I bend with awful reverence when I enquire on what my fear is built.—I

fear that sublime power, whose motive for creating me must have been

wise and good; and I submit to the moral laws which my reason deduces

from this view of my dependence on him.—It is not his power that I

fear—it is not to an arbitrary will, but to unerring _reason_ I

submit.—Submit—yes; I disregard the charge of arrogance, to the law that

regulates his just resolves; and the happiness I pant after must be the

same in kind, and produced by the same exertions as his—though unfeigned

humility overwhelms every idea that would presume to compare the

goodness which the most exalted created being could acquire, with the

grand source of life and bliss.

This fear of God makes me reverence myself.—Yes, Sir, the regard I have

for honest fame, and the friendship of the virtuous, falls far short of

the respect which I have for myself. And this, enlightened self-love, if

an epithet the meaning of which has been grossly perverted will convey

my idea, forces me to see; and, if I may venture to borrow a prostituted

term, to _feel_, that happiness is reflected, and that, in communicating

good, my soul receives its noble aliment.—I do not trouble myself,

therefore, to enquire whether this is the fear the _people_ of England

feel:—and, if it be _natural_ to include all the modifications which you

have annexed—it is not[13].

Besides, I cannot help suspecting that, if you had the _enlightened_

respect for yourself, which you affect to despise, you would not have

said that the constitution of our church and state, formed, like most

other modern ones, by degrees, as Europe was emerging out of barbarism,

was formed ‘under the auspices, and was confirmed by the sanctions, of

religion and piety.’ You have turned over the historic page; have been

hackneyed in the ways of men, and must know that private cabals and

public feuds, private virtues and vices, religion and superstition, have

all concurred to foment the mass and swell it to its present form; nay

more, that it in part owes its sightly appearance to bold rebellion and

insidious innovation. Factions, Sir, have been the leaven, and private

interest has produced public good.

These general reflections are not thrown out to insinuate that virtue

was a creature of yesterday: No; she had her share in the grand drama. I

guard against misrepresentation; but the man who cannot modify general

assertions, has scarcely learned the first rudiments of reasoning. I

know that there is a great portion of virtue in the Romish church, yet I

should not choose to neglect clothing myself with a garment of my own

righteousness, depending on a kind donative of works of supererogation.

I know that there are many clergymen, of all denominations, wise and

virtuous; yet I have not that respect for the whole body, which, you

say, characterizes our nation, ‘emanating from a certain plainness and

directness of understanding.’—Now we are stumbling on _inbred_ feelings

and secret lights again—or, I beg your pardon, it may be the furbished

up face which you choose to give to the argument.

It is a well-known fact, that when _we_, the people of England, have a

son whom we scarcely know what to do with—_we_ make a clergyman of him.

When a living is in the gift of a family, a son is brought up to the

church; but not always with hopes full of immortality. ‘Such sublime

principles are _not constantly_ infused into persons of exalted birth;’

they sometimes think of ‘the paltry pelf of the moment[14]’—and the

vulgar care of preaching the gospel, or practising self-denial, is left

to the poor curates, who, arguing on your ground, cannot have, from the

scanty stipend they receive, ‘very high and worthy notions of their

function and destination.’ This consecration _for ever_; a word, that

from lips of flesh is big with a mighty nothing, has not purged the

_sacred temple_ from all the impurities of fraud, violence, injustice,

and tyranny. Human passions still lurk in her _sanctum sanctorum_; and,

without the profane exertions of reason, vain would be her ceremonial

ablutions; morality would still stand aloof from this national religion,

this ideal consecration of a state; and men would rather choose to give

the goods of their body, when on their death beds, to clear the narrow

way to heaven, than restrain the mad career of passions during life.

Such a curious paragraph occurs in this part of your letter, that I am

tempted to transcribe it[15], and must beg you to elucidate it, if I

misconceive your meaning.

The only way in which the people interfere in government, religious or

civil, is in electing representatives. And, Sir, let me ask you, with

manly plainness—are these _holy_ nominations? Where is the booth of

religion? Does she mix her awful mandates, or lift her persuasive voice,

in those scenes of drunken riot and beastly gluttony? Does she preside

over those nocturnal abominations which so evidently tend to deprave the

manners of the lower class of people? The pestilence stops not here—the

rich and poor have one common nature, and many of the great families,

which, on this side adoration, you venerate, date their misery, I speak

of stubborn matters of fact, from the thoughtless extravagance of an

electioneering frolic.—Yet, after the effervescence of spirits, raised

by opposition, and all the little and tyrannic arts of canvassing are

over—quiet souls! they only intend to march rank and file to say YES—or

NO.

Experience, I believe, will shew that sordid interest, or licentious

thoughtlessness, is the spring of action at most elections.—Again, I beg

you not to lose sight of my modification of general rules. So far are

the people from being habitually convinced of the sanctity of the charge

they are conferring, that the venality of their votes must admonish them

that they have no right to expect disinterested conduct. But to return

to the church, and the habitual conviction of the people of England.

So far are the people from being ‘habitually convinced that no evil can

be acceptable, either in the act or the permission, to him whose essence

is good[16];’ that the sermons which they hear are to them almost as

unintelligible as if they were preached in a foreign tongue. The

language and sentiments rising above their capacities, very orthodox

Christians are driven to fanatical meetings for amusement, if not for

edification. The clergy, I speak of the body, not forgetting the respect

and affection which I have for individuals, perform the duty of their

profession as a kind of fee-simple, to entitle them to the emoluments

accruing from it; and their ignorant flock think that merely going to

church is meritorious.

So defective, in fact, are our laws, respecting religious

establishments, that I have heard many rational pious clergymen

complain, that they had no method of receiving their stipend that did

not clog their endeavours to be useful; whilst the lives of many less

conscientious rectors are passed in litigious disputes with the people

they engaged to instruct; or in distant cities, in all the ease of

luxurious idleness.

But you return to your old firm ground.—_Art thou there, True-penny?_

Must we swear to secure property, and make assurance doubly sure, to

give your perturbed spirit rest? Peace, peace to the manes of thy

patriotic phrensy, which contributed to deprive some of thy

fellow-citizens of their property in America: another spirit now walks

abroad to secure the property of the church.—The tithes are safe!—We

will not say for ever—because the time may come, when the traveller may

ask where proud London stood? when its _temples_, its laws, and its

trade, may be buried in one common ruin, and only serve as a by-word to

point a moral, or furnish senators, who wage a wordy war, on the other

side of the Atlantic, with tropes to swell their thundering bursts of

eloquence.

