warsaw, 1872, 4to); German
translation and Hebrew Commentary (Biur) Part I. (Krotoschin, 1839,
8vo); German translation and notes, Part II. (Wien, 1864), Part III.
(Frankfort-a.-M., 1838).
The Hebrew version of Ibn Tibbon (Part I. to ch. lxxii.) has been
translated into Mishnaic Hebrew by M. Levin (Zolkiew, 1829, 4to).
There is only one MS. known of Ḥarizi’s version, viz., No. 682 of the
Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris. It has been edited by L. Schlosberg,
with notes. London, 1851 (Part I.), 1876 (II.), and 1879 (III.). The
notes on Part I. were supplied by S. Scheyer.
The first Latin translation of the Moreh has been discovered by Dr. J.
Perles among the Latin MSS. of the Munich Library, Catal. Cod.
latinorum bibl. regiae Monacensis, tom. I, pars iii. pag. 208 (Kaish.
36 b), 1700 (7936 b). This version is almost identical with that edited
by Augustinus Justinianus, Paris, 1520, and is based on Ḥarizi’s Hebrew
version of the Moreh. The name of the translator is not mentioned. In
the Commentary of Moses, son of Solomon, of Salerno, on the Moreh, a
Latin translation is quoted, and the quotations agree with this
version. It is called by this commentator ha ʻataḳat ha-noẓrit (“the
Christian translation”), and its author, ha-ma ʻatiḳ ha-noẓer (lit.
“the Christian translator”). Dr. Perles is, however, of opinion that
these terms do not necessarily imply that a Christian has made this
translation, as the word noẓer may have been used here for “Latin.” He
thinks that it is the result of the combined efforts of Jewish and
Christian scholars connected with the court of the German Emperor
Frederic II., especially as in the thirteenth century several Jewish
scholars distinguished themselves by translating Oriental works into
Latin. See Grätz Monatschrift, 1875, Jan.–June, “Die in einer Münchener
Handschrift aufgefundene erste lateinische Uebersetzung,” etc., von Dr.
J. Perles. The title has been variously rendered into Latin: Director
neutrorum, directorium dubitantium, director neutrorum, nutantium or
dubitantium; doctor perplexorum.
Gedaliah ibn Yahyah, in Shalshelet ha-ḳabbalah, mentions a Latin
translation of the Moreh by Jacob Monteno; but nothing is known of it,
unless it be the anonymous translation of the Munich MS., mentioned
above. Augustinus Justinianus edited this version (Paris, 1520), with
slight alterations and a great number of mistakes. Joseph Scaliger’s
opinion of this version is expressed in a letter to Casaubonus, as
follows: Qui latine vertit, Hebraica, non Arabica, convertit, et quidem
sæpe hallucinatur, neque mentem Authoris assequitur. Magna seges
mendorum est in Latino. Præter illa quæ ab inertia Interpretis peccata
sunt accessit et inertia Librariorum aut Typographorum, e.g., prophetiæ
pro philosophiæ; altitudo pro aptitudo; bonitatem pro brevitatem.
(Buxtorf, Doctor Perplexorum, Præf.)
Johannes Buxtorfius, Fil., translated the Hebrew version of Ibn Tibbon
into Latin (Basileæ, 1629, 4to). In the Præfatio ad Lectorem, the
translator discusses the life and the works of Maimonides, and dwells
especially on the merits and the fate of the Moreh-nebuchim. The
preface is followed by a Hebrew poem of Rabbi Raphael Joseph of Trèves,
in praise of an edition of the Moreh containing the Commentaries of
Efodi, Shem-tob, and Crescas.
Italian was the first living language into which the Moreh has been
translated. This translation was made by Yedidyah ben Moses (Amadeo de
Moïse di Recanati), and dedicated by him to “divotissimo e divinissimo
Signor mio il Signor Immanuel da Fano” (i.e., the Kabbalist Menaḥem
Azarriah). The translator dictated it to his brother Eliah, who wrote
it in Hebrew characters; it was finished the 8th of February, 1583. The
MS. copy is contained in the Royal Library at Berlin, MS. Or. Qu. 487
(M. Steinschneider Catal., etc.)—The Moreh has been translated into
Italian a second time, and annotated by D. J. Maroni: Guida degli
Smarriti, Firenze, 1870, fol.
The Moreh has been translated into German by R. Fürstenthal (Part I.,
Krotoschin, 1839), M. Stern (Part II., Wien, 1864), and S. Scheyer
(Part III., Frankfort-a.-M., 1838). The translation is based on Ibn
Tibbon’s Hebrew version. The chapters on the Divine Attributes have
been translated into German, and fully discussed, by Dr. Kaufmann in
his Geschichte der Attributenlehre (Gotha, 1877). An excellent French
translation, based on the Arabic original, has been supplied by the
regenerator of the Guide, S. Munk. It was published together with the
Arabic text (Paris, 1850–1866).
The Moreh has also been translated into the Hungarian language by Dr.
Klein. The translation is accompanied by notes (Budapest, 1878–80).
The portion containing the reasons of the Commandments (Part III. ch.
xxvi.–xlix.) has been translated into English by James Townley (London,
1827). The translation is preceded by an account on the life and works
of Maimonides, and dissertations on various subjects; among others,
Talmudical and Rabbinical writings, the Originality of the Institutions
of Moses, and Judicial astrology.
III. Commentaries.—It is but natural that in a philosophical work like
the Moreh, the reader will meet with passages that at first thought
seem unintelligible, and require further explanation, and this want has
been supplied by the numerous commentators that devoted their attention
to the study of the Moreh. Joseph Solomon del Medigo (1591) saw
eighteen Commentaries. The four principal ones he characterizes thus
(in imitation of the Hagadah for Passover): Moses Narboni is rashaʻ,
has no piety, and reveals all the secrets of the Moreh. Shem-ṭob is
ḥakam, “wise,” expounds and criticises; Crescas is tam, “simple,”
explains the book in the style of the Rabbis; Epodi is she-eno yodeʻa
lishol, “does not understand to ask,” he simply explains in short notes
without criticism (Miktab-aḥuz; ed. A. Geiger, Berlin, 1840, p. 18).
The earliest annotations were made by the author himself on those
passages, which the first translator of the Moreh was unable to
comprehend. They are contained in a letter addressed to Samuel Ibn
Tibbon, beginning, lefi siklo yehullal ish (Bodl. Library, No. 2218,
s.; comp. The Guide, etc., I. 21, 343; II. 8, 99). Ibn Tibbon, the
translator, likewise added a few notes, which are found in the margin
of MSS. of the Hebrew version of the Moreh (on I. xlv. lxxiv.; II.
xxiv.; and III. xlvii.—MSS. Bodl. 1252, 1; 1253, 1255, 1257; Brit. Mus.
Add. 14,763 and 27,068).
Both translators wrote explanations of the philosophical terms employed
in the versions. Ḥarizi wrote his vocabulary first, and Ibn Tibbon, in
the introductory remarks, to Perush millot zarot (“Explanation of
difficult words”), describes his rival’s vocabulary as full of
blunders. Ibn Tibbon’s Perush is found almost in every copy of his
version, both MS. and print; so also Ḥarizi’s index of the contents of
the chapters of the Moreh (Kavvanat ha-peraḳim).
The following is an alphabetical list of Commentaries on the Moreh:—
Abarbanel (Don Isaak) wrote a Commentary on I. i.–lv.; II. xxxi.–xlv.,
and a separate book Shamayim-ḥadashim, “New Heavens,” on II. xix., in
which he fully discusses the question concerning Creatio ex nihilo. The
opinion of Maimonides is not always accepted. Thus twenty-seven
objections are raised against his interpretation of the first chapter
of Ezekiel. These objections he wrote at Molin, in the house of R.
Abraham Treves Ẓarfati. The Commentary is followed by a short essay
(maamar) on the plan of the Moreh. The method adopted by Abarbanel in
all his Commentaries, is also employed in this essay. A series of
questions is put forth on the subject, and then the author sets about
to answer them. M. J. Landau edited the Commentary without text, with a
Preface, and with explanatory notes, called Moreh li-ẓeddakah (Prag.
1831; MS. Bodl. 2385). In addition to these the same author wrote
Teshubot “Answers” to several questions asked by Rabbi Shaul ha-Cohen
on topics discussed in the Moreh (Venice, 1754).
Abraham Abulafia wrote “Sodot ha-moreh,” or Sitre-torah, a kabbalistic
Commentary on the Moreh. He gives the expression, גן עדן (Paradise),
for the number (177) of the chapters of the Moreh. MS. Nat. Bibl. 226,
3. Leipsic Libr. 232, 4. MS. Bodl. 2360, 5, contains a portion of Part
III.
Buchner A. Ha-moreh li-ẓedaḳab (Warsaw, 1838). Commentary on “The
Reasons of the Laws,” Moreh III. xxix.–xlix. The Commentary is preceded
by an account of the life of Maimonides.
Comtino, Mordecai b. Eliezer, wrote a short commentary on the Moreh
(Dr. Ginsburg’s collection of MSS. No. 10). Narboni, who “spread light
on dark passages in the Guide,” is frequently quoted. Reference is also
made to his own commentary on Ibn Ezra’s Yesod-mora.
Crescas (Asher b. Abraham), expresses in the Preface to his Commentary
the conviction that he could not always comprehend the right sense of
the words of Maimonides, for “there is no searching to his
understanding.” He nevertheless thinks that his explanations will help
“the young” to study the Moreh with profit. A long poem in praise of
Maimonides and his work precedes the Preface. His notes are short and
clear, and in spite of his great respect of Maimonides, he now and then
criticises and corrects him.
David Yaḥya is named by Joseph Del Medigo (Miktab-aḥuz ed. A. Geiger,
Berlin, 1840; p. 18, and note 76), as having written a Commentary on
the Moreh.
David ben Yehudah Leon Rabbino wrote ʻEn ha-ḳore, MS. Bodl. 1263. He
quotes in his Commentary among others ʻArama’s ʻAkedat yiẓḥaḳ. The
Preface is written by Immanuel ben Raphael Ibn Meir, after the death of
the author.
Efodi is the name of the Commentary written by Isaac ben Moses, who
during the persecution of 1391 had passed as Christian under the name
of Profiat Duran. He returned to Judaism, and wrote against
Christianity the famous satire “Al tehee ka-aboteka” (“Be not like your
Fathers”), which misled Christians to cite it as written in favour of
Christianity. It is addressed to the apostate En Bonet Bon Giorno. The
same author also wrote a grammatical work, Maʻaseh-efod. The name Efod
(אפד), is explained as composed of the initials Amar Profiat Duran.
His Commentary consists of short notes, explanatory of the text. The
beginning of this Commentary is contained in an Arabic translation in
MS. Bodl. 2422, 16.
Ephraim Al-Naqavah in Shaʻar Kebod ha-shem (MS. Bodl. 939, 2 and 1258,
2), answers some questions addressed to him concerning the Moreh. He
quotes Ḥisdai’s Or adonai.
Fürstenthal, R., translator and commentator of the Maḥzor, added a
Biur, short explanatory notes, to his German translation of Part I. of
the Moreh (Krotoschin, 1839).
Gershon, Moreh-derek, Commentary on Part I. of the Moreh (MS. Bodl.
1265).
Hillel b. Samuel b. Elazar of Verona explained the Introduction to Part
II. (the 25 Propos.). S. H. Halberstam edited this Commentary together
with Tagmule ha-nefesh of the same author, for the Society
Meḳiẓe-nirdamim (Lyck, 1874).
Joseph ben Aba-mari b. Joseph, of Caspi (Argentière), wrote three
Commentaries on the Moreh. The first is contained in a Munich MS. (No.
263); and seems to have been recast by the author, and divided into two
separate Commentaries: ʻAmmude Kesef, and Maskiyot Kesef. The former
was to contain plain and ordinary explanation, whilst profound and
mysterious matter was reserved for the second (Steinschn. Cat.). In
II., chap. xlviii., Caspi finds fault with Maimonides that he does not
place the book of Job among the highest class of inspired writings,
“its author being undoubtedly Moses.” These Commentaries have been
edited by T. Werblumer (Frankfort-a.-M., 1848). R. Kirchheim added a
Hebrew introduction discussing the character of these commentaries, and
describing the manuscripts from which these were copied; a Biography of
the author is added in German.
Joseph Giqatilia wrote notes on the Moreh, printed with “Questions of
Shaul ha-kohen” (Venice, 1574. MS. Bodl. 1911, 3).
Joseph b. Isaac ha-Levi’s Gib’at ha-Moreh is a short Commentary on
portions of the Moreh, with notes by R. Yom-ṭob Heller, the author of
Tosafot Yom-tob (Prag., 1612).
Isaac Satanov wrote a commentary on Parts II. and III. of the Moreh
(see Maimon Solomon p. xxi.).
Isaac ben Shem-ṭob ibn Shem-ṭob wrote a lengthy Commentary on the
Moreh, Part I. (MS. Brit. Mus. Or. 1388). The object of the Commentary
is to show that there is no contradiction between Maimonides and the
Divine Law. He praises Maimonides as a true believer in Creatio ex
nihilo, whilst Ibn Ezra and Gersonides assumed a prima materia (Yoẓer,
ḳadosh). Nachmanides is called ha-ḥasid ha-gadol, but is nevertheless
blamed, together with Narboni and Zeraḥyah ha-Levi, for criticising
Maimonides, instead of trying to explain startling utterances even in
“a forced way” (bederek raḥok); and Narboni, “in spite of his wisdom,
frequently misunderstood the Moreh.” At the end of each chapter a
résumé (derush) of the contents of the chapter is given, and the lesson
to be derived from it. The MS. is incomplete, chaps, xlvi.–xlviii. are
missing.
Kaufmann, D., in his Geschichte der Attributenlehre, translated Part I.
chap, l.–lxiii. into German, and added critical and explanatory notes.
Kalonymos wrote a kind of introduction to the Moreh (Mesharet Mosheh),
in which he especially discusses the theory of Maimonides on
Providence.
Leibnitz made extracts from Buxtorf’s Latin version of the Moreh, and
added his own remarks. Observationes ad R. Mosen Maimoniden (Foucher de
Careil. C.A., La Philosophie Juive, 1861).
Levin, M., wrote Allon-moreh as a kind of introduction to his
retranslation of Tibbon’s Hebrew version into the language of the
Mishnah.
Maimon, Solomon, is the author of Gib’at ha-moreh, a lengthy commentary
on Book I. (Berlin, 1791). The author is fond of expatiating on topics
of modern philosophy. In the introduction he gives a short history of
philosophy. The commentary on Books II. and III. was written by Isaac
Satanov.
Meir ben Jonah ha-mekunneh Ben-shneor wrote a commentary on the Moreh
in Fez 1560 (MS. Bodl. 1262).
Menaḥem Kara expounded the twenty-five propositions enumerated in the
Introduction to Part II. of the Moreh (MS. Bodl. 1649, 13).
Mordecai Yaffe, in his Or Yeḳarot, or Pinnat Yiḳrat, one of his ten
Lebushim, comments upon the theories contained in the Moreh.
Moses, son of Abraham Provençal, explains the passage in Part I. chap,
lxxiii. Prop. 3, in which Maimonides refers to the difference between
commensurable and incommensurable lines (MS. Bodl. 2033, 8).
Moses, son of Jehudah Nagari, made an index of the subjects treated in
the Moreh, indicating in each case the chapters in which allusion is
made to the subject. He did so, “in obedience to the advice of
Maimonides, to consider the chapters in connected order” (Part I. p.
20). It has been printed together with the questions of Shaul ha-kohen
(Venice, 1574).
Moses, son of Solomon of Salerno, is one of the earliest expounders of
the Moreh. He wrote his commentary on Parts I. and II., perhaps
together with a Christian scholar. He quotes the opinion of “the
Christian scholar with whom he worked together.” Thus he names Petrus
de Bernia and Nicolo di Giovenazzo. R. Jacob Anatoli, author of the
Malmed ha-talmidim, is quoted as offering an explanation for the
passage from Pirḳe di-rabbi Eliezer, which Maimonides (II. chap, xxvi.)
considers as strange and inexplicable (Part I., written 1439; MS. of
Bet ha-midrash, London; Parts I.–II., MS. Bodl. 1261, written, 1547;
MS. Petersburg, No. 82; Munich MS. 60 and 370).
