The immense military operations of our civil war have familiarized, to a
considerable extent, not only those connected with the armies, but the
people generally with the systems on which military forces are organized
and the methods of conducting war. Much has been learned in the past
three years, and much accomplished in the improvement of tactics,
internal organization, and the construction of all kinds of material.
Civilians, who were well read in the history of former wars, and even
professional military officers, were comparatively ignorant of all the
numerous details necessarily incident to the formation and movement of
armies. On account of the deficiency of practical information on these
matters, the difficulties which arose at the commencement of the war,
were, as it is well known, immense; but they were overcome with a
celerity and energy absolutely unparalleled in the history of the world,
and to-day we are able to assure ourselves with justifiable pride that
in all essential particulars our armies are fully and properly
organized, equipped, and provided for. We propose to exhibit in a few
articles the methods by which these results have been accomplished--to
present to readers generally the system of organization and the
principles of operation existing in our armies--giving them such
information as can be obtained only from actual thorough acquaintance
with military life, or extended perusal of works on military art, as now
understood among the leading civilized nations.
That such information would be desirable, we were led to believe from
the surprise expressed by an intelligent friend at the definition given
him of the phrase 'line of battle.' He was greatly astonished on
learning that battles are fought, mostly, by lines of only two ranks in
depth. The history of the 'line of battle' is of great interest, and
indeed contains an exposition of the principles on which a great portion
of modern warfare is founded. While the chief principles of strategy, of
the movement of armies, of attack and defence, and to some extent of
tactics, are the same now as in the earliest ages, the mode of arraying
men for battle has undergone an entire change, attributable to the
improvement in the weapons of warfare. We are not superior to the
ancients so much in the science of war, as in the character of our arms.
They undoubtedly fought in the manner most appropriate to the means
which they possessed. The great change which has taken place in the
method of battle, consists chiefly in this--that formerly men were
arrayed in masses, now in lines. The Grecian phalanx was composed of
32,000 men arranged as follows: 16,000 spearmen placed in sixteen ranks
of a thousand men each, forming the centre; on each wing, 4,000 light
spearmen in eight ranks; 4,000 men armed with bows and slings, who
performed the part of skirmishers; 4,000 cavalry. The Roman legion
contained 4,500 men, of which 1,200 were light infantry or skirmishers
armed with bows and slings. The main body consisted of 1,200 spearmen,
who were formed into ten rectangular bodies of twelve men front by ten
deep; behind them were ten other rectangles of the second line; and
behind these a third line of 600 in rectangles of six men front by ten
deep. To the legion was attached 300 cavalry.
In the middle ages, infantry was considered of little importance, the
combat being principally among the knights and cavaliers. The
introduction of gunpowder caused a change in the method of fighting, but
it was effected gradually. For a long time only clumsy cannon were
used, which, however, made great havoc among the formations in mass
still retained. Rude arquebuses were then introduced, and improvements
made from time to time; but even so late as the 17th century the ancient
arms were retained in a large proportion. They did not disappear
entirely until the invention of the bayonet in the 18th century. This
contributed as much as the use of firearms to change the formations of
battle. In the 16th century the number of ranks had been reduced from
ten to six; at the end of the reign of Louis XIV. the number was four;
Frederick the Great reduced it to three. With this number the wars of
the French Republic and Empire were conducted, until at Leipsic, in
1813, Napoleon's army being greatly diminished, he directed the
formation in two ranks, saying that the enemy being accustomed to see it
in three, and not aware of the change, would be deceived in regard to
its numbers. He stated also that the fire of the rear rank was dangerous
to those in front, and that there was no reason for the triple
formation. In this judgment military authorities have since concurred,
and the two-rank formation is almost universally adopted. Russia is the
only civilized power which places men in masses on the battle field.
Formations in column are used when necessary to carry a particular local
position, even at a great expenditure of life. But the usual mode of
combat is that adopted by Napoleon. Our battles have been almost
universally fought in this manner. The rebels have probably used the
formation in column more frequently than the Northern troops. The
non-military reader can easily perceive that formations in mass are more
subject to loss from the fire of artillery and from that of small arms
even at considerable distances, and are less able to deliver their own
fire.
