MY DEAR ——,

I am not surprised to hear that you consider the theory above described

of Christ’s resurrection, “vague, shadowy, and unsatisfying.” But as in

the very same letter you say that you are quite convinced of the

unhistorical nature of the account of the resurrection of Christ’s

material body, I think you ought not to dismiss the subject without

giving more attention than you have given as yet to it. As a student of

history and as a young man bent on attaining such knowledge as can be

attained concerning the certainties or probabilities that have the most

important bearing on the life and conduct of myriads of your

fellow-creatures, you ought at least to ask yourself what better

explanation you have to offer of the marvellous phenomena of the

Christian Church and in particular of St. Paul’s part in spreading

Christianity.

I sympathize with the “sense of bathos,” as you call it, which comes

over you when you hear that the phenomena of the Resurrection of Christ

are to be explained by a study of the growth and development of the

revelation given to mankind through the Imagination. I sympathize with

you; but I sympathize with you as I should with a child who might be

standing by Elijah’s side at the time when the prophet saw his

never-to-be-forgotten vision. That child would feel, no doubt, “a sense

of bathos” because the Lord was not in the fire, nor in the whirlwind,

nor in the earthquake, but in the still small voice. You are in the

childish stage of susceptibility to anything that is noisy and big; you

have not been taught by experience and thought to appreciate the

divineness of things obvious, ordinary, and quiet; above all you have

not yet learned to revere your own nature nor to acknowledge (except

with your lips) that you are made in the image of God. Retaining still a

keen recollection of the pain with which I passed through that stage

myself, I have neither the inclination, nor the right, to despise your

present condition of mind; but I believe, if you will still keep the

question open in your mind, and if you will meditate a little now and

then on the frequency, or I may say the universality, of illusion in the

conveyance of all the highest truth, you will gradually come, as I came,

to perceive that the essence of the resurrection of Christ is that His

Spirit should have really triumphed over death, and not that His body

should have risen from the grave.

No doubt you would be much more impressed if the tangible body of some

dead friend of yours, after being buried in the earth, had appeared to

certain witnesses and touched them, and eaten in their company, than if

a vivid apparition of the friend had appeared to the same witnesses; but

I think you would much more easily believe the latter than the former;

and you might be more impressed by a strong conviction of the latter

than by a doubtful, timid, clinging to the former. I can hardly think

that if you had received several accounts from independent witnesses, of

apparitions of this kind resulting in a marvellous change of character

in all who had seen them, you would at once put them aside simply

because they might be called in some sense natural. The very fact of

their being natural would lead you to consider how strange must have

been the causes that had produced such strange results; how powerful

must have been the personality that had thus forced itself on the mental

retina of the seers of the apparition; and if something important had

followed from such a vision, say, for example, the writing of a great

poem, or the foundation of a noble empire, I cannot think that you would

set down the vision as a negligible trifle.

But you feel, I dare say, that, though you might be impressed by the

stories of such an apparition, you could not feel certain that the

apparition represented any reality; there would be no definite proof

that the witnesses of the apparition were not under the influence of a

delusion. Well, I will admit that there would be no proof of the

ordinary kind, that is to say, no proof such as is conveyed through the

senses about ordinary terrestrial phenomena; but I think you might feel

certain; only it would be that kind of certainty which is largely bred

from Faith and Hope. And this sort of certainty, and no other, appears

to me that which was intended to be produced by the Resurrection of

Christ. His manifestations were unseen and unheard save by the eye and

ear of Faith. If the proof of His resurrection had not depended upon

Faith, then the Roman soldiers would have seen His material body

miraculously issuing from the shattered sepulchre, and the companions of

Saul would have both seen Christ and understood the voice that cried,

“Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me?” If we could ascertain exactly the

historical basis for the account in the Fourth Gospel of Christ’s

manifestation to the doubting Thomas we should probably find—supposing

that we were really justified in treating the account as historical—that

there was in Thomas a strong desire to believe, combined with a strong

sense of the impossibility of attaining adequate proof. As in the life

of Christ, so in the resurrection of Christ, conviction appears never to

have been forced on any entirely unwilling unbeliever.