Moses ha-ḳatan, son of Jehudah, son of Moses, wrote To’aliyot pirḳe
ha-maamar (“Lessons taught in the chapters of this work”). It is an
index to the Moreh (MS. Bodl. 1267).
Moses Leiden explained the 25 Prop. of the Introduction to Part II.
(MS. Günzburg, Paris).
Moses Narboni wrote a short commentary at Soria, 1362. He freely
criticizes Maimonides, and uses expressions like the following:—“He
went too far, may God pardon him” (II. viii.). Is. Euchel ed. Part I.
(Berlin, 1791); J. Goldenthal, I. to III. (Wien, 1852). The Bodl. Libr.
possesses several MS. copies of this commentary (Nos. 1260, 1264, 2,
and 1266).
Munk, S., added to his French translation of the Moreh numerous
critical and explanatory notes.
S. Sachs (Ha-teḥiyah, Berlin, 1850, p. 8) explains various passages of
the Moreh, with a view of discovering the names of those who are
attacked by Maimonides without being named.
Scheyer, S., added critical and explanatory notes to his German
translation of the Moreh, Part 3, and to the Hebrew version of Ḥarizi,
Part 1. He also wrote Das Psychologische System des Maimonides, an
Introduction to the Moreh (Frankf.-a.-M., 1845).
Shem ṭob Ibn Palquera’s Moreh ha-moreh consists of 3 parts: (1) a
philosophical explanation of the Moreh, (2) a description of the
contents of the chapters of the Moreh, Part I, i.-lvii. (Presburg,
1827); (3) Corrections of Ibn Tibbon’s version. He wrote the book for
himself, that in old age he might have a means of refreshing his
memory. The study of science and philosophy is to be recommended, but
only to those who have had a good training in “the fear of sin.” Ibn
Roshd (Averroes) is frequently quoted, and referred to as he-ḥakam
ha-nizkar (the philosopher mentioned above).
Shem-ṭob ben Joseph ben Shem-ṭob had the commentary of Efodi before
him, which he seems to have quoted frequently verbatim without naming
him. In the preface he dwells on the merits of the Moreh as the just
mediator between religion and philosophy. The commentary of Shem-ṭob is
profuse, and includes almost a paraphrase of the text. He apologises in
conclusion for having written many superfluous notes and added
explanation where no explanation was required; his excuse is that he
did not only intend to write a commentary (biur) but also a work
complete in itself (ḥibbur). He often calls the reader’s attention to
things which are plain and clear.
Shem-ṭob. Ibn Shem-ṭob, in Sefer ha-emunot (Ferrara, 1556), criticises
some of the various theories discussed in the Moreh, and rejects them
as heretic. His objections were examined by Moses Al-ashkar, and
answered in Hasagot ʻal mah she-katab Rabbi Shem-ṭob neged ha-Rambam
(Ferrara, 1556).
Solomon b. Jehudah ha-nasi wrote in Germany Sitre-torah, a kabbalistic
commentary on the Moreh, and dedicated it to his pupil Jacob b. Samuel
(MS. Bet-ha-midrash, London).
Tabrizi. The twenty-five Propositions forming the introduction to Part
2, have been fully explained by Mohammed Abu-becr ben Mohammed
al-tabrizi. His Arabic explanations have been translated by Isaac b.
Nathan of Majorca into Hebrew (Ferrara, 1556). At the end the following
eulogy is added:—The author of these Propositions is the chief whose
sceptre is “wisdom” and whose throne is “understanding,” the Israelite
prince, that has benefited his nation and all those who love God, etc.:
Moses b. Maimon b. Ebed-elohim, the Israelite.... May God lead us to
the truth. Amen!
Tishbi. In MS. Bodl. 2279, 1, there are some marginal notes on Part
III. which are signed Tishbi (Neub. Cat.).
Yaḥya Ibn Suleiman wrote in Arabic a Commentary on the Guide for the
Perplexed. A fragment is contained in the Berlin MS. Or. Qu., 554, 2
(Steinschneider, Cat. No. 92).
Zeraḥyah b. Isaac ha-Levi. Commentary on the Moreh, I., i.–lxxi., and
some other portions of the work. (See Maskir, 1861, p. 125).
MS. Bodl. 2360, 8, contains a letter of Jehudah b. Shelomoh on some
passages of the Moreh, and Zeraḥyah’s reply.
Anonymous Commentaries.—The MS. Brit. Mus. 1423 contains marginal and
interlineary notes in Arabic. No author or date is given, nor is any
other commentary referred to in the notes. The explanations given are
mostly preceded by a question, and introduced by the phrase, “the
answer is,” in the same style as is employed in the Hebrew-Arabic
Midrash, MS. Brit. Mus. Or. 2213. The Midrashic character is prominent
in the notes. Thus the verse “Open, ye gates, that the righteous nation
which keepeth the truth may enter in,” is explained as meaning: Open,
ye gates of wisdom, that human understanding that perceiveth truth may
enter. The notes are numerous, especially in the first part, explaining
almost every word; e.g., on “Rabbi”: Why does Maimonides employ this
title before the name of his pupil? The answer is: either the word is
not to be taken literally (“master”), but as a mere compliment, or it
has been added by later copyists. Of a similar style seem to be the
Arabic notes in the Berlin MS. Or. Oct. 258, 2, 8, 10. (Cat.
Steinschneider, No. 108.)—Anonymous marginal notes are met with almost
in every MS. of the Moreh; e.g., Brit. Mus. Harl. 5525; Add. 14,763,
14,764; Bodl. 1264, 1; 2282, 10; 2423, 3; Munich MS., 239, 6.
The explanation of passages from the Pentateuch contained in the Moreh
have been collected by D. Ottensosser, and given as an appendix
(Moreh-derek) to Derek-selulah (Pent. with Comm. etc., Furth, 1824).
IV. Controversies.—The seemingly new ideas put forth by Maimonides in
the Moreh and in the first section of his Mishneh-torah (Sefer
ha-maddaʻ) soon produced a lively controversy as regards the merits of
Maimonides’ theories. It was most perplexing to pious Talmudists to
learn how Maimonides explained the anthropomorphisms employed in the
Bible, the Midrashim and the Talmud, what he thought about the future
state of our soul, and that he considered the study of philosophy as
the highest degree of Divine worship, surpassing even the study of the
Law and the practice of its precepts. The objections and attacks of
Daniel of Damascus were easily silenced by a ḥerem (excommunication)
pronounced against him by the Rosh ha-golah Rabbi David. Stronger was
the opposition that had its centre in Montpellier. Rabbi Solomon ben
Abraham noticed with regret in his own community the fruit of the
theories of Maimonides in the neglect of the study of the Law and of
the practice of the Divine precepts. It happened to Moses Maimonides
what in modern times happened to Moses Mendelssohn. Many so-called
disciples and followers of the great master misunderstood or
misinterpreted his teaching in support of their dereliction of Jewish
law and Jewish practice, and thus brought disrepute on him in the eyes
of their opponents. Thus it came that Rabbi Solomon and his disciples
turned their wrath against the writings of Maimonides instead of
combating the arguments of the pseudo-Maimonists. The latter even
accused Solomon of having denounced the Moreh and the Sefer ha-maddaʻ
to the Dominicans, who condemned these writings to the flames; when
subsequently copies of the Talmud were burnt, and some of the followers
of the Rabbi of Montpellier were subjected to cruel tortures, the
Maimonists saw in this event a just punishment for offending
Maimonides. (Letters of Hillel of Verona, Ḥemdah Genuzah, ed. H.
Edelmann, p. 18 sqq.).
Meir b. Todros ha-levi Abulafia wrote already during the lifetime of
Maimonides to the wise men in Lunel about the heretic doctrines he
discovered in the works of Maimonides. Ahron b. Meshullam and Shesheth
Benvenisti defended Maimonides. About 1232 a correspondence opened
between the Maimonists and the Anti-Maimonists (Grätz, Gesch. d. J.
vii. note I). The Grammarian David Kimḥi wrote in defence of Maimonides
three letters to Jehudah Alfachar, who answered each of them in the
sense of Rabbi Solomon of Montpellier. Abraham b. Ḥisdai and Samuel b.
Abraham Saportas on the side of the Maimonists, took part in the
controversy. Meshullam b. Kalonymos b. Todros of Narbonne begged
Alfachar to treat Kimḥi with more consideration, whereupon Alfachar
resolved to withdraw from the controversy. Naḥmanides, though more on
the side of Rabbi Solomon, wrote two letters of a conciliatory
character, advising moderation on both sides. Representatives of the
congregations of Saragossa, Huesca, Monzon, Kalatajud, and Lerida
signed declarations against R. Solomon. A ḥerem was proclaimed from
Lunel and Narbonne against the Anti-Maimonists. The son of Maimonides,
Abraham, wrote a pamphlet Milḥamot adonai, in defence of the writings
of his father. The controversy raised about fifty years later by Abba
Mari Don Astruc and R. Solomon ben-Aderet of Barcelona, concerned the
Moreh less directly. The question was of a more general character: Is
the study of philosophy dangerous to the religious belief of young
students? The letters written in this controversy are contained in
Minḥat-ḳenaot by Abba Mari Don Astruc (Presburg, 1838), and Kitab
alrasail of Meir Abulafia ed. J. Brill (Paris, 1871). Yedaya Bedrasi
took part in this controversy, and wrote Ketab hitnaẓlut in defence of
the study of philosophy (Teshubot Rashba, Hanau, 1610, p. 111 b.). The
whole controversy ended in the victory of the Moreh and the other
writings of Maimonides. Stray remarks are found in various works, some
in praise and some in condemnation of Maimonides. A few instances may
suffice. Rabbi Jacob Emden in his Mitpaḥat-sefarim (Lemberg, 1870, p.
56) believes that parts of the Moreh are spurious; he even doubts
whether any portion of it is the work of “Maimonides, the author of the
Mishneh-torah, who was not capable of writing such heretic doctrines.”
S. D. Luzzato regards Maimonides with great reverence, but this does
not prevent him from severely criticising his philosophical theories
(Letters to S. Rappoport, No. 79, 83, 266, Iggeroth Shedal ed. E.
Graber, Przemys’l, 1882), and from expressing his conviction that the
saying “From Moses to Moses none rose like Moses,” was as untrue as
that suggested by Rappoport, “From Abraham to Abraham (Ibn-Ezra) none
rose like Abraham.” Rabbi Hirsch Chayyuth in Darke-Mosheh (Zolkiew,
1840) examines the attacks made upon the writings of Maimonides, and
tries to refute them, and to show that they can be reconciled with the
teaching of the Talmud.
The Bodl. MS. 2240, 3a, contains a document signed by Josselman and
other Rabbis, declaring that they accept the teaching of Maimonides as
correct, with the exception of his theory about angels and sacrifices.
Numerous poems were written, both in admiration and in condemnation of
the Moreh. Most of them precede or follow the Moreh in the printed
editions and in the various MS. copies of the work. A few have been
edited in Dibre-ḥakamim, pp. 75 and 86; in the Literaturblatt d. Or. I.
379, II. 26–27, IV. 748, and Leket-shoshannim by Dr. Grätz. In the
Sammelband of the Mekize Nirdamim (1885) a collection of 69 of these
poems is contained, edited and explained by Prof. Dr. A. Berliner. In
imitation of the Moreh and with a view of displacing Maimonides’ work,
the Karaite Ahron II. b. Eliah wrote a philosophical treatise,
Eẓ-ḥayyim (Ed. F. Delitzsch. Leipzig, 1841).
Of the works that discuss the whole or part of the philosophical system
of the Moreh the following are noteworthy:—
Bacher, W. Die Bibilexegese Moses Maimûni’s, in the Jahresbericht der
Landes Rabbinerschule zu Buda-Pest. 1896.
Eisler, M. Vorlesungen über die jüdischen Philosophen des Mittelalters.
Abtheil. II., Moses Maimonides (Wien, 1870).
Geiger, A. Das Judenthum u. seine Geschichte (Breslau, 1865), Zehnte
Vorlesung: Aben Ezra u. Maimonides.
Grätz, H. Geschichte d. Juden, VI. p. 363 sqq.
Joel, M. Religionsphilosophie des Moses b. Maimon (Breslau, 1859).
Joel, M. Albertus Magnus u. sein Verhältniss zu Maimonides (Breslau,
1863).
Kaufmann, D. Geschichte der Attributenlehre, VII. Gotha, 1874.
Philippsohn, L. Die Philosophie des Maimonides. Predigt und
Schul-Magazin, I. xviii. (Magdeburg, 1834.)
Rosin, D. Die Ethik d. Maimonides (Breslau, 1876).
Rubin, S. Spinoza u. Maimonides, ein Psychologisch-Philosophisches
Antitheton (Wien, 1868).
Scheyer, S. Das psychologische System des Maimonides. Frankfort-a.-M.,
1845.
Weiss, T. H. Beth-Talmud, I. x. p. 289.
David Yellin and Israel Abrahams, Maimonides.
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED
It is the object of this work “to afford a guide for the perplexed,”
i.e. “to thinkers whose studies have brought them into collision with
religion” (p. 9), “who have studied philosophy and have acquired sound
knowledge, and who, while firm in religious matters, are perplexed and
bewildered on account of the ambiguous and figurative expressions
employed in the holy writings” (p. 5). Joseph, the son of Jehudah Ibn
Aknin, a disciple of Maimonides, is addressed by his teacher as an
example of this kind of students. It was “for him and for those like
him” that the treatise was composed, and to him this work is inscribed
in the dedicatory letter with which the Introduction begins.
Maimonides, having discovered that his disciple was sufficiently
advanced for an exposition of the esoteric ideas in the books of the
Prophets, commenced to give him such expositions “by way of hints.” His
disciple then begged him to give him further explanations, to treat of
metaphysical themes, and to expound the system and the method of the
Kalām, or Mohammedan Theology. [1] In compliance with this request,
Maimonides composed the Guide for the Perplexed. The reader has,
therefore, to expect that the subjects mentioned in the disciple’s
request indicate the design and arrangement of the present work, and
that the Guide consists of the following parts:—1. An exposition of the
esoteric ideas (sodot) in the books of the Prophets. 2. A treatment of
certain metaphysical problems. 3. An examination of the system and
method of the Kalām. This, in fact, is a correct account of the
contents of the book; but in the second part of the Introduction, in
which the theme of this work is defined, the author mentions only the
first-named subject. He observes: “My primary object is to explain
certain terms occurring in the prophetic book. Of these some are
homonymous, some figurative, and some hybrid terms.” “This work has
also a second object. It is designed to explain certain obscure figures
which occur in the Prophets, and are not distinctly characterised as
being figures” (p. 2). Yet from this observation it must not be
inferred that Maimonides abandoned his original purpose; for he
examines the Kalām in the last chapters of the First Part (ch.
lxx.–lxxvi.), and treats of certain metaphysical themes in the
beginning of the Second Part (Introd. and ch. i.–xxv.). But in the
passage quoted above he confines himself to a delineation of the main
object of this treatise, and advisedly leaves unmentioned the other two
subjects, which, however important they may be, are here of subordinate
interest. Nor did he consider it necessary to expatiate on these
subjects; he only wrote for the student, for whom a mere reference to
works on philosophy and science was sufficient. We therefore meet now
and then with such phrases as the following: “This is fully discussed
in works on metaphysics.” By references of this kind the author may
have intended to create a taste for the study of philosophical works.
But our observation only holds good with regard to the Aristotelian
philosophy. The writings of the Mutakallemim are never commended by
him; he states their opinions, and tells his disciple that he would not
find any additional argument, even if he were to read all their
voluminous works (p. 133). Maimonides was a zealous disciple of
Aristotle, although the theory of the Kalām might seem to have been
more congenial to Jewish thought and belief. The Kalām upheld the
theory of God’s Existence, Incorporeality, and Unity, together with the
creatio ex nihilo. Maimonides nevertheless opposed the Kalām, and,
anticipating the question, why preference should be given to the system
of Aristotle, which included the theory of the Eternity of the
Universe, a theory contrary to the fundamental teaching of the
Scriptures, he exposed the weakness of the Kalām and its fallacies.