Our old regular army consisted of ten regiments of infantry, two of
cavalry, two of dragoons, and one of mounted rifles, of ten companies
each, and four artillery regiments of twelve companies each. Two
companies each of the latter served as light artillery--the companies
alternating in this service. There was also a battalion of engineers.
At the commencement of the war our force of light artillery was very
inadequate, and rifled ordnance had scarcely been introduced. Our
present immense force of the former has been almost entirely created
since the commencement of the war; the splendid achievements in rifled
artillery have been entirely accomplished within the last three years.
Although it had been applied some years previously in Europe, it was not
formally introduced into our service until needed to assist in
suppressing the gigantic rebellion. The Ordnance Department had,
however, given attention to the matter, and boards of officers were
engaged in making experiments. A report had been made that 'the era of
smooth-bore field artillery has passed away, and the period of the
adoption of rifled cannon, for siege and garrison service, is not
remote. The superiority of elongated projectiles, whether solid or
hollow, with the rifle rotation, as regards economy of ammunition,
extent of range, and uniformity and accuracy of effect, over the present
system, is decided and unquestionable.'[A] We shall see, in discussing
artillery, how far these expectations have been realized.
The regular army was increased in 1861 by the addition of nine regiments
of infantry, one of cavalry, and one of artillery. The Mounted Rifles
were changed into the 3d Cavalry, and the two dragoon regiments into the
1st and 2d Cavalry. The old 1st and 2d Cavalry became the 4th and 5th.
All cavalry regiments have now twelve companies, and the new infantry
regiments are formed on the latest French system of three battalions, of
eight companies each, with a colonel, lieutenant-colonel, and three
majors. Each of the 24 companies has 82 privates.
[Footnote A: Scott's _Military Dictionary_.]
The old regular army comprised, when full, about 18,000 officers and
men. As increased, the total complement is over 43,600, including five
major-generals, nine brigadier-generals, thirty-three aides-de-camp,
besides the field officers of the various regiments and the company
officers. In addition to these officers (but included in the aggregate
above given) are the various staff departments, as follows:
_Adjutant-Generals._--1 brigadier-general, 2 colonels, 4
lieutenant-colonels, 13 majors.
_Judge-Advocates._--1 colonel.
_Inspector Generals._--14 colonels, 5 majors.
_Signal Corps._--1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 2 majors.
_Quartermaster's Department._--1 brigadier-general, 3 colonels, 4
lieutenant-colonels, 11 majors, 48 captains, 12 military
storekeepers.
_Subsistence Department._--1 brigadier-general, 2 colonels, 2
lieutenant-colonels, 8 majors, 16 captains.
_Medical Department._--1 brigadier-general, 2 colonels, 16
lieutenant-colonels, 50 majors, 5 captains, 109 first lieutenants,
6 storekeepers, 119 hospital chaplains, 70 medical cadets.
_Pay Department._--1 colonel, 2 lieutenant-colonels, 25 majors.
_Corps of Engineers._--1 brigadier-general, 4 colonels, 10
lieutenant-colonels, 20 majors, 30 captains, 30 first lieutenants,
10 second lieutenants. The battalion of engineers comprises a total
of 805.
_Ordnance Department._--1 brigadier-general, 2 colonels, 3
lieutenant-colonels, 6 majors, 20 captains, 20 first lieutenants,
12 second lieutenants, 15 storekeepers, and a battalion of 905 men.
These figures all pertain to the _regular army_. A considerable number
of the officers in the regiments have been appointed from civil life;
but in the staff departments the officers are almost exclusively
graduates from the Military Academy at West Point.
The raising of the immense volunteer force necessitated a great increase
in the staff departments, and large numbers of persons from civil life
have been appointed into the volunteer staff in the Adjutant-General's,
Judge-Advocate's, Quartermaster's, Commissary, Medical, and Pay
Departments. The ordnance duties are performed by officers detailed from
the line, and engineer duties by regiments assigned for that purpose. A
large number of additional aides-de-camp were also authorized, forming
that branch of duty into a department. Aides-de-camp are also detailed
from the line. The highest rank yet created for volunteer staff officers
is that of colonel in the aides-de-camp. The heads of staff departments
at corps headquarters are lieutenant-colonels, including an assistant
adjutant-general, assistant inspector-general, a chief quartermaster,
and chief commissary. Many regular officers hold these volunteer staff
appointments, gaining in this manner additional rank during the
war--still retaining their positions in the regular service; in the same
manner as many regular officers are field officers in volunteer
regiments.