In order to believe in the resurrection of Christ, it is not enough to

be convinced that the evidence is honest and genuine, and that the

witnesses could not be deceived; that kind of belief savours of the

law-court, and there is nothing spiritual in it; but the man who truly

and spiritually accepts Christ’s resurrection is he who says to himself

as he reviews the life of Christ and the history of the Church: “Being

what He was, and having done the work that He has done, this Jesus of

Nazareth ought not to have succumbed to death. If there is any evidence

to shew that the veil of the invisible has been so far thrown back, be

it for a moment, as to shew me Jesus in the spiritual world still living

and triumphant over death, my conscience opens its arms at once to

embrace that belief.” And there is this advantage in basing your faith

on the spiritual resurrection of Jesus, that you keep the region of

faith distinct from the region of disputable testimony. If you rest your

hopes on the material resurrection, that is a question of doubtful

evidence. Your heart says, “Oh that it might be true!” Your brain says,

“I cannot honestly say that I think it is true.” Hence a constant

conflict between heart and brain, while you are forced again and again

to ask yourself, “Must I be dishonest in order that I may persuade

myself that I am happy? And even if I can honestly believe in the

material resurrection to-day, how do I know that some new evidence—the

discovery of some new Gospel for example—may not overturn my belief

to-morrow?”

But the life and doctrine of Christ, the conversion and letters of St.

Paul, the growth and victories of the Church, and the present power of

Christ’s Spirit are facts that can never be overthrown; and if you say,

“On the basis of these indisputable facts, considered as a part of the

evolution and training of mankind I rest my hope and my faith that Jesus

has conquered death and still lives and works among us and for us”—why

then you rest on a basis that cannot be shaken. And surely such a faith

is more strong, more spiritual, more comforting, yes, and more certain

too, than a “knowledge” which you know in your own heart to be no

knowledge! How long will mankind be content to be ignorant that the HALF

which constitutes truth is worth more than the WHOLE which is made up of

truth and truth’s integumentary illusion! How many there are to whom the

saying of old Hesiod is still unmeaning:

_Alas thou know’st not, silly soul,

How much the half exceeds the whole!_

You cannot obtain, and must not expect to obtain, any demonstrative

proof of the Resurrection of Christ, any more than you can obtain a

demonstrative proof of the existence of a God: yet you can feel as

strong and as sincere a conviction of the former fact as of the latter.

It is curious that St. Paul’s parallel between the Resurrection of

Christ and that of men should be so habitually overlooked. He assumes,

as a matter of course, a similarity, almost an identity, between the

Resurrection of men and the Resurrection of Christ: “If there is no

resurrection of the dead neither hath Christ been raised,” and again:

“Now hath Christ been raised from the dead, the first fruits of them

that are asleep.” This reasoning holds excellently, if the Resurrection

is to be the same for us as it was for our Saviour, a spiritual

Resurrection, and if the Resurrection of Christ visibly revealed the

universal law which shall apply to all who are animated by the Spirit of

God. But if Christ’s Resurrection was of a quite different kind, if it

was a bodily stepping out of the tomb three days after burial, how can

this be called the “first fruits” of the Resurrection of men whose

bodies will all decay and for whom therefore no such stepping out from

the tomb can ever be anticipated? The best, the truest, the most

comforting belief in the end will be found to be that Jesus was “put to

death in the flesh but _quickened_ (not in the flesh but) _in the

spirit_.” And as it was with Him, so we believe it will be with us.

But perhaps you will remind me that one of the Creeds mentions “the

Resurrection of the _body_,” and that St. Paul anticipates the

Resurrection, not of a “spirit,” but of “a spiritual _body_;” and you

may ask me what I infer from this. I for my part infer that St. Paul

desired to guard against the notion that the dead lose their identity

and are merged in God or in some other essence; he wished to convey to

his hearers that they would still retain their individuality, the power

of loving and of being loved; possibly also he wished to suggest a life

of continued activity in the service of God; and in order to express

this he used such language (metaphorical of course) as would

unmistakeably imply that identity would be preserved, and activity would

be possible. But he took care to guard his language against

materialistic misinterpretation by insisting that the body would be

“spiritual” and therefore invisible to the earthly eye and cognizable

only by the spirit. The new body, he says, is “a building from God,” “a

house not made with hands, _eternal_;” and he prefaces this by saying

“the things which are seen are temporal, but the things _which are not

seen_ are _eternal_.” Hereby he clearly implies that the new body will

be “not seen.” Elsewhere he tells us that “the things prepared by God”

for them that love Him (and of course he includes in these the “building

from God, the house not made with hands”) are such as eye “_hath not

seen_ nor ear heard, nor have they entered into the heart of man; but

God hath revealed them unto us _by the Spirit_;” and again, “the things

of God none knoweth _save the Spirit of God_,” which has been imparted

to the faithful.