Who shall dare to accuse you of inconsistency any more, when you have so

staunchly supported the despotic principles which agree so perfectly

with the unerring interest of a large body of your fellow-citizens; not

the largest—for when you venerate parliaments—I presume it is not the

majority, as you have had the presumption to dissent, and loudly explain

your reasons.—But it was not my intention, when I began this letter, to

descend to the minutiæ of your conduct, or to weigh your infirmities in

a balance; it is only some of your pernicious opinions that I wish to

hunt out of their lurking holes; and to shew you to yourself, stripped

of the gorgeous drapery in which you have enwrapped your tyrannic

principles.

That the people of England respect the national establishment I do not

deny; I recollect the melancholy proof which they gave, in this very

century, of their _enlightened_ zeal and reasonable affection. I

likewise know that, according to the dictates of a _prudent_ law, in a

commercial state, truth is reckoned a libel; yet I acknowledge, having

never made my humanity give place to Gothic gallantry, that I should

have been better pleased to have heard that Lord George Gordon was

confined on account of the calamities which he brought on his country,

than for a _libel_ on the queen of France.

But one argument which you adduce to strengthen your assertion, appears

to carry the preponderancy towards the other side.

You observe that ‘our education is so formed as to confirm and fix this

impression, (respect for the religious establishment); and that our

education is in a manner wholly in the hands of ecclesiastics, and in

all stages from infancy to manhood[17].’ Far from agreeing with you,

Sir, that these regulations render the clergy a more useful and

respectable body, experience convinces me that the very contrary is the

fact. In schools and colleges they may, in some degree, support their

dignity within the monastic walls; but, in paying due respect to the

parents of the young nobility under their tutorage, they do not forget,

obsequiously, to respect their noble patrons. The little respect paid,

in great houses, to tutors and chaplains proves, Sir, the fallacy of

your reasoning. It would be almost invidious to remark, that they

sometimes are only modern substitutes for the jesters of Gothic memory,

and serve as whetstones for the blunt wit of the noble peer who

patronizes them; and what respect a boy can imbibe for a _butt_, at

which the shaft of ridicule is daily glanced, I leave those to determine

who can distinguish depravity of morals under the specious mask of

refined manners.

Besides, the custom of sending clergymen to travel with their noble

pupils, as humble companions, instead of exalting, tends inevitably to

degrade the clerical character: it is notorious that they meanly submit

to the most servile dependence, and gloss over the most capricious

follies, to use a soft phrase, of the boys to whom they look up for

preferment. An airy mitre dances before them, and they wrap their

sheep’s clothing more closely about them, and make their spirits bend

till it is prudent to claim the rights of men and the honest freedom of

speech of an Englishman. How, indeed, could they venture to reprove for

his vices their patron: the clergy only give the true feudal emphasis to

this word. It has been observed, by men who have not superficially

investigated the human heart, that when a man makes his spirit bend to

any power but reason, his character is soon degraded, and his mind

shackled by the very prejudices to which he submits with reluctance. The

observations of experience have been carried still further; and the

servility to superiors, and tyranny to inferiors, said to characterize

our clergy, have rationally been supposed to arise naturally from their

associating with the nobility. Among unequals there can be no

society;—giving a manly meaning to the term; from such intimacies

friendship can never grow; if the basis of friendship is mutual respect,

and not a commercial treaty. Taken thus out of their sphere, and

enjoying their tithes at a distance from their flocks, is it not natural

for them to become courtly parasites, and intriguing dependents on great

patrons, or the treasury? Observing all this—for these things have not

been transacted in the dark—our young men of fashion, by a common,

though erroneous, association of ideas, have conceived a contempt for

religion, as they sucked in with their milk a contempt for the clergy.

The people of England, Sir, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,

I will not go any further back to insult the ashes of departed popery,

did not settle the establishment, and endow it with princely revenues,

to make it proudly rear its head, as a part of the constitutional body,

to guard the liberties of the community; but, like some of the laborious

commentators on Shakespeare, you have affixed a meaning to laws that

chance, or, to speak more philosophically, the interested views of men,

settled, not dreaming of your ingenious elucidations.

What, but the rapacity of the only men who exercised their reason, the

priests, secured such vast property to the church, when a man gave his

perishable substance to save himself from the dark torments of

purgatory; and found it more convenient to indulge his depraved

appetites, and pay an exorbitant price for absolution, than listen to

the suggestions of reason, and work out his own salvation: in a word,

was not the separation of religion from morality the work of the

priests, and partly achieved in those _honourable_ days which you so

piously deplore?

That civilization, that the cultivation of the understanding, and

refinement of the affections, naturally make a man religious, I am proud

to acknowledge.—What else can fill the aching void in the heart, that

human pleasures, human friendships can never fill? What else can render

us resigned to live, though condemned to ignorance?—What but a profound

reverence for the model of all perfection, and the mysterious tie which

arises from a love of goodness? What can make us reverence ourselves,

but a reverence for that Being, of whom we are a faint image? That

mighty Spirit moves on the waters—confusion hears his voice, and the

troubled heart ceases to beat with anguish, for trust in Him bade it be

still. Conscious dignity may make us rise superior to calumny, and

sternly brave the winds of adverse fortune,—raised in our own esteem by

the very storms of which we are the sport—but when friends are unkind,

and the heart has not the prop on which it fondly leaned, where can a

tender suffering being fly but to the Searcher of hearts? and, when

death has desolated the present scene, and torn from us the friend of

our youth—when we walk along the accustomed path, and, almost fancying

nature dead, ask, Where art thou who gave life to these well-known

scenes? when memory heightens former pleasures to contrast our present

prospects—there is but one source of comfort within our reach;—and in

this sublime solitude the world appears to contain only the Creator and

the creature, of whose happiness he is the source.—These are human

feelings; but I know not of any common nature or common relation amongst

men but what results from reason. The common affections and passions

equally bind brutes together; and it is only the continuity of those

relations that entitles us to the denomination of rational creatures;

and this continuity arises from reflection—from the operations of that

reason which you contemn with flippant disrespect.

If then it appears, arguing from analogy, that reflection must be the

natural foundation of _rational_ affections, and of that experience

which enables one man to rise above another, a phenomenon that has never

been seen in the brute creation, it may not be stretching the argument

further than it will go to suppose, that those men who are obliged to

exercise their reason have the most reason, and are the persons pointed

out by Nature to direct the society of which they make a part, on any

extraordinary emergency.

Time only will shew whether the general censure, which you afterwards

qualify, if not contradict, and the unmerited contempt that you have

ostentatiously displayed of the National Assembly, be founded on reason,

the offspring of conviction, or the spawn of envy. Time may shew, that

this obscure throng knew more of the human heart and of legislation than

the profligates of rank, emasculated by hereditary effeminacy.