The aggregate _militia_ force of the United States (including seceded
portions), according to the last returns, was 3,214,769. The reports of
the last census increase this to about 5,600,000, which exceeds to some
extent the number actually _fit_ to bear arms. The computed proportion
in Europe of the number of men who can be called into the field is about
one-fifth or one-sixth of the population. If the population of the
entire United States be assumed to be 23,000,000, the number of men
liable, according to this computation, would be about 4,000,000, which
is sufficiently approximate. The European computation of the force to be
kept as a _standing army_ is a hundredth part of the population--varied
somewhat by circumstances. This would give the United States a force of
230,000. It will be seen how greatly inferior our regular force has
been and still is to the computations adopted in Europe. But the United
States will probably never require such a large force to be permanently
organized; for we have not, like the European powers, frontiers to
protect against nations with whom we may at any time be at war, nor
oppressed nationalities to retain in subjugation by force. Our frontiers
on Canada and Mexico have good natural defences--the first by the St.
Lawrence river and lakes, and the second by the great distance to be
traversed by an invading army before it could reach any important
commercial position. Our vulnerability is in our extensive seacoast. The
principal requirement for an army is a large framework, which can be
rapidly filled by volunteers in expectation of war. With such a military
constitution and a system of military education and drill in the
different States, large and effective armies could be rapidly organized.
Our staff corps and regular army are insignificant, compared with those
of European nations, in which the average strength of the standing
armies is from 250,000 to 300,000 men on the peace footing, and 400,000
to 600,000 on the war footing, with immense magazines of equipage and
material, numerous military schools, and extensive organizations in all
the departments incident to an army. Our own army has hitherto been
modelled to a great extent on the English system--the most aristocratic
of all in Europe, and consequently the least adapted to a republic. To
this is attributable much of the jealousy hitherto felt in regard to the
army and all pertaining to it. We are now, however, conforming more to
the French system, and from it will probably be adopted any changes that
may be introduced.
The French army, since Napoleon gave it the impress of his genius, has
in many characteristics been well adapted to the peculiarities of
republican institutions. A soldier can rise from the ranks to the
highest command, by the exhibition of valor and ability, more easily, in
fact, than he can in our own army, with which political favoritism has
much to do in promotions and appointments. By a recent policy of our War
Department, however, vacancies have been left in the subordinate
commissioned officers of the regular army, which are to be filled
exclusively from the ranks. Many deserving officers in the army have
been private soldiers.
No system will be effective for providing an adequate military
organization that does not include thorough instruction for officers.
The prevailing feeling in our country, as remarked above, has rather
been to underrate the army, and to look with some jealousy on the West
Point Military Academy and its graduates. The present war has effected a
change in this respect. The country owes too much to the educated
regular officers for the organization and conduct of the volunteer
forces, to be insensible of the merits of the system which produced
them. A capable civilian can undoubtedly become just as good an officer
of any rank as a graduate of West Point; but it must be through a course
of study similar to that there pursued. No natural ability can supply
the want of the scientific training in the military, more than in any
other profession. Military science is only the result of all the
experience of the past, embodied in the most comprehensive and practical
form. Napoleon was a profound student of military history. In his
Memoirs he observes: 'Alexander made 8 campaigns, Hannibal 17 (of which
1 was in Spain, 15 in Italy, and 1 in Africa), Cæsar made 15 (of which 8
were against the Gauls, and 5 against the legions of Pompey), Gustavus
Adolphus 5, Turenne 18, the Prince Eugene of Savoy 18, and Frederic 11
(in Bohemia, Silesia, and upon the Elbe.) The history of these 87
campaigns, made with care, would be a complete treatise on the art of
war. The principles one should follow, in both offensive and defensive
war, flow from them as a source.'