The exposition of Scriptural texts is divided by the author into two
parts; the first part treats of homonymous, figurative, and hybrid
terms, [2] employed in reference to God; the second part relates to
Biblical figures and allegories. These two parts do not closely follow
each other; they are separated by the examination of the Kalām, and the
discussion of metaphysical problems. It seems that the author adopted
this arrangement for the following reason: first of all, he intended to
establish the fact that the Biblical anthropomorphisms do not imply
corporeality, and that the Divine Being of whom the Bible speaks could
therefore be regarded as identical with the Primal Cause of the
philosophers. Having established this principle, he discusses from a
purely metaphysical point of view the properties of the Primal Cause
and its relation to the universe. A solid foundation is thus
established for the esoteric exposition of Scriptural passages. Before
discussing metaphysical problems, which he treats in accordance with
Aristotelian philosophy, he disposes of the Kalām, and demonstrates
that its arguments are illogical and illusory.
The “Guide for the Perplexed” contains, therefore, an Introduction and
the following four parts:—1. On homonymous, figurative, and hybrid
terms. 2. On the Supreme Being and His relation to the universe,
according to the Kalām. 3. On the Primal Cause and its relation to the
universe, according to the philosophers. 4. Esoteric exposition of some
portions of the Bible (sodot): a, Maʻaseh bereshith, or the history of
the Creation (Genesis, ch. i.–iv.); b, on Prophecy; c, Maʻaseh
mercabhah, or the description of the divine chariot (Ezekiel, ch. i.).
According to this plan, the work ends with the seventh chapter of the
Third Part. The chapters which follow may be considered as an appendix;
they treat of the following theological themes: the Existence of Evil,
Omniscience and Providence, Temptations, Design in Nature, in the Law,
and in the Biblical Narratives, and finally the true Worship of God.
In the Introduction to the “Guide,” Maimonides (1) describes the object
of the work and the method he has followed; (2) treats of similes; (3)
gives “directions for the study of the work”; and (4) discusses the
usual causes of inconsistencies in authors.
1 (pp. 2–3). Inquiring into the root of the evil which the Guide was
intended to remove, viz., the conflict between science and religion,
the author perceived that in most cases it originated in a
misinterpretation of the anthropomorphisms in Holy Writ. The main
difficulty is found in the ambiguity of the words employed by the
prophets when speaking of the Divine Being; the question arises whether
they are applied to the Deity and to other things in one and the same
sense or equivocally; in the latter case the author distinguishes
between homonyms pure and simple, figures, and hybrid terms. In order
to show that the Biblical anthropomorphisms do not imply the
corporeality of the Deity, he seeks in each instance to demonstrate
that the expression under examination is a perfect homonym denoting
things which are totally distinct from each other, and whenever such a
demonstration is impossible, he assumes that the expression is a hybrid
term, that is, being employed in one instance figuratively and in
another homonymously. His explanation of “form” (ẓelem) may serve as an
illustration. According to his opinion, it invariably denotes “form” in
the philosophical acceptation of the term, viz., the complex of the
essential properties of a thing. But to obviate objections he proposes
an alternative view, to take ẓelem as a hybrid term that may be
explained as a class noun denoting only things of the same class, or as
a homonym employed for totally different things, viz., “form” in the
philosophical sense, and “form” in the ordinary meaning of the word.
Maimonides seems to have refrained from explaining anthropomorphisms as
figurative expressions, lest by such interpretation he might implicitly
admit the existence of a certain relation and comparison between the
Creator and His creatures.
Jewish philosophers before Maimonides enunciated and demonstrated the
Unity and the Incorporeality of the Divine Being, and interpreted
Scriptural metaphors on the principle that “the Law speaks in the
language of man”; but our author adopted a new and altogether original
method. The Commentators, when treating of anthropomorphisms, generally
contented themselves with the statement that the term under
consideration must not be taken in its literal sense, or they
paraphrased the passage in expressions which implied a lesser degree of
corporeality. The Talmud, the Midrashim, and the Targumim abound in
paraphrases of this kind. Saadiah in “Emunot ve-deʻot,” Bahya in his
“Ḥobot ha-lebabot,” and Jehudah ha-levi in the “Cusari,” insist on the
necessity and the appropriateness of such interpretations. Saadiah
enumerates ten terms which primarily denote organs of the human body,
and are figuratively applied to God. To establish this point of view he
cites numerous instances in which the terms in question are used in a
figurative sense without being applied to God. Saadiah further shows
that the Divine attributes are either qualifications of such of God’s
actions as are perceived by man, or they imply a negation. The
correctness of this method was held to be so obvious that some authors
found it necessary to apologize to the reader for introducing such
well-known topics. From R. Abraham ben David’s strictures on the Yad
haḥazaḳah it is, however, evident that in the days of Maimonides
persons were not wanting who defended the literal interpretation of
certain anthropomorphisms. Maimonides, therefore, did not content
himself with the vague and general rule, “The Law speaks in the
language of man,” but sought carefully to define the meaning of each
term when applied to God, and to identify it with some transcendental
and metaphysical term. In pursuing this course he is sometimes forced
to venture upon an interpretation which is much too far-fetched to
commend itself even to the supposed philosophical reader. In such
instances he generally adds a simple and plain explanation, and leaves
it to the option of the reader to choose the one which appears to him
preferable. The enumeration of the different meanings of a word is
often, from a philological point of view, incomplete; he introduces
only such significations as serve his object. When treating of an
imperfect homonym, the several significations of which are derived from
one primary signification, he apparently follows a certain system which
he does not employ in the interpretation of perfect homonyms. The
homonymity of the term is not proved; the author confines himself to
the remark, “It is employed homonymously,” even when the various
meanings of a word might easily be traced to a common source.
2 (pag. 4–8). In addition to the explanation of homonyms Maimonides
undertakes to interpret similes and allegories. At first it had been
his intention to write two distinct works—Sefer ha-nebuah, “A Book on
Prophecy,” and Sefer ha-shevaah, “A Book of Reconciliation.” In the
former work he had intended to explain difficult passages of the Bible,
and in the latter to expound such passages in the Midrash and the
Talmud as seemed to be in conflict with common sense. With respect to
the “Book of Reconciliation,” he abandoned his plan, because he
apprehended that neither the learned nor the unlearned would profit by
it: the one would find it superfluous, the other tedious. The subject
of the “Book on Prophecy” is treated in the present work, and also
strange passages that occasionally occur in the Talmud and the Midrash
are explained.
The treatment of the simile must vary according as the simile is
compound or simple. In the first case, each part represents a separate
idea and demands a separate interpretation; in the other case, only one
idea is represented, and it is not necessary to assign to each part a
separate metaphorical meaning. This division the author illustrates by
citing the dream of Jacob (Gen. xxviii. 12 sqq.), and the description
of the adulteress (Prov. vii. 6 sqq.). He gives no rule by which it
might be ascertained to which of the two categories a simile belongs,
and, like other Commentators, he seems to treat as essential those
details of a simile for which he can offer an adequate interpretation.
As a general principle, he warns against the confusion and the errors
which arise when an attempt is made to expound every single detail of a
simile. His own explanations are not intended to be exhaustive; on the
contrary, they are to consist of brief allusions to the idea
represented by the simile, of mere suggestions, which the reader is
expected to develop and to complete. The author thus aspires to follow
in the wake of the Creator, whose works can only be understood after a
long and persevering study. Yet it is possible that he derived his
preference for a reserved and mysterious style from the example of
ancient philosophers, who discussed metaphysical problems in figurative
and enigmatic language. Like Ibn Ezra, who frequently concludes his
exposition of a Biblical passage with the phrase, “Here a profound idea
(sod) is hidden,” Maimonides somewhat mysteriously remarks at the end
of different chapters, “Note this,” “Consider it well.” In such phrases
some Commentators fancied that they found references to metaphysical
theories which the author was not willing fully to discuss. Whether
this was the case or not, in having recourse to that method he was not,
as some have suggested, actuated by fear of being charged with heresy.
He expresses his opinion on the principal theological questions without
reserve, and does not dread the searching inquiries of opponents; for
he boldly announces that their displeasure would not deter him from
teaching the truth and guiding those who are able and willing to follow
him, however few these might be. When, however, we examine the work
itself, we are at a loss to discover to which parts the professed
enigmatic method was applied. His theories concerning the Deity, the
Divine attributes, angels, creatio ex nihilo, prophecy, and other
subjects, are treated as fully as might be expected. It is true that a
cloud of mysterious phrases enshrouds the interpretation of Maʻaseh
bereshit (Gen. i.–iii.) and Maʻaseh mercabah (Ez. i.). But the
significant words occurring in these portions are explained in the
First Part of this work, and a full exposition is found in the Second
and Third Parts. Nevertheless the statement that the exposition was
never intended to be explicit occurs over and over again. The treatment
of the first three chapters of Genesis concludes thus: “These remarks,
together with what we have already observed on the subject, and what we
may have to add, must suffice both for the object and for the reader we
have in view” (II. xxx.). In like manner, he declares, after the
explanation of the first chapter of Ezekiel: “I have given you here as
many suggestions as may be of service to you, if you will give them a
further development.... Do not expect to hear from me anything more on
this subject, for I have, though with some hesitation, gone as far in
my explanation as I possibly could go” (III. vii.).
3 (pag. 8–9). In the next paragraph, headed, “Directions for the Study
of this Work,” he implores the reader not to be hasty with his
criticism, and to bear in mind that every sentence, indeed every word,
had been fully considered before it was written down. Yet it might
easily happen that the reader could not reconcile his own view with
that of the author, and in such a case he is asked to ignore the
disapproved chapter or section altogether. Such disapproval Maimonides
attributes to a mere misconception on the part of the reader, a fate
which awaits every work composed in a mystical style. In adopting this
peculiar style, he intended to reduce to a minimum the violation of the
rule laid down in the Mishnah (Ḥagigah ii. 1), that metaphysics should
not be taught publicly. The violation of this rule he justifies by
citing the following two Mishnaic maxims: “It is time to do something
in honour of the Lord” (Berakot ix. 5), and “Let all thy acts be guided
by pure intentions” (Abot ii. 17). Maimonides increased the
mysteriousness of the treatise, by expressing his wish that the reader
should abstain from expounding the work, lest he might spread in the
name of the author opinions which the latter never held. But it does
not occur to him that the views he enunciates might in themselves be
erroneous. He is positive that his own theory is unexceptionally
correct, that his esoteric interpretations of Scriptural texts are
sound, and that those who differed from him—viz., the Mutakallemim on
the one hand, and the unphilosophical Rabbis on the other—are
indefensibly wrong. In this respect other Jewish philosophers—e.g.
Saadiah and Baḥya—were far less positive; they were conscious of their
own fallibility, and invited the reader to make such corrections as
might appear needful. Owing to this strong self-reliance of Maimonides,
it is not to be expected that opponents would receive a fair and
impartial judgment at his hands.
4 (pag. 9–11). The same self-reliance is noticeable in the next and
concluding paragraph of the Introduction. Here he treats of the
contradictions which are to be found in literary works, and he divides
them with regard to their origin into seven classes. The first four
classes comprise the apparent contradictions, which can be traced back
to the employment of elliptical speech; the other three classes
comprise the real contradictions, and are due to carelessness and
oversight, or they are intended to serve some special purpose. The
Scriptures, the Talmud, and the Midrash abound in instances of apparent
contradictions; later works contain real contradictions, which escaped
the notice of the writers. In the present treatise, however, there
occur only such contradictions as are the result of intention and
design.
PART I.
The homonymous expressions which are discussed in the First Part
include—(1) nouns and verbs used in reference to God, ch. i. to ch.
xlix.; (2) attributes of the Deity, ch. l. to lx.; (3) expressions
commonly regarded as names of God, ch. lxi. to lxx. In the first
section the following groups can be distinguished—(a) expressions which
denote form and figure, ch. i. to ch. vi.; (b) space or relations of
space, ch. viii. to ch. xxv.; (c) parts of the animal body and their
functions, ch. xxviii. to ch. xlix. Each of these groups includes
chapters not connected with the main subject, but which serve as a help
for the better understanding of previous or succeeding interpretations.
Every word selected for discussion bears upon some Scriptural text
which, according to the opinion of the author, has been misinterpreted.
But such phrases as “the mouth of the Lord,” and “the hand of the
Lord,” are not introduced, because their figurative meaning is too
obvious to be misunderstood.
The lengthy digressions which are here and there interposed appear like
outbursts of feeling and passion which the author could not repress.
Yet they are “words fitly spoken in the right place”; for they
gradually unfold the author’s theory, and acquaint the reader with
those general principles on which he founds the interpretations in the
succeeding chapters. Moral reflections are of frequent occurrence, and
demonstrate the intimate connexion between a virtuous life and the
attainment of higher knowledge, in accordance with the maxim current
long before Maimonides, and expressed in the Biblical words, “The fear
of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom” (Ps. cxi. 10). No opportunity
is lost to inculcate this lesson, be it in a passing remark or in an
elaborate essay.
The discussion of the term “ẓelem” (ch. i.) afforded the first occasion
for reflections of this kind. Man, “the image of God,” is defined as a
living and rational being, as though the moral faculties of man were
not an essential element of his existence, and his power to discern
between good and evil were the result of the first sin. According to
Maimonides, the moral faculty would, in fact, not have been required,
if man had remained a purely rational being. It is only through the
senses that “the knowledge of good and evil” has become indispensable.
The narrative of Adam’s fall is, according to Maimonides, an allegory
representing the relation which exists between sensation, moral
faculty, and intellect. In this early part (ch. ii.), however, the
author does not yet mention this theory; on the contrary, every
allusion to it is for the present studiously avoided, its full
exposition being reserved for the Second Part.
The treatment of ḥazah “he beheld” (ch. vi.), is followed by the advice
that the student should not approach metaphysics otherwise than after a
sound and thorough preparation, because a rash attempt to solve
abstruse problems brings nothing but injury upon the inexperienced
investigator. The author points to the “nobles of the children of
Israel” (Exod. xxiv. 11), who, according to his interpretation, fell
into this error, and received their deserved punishment. He gives
additional force to these exhortations by citing a dictum of Aristotle
to the same effect. In a like way he refers to the allegorical use of
certain terms by Plato (ch. xvii.) in support of his interpretation of
“ẓur” (lit., “rock”) as denoting “Primal Cause.”
The theory that nothing but a sound moral and intellectual training
would entitle a student to engage in metaphysical speculations is again
discussed in the digression which precedes the third group of homonyms
(xxxi.–xxxvi.). Man’s intellectual faculties, he argues, have this in
common with his physical forces, that their sphere of action is
limited, and they become inefficient whenever they are overstrained.
This happens when a student approaches metaphysics without due
preparation. Maimonides goes on to argue that the non-success of
metaphysical studies is attributable to the following causes: the
transcendental character of this discipline, the imperfect state of the
student’s knowledge, the persistent efforts which have to be made even
in the preliminary studies, and finally the waste of energy and time
owing to the physical demands of man. For these reasons the majority of
persons are debarred from pursuing the study of metaphysics.
Nevertheless, there are certain metaphysical truths which have to be
communicated to all men, e.g., that God is One, and that He is
incorporeal; for to assume that God is corporeal, or that He has any
properties, or to ascribe to Him any attributes, is a sin bordering on
idolatry.