It is not, perhaps, of very great consequence who were the founders of a

state; savages, thieves, curates, or practitioners in the law. It is

true, you might sarcastically remark, that the Romans had always a

_smack_ of the old leaven, and that the private robbers, supposing the

tradition to be true, only became public depredators. You might have

added, that their civilization must have been very partial, and had more

influence on the manners than morals of the people; or the amusements of

the amphitheatre would not have remained an everlasting blot not only on

their humanity, but on their refinement, if a vicious elegance of

behaviour and luxurious mode of life is not a prostitution of the term.

However, the thundering censures which you have cast with a ponderous

arm, and the more playful bushfiring of ridicule, are not arguments that

will ever depreciate the National Assembly, for applying to their

understanding rather than to their imagination, when they met to settle

the newly acquired liberty of the state on a solid foundation.

If you had given the same advice to a young history painter of

abilities, I should have admired your judgment, and re-echoed your

sentiments[18]. Study, you might have said, the noble models of

antiquity, till your imagination is inflamed; and, rising above the

vulgar practice of the hour, you may imitate without copying those great

originals. A glowing picture, of some interesting moment, would probably

have been produced by these natural means; particularly if one little

circumstance is not overlooked, that the painter had noble models to

revert to, calculated to excite admiration and stimulate exertion.

But, in settling a constitution that involved the happiness of millions,

that stretch beyond the computation of science, it was, perhaps,

necessary for the Assembly to have a higher model in view than the

_imagined_ virtues of their forefathers; and wise to deduce their

respect for themselves from the only legitimate source, respect for

justice. Why was it a duty to repair an ancient castle, built in

barbarous ages, of Gothic materials? Why were the legislators obliged to

rake amongst heterogeneous ruins; to rebuild old walls, whose

foundations could scarcely be explored, when a simple structure might be

raised on the foundation of experience, the only valuable inheritance

our forefathers could bequeath? Yet of this bequest we can make little

use till we have gained a stock of our own; and even then, their

inherited experience would rather serve as lighthouses, to warn us

against dangerous rocks or sand-banks, than as finger-posts that stand

at every turning to point out the right road.

Nor was it absolutely necessary that they should be diffident of

themselves when they were dissatisfied with, or could not discern the

_almost obliterated_ constitution of their ancestors[19]. They should

first have been convinced that our constitution was not only the best

modern, but the best possible one; and that our social compact was the

surest foundation of all the _possible_ liberty a mass of men could

enjoy, that the human understanding could form. They should have been

certain that our representation answered all the purposes of

representation; and that an established inequality of rank and property

secured the liberty of the whole community, instead of rendering it a

sounding epithet of subjection, when applied to the nation at large.

They should have had the same respect for our House of Commons that you,

vauntingly, intrude on us, though your conduct throughout life has

spoken a very different language; before they made a point of not

deviating from the model which first engaged their attention.

That the British House of Commons is filled with every thing illustrious

in rank, in descent, in hereditary, and acquired opulence, may be

true,—but that it contains every thing respectable in talents, in

military, civil, naval, and political distinction, is very

problematical. Arguing from natural causes, the very contrary would

appear to the speculatist to be the fact; and let experience say whether

these speculations are built on sure ground.

It is true you lay great stress on the effects produced by the bare idea

of a liberal descent[20]; but from the conduct of men of rank, men of

discernment would rather be led to conclude, that this idea obliterated

instead of inspiring native dignity, and substituted a factitious pride

that disemboweled the man. The liberty of the rich has its ensigns

armorial to puff the individual out with insubstantial honours; but

where are blazoned the struggles of virtuous poverty? Who, indeed, would

dare to blazon what would blur the pompous monumental inscription you

boast of, and make us view with horror, as monsters in human shape, the

superb gallery of portraits proudly set in battle array?

But to examine the subject more closely. Is it among the list of

possibilities that a man of rank and fortune _can_ have received a good

education? How can he discover that he is a man, when all his wants are

instantly supplied, and invention is never sharpened by necessity? Will

he labour, for every thing valuable must be the fruit of laborious

exertions, to attain knowledge and virtue, in order to merit the

affection of his equals, when the flattering attention of sycophants is

a more luscious cordial?

Health can only be secured by temperance; but is it easy to persuade a

man to live on plain food even to recover his health, who has been

accustomed to fare sumptuously every day? Can a man relish the simple

food of friendship, who has been habitually pampered by flattery? And

when the blood boils, and the senses meet allurements on every side,

will knowledge be pursued on account of its abstract beauty? No; it is

well known that talents are only to be unfolded by industry, and that we

must have made some advances, led by an inferior motive, before we

discover that they are their own reward.

But _full blown_ talents _may_, according to your system, be hereditary,

and as independent of ripening judgment, as the inbred feelings that,

rising above reason, naturally guard Englishmen from error. Noble

franchises! what a grovelling mind must that man have, who can pardon

his step-dame Nature for not having made him at least a lord?

And who will, after your description of senatorial virtues, dare to say

that our House of Commons has often resembled a bear-garden; and

appeared rather like a committee of _ways and means_ than a dignified

legislative body, though the concentrated wisdom and virtue of the whole

nation blazed in one superb constellation? That it contains a dead

weight of benumbing opulence I readily allow, and of ignoble ambition;

nor is there any thing surpassing belief in a supposition that the raw

recruits, when properly drilled by the minister, would gladly march to

the Upper House to unite hereditary honours to fortune. But talents,

knowledge, and virtue, must be a part of the man, and cannot be put, as

robes of state often are, on a servant or a block, to render a pageant

more magnificent.

Our House of Commons, it is true, has been celebrated as a school of

eloquence, a hot-bed for wit, even when party intrigues narrow the

understanding and contract the heart; yet, from the few proficients it

has accomplished, this inferior praise is not of great magnitude: nor of

great consequence, Mr. Locke would have added, who was ever of opinion

that eloquence was oftener employed to make ‘the worse appear the better

part,’ than to support the dictates of cool judgment. However, the

greater number who have gained a seat by their fortune and hereditary

rank, are content with their pre-eminence, and struggle not for more

hazardous honours. But you are an exception; you have raised yourself by

the exertion of abilities, and thrown the automatons of rank into the

back ground. Your exertions have been a generous contest for secondary

honours, or a grateful tribute of respect due to the noble ashes that

lent a hand to raise you into notice, by introducing you into the house

of which you have ever been an ornament, if not a support. But,

unfortunately, you have lately lost a great part of your popularity:

members were tired of listening to declamation, or had not sufficient

taste to be amused when you ingeniously wandered from the question, and

said certainly many good things, if they were not to the present

purpose. You were the Cicero of one side of the house for years; and

then to sink into oblivion, to see your blooming honours fade before

you, was enough to rouse all that was human in you—and make you produce

the impassioned _Reflections_ which have been a glorious revivification

of your fame.—Richard is himself again! He is still a great man, though

he has deserted his post, and buried in elogiums, on church

establishments, the enthusiasm that forced him to throw the weight of

his talents on the side of liberty and natural rights, when the

_will_[21] of the nation oppressed the Americans.