To one familiar with the gradual progress in the organization of our
armies, it is interesting to recur to the time when the first levies of
volunteers were raised. Regiments were hurried into Washington half
accoutred and indifferently armed. Officers and men were for the most
part equally ignorant of the details, a knowledge of which enables a
soldier to take care of himself in all circumstances. Staff officers
knew nothing of the various departments and the methods of obtaining
supplies. The Government had not been able to provide barrack
accommodations for the immense irruption of 'Northern barbarians,' and
the men were stowed like sheep in any unoccupied buildings that could be
obtained. These were generally storehouses, without any cooking
arrangements, so that when provisions were procured, no one knew what to
do with them. Hundreds of men, who previously scarcely knew but that
beef-steaks and potatoes grew already cooked and seasoned, could be seen
every day sitting disconsolately on the curbstones cooking their pork on
ramrods over little fires made with twigs gathered from the trees. Those
who happened to be the lucky possessors of a few spare dimes, straggled
off to restaurants. Washington, in those days, was only a great
country-town, and not the immense city which the war has made it. The
vague and laughable attempts of officers to assume military dignity and
enforce discipline, with the careless insubordination of the men,
furnished many amusing scenes. It was not easy for officer and man, who
had gone to the same school, worked in the same shop, sung in the same
choir, and belonged to the same base-ball club, to assume their new
relations.
Privates would address their officer, 'I say, Bill, have you got any
tobacco?' Officers would reply, 'Do you not know, sir, the proper method
of addressing me?' Private would exclaim, 'Well, I guess now you're
puttin' on airs, a'n't you?' Pompous colonels strutted about in a blaze
of new uniforms, and even line officers then considered themselves of
some consequence; while a brigadier-general was a sort of a demigod--a
man to be revered as something infallible. Now-a-days old veterans care
very little for even the two stars of a major-general, unless they know
that the wearer has some other claims to respect than his shoulder
straps.
As matters gradually became arranged, the troops were provided with
tents, and encamped in the vicinity. Never was guard duty more
vigilantly performed than in those camps around Washington. Every one of
us came to the capital with the expectation of being immediately
despatched to Virginia, and ordered to pitch into a miscellaneous fight
with the rebels. Rebel guerillas and spies were supposed to be lurking
in the surroundings of the capital, and 'taking notes' in all the camps.
Woe betide the unsuspicious stranger who might loiter curiously around
the encampments. With half a dozen bayonets at his breast he was hurried
off in utter amazement to the guard house. At night the sentinels saw
'in every bush' a lurking rebel. Shots were pattering all night in every
direction. Unfortunate straggling cows were frequently reduced to beeves
by the bullets of the wary guardians. The colonel's horse broke loose
one night, and, while browsing around, his long, flowing tail, the
colonel's pride, was reduced to an ignominious 'bob' by a bullet, which
neatly severed it near the root. Many was the trigger pulled at me, many
the bullet sent whizzing at my head, as I returned to camp after an
evening in the city. Fortunately, the person fired at was usually
safe--any one within the circle of a hundred feet diameter was likely to
receive the ball. One evening, about dusk, going into camp, I took a
running jump over a ditch, and this rapid motion so frightened an
honest German sentinel--probably a little muddled with lager--that he
actually forgot to fire, and came at me in a more natural way with his
musket clubbed. I escaped a broken head at the expense of a severely
bruised arm. The rule for challenging, it used to be said, was to 'fire
three times, and then cry 'halt!' instead of the reverse, as prescribed
in the regulations.
When the order--long anticipated--for actually invading Virginia
arrived, then was there excitement. Every man felt the premonition of
battle, and nerved himself for conflict. As we marched down to Long
Bridge, at midnight, perfect silence prevailed. Breaths were suspended,
footfalls were as light as snowflakes, orders were given in hollow
whispers. We placed our feet on the 'sacred soil' with more emotion than
the Normans felt when landing in England, or the Pilgrims at Plymouth.