Another digression occurs as an appendix to the second group of
homonyms (ch. xxvi.–xxvii.). Maimonides found that only a limited
number of terms are applied to God in a figurative sense; and again,
that in the “Targum” of Onkelos some of the figures are paraphrased,
while other figures received a literal rendering. He therefore seeks to
discover the principle which was applied both in the Sacred Text and in
the translation, and he found it in the Talmudical dictum, “The Law
speaketh the language of man.” For this reason all figures are eschewed
which, in their literal sense, would appear to the multitude as
implying debasement or a blemish. Onkelos, who rigorously guards
himself against using any term that might suggest corporification,
gives a literal rendering of figurative terms when there is no cause
for entertaining such an apprehension. Maimonides illustrates this rule
by the mode in which Onkelos renders “yarad” (“he went down,”), when
used in reference to God. It is generally paraphrased, but in one
exceptional instance, occurring in Jacob’s “visions of the night” (Gen.
xlvi. 4), it is translated literally; in this instance the literal
rendering does not lead to corporification; because visions and dreams
were generally regarded as mental operations, devoid of objective
reality. Simple and clear as this explanation may be, we do not
consider that it really explains the method of Onkelos. On the
contrary, the translator paraphrased anthropomorphic terms, even when
he found them in passages relating to dreams or visions; and indeed it
is doubtful whether Maimonides could produce a single instance in
favour of his view. He was equally unsuccessful in his explanation of
“ḥazah” “he saw” (ch. xlviii.). He says that when the object of the
vision was derogatory, it was not brought into direct relation with the
Deity; in such instances the verb is paraphrased, while in other
instances the rendering is literal. Although Maimonides grants that the
force of this observation is weakened by three exceptions, he does not
doubt its correctness.
The next Section (ch. l. to ch. lix.) “On the Divine Attributes” begins
with the explanation that “faith” consists in thought, not in mere
utterance; in conviction, not in mere profession. This explanation
forms the basis for the subsequent discussion. The several arguments
advanced by Maimonides against the employment of attributes are
intended to show that those who assume the real existence of Divine
attributes may possibly utter with their lips the creed of the Unity
and the Incorporeality of God, but they cannot truly believe it. A
demonstration of this fact would be needless, if the Attributists had
not put forth their false theses and defended them with the utmost
tenacity, though with the most absurd arguments.
After this explanation the author proceeds to discuss the impropriety
of assigning attributes to God. The Attributists admit that God is the
Primal Cause, One, incorporeal, free from emotion and privation, and
that He is not comparable to any of His creatures. Maimonides therefore
contends that any attributes which, either directly or indirectly, are
in contradiction to this creed, should not be applied to God. By this
rule he rejects four classes of attributes: viz., those which include a
definition, a partial definition, a quality, or a relation.
The definition of a thing includes its efficient cause; and since God
is the Primal Cause, He cannot be defined, or described by a partial
definition. A quality, whether psychical, physical, emotional, or
quantitative, is always regarded as something distinct from its
substratum; a thing which possesses any quality, consists, therefore,
of that quality and a substratum, and should not be called one. All
relations of time and space imply corporeality; all relations between
two objects are, to a certain degree, a comparison between these two
objects. To employ any of these attributes in reference to God would be
as much as to declare that God is not the Primal Cause, that He is not
One, that He is corporeal, or that He is comparable to His creatures.
There is only one class of attributes to which Maimonides makes no
objection, viz. such as describe actions, and to this class belong all
the Divine attributes which occur in the Scriptures. The “Thirteen
Attributes” (shelosh esreh middot, Exod. xxxiv. 6, 7) serve as an
illustration. They were communicated to Moses when he, as the chief of
the Israelites, wished to know the way in which God governs the
universe, in order that he himself in ruling the nation might follow
it, and thereby promote their real well-being.
On the whole, the opponents of Maimonides admit the correctness of this
theory. Only a small number of attributes are the subject of dispute.
The Scriptures unquestionably ascribe to God Existence, Life, Power,
Wisdom, Unity, Eternity, and Will. The Attributists regard these as
properties distinct from, but co-existing with, the Essence of God.
With great acumen, and with equally great acerbity, Maimonides shows
that their theory is irreconcilable with their belief in the Unity and
the Incorporeality of God. He points out three different ways of
interpreting these attributes:—1. They may be regarded as descriptive
of the works of God, and as declaring that these possess such
properties as, in works of man, would appear to be the result of the
will, the power, and the wisdom of a living being. 2. The terms
“existing,” “one,” “wise,” etc., are applied to God and to His
creatures homonymously; as attributes of God they coincide with His
Essence; as attributes of anything beside God they are distinct from
the essence of the thing. 3. These terms do not describe a positive
quality, but express a negation of its opposite. This third
interpretation appears to have been preferred by the author; he
discusses it more fully than the two others. He observes that the
knowledge of the incomprehensible Being is solely of a negative
character, and he shows by simple and appropriate examples that an
approximate knowledge of a thing can be attained by mere negations,
that such knowledge increases with the number of these negations, and
that an error in positive assertions is more injurious than an error in
negative assertions. In describing the evils which arise from the
application of positive attributes to God, he unsparingly censures the
hymnologists, because he found them profuse in attributing positive
epithets to the Deity. On the basis of his own theory he could easily
have interpreted these epithets in the same way as he explains the
Scriptural attributes of God. His severity may, however, be accounted
for by the fact that the frequent recurrence of positive attributes in
the literary composition of the Jews was the cause that the Mohammedans
charged the Jews with entertaining false notions of the Deity.
The inquiry into the attributes is followed by a treatment of the names
of God. It seems to have been beyond the design of the author to
elucidate the etymology of each name, or to establish methodically its
signification; for he does not support his explanations by any proof.
His sole aim is to show that the Scriptural names of God in their true
meaning strictly harmonize with the philosophical conception of the
Primal Cause. There are two things which have to be distinguished in
the treatment of the Primal Cause: the Primal Cause per se, and its
relation to the Universe. The first is expressed by the tetragrammaton
and its cognates, the second by the several attributes, especially by
rokeb baʻarabot, “He who rideth on the ʻarabot” (Ps. lxviii. 4)
The tetragrammaton exclusively expresses the essence of God, and
therefore it is employed as a nomen proprium. In the mystery of this
name, and others mentioned in the Talmud, as consisting of twelve and
of forty-two letters, Maimonides finds no other secret than the
solution of some metaphysical problems. The subject of these problems
is not actually known, but the author supposes that it referred to the
“absolute existence of the Deity.” He discovers the same idea in ehyeh
(Exod. iii. 14), in accordance with the explanation added in the Sacred
Text: asher ehyeh, “that is, I am.” In the course of this discussion he
exposes the folly or sinfulness of those who pretend to work miracles
by the aid of these and similar names.
With a view of preparing the way for his peculiar interpretation of
rokeb baʻarabot, he explains a variety of Scriptural passages, and
treats of several philosophical terms relative to the Supreme Being.
Such expressions as “the word of God,” “the work of God,” “the work of
His fingers,” “He made,” “He spake,” must be taken in a figurative
sense; they merely represent God as the cause that some work has been
produced, and that some person has acquired a certain knowledge. The
passage, “And He rested on the seventh day” (Exod. xx. 11) is
interpreted as follows: On the seventh Day the forces and laws were
complete, which during the previous six days were in the state of being
established for the preservation of the Universe. They were not to be
increased or modified.
It seems that Maimonides introduced this figurative explanation with a
view of showing that the Scriptural “God” does not differ from the
“Primal Cause” or “Ever-active Intellect” of the philosophers. On the
other hand, the latter do not reject the Unity of God, although they
assume that the Primal Cause comprises the causa efficiens, the agens,
and the causa finalis (or, the cause, the means, and the end); and that
the Ever-active Intellect comprises the intelligens, the intellectus,
and the intellectum (or, the thinking subject, the act of thought, and
the object thought of); because in this case these apparently different
elements are, in fact, identical. The Biblical term corresponding to
“Primal Cause” is rokeb baʻarabot, “riding on ʻarabot.” Maimonides is
at pains to prove that ʻarabot denotes “the highest sphere,” which
causes the motion of all other spheres, and which thus brings about the
natural course of production and destruction. By “the highest sphere”
he does not understand a material sphere, but the immaterial world of
intelligences and angels, “the seat of justice and judgment, stores of
life, peace, and blessings, the seat of the souls of the righteous,”
etc. Rokeb baʻarabot, therefore, means: He presides over the immaterial
beings, He is the source of their powers, by which they move the
spheres and regulate the course of nature. This theory is more fully
developed in the Second Part.
The next section (chap. lxxi.–lxxvi.) treats of the Kalām. According to
the author, the method of the Kalām is copied from the Christian
Fathers, who applied it in the defence of their religious doctrines.
The latter examined in their writings the views of the philosophers,
ostensibly in search of truth, in reality, however, with the object of
supporting their own dogmas. Subsequently Mohammedan theologians found
in these works arguments which seemed to confirm the truth of their own
religion; they blindly adopted these arguments, and made no inquiry
whence these had been derived. Maimonides rejects à priori the theories
of the Mutakallemim, because they explain the phenomena in the universe
in conformity with preconceived notions, instead of following the
scientific method of the philosophers. Among the Jews, especially in
the East and in Africa, there were also some who adopted the method of
the Kalām; in doing so they followed the Muʻtazilah (dissenting
Mohammedans), not because they found it more correct than the Kalām of
the Ashariyah (orthodox Mohammedans), but because at the time when the
Jews became acquainted with the Kalām it was only cultivated by the
Muʻtazilah. The Jews in Spain, however, remained faithful to the
Aristotelian philosophy.
The four principal dogmas upheld by the dominant religions were the
creatio ex nihilo, the Existence of God, His Incorporeality, and His
Unity. By the philosophers the creatio ex nihilo was rejected, but the
Mutakallemim defended it, and founded upon it their proofs for the
other three dogmas. Maimonides adopts the philosophical proofs for the
Existence, Incorporeality, and Unity of God, because they must be
admitted even by those who deny the creatio ex nihilo, the proofs being
independent of this dogma. In order to show that the Mutakallemim are
mistaken in ignoring the organization of the existing order of things,
the author gives a minute description of the analogy between the
Universe, or Kosmos, and man, the mikrokosmos (ch. lxxii.). This
analogy is merely asserted, and the reader is advised either to find
the proof by his own studies, or to accept the fact on the authority of
the learned. The Kalām does not admit the existence of law,
organization, and unity in the universe. Its adherents have,
accordingly, no trustworthy criterion to determine whether a thing is
possible or impossible. Everything that is conceivable by imagination
is by them held as possible. The several parts of the universe are in
no relation to each other; they all consist of equal elements; they are
not composed of substance and properties, but of atoms and accidents:
the law of causality is ignored; man’s actions are not the result of
will and design, but are mere accidents. Maimonides in enumerating and
discussing the twelve fundamental propositions of the Kalām (ch.
lxiii.), which embody these theories, had apparently no intention to
give a complete and impartial account of the Kalām; he solely aimed at
exposing the weakness of a system which he regarded as founded not on a
sound basis of positive facts, but on mere fiction; not on the
evidences of the senses and of reason, but on the illusions of
imagination.
After having shown that the twelve fundamental propositions of the
Kalām are utterly untenable, Maimonides finds no difficulty in
demonstrating the insufficiency of the proofs advanced by the
Mutakallemim in support of the above-named dogmas. Seven arguments are
cited which the Mutakallemim employ in support of the creatio ex
nihilo. [3] The first argument is based on the atomic theory, viz.,
that the universe consists of equal atoms without inherent properties:
all variety and change observed in nature must therefore be attributed
to an external force. Three arguments are supplied by the proposition
that finite things of an infinite number cannot exist (Propos. xi.).
Three other arguments derive their support from the following
proposition (x.): Everything that can be imagined can have an actual
existence. The present order of things is only one out of the many
forms which are possible, and exist through the fiat of a determining
power.
The Unity of God is demonstrated by the Mutakallemim as follows: Two
Gods would have been unable to produce the world; one would have
impeded the work of the other. Maimonides points out that this might
have been avoided by a suitable division of labour. Another argument is
as follows: The two Beings would have one element in common, and would
differ in another; each would thus consist of two elements, and would
not be God. Maimonides might have suggested that the argument moves in
a circle, the unity of God being proved by assuming His unity. The
following argument is altogether unintelligible: Both Gods are moved to
action by will; the will, being without a substratum, could not act
simultaneously in two separate beings. The fallacy of the following
argument is clear: The existence of one God is proved; the existence of
a second God is not proved, it would be possible; and as possibility is
inapplicable to God, there does not exist a second God. The possibility
of ascertaining the existence of God is here confounded with
potentiality of existence. Again, if one God suffices, the second God
is superfluous; if one God is not sufficient, he is not perfect, and
cannot be a deity. Maimonides objects that it would not be an
imperfection in either deity to act exclusively within their respective
provinces. As in the criticism of the first argument, Maimonides seems
here to forget that the existence of separate provinces would require a
superior determining Power, and the two Beings would not properly be
called Gods.
The weakest of all arguments are, according to Maimonides, those by
which the Mutakallemim sought to support the doctrine of God’s
Incorporeality. If God were corporeal, He would consist of atoms, and
would not be one; or He would be comparable to other beings: but a
comparison implies the existence of similar and of dissimilar elements,
and God would thus not be one. A corporeal God would be finite, and an
external power would be required to define those limits.
PART II.
The Second Part includes the following sections:—1. Introduction; 2.
Philosophical Proof of the Existence of One Incorporeal Primal Cause
(ch. i.); 3. On the Spheres and the Intelligences (ii.–xii.); 4. On the
theory of the Eternity of the Universe (xiii.–xxix.); 5. Exposition of
Gen. i.–iv. (xxx., xxxi.); 6. On Prophecy (xxxii.–xlviii.).
The enumeration of twenty-six propositions, by the aid of which the
philosophers prove the Existence, the Unity, and the Incorporeality of
the Primal Cause, forms the introduction to the Second Part of this
work. The propositions treat of the properties of the finite and the
infinite (i.–iii., x.–xii., xvi.), of change and motion (iv.–ix.,
xiii.–xviii.), and of the possible and the absolute or necessary
(xx.–xxv.); they are simply enumerated, but are not demonstrated.
Whatever the value of these Propositions may be, they were inadequate
for their purpose, and the author is compelled to introduce auxiliary
propositions to prove the existence of an infinite, incorporeal, and
uncompounded Primal Cause. (Arguments I. and III.)
The first and the fourth arguments may be termed cosmological proofs.
They are based on the hypothesis that the series of causes for every
change is finite, and terminates in the Primal Cause. There is no
essential difference in the two arguments: in the first are discussed
the causes of the motion of a moving object; the fourth treats of the
causes which bring about the transition of a thing from potentiality to
reality. To prove that neither the spheres nor a force residing in them
constitute the Primal Cause, the philosophers employed two
propositions, of which the one asserts that the revolutions of the
spheres are infinite, and the other denies the possibility that an
infinite force should reside in a finite object. The distinction
between the finite in space and the finite in time appears to have been
ignored; for it is not shown why a force infinite in time could not
reside in a body finite in space. Moreover, those who, like Maimonides,
reject the eternity of the universe, necessarily reject this proof,
while those who hold that the universe is eternal do not admit that the
spheres have ever been only potential, and passed from potentiality to
actuality. The second argument is supported by the following
supplementary proposition: If two elements coexist in a state of
combination, and one of these elements is to be found at the same time
separate, in a free state, it is certain that the second element is
likewise to be found by itself. Now, since things exist which combine
in themselves motive power and mass moved by that power, and since mass
is found by itself, motive power must also be found by itself
independent of mass.
The third argument has a logical character: The universe is either
eternal or temporal, or partly eternal and partly temporal. It cannot
be eternal in all its parts, as many parts undergo destruction; it is
not altogether temporal, because, if so, the universe could not be
reproduced after being destroyed. The continued existence of the
universe leads, therefore, to the conclusion that there is an immortal
force, the Primal Cause, besides the transient world.
These arguments have this in common, that while proving the existence
of a Primal Cause, they at the same time demonstrate the Unity, the
Incorporeality, and the Eternity of that Cause. Special proofs are
nevertheless superadded for each of these postulates, and on the whole
they differ very little from those advanced by the Mohammedan
Theologians.
This philosophical theory of the Primal Cause was adapted by Jewish
scholars to the Biblical theory of the Creator. The universe is a
living, organized being, of which the earth is the centre. Any changes
on this earth are due to the revolutions of the spheres; the lowest or
innermost sphere, viz., the one nearest to the centre, is the sphere of
the moon; the outermost or uppermost is “the all-encompassing sphere.”