There appears to be such a mixture of real sensibility and fondly

cherished romance in your composition, that the present crisis carries

you out of yourself; and since you could not be one of the grand movers,

the next _best_ thing that dazzled your imagination was to be a

conspicuous opposer. Full of yourself, you make as much noise to

convince the world that you despise the revolution, as Rousseau did to

persuade his contemporaries to let him live in obscurity.

Reading your Reflections warily over, it has continually and forcibly

struck me, that had you been a Frenchman, you would have been, in spite

of your respect for rank and antiquity, a violent revolutionist; and

deceived, as you now probably are, by the passions that cloud your

reason, have termed your romantic enthusiasm an enlightened love of your

country, a benevolent respect for the rights of men. Your imagination

would have taken fire, and have found arguments, full as ingenious as

those you now offer, to prove that the constitution, of which so few

pillars remained, that constitution which time had almost obliterated,

was not a model sufficiently noble to deserve close adherence. And, for

the English constitution, you might not have had such a profound

veneration as you have lately acquired; nay, it is not impossible that

you might have entertained the same opinion of the English Parliament,

that you professed to have during the American war.

Another observation which, by frequently occurring, has almost grown

into a conviction, is simply this, that had the English in general

reprobated the French revolution, you would have stood forth alone, and

been the avowed Goliah of liberty. But, not liking to see so many

brothers near the throne of fame, you have turned the current of your

passions, and consequently of your reasoning, another way. Had Dr.

Price’s sermon not lighted some sparks very like envy in your bosom, I

shrewdly suspect that he would have been treated with more candour; nor

is it charitable to suppose that any thing but personal pique and hurt

vanity could have dictated such bitter sarcasms and reiterated

expressions of contempt as occur in your Reflections.

But without fixed principles even goodness of heart is no security from

inconsistency, and mild affectionate sensibility only renders a man more

ingeniously cruel, when the pangs of hurt vanity are mistaken for

virtuous indignation, and the gall of bitterness for the milk of

Christian charity.

Where is the dignity, the infallibility of sensibility, in the fair

ladies, whom, if the voice of rumour is to be credited, the captive

negroes curse in all the agony of bodily pain, for the unheard of

tortures they invent? It is probable that some of them, after the sight

of a flagellation, compose their ruffled spirits and exercise their

tender feelings by the perusal of the last imported novel.—How true

these tears are to nature, I leave you to determine. But these ladies

may have read your Enquiry concerning the origin of our ideas of the

Sublime and Beautiful, and, convinced by your arguments, may have

laboured to be pretty, by counterfeiting weakness.

You may have convinced them that _littleness_ and _weakness_ are the

very essence of beauty; and that the Supreme Being, in giving women

beauty in the most supereminent degree, seemed to command them, by the

powerful voice of Nature, not to cultivate the moral virtues that might

chance to excite respect, and interfere with the pleasing sensations

they were created to inspire. Thus confining truth, fortitude, and

humanity, within the rigid pale of manly morals, they might justly

argue, that to be loved, woman’s high end and great distinction! they

should ‘learn to lisp, to totter in their walk, and nick-name God’s

creatures.’ Never, they might repeat after you, was any man, much less a

woman, rendered amiable by the force of those exalted qualities,

fortitude, justice, wisdom, and truth; and thus forewarned of the

sacrifice they must make to those austere, unnatural virtues, they would

be authorized to turn all their attention to their persons,

systematically neglecting morals to secure beauty.—Some rational old

woman indeed might chance to stumble at this doctrine, and hint, that in

avoiding atheism you had not steered clear of the mussulman’s creed; but

you could readily exculpate yourself by turning the charge on Nature,

who made our idea of beauty independent of reason. Nor would it be

necessary for you to recollect, that if virtue has any other foundation

than worldly utility, you have clearly proved that one half of the human

species, at least, have not souls; and that Nature, by making women

_little_, _smooth_, _delicate_, _fair_ creatures, never designed that

they should exercise their reason to acquire the virtues that produce

opposite, if not contradictory, feelings. The affection they excite, to

be uniform and perfect, should not be tinctured with the respect which

moral virtues inspire, lest pain should be blended with pleasure, and

admiration disturb the soft intimacy of love. This laxity of morals in

the female world is certainly more captivating to a libertine

imagination than the cold arguments of reason, that give no sex to

virtue. If beautiful weakness be interwoven in a woman’s frame, if the

chief business of her life be (as you insinuate) to inspire love, and

Nature has made an eternal distinction between the qualities that

dignify a rational being and this animal perfection, her duty and

happiness in this life must clash with any preparation for a more

exalted state. So that Plato and Milton were grossly mistaken in

asserting that human love led to heavenly, and was only an exaltation of

the same affection; for the love of the Deity, which is mixed with the

most profound reverence, must be love of perfection, and not compassion

for weakness.

To say the truth, I not only tremble for the souls of women, but for the

good natured man, whom every one loves. The _amiable_ weakness of his

mind is a strong argument against its immateriality, and seems to prove

that beauty relaxes the _solids_ of the soul as well as the body.

It follows then immediately, from your own reasoning, that respect and

love are antagonist principles; and that, if we really wish to render

men more virtuous, we must endeavour to banish all enervating

modifications of beauty from civil society. We must, to carry your

argument a little further, return to the Spartan regulations, and settle

the virtues of men on the stern foundation of mortification and

self-denial; for any attempt to civilize the heart, to make it humane by

implanting reasonable principles, is a mere philosophic dream. If

refinement inevitably lessens respect for virtue, by rendering beauty,

the grand tempter, more seductive; if these relaxing feelings are

incompatible with the nervous exertions of morality, the sun of Europe

is not set; it begins to dawn, when cold metaphysicians try to make the

head give laws to the heart.

But should experience prove that there is a beauty in virtue, a charm in

order, which necessarily implies exertion, a depraved sensual taste may

give way to a more manly one—and _melting_ feelings to rational

satisfactions. Both may be equally natural to man; the test is their

moral difference, and that point reason alone can decide.