This was war--the real, genuine thing. But our expectations were not
realized. As the 'grand army' advanced, the scattered rebel pickets
withdrew. The only fatality of the campaign was the death of the gallant
but indiscreet Ellsworth. We had our first experience of lying out doors
in our blankets. How vainglorious we felt over it! Many a poor fellow
complained jocosely of the hardship and exposure, whom since I have seen
perfectly content to obtain a few pine boughs to keep him from being
submerged in an abyss of mud. Many, alas! have gone to a couch where
their sleep will be no more broken by the reveille of drum and fife and
bugle--in the trenches of Yorktown, in the thickets of Williamsburg, in
the morasses of the Chickahominy, on the banks of the Antietam, at the
foot of those fatal heights at Fredericksburg, in the wilderness of
Chancellorsville, on the glorious ridge of Gettysburg. Comrades of the
bivouac and the mess! ye are not forgotten in that sleep upon the fields
where swept the infernal tide of battle, obliterating so much glorious
life, leaving so much desolation! Even amid the roar of cannon, exulting
in their might for destruction, amid the shrieking of the merciless
shells, amid the blaze of the deadly musketry, memories of you occur to
us. We resolve that your lives shall not have been sacrificed in vain.
And in these long, dreary, monotonous days of winter, as the sleet
rattles on our frail canvas covering, and the wind roars in our rude log
chimneys, while the jests go around and the song arises, thoughts of the
battle fields of the past cross our minds--we recall the incidents of
fierce conflicts--we say, there and there fell----, no nobler fellows
ever lived! A blunt and hasty epitaph, but the desultory vicissitudes of
a soldier's life permit no other--we expect no other for ourselves when
our turn to follow you shall come. So we break out into our favorite
chorus:
'Then we'll stand by our glasses steady,
And we'll drink to our ladies' eyes.
Three cheers for the dead already,
And huzza for the next man that dies.
Though your graves are unmarked, save by the simple broad slab from
which storms have already effaced the pencilled legend, or perhaps only
by the murderous fragment of iron, which lies half imbedded on the spot
where you fell and where you lie, yet you live in the memory of your
comrades, you live in the hearts of those who were desolated by your
death, you live in that eternal record of heaven where are written the
names of those who have given their lives to promote the truth and the
freedom which God has guaranteed to humanity in the great charters of
Nature and Revelation. For we are fighting in a holy cause. No crusade
to redeem Eastern shrines from infidels, no struggle for the privilege
of religious freedom, no insurrection for civil independence, has been
more holy than this strife against the great curse and its abettors, who
seek to make a land of freedom a land of bondage to substitute for a
Union of freemen, miserable oligarchies controlled by breeders of
slaves. If we die in this cause, we have lived a full life. An anomalous
state of things had existed between the time of the attack on Sumter and
the 'invasion' of Virginia. Although the war had in reality commenced,
communication was not suspended between Washington and Alexandria. On
the day following the march over the Potomac, we found the plans of
intrenchments marked out by wooden forms on the spots which subsequently
became Fort Corcoran, opposite Georgetown, Fort Runyon, opposite
Washington, and Fort Ellsworth, in front of Alexandria. How this had so
speedily been done by the engineers I did not learn until many months
afterward, when one of the party who planned the works described the
_modus operandi_. They went over to Virginia in a very rustic dress, and
professed to the rebel pickets to be from 'down country,' come up to
take a look at 'them durned Yankees.' So they walked around unmolested,
selected the sites for the intrenchments, formed the plans in their
minds, made some stealthy notes and sketches, and, returning to
Washington, plotted the works on paper, gave directions to the
carpenters about the frames, which were constructed; and, after the army
crossed, these were put in their proper positions, tools were placed
conveniently, and, soon after the crossing was made, the men commenced
to work.
In raising these intrenchments, drilling and organizing, the army passed
about a month--varied only by alarms two or three times a week at night
that the rebels were coming, whereupon the troops turned out and stood
in line till daylight. It was shrewdly suspected that these alarms were
purposely propagated from headquarters to accustom the men to form
themselves quickly at night without panic. In after times, in front of
Richmond, we had such duty to perform, without any factitious reasons.