Numerous spheres are interposed; but Maimonides divides all the spheres
into four groups, corresponding to the moon, the sun, the planets, and
the fixed stars. This division is claimed by the author as his own
discovery; he believes that it stands in relation to the four causes of
their motions, the four elements of the sublunary world, and the four
classes of beings, viz., the mineral, the vegetable, the animal, and
the rational. The spheres have souls, and are endowed with intellect;
their souls enable them to move freely, and the impulse to the motion
is given by the intellect in conceiving the idea of the Absolute
Intellect. Each sphere has an intellect peculiar to itself; the
intellect attached to the sphere of the moon is called “the active
intellect” (Sekel ha-poʻēl). In support of this theory numerous
passages are cited both from Holy Writ and from post-Biblical Jewish
literature. The angels (elohim, malakim) mentioned in the Bible are
assumed to be identical with the intellects of the spheres; they are
free agents, and their volition invariably tends to that which is good
and noble; they emanate from the Primal Cause, and form a descending
series of beings, ending with the active intellect. The transmission of
power from one element to the other is called “emanation” (shefaʻ).
This transmission is performed without the utterance of a sound; if any
voice is supposed to be heard, it is only an illusion, originating in
the human imagination, which is the source of all evils (ch. xii.).
In accordance with this doctrine, Maimonides explains that the three
men who appeared to Abraham, the angels whom Jacob saw ascend and
descend the ladder, and all other angels seen by man, are nothing but
the intellects of the spheres, four in number, which emanate from the
Primal Cause (ch. x.). In his description of the spheres he, as usual,
follows Aristotle. The spheres do not contain any of the four elements
of the sublunary world, but consist of a quintessence, an entirely
different element. Whilst things on this earth are transient, the
beings which inhabit the spheres above are eternal. According to
Aristotle, these spheres, as well as their intellects, coexist with the
Primal Cause. Maimonides, faithful to the teaching of the Scriptures,
here departs from his master, and holds that the spheres and the
intellects had a beginning, and were brought into existence by the will
of the Creator. He does not attempt to give a positive proof of his
doctrine; all he contends is that the theory of the creatio ex nihilo
is, from a philosophical point of view, not inferior to the doctrine
which asserts the eternity of the universe, and that he can refute all
objections advanced against his theory (ch. xiii.–xxviii.).
He next enumerates and criticises the various theories respecting the
origin of the Universe, viz.: A. God created the Universe out of
nothing. B. God formed the Universe from an eternal substance. C. The
Universe originating in the eternal Primal Cause is co-eternal.—It is
not held necessary by the author to discuss the view of those who do
not assume a Primal Cause, since the existence of such a cause has
already been proved (ch. xiii.).
The objections raised to a creatio ex nihilo by its opponents are
founded partly on the properties of Nature, and partly on those of the
Primal Cause. They infer from the properties of Nature the following
arguments: (1) The first moving force is eternal; for if it had a
beginning, another motion must have produced it, and then it would not
be the First moving force. (2) If the formless matter be not eternal,
it must have been produced out of another substance; it would then have
a certain form by which it might be distinguished from the primary
substance, and then it would not be formless. (3) The circular motion
of the spheres does not involve the necessity of termination; and
anything that is without an end, must be without a beginning. (4)
Anything brought to existence existed previously in potentia; something
must therefore have pre-existed of which potential existence could be
predicated. Some support for the theory of the eternity of the heavens
has been derived from the general belief in the eternity of the
heavens.—The properties of the Primal Cause furnished the following
arguments:—If it were assumed that the Universe was created from
nothing, it would imply that the First Cause had changed from the
condition of a potential Creator to that of an actual Creator, or that
His will had undergone a change, or that He must be imperfect, because
He produced a perishable work, or that He had been inactive during a
certain period. All these contingencies would be contrary to a true
conception of the First Cause (ch. xiv.).
Maimonides is of opinion that the arguments based on the properties of
things in Nature are inadmissible, because the laws by which the
Universe is regulated need not have been in force before the Universe
was in existence. This refutation is styled by our author “a strong
wall built round the Law, able to resist all attacks” (ch. xvii.). In a
similar manner the author proceeds against the objections founded on
the properties of the First Cause. Purely intellectual beings, he says,
are not subject to the same laws as material bodies; that which
necessitates a change in the latter or in the will of man need not
produce a change in immaterial beings. As to the belief that the
heavens are inhabited by angels and deities, it has not its origin in
the real existence of these supernatural beings; it was suggested to
man by meditation on the apparent grandeur of heavenly phenomena (ch.
xviii.).
Maimonides next proceeds to explain how, independently of the authority
of Scripture, he has been led to adopt the belief in the creatio ex
nihilo. Admitting that the great variety of the things in the sublunary
world can be traced to those immutable laws which regulate the
influence of the spheres on the beings below—the variety in the spheres
can only be explained as the result of God’s free will. According to
Aristotle—the principal authority for the eternity of the Universe—it
is impossible that a simple being should, according to the laws of
nature, be the cause of various and compound beings. Another reason for
the rejection of the Eternity of the Universe may be found in the fact
that the astronomer Ptolemy has proved the incorrectness of the view
which Aristotle had of celestial spheres, although the system of that
astronomer is likewise far from being perfect and final (ch. xxiv.). It
is impossible to obtain a correct notion of the properties of the
heavenly spheres; “the heaven, even the heavens, are the Lord’s, but
the earth hath He given to the children of man” (Ps. cxv. 16). The
author, observing that the arguments against the creatio ex nihilo are
untenable, adheres to his theory, which was taught by such prophets as
Abraham and Moses. Although each Scriptural quotation could, by a
figurative interpretation, be made to agree with the opposite theory,
Maimonides declines to ignore the literal sense of a term, unless it be
in opposition to well-established truths, as is the case with
anthropomorphic expressions; for the latter, if taken literally, would
be contrary to the demonstrated truth of God’s incorporeality (ch.
xxv.). He is therefore surprised that the author of Pirke-di Rabbi
Eliezer ventured to assume the eternity of matter, and he thinks it
possible that Rabbi Eliezer carried the license of figurative speech
too far. (Ch. xxvi.).
The theory of the creatio ex nihilo does not involve the belief that
the Universe will at a future time be destroyed; the Bible distinctly
teaches the creation, but not the destruction of the world except in
passages which are undoubtedly conceived in a metaphorical sense. On
the contrary, respecting certain parts of the Universe it is clearly
stated “He established them for ever.” (Ps. cxlviii. 5.) The
destruction of the Universe would be, as the creation has been, a
direct act of the Divine will, and not the result of those immutable
laws which govern the Universe. The Divine will would in that case set
aside those laws, both in the initial and the final stages of the
Universe. Within this interval, however, the laws remain undisturbed
(ch. xxvii.). Apparent exceptions, the miracles, originate in these
laws, although man is unable to perceive the causal relation. The
Biblical account of the creation concludes with the statement that God
rested on the seventh day, that is to say, He declared that the work
was complete; no new act of creation was to take place, and no new law
was to be introduced. It is true that the second and the third chapters
of Genesis appear to describe a new creation, that of Eve, and a new
law, viz., that of man’s mortality, but these chapters are explained as
containing an allegorical representation of man’s psychical and
intellectual faculties, or a supplemental detail of the contents of the
first chapter. Maimonides seems to prefer the allegorical explanation
which, as it seems, he had in view without expressly stating it, in his
treatment of Adam’s sin and punishment. (Part I. ch. ii.) It is
certainly inconsistent on the one hand to admit that at the pleasure of
the Almighty the laws of nature may become inoperative, and that the
whole Universe may become annihilated, and on the other hand to deny,
that during the existence of the Universe, any of the natural laws ever
have been or ever will be suspended. It seems that Maimonides could not
conceive the idea that the work of the All-wise should be, as the
Mutakallemim taught—without plan and system, or that the laws once laid
down should not be sufficient for all emergencies.
The account of the Creation given in the book of Genesis is explained
by the author according to the following two rules: First its language
is allegorical; and, Secondly, the terms employed are homonyms. The
words erez, mayim, ruaḥ, and ḥoshek in the second verse (ch. i.), are
homonyms and denote the four elements: earth, water, air, and fire; in
other instances erez is the terrestrial globe, mayim is water or
vapour, ruaḥ denotes wind, and ḥoshek darkness: According to
Maimonides, a summary of the first chapter may be given thus; God
created the Universe by producing first the reshit the “beginning”
(Gen. i. 1), or hatḥalah, i.e., the intellects which give to the
spheres both existence and motion, and thus become the source of the
existence of the entire Universe. At first this Universe consisted of a
chaos of elements, but its form was successively developed by the
influence of the spheres, and more directly by the action of light and
darkness, the properties of which were fixed on the first day of the
Creation. In the subsequent five days minerals, plants, animals, and
the intellectual beings came into existence. The seventh day, on which
the Universe was for the first time ruled by the same natural laws
which still continue in operation, was distinguished as a day blessed
and sanctified by the Creator, who designed it to proclaim the creatio
ex nihilo (Exod. xx. 11). The Israelites were moreover commanded to
keep this Sabbath in commemoration of their departure from Egypt (Deut.
v. 15), because during the period of the Egyptian bondage, they had not
been permitted to rest on that day. In the history of the first sin of
man, Adam, Eve, and the serpent represent the intellect, the body, and
the imagination. In order to complete the imagery, Samael or Satan,
mentioned in the Midrash in connexion with this account, is added as
representing man’s appetitive faculties. Imagination, the source of
error, is directly aided by the appetitive faculty, and the two are
intimately connected with the body, to which man generally gives
paramount attention, and for the sake of which he indulges in sins; in
the end, however, they subdue the intellect and weaken its power.
Instead of obtaining pure and real knowledge, man forms false
conceptions; in consequence, the body is subject to suffering, whilst
the imagination, instead of being guided by the intellect and attaining
a higher development becomes debased and depraved. In the three sons of
Adam, Kain, Abel, and Seth, Maimonides finds an allusion to the three
elements in man: the vegetable, the animal, and the intellectual.
First, the animal element (Abel) becomes extinct; then the vegetable
elements (Kain) are dissolved; only the third element, the intellect
(Seth), survives, and forms the basis of mankind (ch. xxx., xxxi.).
Maimonides having so far stated his opinion in explicit terms, it is
difficult to understand what he had in view by the avowal that he could
not disclose everything. It is unquestionably no easy matter to adapt
each verse in the first chapters of Genesis to the foregoing allegory;
but such an adaptation is, according to the author’s own view (Part I.,
Introd., p. 19), not only unnecessary, but actually objectionable.
In the next section (xxxii.–xlviii.) Maimonides treats of Prophecy. He
mentions the following three opinions:—1. Any person, irrespective of
his physical or moral qualifications, may be summoned by the Almighty
to the mission of a prophet. 2. Prophecy is the highest degree of
mental development, and can only be attained by training and study. 3.
The gift of prophecy depends on physical, moral, and mental training,
combined with inspiration. The author adopts the last-mentioned
opinion. He defines prophecy as an emanation (shefaʻ), which through
the will of the Almighty descends from the Active Intellect to the
intellect and the imagination of thoroughly qualified persons. The
prophet is thus distinguished both from wise men whose intellect alone
received the necessary impulse from the Active Intellect, and from
diviners or dreamers, whose imagination alone has been influenced by
the Active Intellect. Although it is assumed that the attainment of
this prophetic faculty depends on God’s will, this dependence is
nothing else but the relation which all things bear to the Primal
Cause; for the Active Intellect acts in conformity with the laws
established by the will of God; it gives an impulse to the intellect of
man, and, bringing to light those mental powers which lay dormant, it
merely turns potential faculty into real action. These faculties can be
perfected to such a degree as to enable man to apprehend the highest
truths intuitively, without passing through all the stages of research
required by ordinary persons. The same fact is noticed with respect to
imagination; man sometimes forms faithful images of objects and events
which cannot be traced to the ordinary channel of information, viz.,
impressions made on the senses. Since prophecy is the result of a
natural process, it may appear surprising that, of the numerous men
excelling in wisdom, so few became prophets. Maimonides accounts for
this fact by assuming that the moral faculties of such men had not been
duly trained. None of them had, in the author’s opinion, gone through
the moral discipline indispensable for the vocation of a prophet.
Besides this, everything which obstructs mental improvement, misdirects
the imagination or impairs the physical strength, and precludes man
from attaining to the rank of prophet. Hence no prophecy was vouchsafed
to Jacob during the period of his anxieties on account of his
separation from Joseph. Nor did Moses receive a Divine message during
the years which the Israelites, under Divine punishment, spent in the
desert. On the other hand, music and song awakened the prophetic power
(comp. 2 Kings iii. 15), and “The spirit of prophecy alights only on
him who is wise, strong, and rich” (Babyl. Talm. Shabbat, 92a).
Although the preparation for a prophetic mission, the pursuit of
earnest and persevering study, as also the execution of the Divine
dictates, required physical strength, yet in the moment when the
prophecy was received the functions of the bodily organs were
suspended. The intellect then acquired true knowledge, which presented
itself to the prophet’s imagination in forms peculiar to that faculty.
Pure ideals are almost incomprehensible; man must translate them into
language which he is accustomed to use, and he must adapt them to his
own mode of thinking. In receiving prophecies and communicating them to
others the exercise of the prophet’s imagination was therefore as
essential as that of his intellect, and Maimonides seems to apply to
this imagination the term “angel,” which is so frequently mentioned in
the Bible as the medium of communication between the Supreme Being and
the prophet.
Only Moses held his bodily functions under such control that even
without their temporary suspension he was able to receive prophetic
inspiration; the interposition of the imagination was in his case not
needed: “God spoke to him mouth to mouth” (Num. xii. 8). Moses differed
so completely from other prophets that the term “prophet” could only
have been applied to him and other men by way of homonymy.
The impulses descending from the Active Intellect to man’s intellect
and to his imagination produce various effects, according to his
physical, moral, and intellectual condition. Some men are thus endowed
with extraordinary courage and with an ambition to perform great deeds,
or they feel themselves impelled to appeal mightily to their fellowmen
by means of exalted and pure language. Such men are filled with “the
spirit of the Lord,” or, “with the spirit of holiness.” To this
distinguished class belonged Jephthah, Samson, David, Solomon, and the
authors of the Hagiographa. Though above the standard of ordinary men,
they were not included in the rank of prophets. Maimonides divides the
prophets into two groups, viz., those who receive inspiration in a
dream and those who receive it in a vision. The first group includes
the following five classes:—1. Those who see symbolic figures; 2. Those
who hear a voice addressing them without perceiving the speaker; 3.
Those who see a man and hear him addressing them; 4. Those who see an
angel addressing them; 5. Those who see God and hear His voice. The
other group is divided in a similar manner, but contains only the first
four classes, for Maimonides considered it impossible that a prophet
should see God in a vision. This classification is based on the various
expressions employed in the Scriptures to describe the several
prophecies.
When the Israelites received the Law at Mount Sinai, they distinctly
heard the first two commandments, which include the doctrines of the
Existence and the Unity of God; of the other eight commandments, which
enunciate moral, not metaphysical truths, they heard the mere “sound of
words”; and it was through the mouth of Moses that the Divine
instruction was revealed to them. Maimonides defends this opinion by
quotations from the Talmud and the Midrashim.
The theory that imagination was an essential element in prophecy is
supported by the fact that figurative speech predominates in the
prophetical writings, which abound in figures, hyperbolical expressions
and allegories. The symbolical acts which are described in connexion
with the visions of the prophets, such as the translation of Ezekiel
from Babylon to Jerusalem (Ez. viii. 3), Isaiah’s walking about naked
and barefoot (Isa. xx. 2), Jacob’s wrestling with the angel (Gen.
xxxii. 27 sqq.), and the speaking of Balaam’s ass (Num. xxii. 28), had
no positive reality. The prophets, employing an elliptical style,
frequently omitted to state that a certain event related by them was
part of a vision or a dream. In consequence of such elliptical speech
events are described in the Bible as coming directly from God, although
they simply are the effect of the ordinary laws of nature, and as such
depend on the will of God. Such passages cannot be misunderstood when
it is borne in mind that every event and every natural phenomenon can
for its origin be traced to the Primal Cause. In this sense the
prophets employ such phrases as the following: “And I will command the
clouds that they rain no rain upon it” (Isa. v. 6); “I have also called
my mighty men” (ibid. xi. 3).
PART III.