Such a glorious change can only be produced by liberty. Inequality of

rank must ever impede the growth of virtue, by vitiating the mind that

submits or domineers; that is ever employed to procure nourishment for

the body, or amusement for the mind. And if this grand example be set by

an assembly of unlettered clowns, if they can produce a crisis that may

involve the fate of Europe, and ‘more than Europe[22],’ you must allow

us to respect unsophisticated reason, and reverence the active exertions

that were not relaxed by a fastidious respect for the beauty of rank, or

a dread of the deformity produced by any _void_ in the social structure.

After your contemptuous manner of speaking of the National Assembly,

after descanting on the coarse vulgarity of their proceedings, which,

according to your own definition of virtue, is a proof of its

genuineness; was it not a little inconsistent, not to say absurd, to

assert, that a dozen people of quality were not a sufficient

counterpoise to the vulgar mob with whom they condescended to associate?

Have we half a dozen leaders of eminence in our House of Commons, or

even in the fashionable world? yet the sheep obsequiously pursue their

steps with all the undeviating sagacity of instinct.

In order that liberty should have a firm foundation, an acquaintance

with the world would naturally lead cool men to conclude that it must be

laid, knowing the weakness of the human heart, and the ‘deceitfulness of

riches,’ either by _poor_ men, or philosophers, if a sufficient number

of men, disinterested from principle, or truly wise, could be found. Was

it natural to expect that sensual prejudices should give way to reason,

or present feelings to enlarged views?—No; I am afraid that human nature

is still in such a weak state, that the abolition of titles, the

corner-stone of despotism, could only have been the work of men who had

no titles to sacrifice. The National Assembly, it is true, contains some

honourable exceptions; but the majority had not such powerful feelings

to struggle with, when reason led them to respect the naked dignity of

virtue.

Weak minds are always timid. And what can equal the weakness of mind

produced by servile flattery, and the vapid pleasures that neither hope

nor fear seasoned? Had the constitution of France been new modelled, or

more cautiously repaired, by the lovers of elegance and beauty, it is

natural to suppose that the imagination would have erected a fragile

temporary building; or the power of one tyrant, divided amongst a

hundred, might have rendered the struggle for liberty only a choice of

masters. And the glorious _chance_ that is now given to human nature of

attaining more virtue and happiness than has hitherto blessed our globe,

might have been sacrificed to a meteor of the imagination, a bubble of

passion. The ecclesiastics, indeed, would probably have remained in

quiet possession of their sinecures; and your gall might not have been

mixed with your ink on account of the daring sacrilege that brought them

more on a level. The nobles would have had bowels for their younger

sons, if not for the misery of their fellow-creatures. An august mass of

property would have been transmitted to posterity to guard the temple of

superstition, and prevent reason from entering with her officious light.

And the pomp of religion would have continued to impress the senses, if

she were unable to subjugate the passions.

Is hereditary weakness necessary to render religion lovely? and will her

form have lost the smooth delicacy that inspires love, when stripped of

its Gothic drapery? Must every grand model be placed on the pedestal of

property? and is there no beauteous proportion in virtue, when not

clothed in a sensual garb?

Of these questions there would be no end, though they lead to the same

conclusion;—that your politics and morals, when simplified, would

undermine religion and virtue to set up a spurious, sensual beauty, that

has long debauched your imagination, under the specious form of natural

feelings.

And what is this mighty revolution in property? The present incumbents

only are injured, or the hierarchy of the clergy, an ideal part of the

constitution, which you have personified, to render your affection more

tender. How has posterity been injured by a distribution of the property

snatched, perhaps, from innocent hands, but accumulated by the most

abominable violation of every sentiment of justice and piety? Was the

monument of former ignorance and iniquity to be held sacred, to enable

the present possessors of enormous benefices to _dissolve_ in indolent

pleasures? Was not their convenience, for they have not been turned

adrift on the world, to give place to a just partition of the land

belonging to the state? And did not the respect due to the natural

equality of man require this triumph over Monkish rapacity? Were those

monsters to be reverenced on account of their antiquity, and their

unjust claims perpetuated to their ideal children, the clergy, merely to

preserve the sacred majesty of Property inviolate, and to enable the

Church to retain her pristine splendor? Can posterity be injured by

individuals losing the chance of obtaining great wealth, without

meriting it, by its being diverted from a narrow channel, and

disembogued into the sea that affords clouds to water all the land?

Besides, the clergy not brought up with the expectation of great

revenues will not feel the loss; and if bishops should happen to be

chosen on account of their personal merit, religion may be benefited by

the vulgar nomination.

The sophistry of asserting that Nature leads us to reverence our civil

institutions from the same principle that we venerate aged individuals,

is a palpable fallacy ‘that is so like truth, it will serve the turn as

well.’ And when you add, ‘that we have chosen our nature rather than our

speculations, our breasts rather than our inventions[23]’, the pretty

jargon seems equally unintelligible.

But it was the downfall of the visible power and dignity of the church

that roused your ire; you could have excused a little squeezing of the

individuals to supply present exigencies; the actual possessors of the

property might have been oppressed with something like impunity, if the

church had not been spoiled of its gaudy trappings. You love the church,

your country, and its laws, you repeatedly tell us, because they deserve

to be loved; but from you this is not a panegyric: weakness and

indulgence are the only incitements to love and confidence that you can

discern, and it cannot be denied that the tender mother you venerate

deserves, on this score, all your affection.

It would be as vain a task to attempt to obviate all your passionate

objections, as to unravel all your plausible arguments, often

illustrated by known truths, and rendered forcible by pointed

invectives. I only attack the foundation. On the natural principles of

justice I build my plea for disseminating the property artfully said to

be appropriated to religious purposes, but, in reality, to support idle

tyrants, amongst the society whose ancestors were cheated or forced into

illegal grants. Can there be an opinion more subversive of morality,

than that time sanctifies crimes, and silences the blood that calls out

for retribution, if not for vengeance? If the revenue annexed to the

Gallic church was greater than the most bigoted protestant would now

allow to be its reasonable share, would it not have been trampling on

the rights of men to perpetuate such an arbitrary appropriation of the

common stock, because time had rendered the fraudulent seizure

venerable? Besides, if Reason had suggested, as surely she must, if the

imagination had not been allowed to dwell on the fascinating pomp of

ceremonial grandeur, that the clergy would be rendered both more

virtuous and useful by being put more on a par with each other, and the

mass of the people it was their duty to instruct;—where was there room

for hesitation? The charge of presumption, thrown by you on the most

reasonable innovations, may, without any violence to truth, be retorted

on every reformation that has meliorated our condition, and even on the

improvable faculty that gives us a claim to the pre-eminence of

intelligent beings.