It was a matter of necessary precaution to stand to our arms nightly for
two or three hours before daybreak.
Until just previous to the disastrous Bull Run campaign, no higher
organization than that of brigades was adopted; but a day or two before
the march commenced, General McDowell organized the brigades into
divisions. These were reorganized by General McClellan as the two and
three years volunteers joined the army. The organization of corps was
made in the spring of 1862, just before the commencement of the
Peninsula campaign, and is now the organization of the army.
The complete organization is now as follows:
_Regiments_, generally of ten companies.
_Brigades_, of four or more regiments.
_Divisions_, generally of three brigades.
_Corps_, generally of three divisions.
The various staffs have gradually been organized, until they now stand
(in the Army of the Potomac) as follows:
At the headquarters of the army:
_A Chief of Staff._
_An Assistant Adjutant-General._
_A Chief Quartermaster._
_A Chief Commissary._
_A Chief of Artillery._
_An Assistant Inspector-General._
_A Medical Director._
_A Judge Advocate-General._
_An Ordnance Officer._
_A Provost Marshal-General._
_A Chief Engineer._
_A Signal Officer._
_Aides-de-Camp._
The rank of these officers, as the staff is now composed, is as follows:
The chief of staff, a major-general; the assistant adjutant-general,
chief of artillery, and provost marshal, brigadier-generals; assistant
inspector-general, a colonel; medical director, chief engineer, judge
advocate-general, majors; the signal officer, chief commissary, and
ordnance officer, captains; the aides, of various ranks, lieutenants,
captains, and majors. Most of these officers do not derive their rank
from their position on the staff, but it has been given them in the
volunteer organization, or pertains to them in the line of the regular
or volunteer army. All the department officers (meaning all except
aides) have a number of assistants, and the general officers have staffs
and aides of their own, to which they are entitled by law. The total
number of officers on duty at the headquarters may amount to fifty or
more, and there is plenty of work for all of them during a campaign.
Besides the regular staff, constituted as above related, there are the
officers of an infantry regiment which furnishes guards and escorts, and
officers of cavalry squadrons detailed to furnish orderlies. The
headquarters of the army is therefore a town of considerable population.
At the headquarters of the different corps the staffs are as follows:
_An Assistant Adjutant-General_--Lieutenant-colonel.
_A Chief Quartermaster_--Lieutenant-colonel.
_A Chief Commissary_--Lieutenant-colonel.
_An Assistant Inspector-General_--Lieutenant-colonel.
[These officers derive their rank from their position, under a law of
Congress.]
_A Medical Director_--being detailed from
the senior surgeons of the regular or
Volunteer army, and ranking as a
major.
_A Commissary of Musters._
_A Provost Marshal._
_A Signal Officer._
[These officers are detailed from the line, and have the ranks which
there belongs to them. The signal corps is, however, now being
organized, with ranks prescribed by law.]
_Aides-de-Camp_--one with the rank of major, and two with the rank of
captain. Besides these, additional aides are sent to the corps from
those created under an act of Congress of 1861--now repealed--and are
detailed from the line.
* * * * *
The quartermaster, commissary, and medical director generally have
assistant officers. There is a squadron of cavalry and usually a company
of infantry at each corps headquarters.
The staffs of divisions and brigades resemble those of the corps, except
that the regular staff officers usually rank only as captains, except in
cases where a major-general commands; he is entitled to an assistant
adjutant-general with the rank of major. Officers detailed from the line
to act on any staff in any capacity, bring with them the rank they hold
in the line. They are not entitled, except the authorized aides and in
some other particular cases, when ordered by the War Department, to
additional allowances; but if they are foot officers, and are properly
detailed for mounted duty, the quartermaster of the staff on which they
serve is obligated to furnish them a horse and equipments. Divisions
usually have an _ordnance officer_, whose duty it is to take charge of
the ammunition of the division, keep the quantity ordered, and supply
the troops in time of battle. By law the chief of artillery at corps
headquarters is the chief ordnance officer for the corps, but this
arrangement has been found impracticable. In the Army of the Potomac the
chief of artillery does not remain at corps headquarters, but is
assigned directly to the command of the artillery, where he also has a
staff, including an ordnance officer, who supplies ammunition and other
articles pertaining to his department, exclusively to the artillery.