This part contains the following six sections:—1. Exposition of the
maʻaseh mercabah (Ez. i.), ch. i. vii.; 2. On the nature and the origin
of evil, ch. viii. xii.; 3. On the object of the creation, ch.
xiii.–xv.; 4. On Providence and Omniscience, ch. xvi.–xxv.; 5. On the
object of the Divine precepts (taʻame ha-miẓvot) and the historical
portions of the Bible, ch. xxv.–xl.; 6. A guide to the proper worship
of God.
With great caution Maimonides approaches the explanation of the maʻaseh
mercabah, the chariot which Ezekiel beheld in a vision (Ez. i.). The
mysteries included in the description of the Divine chariot had been
orally transmitted from generation to generation, but in consequence of
the dispersion of the Jews the chain of tradition was broken, and the
knowledge of these mysteries had vanished. Whatever he knew of those
mysteries he owed exclusively to his own intellectual faculties; he
therefore could not reconcile himself to the idea that his knowledge
should die with him. He committed his exposition of the maʻaseh
mercabah and the maʻaseh bereshit to writing, but did not divest it of
its original mysterious character; so that the explanation was fully
intelligible to the initiated—that is to say, to the philosopher—but to
the ordinary reader it was a mere paraphrase of the Biblical
text.—(Introduction.)
The first seven chapters are devoted to the exposition of the Divine
chariot. According to Maimonides three distinct parts are to be
noticed, each of which begins with the phrase, “And I saw.” These parts
correspond to the three parts of the Universe, the sublunary world, the
spheres and the intelligences. First of all the prophet is made to
behold the material world which consists of the earth and the spheres,
and of these the spheres, as the more important, are noticed first. In
the Second Part, in which the nature of the spheres is discussed, the
author dwells with pride on his discovery that they can be divided into
four groups. This discovery he now employs to show that the four
“hayyot” (animals) represent the four divisions of the spheres. He
points out that the terms which the prophet uses in the description of
the hayyot are identical with terms applied to the properties of the
spheres. For the four hayyot or “angels,” or cherubim, (1) have human
form; (2) have human faces; (3) possess characteristics of other
animals; (4) have human hands; (5) their feet are straight and round
(cylindrical); (6) their bodies are closely joined to each other; (7)
only their faces and their wings are separate; (8) their substance is
transparent and refulgent; (9) they move uniformly; (10) each moves in
its own direction; (11) they run; (12) swift as lightning they return
towards their starting point; and (13) they move in consequence of an
extraneous impulse (ruaḥ). In a similar manner the spheres are
described:—(1) they possess the characteristics of man, viz., life and
intellect; (2) they consist like man of body and soul; (3) they are
strong, mighty and swift, like the ox, the lion, and the eagle; (4)
they perform all manner of work as though they had hands; (5) they are
round, and are not divided into parts; (6) no vacuum intervenes between
one sphere and the other; (7) they may be considered as one being, but
in respect to the intellects, which are the causes of their existence
and motion, they appear as four different beings; (8) they are
transparent and refulgent; (9) each sphere moves uniformly, (10) and
according to its special laws; (11) they revolve with great velocity;
(12) each point returns again to its previous position; (13) they are
self-moving, yet the impulse emanates from an external power.
In the second part of the vision the prophet saw the ofannim. These
represent the four elements of the sublunary world. For the ofannim (1)
are connected with the ḥayyot and with the earth; (2) they have four
faces, and are four separate beings, but interpenetrate each other “as
though it were a wheel in the midst of a wheel” (Ez. i. 16); (3) they
are covered with eyes; (4) they are not self-moving; (5) they are set
in motion by the ḥayyot; (6) their motion is not circular but
rectilinear. The same may almost be said of the four elements:—(1) they
are in close contact with the spheres, being encompassed by the sphere
of the moon; earth occupies the centre, water surrounds earth, air has
its position between water and fire; (2) this order is not invariably
maintained; the respective portions change and they become intermixed
and combined with each other; (3) though they are only four elements
they form an infinite number of things; (4) not being animated they do
not move of their own accord; (5) they are set in motion by the action
of the spheres; (6) when a portion is displaced it returns in a
straight line to its original position.
In the third vision Ezekiel saw a human form above the ḥayyot. The
figure was divided in the middle; in the upper portion the prophet only
noticed that it was ḥashmal, (mysterious); from the loins downwards
there was “the vision of the likeness of the Divine Glory,” and “the
likeness of the throne.” The world of Intelligences was represented by
the figure; these can only be perceived in as far as they influence the
spheres, but their relation to the Creator is beyond human
comprehension. The Creator himself is not represented in this vision.
The key to the whole vision Maimonides finds in the introductory words,
“And the heavens were opened,” and in the minute description of the
place and the time of the revelation. When pondering on the grandeur of
the spheres and their influences, which vary according to time and
place, man begins to think of the existence of the Creator. At the
conclusion of this exposition Maimonides declares that he will, in the
subsequent chapters, refrain from giving further explanation of the
maʻaseh mercabah. The foregoing summary, however, shows that the
opinion of the author on this subject is fully stated, and it is indeed
difficult to conceive what additional disclosures he could still have
made.
The task which the author has proposed to himself in the Preface he now
regarded as accomplished. He has discussed the method of the Kalām, the
system of the philosophers, and his own theory concerning the relation
between the Primal Cause and the Universe: he has explained the
Biblical account of the creation, the nature of prophecy, and the
mysteries in Ezekiel’s vision. In the remaining portion of the work the
author attempts to solve certain theological problems, as though he
wished to obviate the following objections, which might be raised to
his theory that there is a design throughout the creation, and that the
entire Universe is subject to the law of causation:—What is the purpose
of the evils which attend human life? For what purpose was the world
created? In how far does Providence interfere with the natural course
of events? Does God know and foresee man’s actions? To what end was the
Divine Law revealed? These problems are treated seriatim.
All evils, Maimonides holds, originate in the material element of man’s
existence. Those who are able to emancipate themselves from the tyranny
of the body, and unconditionally to submit to the dictates of reason,
are protected from many evils. Man should disregard the cravings of the
body, avoid them as topics of conversation, and keep his thoughts far
away from them; convivial and erotic songs debase man’s noblest
gifts—thought and speech. Matter is the partition separating man from
the pure Intellects; it is “the thickness of the cloud” which true
knowledge has to traverse before it reaches man. In reality, evil is
the mere negative of good: “God saw all that He had made, and behold it
was very good” (Gen. i. 31). Evil does not exist at all. When evils are
mentioned in the Scriptures as the work of God, the Scriptural
expressions must not be taken in their literal sense.
There are three kinds of evils:—1. Evils necessitated by those laws of
production and destruction by which the species are perpetuated. 2.
Evils which men inflict on each other; they are comparatively few,
especially among civilized men. 3. Evils which man brings upon himself,
and which comprise the majority of existing evils. The consideration of
these three classes of evils leads to the conclusion that “the Lord is
good to all, and his tender mercies are over all his works” (Ps. cxlv.
9).
The question, What is the object of the creation? must be left
unanswered. The creation is the result of the will of God. Also those
who believe that the Universe is eternal must admit that they are
unable to discover the purpose of the Universe. It would, however, not
be illogical to assume that the spheres have been created for the sake
of man, notwithstanding the great dimensions of the former and the
smallness of the latter. Still it must be conceded that, even if
mankind were the main and central object of creation, there is no
absolute interdependence between them; for it is a matter of course
that, under altered conditions, man could exist without the spheres.
All teleological theories must therefore be confined within the limits
of the Universe as it now exists. They are only admissible in the
relation in which the several parts of the Universe stand to each
other; but the purpose of the Universe as a whole cannot be accounted
for. It is simply an emanation from the will of God.
Regarding the belief in Providence, Maimonides enumerates the following
five opinions:—1. There is no Providence; everything is subject to
chance; 2. Only a part of the Universe is governed by Providence, viz.,
the spheres, the species, and such individual beings as possess the
power of perpetuating their existence (e.g., the stars); the rest—that
is, the sublunary world—is left to mere chance. 3. Everything is
predetermined; according to this theory, revealed Law is inconceivable.
4. Providence assigns its blessings to all creatures, according to
their merits; accordingly, all beings, even the lowest animals, if
innocently injured or killed, receive compensation in a future life. 5.
According to the Jewish belief, all living beings are endowed with
free-will; God is just, and the destiny of man depends on his merits.
Maimonides denies the existence of trials inflicted by Divine love,
i.e. afflictions which befall man, not as punishments of sin, but as
means to procure for him a reward in times to come. Maimonides also
rejects the notion that God ordains special temptation. The Biblical
account, according to which God tempts men, “to know what is in their
hearts,” must not be taken in its literal sense; it merely states that
God made the virtues of certain people known to their fellowmen in
order that their good example should be followed. Of all creatures man
alone enjoys the especial care of Providence; because the acts of
Providence are identical with certain influences (shefaʻ) which the
Active Intellect brings to bear upon the human intellect; their effect
upon man varies according to his physical, moral, and intellectual
condition; irrational beings, however, cannot be affected by these
influences. If we cannot in each individual case see how these
principles are applied, it must be borne in mind that God’s wisdom is
far above that of man. The author seems to have felt that his theory
has its weak points, for he introduces it as follows:—“My theory is not
established by demonstrative proof; it is based on the authority of the
Bible, and it is less subject to refutation than any of the theories
previously mentioned.”
Providence implies Omniscience, and men who deny this, eo ipso, have no
belief in Providence. Some are unable to reconcile the fate of man with
Divine Justice, and are therefore of opinion that God takes no notice
whatever of the events which occur on earth. Others believe that God,
being an absolute Unity, cannot possess a knowledge of a multitude of
things, or of things that do not yet exist, or the number of which is
infinite. These objections, which are based on the nature of man’s
perception, are illogical; for God’s knowledge cannot be compared to
that of man; it is identical with His essence. Even the Attributists,
who assume that God’s knowledge is different from His essence, hold
that it is distinguished from man’s knowledge in the following five
points:—1. It is one, although it embraces a plurality. 2. It includes
even such things as do not yet exist. 3. It includes things which are
infinite in number. 4. It does not change when new objects of
perception present themselves. 5. It does not determine the course of
events.—However difficult this theory may appear to human
comprehension, it is in accordance with the words of Isaiah (lv. 8):
“Your thoughts are not My thoughts, and your ways are not My ways.”
According to Maimonides, the difficulty is to be explained by the fact
that God is the Creator of all things, and His knowledge of the things
is not dependent on their existence; while the knowledge of man is
solely dependent on the objects which come under his cognition.
According to Maimonides, the book of Job illustrates the several views
which have been mentioned above. Satan, that is, the material element
in human existence, is described as the cause of Job’s sufferings. Job
at first believed that man’s happiness depends on riches, health, and
children; being deprived of these sources of happiness, he conceived
the notion that Providence is indifferent to the fate of mortal beings.
After a careful study of natural phenomena, he rejected this opinion.
Eliphaz held that all misfortunes of man serve as punishments of past
sins. Bildad, the second friend of Job, admitted the existence of those
afflictions which Divine love decrees in order that the patient
sufferer may be fitted to receive a bountiful reward. Zofar, the third
friend of Job, declared that the ways of God are beyond human
comprehension; there is but one explanation assignable to all Divine
acts, namely: Such is His Will. Elihu gives a fuller development to
this idea; he says that such evils as befell Job may be remedied once
or twice, but the course of nature is not altogether reversed. It is
true that by prophecy a clearer insight into the ways of God can be
obtained, but there are only few who arrive at that exalted
intellectual degree, whilst the majority of men must content themselves
with acquiring a knowledge of God through the study of nature. Such a
study leads man to the conviction that his understanding cannot fathom
the secrets of nature and the wisdom of Divine Providence.
The concluding section of the Third Part treats of the purpose of the
Divine precepts. In the Pentateuch they are described as the means of
acquiring wisdom, enduring happiness, and also bodily comfort (ch.
xxxi.). Generally a distinction is made between “ḥuḳḳim” (“statutes”)
and mishpaṭim (“judgments”). The object of the latter is, on the whole,
known, but the ḥuḳḳim are considered as tests of man’s obedience; no
reason is given why they have been enacted. Maimonides rejects this
distinction; he states that all precepts are the result of wisdom and
design, that all contribute to the welfare of mankind, although with
regard to the ḥuḳḳim this is less obvious. The author draws another
line of distinction between the general principles and the details of
rules. For the selection and the introduction of the latter there is
but one reason, viz.: “Such is the will of God.”
The laws are intended to promote man’s perfection; they improve both
his mental and his physical condition; the former in so far as they
lead him to the acquisition of true knowledge, the latter through the
training of his moral and social faculties. Each law thus imparts
knowledge, improves the moral condition of man, or conduces to the
well-being of society. Many revealed laws help to enlighten man, and to
correct false opinions. This object is not always clearly announced.
God in His wisdom sometimes withheld from the knowledge of man the
purpose of commandments and actions. There are other precepts which
tend to restrain man’s passions and desires. If the same end is
occasionally attainable by other means, it must be remembered that the
Divine laws are adapted to the ordinary mental and emotional state of
man, and not to exceptional circumstances. In this work, as in the Yad
ha-ḥazaḳah, Maimonides divides the laws of the Pentateuch into fourteen
groups, and in each group he discusses the principal and the special
object of the laws included in it.
In addition to the legislative contents, the Bible includes historical
information; and Maimonides, in briefly reviewing the Biblical
narratives, shows that these are likewise intended to improve man’s
physical, moral, and intellectual condition. “It is not a vain thing
for you” (Deut. xxxii. 47), and when it proves vain to anyone, it is
his own fault.
In the final chapters the author describes the several degrees of human
perfection, from the sinners who have turned from the right path to the
best of men, who in all their thoughts and acts cling to the Most
Perfect Being, who aspire after the greatest possible knowledge of God,
and strive to serve their Maker in the practice of “loving-kindness,
righteousness, and justice.” This degree of human perfection can only
be attained by those who never forget the presence of the Almighty, and
remain firm in their fear and love of God. These servants of the Most
High inherit the choicest of human blessings; they are endowed with
wisdom: they are godlike beings.
INTRODUCTION
[Letter of the Author to his Pupil, R. Joseph Ibn Aknin.]
In the name of God, Lord of the Universe.
To R. Joseph (may God protect him!), son of R. Jehudah (may his repose
be in Paradise!):—
“My dear pupil, ever since you resolved to come to me, from a distant
country, and to study under my direction, I thought highly of your
thirst for knowledge, and your fondness for speculative pursuits, which
found expression in your poems. I refer to the time when I received
your writings in prose and verse from Alexandria. I was then not yet
able to test your powers of apprehension, and I thought that your
desire might possibly exceed your capacity. But when you had gone with
me through a course of astronomy, after having completed the [other]
elementary studies which are indispensable for the understanding of
that science, I was still more gratified by the acuteness and the
quickness of your apprehension. Observing your great fondness for
mathematics, I let you study them more deeply, for I felt sure of your
ultimate success. Afterwards, when I took you through a course of
logic, I found that my great expectations of you were confirmed, and I
considered you fit to receive from me an exposition of the esoteric
ideas contained in the prophetic books, that you might understand them
as they are understood by men of culture. When I commenced by way of
hints, I noticed that you desired additional explanation, urging me to
expound some metaphysical problems; to teach you the system of the
Mutakallemim; to tell you whether their arguments were based on logical
proof; and if not, what their method was. I perceived that you had
acquired some knowledge in those matters from others, and that you were
perplexed and bewildered; yet you sought to find out a solution to your
difficulty. I urged you to desist from this pursuit, and enjoined you
to continue your studies systematically; for my object was that the
truth should present itself in connected order, and that you should not
hit upon it by mere chance. Whilst you studied with me I never refused
to explain difficult verses in the Bible or passages in rabbinical
literature which we happened to meet. When, by the will of God, we
parted, and you went your way, our discussions aroused in me a
resolution which had long been dormant. Your absence has prompted me to
compose this treatise for you and for those who are like you, however
few they may be. I have divided it into chapters, each of which shall
be sent to you as soon as it is completed. Farewell!”
[PREFATORY REMARKS.]
“Cause me to know the way wherein I should walk, for I lift
up my soul unto Thee.” (Psalm cxliii. 8.)