Plausibility, I know, can only be unmasked by shewing the absurdities it

glosses over, and the simple truths it involves with specious errors.

Eloquence has often confounded triumphant villainy; but it is probable

that it has more frequently rendered the boundary that separates virtue

and vice doubtful.—Poisons may be only medicines in judicious hands; but

they should not be administered by the ignorant, because they have

sometimes seen great cures performed by their powerful aid.

The many sensible remarks and pointed observations which you have mixed

with opinions that strike at our dearest interests, fortify those

opinions, and give them a degree of strength that render them formidable

to the wise, and convincing to the superficial. It is impossible to read

half a dozen pages of your book without admiring your ingenuity, or

indignantly spurning your sophisms. Words are heaped on words, till the

understanding is confused by endeavouring to disentangle the sense, and

the memory by tracing contradictions. After observing a host of these

contradictions, it can scarcely be a breach of charity to think that you

have often sacrificed your sincerity to enforce your favourite

arguments, and called in your judgment to adjust the arrangement of

words that could not convey its dictates.

A fallacy of this kind, I think, could not have escaped you when you

were treating the subject that called forth your bitterest

animadversions, the confiscation of the ecclesiastical revenue. Who of

the vindicators of the rights of men ever ventured to assert, that the

clergy of the present day should be punished on account of the

intolerable pride and inhuman cruelty of many of their predecessors[24]?

No; such a thought never entered the mind of those who warred with

inveterate prejudices. A desperate disease required a powerful remedy.

Injustice had no right to rest on prescription; nor has the character of

the present clergy any weight in the argument.

You find it very difficult to separate policy from justice: in the

political world they have frequently been separated with shameful

dexterity. To mention a recent instance. According to the limited views

of timid, or interested politicians, an abolition of the infernal slave

trade would not only be unsound policy, but a flagrant infringement of

the laws (which are allowed to have been infamous) that induced the

planters to purchase their estates. But is it not consonant with

justice, with the common principles of humanity, not to mention

Christianity, to abolish this abominable mischief? [25]There is not one

argument, one invective, levelled by you at the confiscators of the

church revenue, which could not, with the strictest propriety, be

applied by the planters and negro-drivers to our Parliament, if it

gloriously dared to shew the world that British senators were men: if

the natural feelings of humanity silenced the cold cautions of timidity,

till this stigma on our nature was wiped off, and all men were allowed

to enjoy their birth-right—liberty, till by their crimes they had

authorized society to deprive them of the blessing they had abused.

The same arguments might be used in India, if any attempt were made to

bring back things to nature, to prove that a man ought never to quit the

cast that confined him to the profession of his lineal forefathers. The

Bramins would doubtless find many ingenious reasons to justify this

debasing, though venerable prejudice; and would not, it is to be

supposed, forget to observe that time, by interweaving the oppressive

law with many useful customs, had rendered it for the present very

convenient, and consequently legal. Almost every vice that has degraded

our nature might be justified by shewing that it had been productive of

_some_ benefit to society: for it would be as difficult to point out

positive evil as unallayed good, in this imperfect state. What indeed

would become of morals, if they had no other test than prescription? The

manners of men may change without end; but, wherever reason receives the

least cultivation—wherever men rise above brutes, morality must rest on

the same base. And the more man discovers of the nature of his mind and

body, the more clearly he is convinced, that to act according to the

dictates of reason is to conform to the law of God.

The test of honour may be arbitrary and fallacious, and, retiring into

subterfuge, elude close enquiry; but true morality shuns not the day,

nor shrinks from the ordeal of investigation. Most of the happy

revolutions that have taken place in the world have happened when weak

princes held the reins they could not manage; but are they, on that

account, to be canonized as saints or demi-gods, and pushed forward to

notice on the throne of ignorance? Pleasure wants a zest, if experience

cannot compare it with pain; but who courts pain to heighten his

pleasures? A transient view of society will further illustrate arguments

which appear so obvious that I am almost ashamed to produce

illustrations. How many children have been taught œconomy, and many

other virtues, by the extravagant thoughtlessness of their parents; yet

a good education is allowed to be an inestimable blessing. The tenderest

mothers are often the most unhappy wives; but can the good that accrues

from the private distress that produces a sober dignity of mind justify

the inflictor? Right or wrong may be estimated according to the point of

sight, and other adventitious circumstances; but, to discover its real

nature, the enquiry must go deeper than the surface, and beyond the

local consequences that confound good and evil together. The rich and

weak, a numerous train, will certainly applaud your system, and loudly

celebrate your pious reverence for authority and establishments—they

find it pleasanter to enjoy than to think; to justify oppression than

correct abuses.—_The rights of men_ are grating sounds that set their

teeth on edge; the impertinent enquiry of philosophic meddling

innovation. If the poor are in distress, they will make some

_benevolent_ exertions to assist them; they will confer obligations, but

not do justice. Benevolence is a very amiable specious quality; yet the

aversion which men feel to accept a right as a favour, should rather be

extolled as a vestige of native dignity, than stigmatized as the odious

offspring of ingratitude. The poor consider the rich as their lawful

prey; but we ought not too severely to animadvert on their ingratitude.

When they receive an alms they are commonly grateful at the moment; but

old habits quickly return, and cunning has ever been a substitute for

force.

That both physical and moral evil were not only foreseen, but entered

into the scheme of Providence, when this world was contemplated in the

Divine mind, who can doubt, without robbing Omnipotence of a most

exalted attribute? But the business of the life of a good man should be,

to separate light from darkness; to diffuse happiness, whilst he submits

to unavoidable misery. And a conviction that there is much unavoidable

wretchedness, appointed by the grand Disposer of all events, should not

slacken his exertions: the extent of what is possible can only be

discerned by God. The justice of God may be vindicated by a belief in a

future state; but, only by believing that evil is educing good for the

individual, and not for an imaginary whole. The happiness of the whole

must arise from the happiness of the constituent parts, or the essence

of justice is sacrificed to a supposed grand arrangement. And that may

be good for the whole of a creature’s existence, that disturbs the

comfort of a small portion. The evil which an individual suffers for the

good of the community is partial, it must be allowed, if the account is

settled by death.—But the partial evil which it suffers, during one

stage of existence, to render another stage more perfect, is strictly

just. The Father of all only can regulate the education of his children.

To suppose that, during the whole or part of its existence, the

happiness of any individual is sacrificed to promote the welfare of ten,

or ten thousand, other beings—is impious. But to suppose that the

happiness, or animal enjoyment, of one portion of existence is

sacrificed to improve and ennoble the being itself, and render it

capable of more perfect happiness, is not to reflect on either the

goodness or wisdom of God.