The _staff_, it must be recollected, is to an army what the masons,
carpenters, ironworkers, and upholsterers are to a building. As the
latter are the agents for executing the designs of the architect, so the
staff are the medium by which the commander of an army effects his
purposes. Without competent staff officers in all the various grades of
organization constituting an army, the most judicious plans of the
ablest commander will entirely fail. If a campaign is to be made, the
commanding general, having formed his general strategical plan, needs
the advice of his chief of staff as to the condition of his troops, and
his assistance in devising the details. His adjutant-general's office
must contain full records of the numbers of the troops--effective and
non-effective--armed and unarmed--sick and well--present and absent,
with all reports and communications relative to the state of the army.
His quartermaster must have been diligent to provide animals, wagons,
clothing, tents, forage, and other supplies in his department; his
commissary and ordnance officer, the same in relation to subsistence and
munitions--all having made their arrangements to establish depots at the
most accessible points on the proposed route of march. His chief of
artillery must have bestowed proper attention to keeping the hundred
batteries of the army in the most effective condition. His chief
engineer must have informed himself of all the routes and the general
topography of the country to be traversed; he must know at what points
rivers can be best crossed, and where positions for battle can be best
obtained; his pontoon trains and intrenching implements must be complete
and ready for service; his maps prepared for distribution to subordinate
commanders. His inspector must have seen that the orders for discipline
and equipment have been complied with. His medical director must have
procured a supply of hospital stores, and organized the ambulance and
hospital departments. His provost marshal must have made adequate
arrangements to prevent straggling, plundering, and other disorders. His
aides must have informed themselves of the positions of the various
commands, and become acquainted with the principal officers, so as to
take orders through night and storm with unerring accuracy. They must be
cool-headed, daring fellows, alert, and well posted, good riders, and
have good horses under them.
All this work cannot be accomplished in a day, a week, or a month. The
full preparations required to render a campaign successful must have
been the result of long, patient, thoughtful consideration and
organization. It is no time to teach sailors seamanship in a hurricane.
They must know where to find the ropes and what to do with them, with
the spray dashing in their eyes and the black clouds scurrying across
the sky. It is no time for staff officers to begin their duties when a
great army is to be moved. Then it is needed that every harness strap,
every gun-carriage wheel, every knapsack, every soldier's shoe should
have been provided and should be in serviceable order; that the men
should have had their regular fare, and have been kept in the healthiest
condition; that clear and explicit information be ready on all details.
Prepared by the assiduous, intelligent labor of a vigilant and faithful
staff, an army becomes a compact, homogeneous mass--without
individuality, but pervaded by one animating will--cohesive by
discipline, but pliant in all its parts--impetuous with enthusiasm, but
controlled easily in the most minute operations.
These remarks, relative to the requirements for an effective staff,
pertain to all grades of organization. The staff officers at the
headquarters of the army organize general arrangements and supervise the
operations of subordinate officers of their department at the
headquarters of corps; these have more detailed duties, and, in their
turn, supervise the staffs of the divisions; the duties of these again
are still more detailed, and they supervise the staffs of brigades;
these finally are charged with the specific details pertaining to their
commands, supervising the staffs of the regiments, who are in direct
communication with the officers of companies.
Prepared for service by the unremitting labors of the staff officers, it
is seldom that the army cannot move in complete order at six hours'
notice. Think what preparation is required for a family of half a dozen
to get ready to spend a month in the country--how tailors and milliners
and dressmakers are put in requisition--how business arrangements must
be made--how a thousand little vexing details constantly suggest
themselves which need attention. Think of a thousand families--ten
thousand--making these preparations! What a vast hurly burly! What an
ocean of confusion! How many delays and disappointments! During the
fortnight or month which has elapsed while these families have been
getting ready, an army of fifty or a hundred thousand men has marched a
hundred miles, fought a battle, been reëquipped, reclothed, reorganized,
and, perhaps, the order of a nation's history has experienced an entire
change.
Our next paper will describe in detail the operations of the staff
departments.