To speak honestly, I must add that, even if I found St. Paul had

committed himself repeatedly to any theory of a material or

semi-material Resurrection, consonant with the feelings of his times, I

should not have felt bound to place a belief in a materialistic detail

of this kind upon the same high and authoritative level as the belief in

the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, or any other general and

spiritual article of faith. But I find no such materialism in St. Paul.

He appears to me to say consistently, 1st, that Christ’s Resurrection

was a type of (“the first fruits of”) the Resurrection of mankind; 2nd,

that in contrast to the first man Adam, the earthy, who became a living

soul, the last Adam, the heavenly, became a “life-giving spirit;” 3rd,

that, as we have borne the image of the earthy, so we shall also bear

the image of the heavenly; 4th, that the “body” of the faithful after

death will be “spiritual,” just as the Church of God is “a _spiritual_

house,” and the sacrifices of the saints are “_spiritual_ sacrifices.”

There is no more ground for thinking that St. Paul supposed that we

should hereafter have spiritual hands, or be spiritual bipeds, than for

thinking that he supposed the sacrifices of the Church to be spiritual

sheep, or the temple of the Church to be composed of celestial stones.

After our Resurrection, we are still to be conscious of God’s past love,

still to rejoice in His present and never-ending love, still to be

capable of glorifying and serving God, of loving as well as of being

loved—this St. Paul’s theory of the “spiritual body” certainly implies;

and it need not imply more. And what our Resurrection will be, that

Christ’s Resurrection was.

The ordinary fancies about the Resurrection teem with absurdities, and

are redeemed from being ridiculous, only because they all spring from

the natural and reasonable desire that we may hereafter preserve our

identity. But they ought to be suppressed if they create, as I fear they

create, additional difficulties in the way of conceiving, and believing

in, a future life. I do not wish to scoff at the popular views; but it

is important that those who adopt the materialistic theory of the

Resurrection should realize the unnecessary and grotesque

inconsistencies with which they obscure the Christian faith. Popular

Christianity appears generally to accept a sensuous paradise, only

excluding what some may deem the coarser senses, the smell, touch, and

taste. But what is the special merit of the other two senses, hearing

and seeing, that they alone should be allowed places in Paradise? And

this visible, semi-spiritual body upon which the vulgar fancy so

insists—what purpose will it serve? “The purposes of recognition between

friends.” Then it will be like the old material body of the departed—at

what period of his existence? Shall he be represented as a youth of

twenty or a man of forty, or of fifty, or as a child of ten? And how as

to the body of one who was deformed, maimed, or hideously misshapen and

ugly? “It would be a purified likeness, summarizing, as it were, every

period of life, so that it would be recognizable, not indeed by our eyes

but by those of spiritual beings.” That is conceivable: but why all this

trouble to obtain a visible body that shall make recognition difficult,

when recognition can be conceived so much more easily as the result of

mere spiritual communion? Keep by all means the language of the

_Apocalypse_ and of the _Pilgrim’s Progress_ in order to describe in

poetry the condition of the blessed dead; but remember that it is the

language of poetry; and let every such use of words be concluded (as

with a doxology) by the thought, “Thus will it be, only far better,

infinitely better; for God is love; and our future communion with the

love of God will be a height of happiness such as no power of sense can

reveal, and only the spirit-guided soul can faintly apprehend.”

But perhaps you will say “You are ready enough to attack other people’s

notions about the semi-material resurrection; but you are not equally

ready to explain your own notions about a spiritual resurrection. You

cannot even tell us what a spiritual body is, except that it has the

power of loving and being loved.” Precisely so; I am quite ignorant. Yet

in my knowledge of this matter I am superior to a very great number of

other theologians. For they think they know, whereas I know that neither

I nor they know. Let me go a little further in my confession of

ignorance and admit that I do not really possess knowledge about a

number of other matters about which many profess with great glibness to

know everything. I am certain that I exist; but I doubt whether I can

analyse and explain the reasons for my certainty, and I am quite sure I

cannot prove my existence by logic. If I am pressed for a proof, I

should say (as I have stated in a previous letter) that my belief in my

existence was largely due to the Imagination. _Cogito, ergo sum_, “I

think, therefore I am,”—if intended as a serious proof, and if there is

any real meaning in the “_ergo_”—appears to me to be the most babyish of

arguments. I respect the gigantic intellect of the arguer, but not even

a giant can make ropes of sand; and it needs but a little grammar to

dissolve this reasoning to nothing. “I think” means “I am one thinking.”

In some languages, in Hebrew for example, you might have no other way of

expressing the proposition than in this form: “I am one thinking.” What

sort of reasoning then is this! “I _am_ one thinking, therefore I _am_.”