“Unto you, O men, I call, and my voice is to the sons of
men.” (Prov. viii. 4.)
“Bow down thine ear and hear the words of the wise, and
apply thine heart unto my knowledge.” (Prov. xxii. 17.)
My primary object in this work is to explain certain words occurring in
the prophetic books. Of these some are homonyms, and of their several
meanings the ignorant choose the wrong ones; other terms which are
employed in a figurative sense are erroneously taken by such persons in
their primary signification. There are also hybrid terms, denoting
things which are of the same class from one point of view and of a
different class from another. It is not here intended to explain all
these expressions to the unlettered or to mere tyros, a previous
knowledge of Logic and Natural Philosophy being indispensable, or to
those who confine their attention to the study of our holy Law, I mean
the study of the canonical law alone; for the true knowledge of the
Torah is the special aim of this and similar works.
The object of this treatise is to enlighten a religious man who has
been trained to believe in the truth of our holy Law, who
conscientiously fulfils his moral and religious duties, and at the same
time has been successful in his philosophical studies. Human reason has
attracted him to abide within its sphere; and he finds it difficult to
accept as correct the teaching based on the literal interpretation of
the Law, and especially that which he himself or others derived from
those homonymous, metaphorical, or hybrid expressions. Hence he is lost
in perplexity and anxiety. If he be guided solely by reason, and
renounce his previous views which are based on those expressions, he
would consider that he had rejected the fundamental principles of the
Law; and even if he retains the opinions which were derived from those
expressions, and if, instead of following his reason, he abandon its
guidance altogether, it would still appear that his religious
convictions had suffered loss and injury. For he would then be left
with those errors which give rise to fear and anxiety, constant grief
and great perplexity.
This work has also a second object in view. It seeks to explain certain
obscure figures which occur in the Prophets, and are not distinctly
characterized as being figures. Ignorant and superficial readers take
them in a literal, not in a figurative sense. Even well informed
persons are bewildered if they understand these passages in their
literal signification, but they are entirely relieved of their
perplexity when we explain the figure, or merely suggest that the terms
are figurative. For this reason I have called this book Guide for the
Perplexed.
I do not presume to think that this treatise settles every doubt in the
minds of those who understand it, but I maintain that it settles the
greater part of their difficulties. No intelligent man will require and
expect that on introducing any subject I shall completely exhaust it;
or that on commencing the exposition of a figure I shall fully explain
all its parts. Such a course could not be followed by a teacher in a
viva voce exposition, much less by an author in writing a book, without
becoming a target for every foolish conceited person to discharge the
arrows of folly at him. Some general principles bearing upon this point
have been fully discussed in our works on the Talmud, and we have there
called the attention of the reader to many themes of this kind. We also
stated (Mishneh torah, I. ii. 12, and iv. 10) that the expression
Maʻase Bereshit (Account of the Creation) signified “Natural Science,”
and Maʻaseh Mercabah (“Description of the Chariot”) Metaphysics, and we
explained the force of the Rabbinical dictum, “The Maʻaseh Mercabah
must not be fully expounded even in the presence of a single student,
unless he be wise and able to reason for himself, and even then you
should merely acquaint him with the heads of the different sections of
the subject.” (Babyl. Talm. Ḥagigah, fol. 11 b). You must, therefore,
not expect from me more than such heads. And even these have not been
methodically and systematically arranged in this work, but have been,
on the contrary, scattered, and are interspersed with other topics
which we shall have occasion to explain. My object in adopting this
arrangement is that the truths should be at one time apparent, and at
another time concealed. Thus we shall not be in opposition to the
Divine Will (from which it is wrong to deviate) which has withheld from
the multitude the truths required for the knowledge of God, according
to the words, “The secret of the Lord is with them that fear Him” (Ps.
xxv. 14).
Know that also in Natural Science there are topics which are not to be
fully explained. Our Sages laid down the rule, “The Maʻaseh Bereshith
must not be expounded in the presence of two.” If an author were to
explain these principles in writing, it would be equal to expounding
them unto thousands of men. For this reason the prophets treat these
subjects in figures, and our Sages, imitating the method of Scripture,
speak of them in metaphors and allegories; because there is a close
affinity between these subjects and metaphysics, and indeed they form
part of its mysteries. Do not imagine that these most difficult
problems can be thoroughly understood by any one of us. This is not the
case. At times the truth shines so brilliantly that we perceive it as
clear as day. Our nature and habit then draw a veil over our
perception, and we return to a darkness almost as dense as before. We
are like those who, though beholding frequent flashes of lightning,
still find themselves in the thickest darkness of the night. On some
the lightning flashes in rapid succession, and they seem to be in
continuous light, and their night is as clear as the day. This was the
degree of prophetic excellence attained by (Moses) the greatest of
prophets, to whom God said, “But as for thee, stand thou here by Me”
(Deut. v. 31), and of whom it is written “the skin of his face shone,”
etc. (Exod. xxxiv. 29). [Some perceive the prophetic flash at long
intervals; this is the degree of most prophets.] By others only once
during the whole night is a flash of lightning perceived. This is the
case with those of whom we are informed, “They prophesied, and did not
prophesy again” (Num. xi. 25). There are some to whom the flashes of
lightning appear with varying intervals; others are in the condition of
men, whose darkness is illumined not by lightning, but by some kind of
crystal or similar stone, or other substances that possess the property
of shining during the night; and to them even this small amount of
light is not continuous, but now it shines and now it vanishes, as if
it were “the flame of the rotating sword.”
The degrees in the perfection of men vary according to these
distinctions. Concerning those who never beheld the light even for one
day, but walk in continual darkness, it is written, “They know not,
neither will they understand; they walk on in darkness” (Ps. lxxxii.
5). Truth, in spite of all its powerful manifestations, is completely
withheld from them, and the following words of Scripture may be applied
to them, “And now men see not the light which is bright in the skies”
(Job xxxvii. 21). They are the multitude of ordinary men; there is no
need to notice them in this treatise.
You must know that if a person, who has attained a certain degree of
perfection, wishes to impart to others, either orally or in writing,
any portion of the knowledge which he has acquired of these subjects,
he is utterly unable to be as systematic and explicit as he could be in
a science of which the method is well known. The same difficulties
which he encountered when investigating the subject for himself will
attend him when endeavouring to instruct others; viz., at one time the
explanation will appear lucid, at another time, obscure; this property
of the subject appears to remain the same both to the advanced scholar
and to the beginner. For this reason, great theological scholars gave
instruction in all such matters only by means of metaphors and
allegories. They frequently employed them in forms varying more or less
essentially. In most cases they placed the lesson to be illustrated at
the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end of the simile. When they
could find no simile which from beginning to end corresponded to the
idea which was to be illustrated, they divided the subject of the
lesson, although in itself one whole, into different parts, and
expressed each by a separate figure. Still more obscure are those
instances in which one simile is employed to illustrate many subjects,
the beginning of the simile representing one thing, the end another.
Sometimes the whole metaphor may refer to two cognate subjects in the
same branch of knowledge.
If we were to teach in these disciplines, without the use of parables
and figures, we should be compelled to resort to expressions both
profound and transcendental, and by no means more intelligible than
metaphors and similes; as though the wise and learned were drawn into
this course by the Divine Will, in the same way as they are compelled
to follow the laws of nature in matters relating to the body. You are
no doubt aware that the Almighty, desiring to lead us to perfection and
to improve our state of society, has revealed to us laws which are to
regulate our actions. These laws, however, presuppose an advanced state
of intellectual culture. We must first form a conception of the
Existence of the Creator according to our capabilities; that is, we
must have a knowledge of Metaphysics. But this discipline can only be
approached after the study of Physics; for the science of Physics
borders on Metaphysics, and must even precede it in the course of our
studies, as is clear to all who are familiar with these questions.
Therefore the Almighty commenced Holy Writ with the description of the
Creation, that is, with Physical Science; the subject being on the one
hand most weighty and important, and on the other hand our means of
fully comprehending those great problems being limited. He described
those profound truths, which His Divine Wisdom found it necessary to
communicate to us, in allegorical, figurative, and metaphorical
language. Our Sages have said (Yemen Midrash on Gen. i. 1), “It is
impossible to give a full account of the Creation to man. Therefore
Scripture simply tells us, In the beginning God created the heavens and
the earth” (Gen. i. 1). Thus they have suggested that this subject is a
deep mystery, and in the words of Solomon, “Far off and exceedingly
deep, who can find it out?” (Eccles. vii. 24). It has been treated in
metaphors in order that the uneducated may comprehend it according to
the measure of their faculties and the feebleness of their
apprehension, while educated persons may take it in a different sense.
In our commentary on the Mishnah we stated our intention to explain
difficult problems in the Book on Prophecy and in the Book of Harmony.
In the latter we intended to examine all the passages in the Midrash
which, if taken literally, appear to be inconsistent with truth and
common sense, and must therefore be taken figuratively. Many years have
elapsed since I first commenced those works. I had proceeded but a
short way when I became dissatisfied with my original plan. For I
observed that by expounding these passages by means of allegorical and
mystical terms, we do not explain anything, but merely substitute one
thing for another of the same nature, whilst in explaining them fully
our efforts would displease most people; and my sole object in planning
to write those books was to make the contents of Midrashim and the
exoteric lessons of the prophecies intelligible to everybody. We have
further noticed that when an ill-informed Theologian reads these
Midrashim, he will find no difficulty; for possessing no knowledge of
the properties of things, he will not reject statements which involve
impossibilities. When, however, a person who is both religious and well
educated reads them, he cannot escape the following dilemma: either he
takes them literally, and questions the abilities of the author and the
soundness of his mind—doing thereby nothing which is opposed to the
principles of our faith,—or he will acquiesce in assuming that the
passages in question have some secret meaning, and he will continue to
hold the author in high estimation whether he understood the allegory
or not. As regards prophecy in its various degrees and the different
metaphors used in the prophetic books, we shall give in the present
work an explanation, according to a different method. Guided by these
considerations I have refrained from writing those two books as I had
previously intended. In my larger work, the Mishnah Torah, I have
contented myself with briefly stating the principles of our faith and
its fundamental truths, together with such hints as approach a clear
exposition. In this work, however, I address those who have studied
philosophy and have acquired sound knowledge, and who while firm in
religious matters are perplexed and bewildered on account of the
ambiguous and figurative expressions employed in the holy writings.
Some chapters may be found in this work which contain no reference
whatever to homonyms. Such chapters will serve as an introduction to
others; they will contain some reference to the signification of a
homonym which I do not wish to mention in that place, or explain some
figure; point out that a certain expression is a figure; treat of
difficult passages generally misunderstood in consequence of the
homonymy they include, or because the simile they contain is taken in
place of that which it represents, and vice versâ.
Having spoken of similes, I proceed to make the following remark:—The
key to the understanding and to the full comprehension of all that the
Prophets have said is found in the knowledge of the figures, their
general ideas, and the meaning of each word they contain. You know the
verse:—
“I have also spoken in similes by the Prophets” (Hosea xii. 10); and
also the verse, “Put forth a riddle and speak a parable” (Ezek. xvii.
2). And because the Prophets continually employ figures, Ezekiel said,
“Does He not speak parables?” (xxi. 5). Again, Solomon begins his book
of Proverbs with the words, “To understand a proverb and figurative
speech, the words of the wise and their dark sayings” (Prov. i. 6); and
we read in Midrash, (Shir ha-shirim Rabba, i. 1); “To what were the
words of the Law to be compared before the time of Solomon? To a well
the waters of which are at a great depth, and though cool and fresh,
yet no man could drink of them. A clever man joined cord with cord, and
rope with rope, and drew up and drank. So Solomon went from figure to
figure, and from subject to subject, till he obtained the true sense of
the Law.” So far go the words of our Sages. I do not believe that any
intelligent man thinks that “the words of the Law” mentioned here as
requiring the application of figures in order to be understood, can
refer to the rules for building tabernacles, for preparing the lulab,
or for the four kinds of trustees. What is really meant is the
apprehension of profound and difficult subjects, concerning which our
Sages said, “If a man loses in his house a sela, or a pearl, he can
find it by lighting a taper worth only one issar. Thus the parables in
themselves are of no great value, but through them the words of the
holy Law are rendered intelligible.” These likewise are the words of
our Sages; consider well their statement, that the deeper sense of the
words of the holy Law are pearls, and the literal acceptation of a
figure is of no value in itself. They compare the hidden meaning
included in the literal sense of the simile to a pearl lost in a dark
room, which is full of furniture. It is certain that the pearl is in
the room, but the man can neither see it nor know where it lies. It is
just as if the pearl were no longer in his possession, for, as has been
stated, it affords him no benefit whatever until he kindles a light.
The same is the case with the comprehension of that which the simile
represents. The wise king said, “A word fitly spoken is like apples of
gold in vessels of silver” (Prov. xxv. 11). Hear the explanation of
what he said:—The word maskiyoth, the Hebrew equivalent for “vessels,”
denotes “filigree network”—i.e., things in which there are very small
apertures, such as are frequently wrought by silversmiths. They are
called in Hebrew maskiyyoth (lit. “transpicuous,” from the verb sakah,
“he saw,” a root which occurs also in the Targum of Onkelos, Gen. xxvi.
8), because the eye penetrates through them. Thus Solomon meant to say,
“Just as apples of gold in silver filigree with small apertures, so is
a word fitly spoken.”
See how beautifully the conditions of a good simile are described in
this figure! It shows that in every word which has a double sense, a
literal one and a figurative one, the plain meaning must be as valuable
as silver, and the hidden meaning still more precious; so that the
figurative meaning bears the same relation to the literal one as gold
to silver. It is further necessary that the plain sense of the phrase
shall give to those who consider it some notion of that which the
figure represents. Just as a golden apple overlaid with a network of
silver, when seen at a distance, or looked at superficially, is
mistaken for a silver apple, but when a keen-sighted person looks at
the object well, he will find what is within, and see that the apple is
gold. The same is the case with the figures employed by prophets. Taken
literally, such expressions contain wisdom useful for many purposes,
among others, for the amelioration of the condition of society; e.g.,
the Proverbs (of Solomon), and similar sayings in their literal sense.
Their hidden meaning, however, is profound wisdom, conducive to the
recognition of real truth.
Know that the figures employed by prophets are of two kinds: first,
where every word which occurs in the simile represents a certain idea;
and secondly, where the simile, as a whole, represents a general idea,
but has a great many points which have no reference whatever to that
idea; they are simply required to give to the simile its proper form
and order, or better to conceal the idea; the simile is therefore
continued as far as necessary, according to its literal sense. Consider
this well.
An example of the first class of prophetic figures is to be found in
Genesis:—“And, behold, a ladder set up on the earth, and the top of it
reached to heaven; and, behold, the angels of God ascending and
descending on it” (Gen. xxviii. 12). The word “ladder” refers to one
idea; “set up on the earth” to another; “and the top of it reached to
heaven” to a third; “angels of God” to a fourth; “ascending” to a
fifth; “descending” to a sixth; “the Lord stood above it” (ver. 13) to
a seventh. Every word in this figure introduces a fresh element into
the idea represented by the figure.
An example of the second class of prophetic figures is found in
Proverbs (vii. 6–26):—“For at the window of my house I looked through
my casement, and beheld among the simple ones; I discerned among the
youths a young man void of understanding, passing through the street
near her corner: and he went the way to her house, in the twilight, in
the evening, in the black and dark night: and, behold, there met him a
woman with the attire of a harlot, and subtil of heart. (She is loud
and stubborn; her feet abide not in her house: now she is without, now
in the streets, and lieth in wait in every corner.) So she caught him,
and kissed him, and with an impudent face said unto him, I have peace
offerings with me; this day have I paid my vows. Therefore came I forth
to meet thee, diligently to seek thy face, and I have found thee. I
have decked my bed with coverings of tapestry, with striped cloths of
the yarn of Egypt. I have perfumed my bed with myrrh, aloes, and
cinnamon. Come, let us take our fill of love until the morning: let us
solace ourselves with loves. For the goodman is not at home, he is gone
a long journey: he hath taken a bag of money with him, and will come
home at the day appointed. With her much fair speech she caused him to
yield, with the flattering of her lips she forced him. He goeth after
her straightway, as an ox goeth to the slaughter, or as fetters to the
correction of a fool: till a dart strike through his liver; as a bird
hasteth to the snare, and knoweth not that it is for his life. Hearken
unto me now therefore, O ye children, and attend to the words of my
mouth. Let not thine heart decline to her ways, go not astray in her
paths. For she hath cast down many wounded: yea, many strong men have
been slain by her.”