It may be confidently asserted that no man chooses evil, because it is

evil; he only mistakes it for happiness, the good he seeks. And the

desire of rectifying these mistakes, is the noble ambition of an

enlightened understanding, the impulse of feelings that Philosophy

invigorates. To endeavour to make unhappy men resigned to their fate, is

the tender endeavour of short-sighted benevolence, of transient

yearnings of humanity; but to labour to increase human happiness by

extirpating error, is a masculine godlike affection. This remark may be

carried still further. Men who possess uncommon sensibility, whose quick

emotions shew how closely the eye and heart are connected, soon forget

the most forcible sensations. Not tarrying long enough in the brain to

be subject to reflection, the next sensations, of course, obliterate

them. Memory, however, treasures up these proofs of native goodness; and

the being who is not spurred on to any virtuous act, still thinks itself

of consequence, and boasts of its feelings. Why? Because the sight of

distress, or an affecting narrative, made its blood flow with more

velocity, and the heart, literally speaking, beat with sympathetic

emotion. We ought to beware of confounding mechanical instinctive

sensations with emotions that reason deepens, and justly terms the

feelings of _humanity_. This word discriminates the active exertions of

virtue from the vague declamation of sensibility.

The declaration of the National Assembly, when they recognized the

rights of men, was calculated to touch the humane heart—the downfall of

the clergy, to agitate the pupil of impulse. On the watch to find fault,

faults met your prying eye; a different prepossession might have

produced a different conviction.

When we read a book that supports our favourite opinions, how eagerly do

we suck in the doctrines, and suffer our minds placidly to reflect the

images that illustrate the tenets we have previously embraced. We

indolently acquiesce in the conclusion, and our spirit animates and

corrects the various subjects. But when, on the contrary, we peruse a

skilful writer, with whom we do not coincide in opinion, how attentive

is the mind to detect fallacy. And this suspicious coolness often

prevents our being carried away by a stream of natural eloquence, which

the prejudiced mind terms declamation—a pomp of words! We never allow

ourselves to be warmed; and, after contending with the writer, are more

confirmed in our opinion; as much, perhaps, from a spirit of

contradiction as from reason. A lively imagination is ever in danger of

being betrayed into error by favourite opinions, which it almost

personifies, the more effectually to intoxicate the understanding.

Always tending to extremes, truth is left behind in the heat of the

chace, and things are viewed as positively good, or bad, though they

wear an equivocal face.

Some celebrated writers have supposed that wit and judgment were

incompatible; opposite qualities, that, in a kind of elementary strife,

destroyed each other: and many men of wit have endeavoured to prove that

they were mistaken. Much may be adduced by wits and metaphysicians on

both sides of the question. But, from experience, I am apt to believe

that they do weaken each other, and that great quickness of

comprehension, and facile association of ideas, naturally preclude

profundity of research. Wit is often a lucky hit; the result of a

momentary inspiration. We know not whence it comes, and it blows where

it lifts. The operations of judgment, on the contrary, are cool and

circumspect; and coolness and deliberation are great enemies to

enthusiasm. If wit is of so fine a spirit, that it almost evaporates

when translated into another language, why may not the temperature have

an influence over it? This remark may be thought derogatory to the

inferior qualities of the mind: but it is not a hasty one; and I mention

it as a prelude to a conclusion I have frequently drawn, that the

cultivation of reason damps fancy. The blessings of Heaven lie on each

side; we must choose, if we wish to attain any degree of superiority,

and not lose our lives in laborious idleness. If we mean to build our

knowledge or happiness on a rational basis, we must learn to distinguish

the _possible_, and not fight against the stream. And if we are careful

to guard ourselves from imaginary sorrows and vain fears, we must also

resign many enchanting illusions: for shallow must be the discernment

which fails to discover that raptures and ecstasies arise from

error.—Whether it will always be so, is not now to be discussed; suffice

it to observe, that Truth is seldom arrayed by the Graces; and if she

charms, it is only by inspiring a sober satisfaction, which takes its

rise from a calm contemplation of proportion and simplicity. But, though

it is allowed that one man has by nature more fancy than another, in

each individual there is a spring-tide when fancy should govern and

amalgamate materials for the understanding; and a graver period, when

those materials should be employed by the judgment. For example, I am

inclined to have a better opinion of the heart of an _old_ man, who

speaks of Sterne as his favourite author, than of his understanding.

There are times and seasons for all things: and moralists appear to me

to err, when they would confound the gaiety of youth with the

seriousness of age; for the virtues of age look not only more imposing,

but more natural, when they appear rather rigid. He who has not

exercised his judgment to curb his imagination during the meridian of

life, becomes, in its decline, too often the prey of childish feelings.

Age demands respect; youth love: if this order is disturbed, the

emotions are not pure; and when love for a man in his grand climacteric

takes place of respect, it, generally speaking, borders on contempt.

Judgment is sublime, wit beautiful; and, according to your own theory,

they cannot exist together without impairing each other’s power. The

predominancy of the latter, in your endless Reflections, should lead

hasty readers to suspect that it may, in a great degree, exclude the

former.

But, among all your plausible arguments, and witty illustrations, your

contempt for the poor always appears conspicuous, and rouses my

indignation. The following paragraph in particular struck me, as

breathing the most tyrannic spirit, and displaying the most factitious

feelings. ‘Good order is the foundation of all good things. To be

enabled to acquire, the people, without being servile, must be tractable

and obedient. The magistrate must have his reverence, the laws their

authority. The body of the people must not find the principles of

natural subordination by art rooted out of their minds. They _must_

respect that property of which they _cannot_ partake. _They must labour

to obtain what by labour can be obtained; and when they find, as they

commonly do, the success disproportioned to the endeavour, they must be

taught their consolation in the final proportions of eternal justice._

Of this consolation, whoever deprives them, deadens their industry, and

strikes at the root of all acquisition as of all conservation. He that

does this, is the cruel oppressor, the merciless enemy, of the poor and

wretched; at the same time that, by his wicked speculations, he exposes

the fruits of successful industry, and the accumulations of fortune,’

(ah! there’s the rub) ‘to the plunder of the negligent, the

disappointed, and the unprosperous[26].’

This is contemptible hard-hearted sophistry, in the specious form of

humility, and submission to the will of Heaven.—It is, Sir, _possible_

to render the poor happier in this world, without depriving them of the

consolation which you gratuitously grant them in the next. They have a

right to more comfort than they at present enjoy; and more comfort might

be afforded them, without encroaching on the pleasures of the rich: not

now waiting to enquire whether the rich have any right to exclusive

pleasures. What do I say?—encroaching! No; if an intercourse were

established between them, it would impart the only true pleasure that

can be snatched in this land of shadows, this hard school of moral

discipline.