“This _is_ white paper, therefore it _is_!” Surely a ridiculous

offspring to issue from great logical travail! And besides, what

infinite assumptions are presupposed in that monosyllable “I”! How do I

know that “_I_ think,” and that it is not the great world-spirit who

thinks in me, as well as rains outside me? Why ought I not to say “_it_

thinks,” just as I say “_it_ rains”? What do you mean by “I”? Tell us

what “I” is. And how can the desperate logician set about telling us

what “I” is, without assuming that his own “I” is, which is equivalent

to assuming “I _am_”? Surely this is altogether a hopeless muddle, and

we ought to give up reasoning about “I” and “am;” yes, and I would add

not only about “I” and “am,” but also about a number of other

fundamental conceptions, which are far more profitably assumed as

axioms. For my part, whenever I use the words “mind,” “matter,”

“substance,” “spirit,” “soul,” “intellect,” and the like, and make any

serious statement about them, I hardly ever do so without a mental

reservation, saying to myself—“but of course there may be no such things

precisely as these, but some other things quite different, producing the

results which we ascribe to these; so that all these statements may be

only proportionately true.”

I do not object to the use of the materialistic language where it is

recognized as metaphor by those who use and those who hear it; but the

mischief is that it is often not so recognized. Once make yourself the

slave of the popular language about “spirit,” and “substance,” and what

not—and you are in danger of being manacled intellectually as well as

theologically. The popular belief is that a man’s spirit is inside him,

like his qualities; the latter like peas in a box, the former like gas

in a bladder. Drive a hole through a man’s left side or the middle of

his head, and—out goes the spirit; that is the common materialistic

creed. Now I have a strong desire to declare that this creed is

ridiculously false. But I will be consistent and simply say that I know

nothing whatever about it. My spirit may possibly be inside me; but it

may possibly be outside me; say at a point six feet, or six miles, above

me; or away in Jupiter, or Saturn, or down at the earth’s centre; or it

may be incapable of occupying space. What does it matter to you or to

me, theologically or intellectually, whether that part of us which we

call our “spirit” has its local habitation inside us, or outside, or in

no locality at all? Is it not enough to recognize that we have powers of

acting, loving, trusting, and believing, and to feel certain that God

intends these powers to be developed and never to perish? Yet I remember

that a friend of mine was shocked, and almost appalled, when I avowed

ignorance as to the locality of my spirit. He seemed to think I might as

well have no spirit at all, if it could not prove its respectability by

giving its name and address!

For my part I am now quite certain of Christ’s spiritual Resurrection,

and in that conviction I am far happier and far more trustful than when

I at first mechanically accepted upon authority and evidence the belief

in the Resurrection of Christ’s body, and subsequently strove to retain

that belief, against the testimony of my intelligence and my conscience.

I think you also will find, as years go on, when it becomes your lot to

stand by the grave into which friend after friend is lowered, that a

heartfelt conviction of the spiritual Resurrection of Christ affords

more comfort to you at such moments than your old belief—based largely

upon historical evidence, and brain-felt rather than heart-felt—in His

physical Resurrection. For the former unites us with Christ, the latter

separates us from Christ. We none of us expect that the material and

tangible bodies of our friends will rise from the dead in the flesh

without “seeing corruption;” but we do trust that they shall rise as

“spiritual bodies” over whom death shall have no power. This trust is

confirmed by the belief that Christ rose as we trust they shall

hereafter rise. If, therefore, Christ rose a material body from the

grave—that stirs no hope in us. But if, while His body remained in the

grave, His spirit rose triumphant to the throne of God, then we see a

hope indeed that may suit our case and give us some gleam of

consolation. The bodies of the dead may lie there and decay; but what of

that? Even so was it with the Saviour: but the spiritual body is

independent of the flesh and shall rise superior to death.

Do not imagine that the spiritual body is one whit less real than the

material body; only, as the material body belongs to the time-world, so

the spiritual body belongs to the eternal world. Each is suited to its

own environment, but each of them is a real body. As to the relation

between the material and the spiritual body we know nothing, and we need

know nothing.

When will men learn to be less greedy of shams and bubbles of pretended

material knowledge, and more earnest and patient in their sober

aspirations after spiritual truth? When will they realize that an

unhesitating faith in a few elementary principles is better than a

tremulous quasi-knowledge of a whole globe of dogmas?

XXIV

WHAT IS A SPIRIT?

The Kernel and the Husk: Letters on Spiritual Christianity · 第 60 / 72 题