The general principle expounded in all these verses is to abstain from
excessive indulgence in bodily pleasures. The author compares the body,
which is the source of all sensual pleasures, to a married woman who at
the same time is a harlot. And this figure he has taken as the basis of
his entire book. We shall hereafter show the wisdom of Solomon in
comparing sensual pleasures to an adulterous harlot. We shall explain
how aptly he concludes that work with the praises of a faithful wife
who devotes herself to the welfare of her husband and of her household.
All obstacles which prevent man from attaining his highest aim in life,
all the deficiencies in the character of man, all his evil
propensities, are to be traced to the body alone. This will be
explained later on. The predominant idea running throughout the figure
is that man shall not be entirely guided by his animal, or material
nature; for the material substance of man is identical with that of the
brute creation.
An adequate explanation of the figure having been given, and its
meaning having been shown, do not imagine that you will find in its
application a corresponding element for each part of the figure; you
must not ask what is meant by “I have peace offerings with me” (ver.
14); by “I have decked my bed with coverings of tapestry” (ver. 16); or
what is added to the force of the figure by the observation “for the
goodman is not at home” (ver. 19), and so on to the end of the chapter.
For all this is merely to complete the illustration of the metaphor in
its literal meaning. The circumstances described here are such as are
common to adulterers. Such conversations take place between all
adulterous persons. You must well understand what I have said, for it
is a principle of the utmost importance with respect to those things
which I intend to expound. If you observe in one of the chapters that I
explained the meaning of a certain figure, and pointed out to you its
general scope, do not trouble yourself further in order to find an
interpretation of each separate portion, for that would lead you to one
of the two following erroneous courses; either you will miss the sense
included in the metaphor, or you will be induced to explain certain
things which require no explanation, and which are not introduced for
that purpose. Through this unnecessary trouble you may fall into the
great error which besets most modern sects in their foolish writings
and discussions; they all endeavour to find some hidden meaning in
expressions which were never uttered by the author in that sense. Your
object should be to discover in most of the figures the general idea
which the author wishes to express. In some instances it will be
sufficient if you understand from my remarks that a certain expression
contains a figure, although I may offer no further comment. For when
you know that it is not to be taken literally, you will understand at
once to what subject it refers. My statement that it is a figurative
expression will, as it were, remove the screen from between the object
and the observer.
DIRECTIONS FOR THE STUDY OF THIS WORK.
If you desire to grasp all that is contained in this book so that
nothing shall escape your notice, consider the chapters in connected
order. In studying each chapter, do not content yourself with
comprehending its principal subject, but attend to every term mentioned
therein, although it may seem to have no connection with the principal
subject. For what I have written in this work was not the suggestion of
the moment; it is the result of deep study and great application. Care
has been taken that nothing that appeared doubtful should be left
unexplained. Nothing of what is mentioned is out of place, every remark
will be found to illustrate the subject-matter of the respective
chapter. Do not read superficially, lest you do me an injury, and
derive no benefit for yourself. You must study thoroughly and read
continually; for you will then find the solution of those important
problems of religion, which are a source of anxiety to all intelligent
men. I adjure any reader of my book, in the name of the Most High, not
to add any explanation even to a single word; nor to explain to another
any portion of it except such passages as have been fully treated of by
previous theological authorities; he must not teach others anything
that he has learnt from my work alone, and that has not been hitherto
discussed by any of our authorities. The reader must, moreover, beware
of raising objections to any of my statements, because it is very
probable that he may understand my words to mean the exact opposite to
what I intended to say. He will injure me, while I endeavoured to
benefit him. “He will requite me evil for good.” Let the reader make a
careful study of this work; and if his doubt be removed on even one
point, let him praise his Maker and rest contented with the knowledge
he has acquired. But if he derive from it no benefit whatever, he may
consider the book as if it had never been written. Should he notice any
opinions with which he does not agree, let him endeavour to find a
suitable explanation, even if it seem far-fetched, in order that he may
judge me charitably. Such a duty we owe to every one. We owe it
especially to our scholars and theologians, who endeavour to teach us
what is the truth according to the best of their ability. I feel
assured that those of my readers who have not studied philosophy, will
still derive profit from many a chapter. But the thinker whose studies
have brought him into collision with religion, will, as I have already
mentioned, derive much benefit from every chapter. How greatly will he
rejoice! How agreeably will my words strike his ears! Those, however,
whose minds are confused with false notions and perverse methods, who
regard their misleading studies as sciences, and imagine themselves
philosophers, though they have no knowledge that could truly be termed
science, will object to many chapters, and will find in them many
insuperable difficulties, because they do not understand their meaning,
and because I expose therein the absurdity of their perverse notions,
which constitute their riches and peculiar treasure, “stored up for
their ruin.” God knows that I hesitated very much before writing on the
subjects contained in this work, since they are profound mysteries;
they are topics which, since the time of our captivity have not been
treated by any of our scholars as far as we possess their writings; how
then shall I now make a beginning and discuss them? But I rely on two
precedents: first, to similar cases our Sages applied the verse, “It is
time to do something in honour of the Lord: for they have made void thy
law” (Ps. cxix. 126). Secondly, they have said, “Let all thy acts be
guided by pure intentions.” On these two principles I relied while
composing some parts of this work. Lastly, when I have a difficult
subject before me—when I find the road narrow, and can see no other way
of teaching a well established truth except by pleasing one intelligent
man and displeasing ten thousand fools—I prefer to address myself to
the one man, and to take no notice whatever of the condemnation of the
multitude; I prefer to extricate that intelligent man from his
embarrassment and show him the cause of his perplexity, so that he may
attain perfection and be at peace.
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.
[On Method.]
There are seven causes of inconsistencies and contradictions to be met
with in a literary work. The first cause arises from the fact that the
author collects the opinions of various men, each differing from the
other, but neglects to mention the name of the author of any particular
opinion. In such a work contradictions or inconsistencies must occur,
since any two statements may belong to two different authors. Second
cause: The author holds at first one opinion which he subsequently
rejects; in his work, however, both his original and altered views are
retained. Third cause: The passages in question are not all to be taken
literally; some only are to be understood in their literal sense, while
in others figurative language is employed, which includes another
meaning besides the literal one: or, in the apparently inconsistent
passages, figurative language is employed which, if taken literally,
would seem to be contradictories or contraries. Fourth cause: The
premises are not identical in both statements, but for certain reasons
they are not fully stated in these passages; or two propositions with
different subjects which are expressed by the same term without having
the difference in meaning pointed out, occur in two passages. The
contradiction is therefore only apparent, but there is no contradiction
in reality. The fifth cause is traceable to the use of a certain method
adopted in teaching and expounding profound problems. Namely, a
difficult and obscure theorem must sometimes be mentioned and assumed
as known, for the illustration of some elementary and intelligible
subject which must be taught beforehand, the commencement being always
made with the easier thing. The teacher must therefore facilitate, in
any manner which he can devise, the explanation of those theorems,
which have to be assumed as known, and he must content himself with
giving a general though somewhat inaccurate notion on the subject. It
is, for the present, explained according to the capacity of the
students, that they may comprehend it as far as they are required to
understand the subject. Later on, the same subject is thoroughly
treated and fully developed in its right place. Sixth cause: The
contradiction is not apparent, and only becomes evident through a
series of premises. The larger the number of premises necessary to
prove the contradiction between the two conclusions, the greater is the
chance that it will escape detection, and that the author will not
perceive his own inconsistency. Only when from each conclusion, by
means of suitable premises, an inference is made, and from the
enunciation thus inferred, by means of proper arguments, other
conclusions are formed, and after that process has been repeated many
times, then it becomes clear that the original conclusions are
contradictories or contraries. Even able writers are liable to overlook
such inconsistencies. If, however, the contradiction between the
original statements can at once be discovered, and the author, while
writing the second, does not think of the first, he evinces a greater
deficiency, and his words deserve no notice whatever. Seventh cause: It
is sometimes necessary to introduce such metaphysical matter as may
partly be disclosed, but must partly be concealed; while, therefore, on
one occasion the object which the author has in view may demand that
the metaphysical problem be treated as solved in one way, it may be
convenient on another occasion to treat it as solved in the opposite
way. The author must endeavour, by concealing the fact as much as
possible, to prevent the uneducated reader from perceiving the
contradiction.
Inconsistencies occurring in the Mishnah and Boraitot are traceable to
the first cause. You meet frequently in the Gemara with passages like
the following:—“Does not the beginning of the passage contradict the
end? No; the beginning is the dictum of a certain Rabbi; the end that
of another”; or “Rabbi (Jehudah ha-Nasi) approved of the opinion of a
certain rabbi in one case and gave it therefore anonymously, and having
accepted that of another rabbi in the other case he introduced that
view without naming the authority”; or “Who is the author of this
anonymous dictum? Rabbi A.” “Who is the author of that paragraph in the
Mishnah? Rabbi B.” Instances of this kind are innumerable.
Apparent contradictions or differences occurring in the Gemara may be
traced to the first cause and to the second, as e.g., “In this
particular case he agrees with this rabbi”; or “He agrees with him in
one point, but differs from him in another”; or “These two dicta are
the opinions of two Amoraim, who differ as regards the statement made
by a certain rabbi.” These are examples of contradictions traceable to
the first cause. The following are instances which may be traced to the
second cause. “Rabba altered his opinion on that point”; it then
becomes necessary to consider which of the two opinions came second.
Again, “In the first recension of the Talmud by Rabbi Ashi, he made one
assertion, and in the second a different one.”
The inconsistencies and contradictions met with in some passages of the
prophetic books, if taken literally, are all traceable to the third or
fourth cause, and it is exclusively in reference to this subject that I
wrote the present Introduction. You know that the following expression
frequently occurs, “One verse says this, another that,” showing the
contradiction, and explaining that either some premise is wanting or
the subject is altered. Comp. “Solomon, it is not sufficient that thy
words contradict thy father; they are themselves inconsistent, etc.”
Many similar instances occur in the writings of our Sages. The passages
in the prophetical books which our Sages have explained, mostly refer
to religious or moral precepts. Our desire, however, is to discuss such
passages as contain apparent contradictions in regard to the principles
of our faith. I shall explain some of them in various chapters of the
present work; for this subject also belongs to the secrets of the
Torah.
Contradictions traceable to the seventh cause occurring in the
prophetical works require special investigation; and no one should
express his opinion on that matter by reasoning and arguing without
weighing the matter well in his mind.
Inconsistencies in the writings of true philosophers are traceable to
the fifth cause. Contradictions occurring in the writings of most
authors and commentators, such as are not included in the
above-mentioned works, are due to the sixth cause. Many examples of
this class of contradictions are found in the Midrash and the Agada;
hence the saying, “We must not raise questions concerning the
contradictions met with in the Agada.” You may also notice in them
contradictions due to the seventh cause. Any inconsistency discovered
in the present work will be found to arise in consequence of the fifth
cause or the seventh. Notice this, consider its truth, and remember it
well, lest you misunderstand some of the chapters in this book.
Having concluded these introductory remarks I proceed to examine those
expressions, to the true meaning of which, as apparent from the
context, it is necessary to direct your attention. This book will then
be a key admitting to places the gates of which would otherwise be
closed. When the gates are opened and men enter, their souls will enjoy
repose, their eyes will be gratified, and even their bodies, after all
toil and labour, will be refreshed.
PART I
“Open ye the gates, that the righteous nation which keepeth
the truth may enter in.”—(Isa. xxvi. 2.)
CHAPTER I
Some have been of opinion that by the Hebrew ẓelem, the shape and
figure of a thing is to be understood, and this explanation led men to
believe in the corporeality [of the Divine Being]: for they thought
that the words “Let us make man in our ẓelem” (Gen. i. 26), implied
that God had the form of a human being, i.e., that He had figure and
shape, and that, consequently, He was corporeal. They adhered
faithfully to this view, and thought that if they were to relinquish it
they would eo ipso reject the truth of the Bible: and further, if they
did not conceive God as having a body possessed of face and limbs,
similar to their own in appearance, they would have to deny even the
existence of God. The sole difference which they admitted, was that He
excelled in greatness and splendour, and that His substance was not
flesh and blood. Thus far went their conception of the greatness and
glory of God. The incorporeality of the Divine Being, and His unity, in
the true sense of the word—for there is no real unity without
incorporeality—will be fully proved in the course of the present
treatise. (Part II., ch. i.) In this chapter it is our sole intention
to explain the meaning of the words ẓelem and demut. I hold that the
Hebrew equivalent of “form” in the ordinary acceptation of the word,
viz., the figure and shape of a thing, is toär. Thus we find “[And
Joseph was] beautiful in toär (‘form’), and beautiful in appearance”
(Gen. xxxix. 6): “What form (toär) is he of?” (1 Sam. xxviii. 14): “As
the form (toär) of the children of a king” (Judges viii. 18). It is
also applied to form produced by human labour, as “He marketh its form
(toär) with a line,” “and he marketh its form (toär) with the compass”
(Isa. xliv. 13). This term is not at all applicable to God. The term
ẓelem, on the other hand, signifies the specific form, viz., that which
constitutes the essence of a thing, whereby the thing is what it is;
the reality of a thing in so far as it is that particular being. In man
the “form” is that constituent which gives him human perception: and on
account of this intellectual perception the term ẓelem is employed in
the sentences “In the ẓelem of God he created him” (Gen. i. 27). It is
therefore rightly said, “Thou despisest their ẓelem” (Ps. lxiii. 20);
the “contempt” can only concern the soul—the specific form of man, not
the properties and shape of his body. I am also of opinion that the
reason why this term is used for “idols” may be found in the
circumstance that they are worshipped on account of some idea
represented by them, not on account of their figure and shape. For the
same reason the term is used in the expression, “the forms (ẓalme) of
your emerods” (1 Sam. vi. 5), for the chief object was the removal of
the injury caused by the emerods, not a change of their shape. As,
however, it must be admitted that the term ẓelem is employed in these
two cases, viz. “the images of the emerods” and “the idols” on account
of the external shape, the term ẓelem is either a homonym or a hybrid
term, and would denote both the specific form and the outward shape,
and similar properties relating to the dimensions and the shape of
material bodies; and in the phrase “Let us make man in our ẓelem” (Gen.
i. 26), the term signifies “the specific form” of man, viz., his
intellectual perception, and does not refer to his “figure” or “shape.”
Thus we have shown the difference between ẓelem and toär, and explained
the meaning of ẓelem.
Demut is derived from the verb damah, “he is like.” This term likewise
denotes agreement with regard to some abstract relation: comp. “I am
like a pelican of the wilderness” (Ps. cii. 7); the author does not
compare himself to the pelican in point of wings and feathers, but in
point of sadness. “Nor any tree in the garden of God was like unto him
in beauty” (Ezek. xxxi. 8); the comparison refers to the idea of
beauty. “Their poison is like the poison of a serpent” (Ps. lviii. 5);
“He is like unto a lion” (Ps. xvii. 12); the resemblance indicated in
these passages does not refer to the figure and shape, but to some
abstract idea. In the same manner is used “the likeness of the throne”
(Ezek. i. 26); the comparison is made with regard to greatness and
glory, not, as many believe, with regard to its square form, its
breadth, or the length of its legs: this explanation applies also to
the phrase “the likeness of the ḥayyot” (“living creatures,” Ezek. i.
13).
As man’s distinction consists in a property which no other creature on
earth possesses, viz., intellectual perception, in the exercise of
which he does not employ his senses, nor move his hand or his foot,
this perception has been compared—though only apparently, not in
truth—to the Divine perception, which requires no corporeal organ. On
this account, i.e., on account of the Divine intellect with which man
has been endowed, he is said to have been made in the form and likeness
of the Almighty, but far from it be the notion that the Supreme Being
is corporeal, having a material form.