I know, indeed, that there is often something disgusting in the

distresses of poverty, at which the imagination revolts, and starts back

to exercise itself in the more attractive Arcadia of fiction. The rich

man builds a house, art and taste give it the highest finish. His

gardens are planted, and the trees grow to recreate the fancy of the

planter, though the temperature of the climate may rather force him to

avoid the dangerous damps they exhale, than seek the umbrageous retreat.

Every thing on the estate is cherished but man;—yet, to contribute to

the happiness of man, is the most sublime of all enjoyments. But if,

instead of sweeping pleasure-grounds, obelisks, temples, and elegant

cottages, as _objects_ for the eye, the heart was allowed to beat true

to nature, decent farms would be scattered over the estate, and plenty

smile around. Instead of the poor being subject to the griping hand of

an avaricious steward, they would be watched over with fatherly

solicitude, by the man whose duty and pleasure it was to guard their

happiness, and shield from rapacity the beings who, by the sweat of

their brow, exalted him above his fellows.

I could almost imagine I see a man thus gathering blessings as he

mounted the hill of life; or consolation, in those days when the spirits

lag, and the tired heart finds no pleasure in them. It is not by

squandering alms that the poor can be relieved, or improved—it is the

fostering sun of kindness, the wisdom that finds them employments

calculated to give them habits of virtue, that meliorates their

condition. Love is only the fruit of love; condescension and authority

may produce the obedience you applaud; but he has lost his heart of

flesh who can see a fellow-creature humbled before him, and trembling at

the frown of a being, whose heart is supplied by the same vital current,

and whose pride ought to be checked by a consciousness of having the

same infirmities.

What salutary dews might not be shed to refresh this thirsty land, if

men were more _enlightened_! Smiles and premiums might encourage

cleanliness, industry, and emulation.—A garden more inviting than Eden

would then meet the eye, and springs of joy murmur on every side. The

clergyman would superintend his own flock, the shepherd would then love

the sheep he daily tended; the school might rear its decent head, and

the buzzing tribe, let loose to play, impart a portion of their

vivacious spirits to the heart that longed to open their minds, and lead

them to taste the pleasures of men. Domestic comfort, the civilizing

relations of husband, brother, and father, would soften labour, and

render life contented.

Returning once from a despotic country to a part of England well

cultivated, but not very picturesque—with what delight did I not observe

the poor man’s garden!—The homely palings and twining woodbine, with all

the rustic contrivances of simple, unlettered taste, was a sight which

relieved the eye that had wandered indignant from the stately palace to

the pestiferous hovel, and turned from the awful contrast into itself to

mourn the fate of man, and curse the arts of civilization!

Why cannot large estates be divided into small farms? these dwellings

would indeed grace our land. Why are huge forests still allowed to

stretch out with idle pomp and all the indolence of Eastern grandeur?

Why does the brown waste meet the traveller’s view, when men want work?

But commons cannot be enclosed without _acts of parliament_ to increase

the property of the rich! Why might not the industrious peasant be

allowed to steal a farm from the heath? This sight I have seen;—the cow

that supported the children grazed near the hut, and the cheerful

poultry were fed by the chubby babes, who breathed a bracing air, far

from the diseases and the vices of cities. Domination blasts all these

prospects; virtue can only flourish amongst equals, and the man who

submits to a fellow-creature, because it promotes his worldly interest,

and he who relieves only because it is his duty to lay up a treasure in

heaven, are much on a par, for both are radically degraded by the habits

of their life.

In this great city, that proudly rears its head, and boasts of its

population and commerce, how much misery lurks in pestilential corners,

whilst idle mendicants assail, on every side, the man who hates to

encourage importers, or repress, with angry frown, the plaints of the

poor! How many mechanics, by a flux of trade or fashion, lose their

employment; whom misfortunes, not to be warded off, lead to the idleness

that vitiates their character and renders them afterwards averse to

honest labour! Where is the eye that marks these evils, more gigantic

than any of the infringements of property, which you piously deprecate?

Are these remediless evils? And is the humane heart satisfied with

turning the poor over to _another_ world, to receive the blessings this

could afford? If society was regulated on a more enlarged plan; if man

was contented to be the friend of man, and did not seek to bury the

sympathies of humanity in the servile appellation of master; if, turning

his eyes from ideal regions of taste and elegance, he laboured to give

the earth he inhabited all the beauty it is capable of receiving, and

was ever on the watch to shed abroad all the happiness which human

nature can enjoy;—he who, respecting the rights of men, wishes to

convince or persuade society that this is true happiness and dignity, is

not the cruel _oppressor_ of the poor, nor a short-sighted

philosopher—HE fears God and loves his fellow-creatures.—Behold the

whole duty of man!—the citizen who acts differently is a sophisticated

being.

Surveying civilized life, and seeing, with undazzled eye, the polished

vices of the rich, their insincerity, want of natural affections, with

all the specious train that luxury introduces, I have turned impatiently

to the poor, to look for man undebauched by riches or power—but, alas!

what did I see? a being scarcely above the brutes, over which he

tyrannized; a broken spirit, worn-out body, and all those gross vices

which the example of the rich, rudely copied, could produce. Envy built

a wall of separation, that made the poor hate, whilst they bent to their

superiors; who, on their part, stepped aside to avoid the loathsome

sight of human misery.

What were the outrages of a day[27] to these continual miseries? Let

those sorrows hide their diminished head before the tremendous mountain

of woe that thus defaces our globe! Man preys on man; and you mourn for

the idle tapestry that decorated a gothic pile, and the dronish bell

that summoned the fat priest to prayer. You mourn for the empty pageant

of a name, when slavery flaps her wing, and the sick heart retires to

die in lonely wilds, far from the abodes of men. Did the pangs you felt

for insulted nobility, the anguish that rent your heart when the

gorgeous robes were torn off the idol human weakness had set up, deserve

to be compared with the long-drawn sigh of melancholy reflection, when

misery and vice are thus seen to haunt our steps, and swim on the top of

every cheering prospect? Why is our fancy to be appalled by terrific

perspectives of a hell beyond the grave?—Hell stalks abroad;—the lash

resounds on the slave’s naked sides; and the sick wretch, who can no

longer earn the sour bread of unremitting labour, steals to a ditch to

bid the world a long good night—or, neglected in some ostentatious

hospital, breathes his last amidst the laugh of mercenary attendants.

Such misery demands more than tears—I pause to recollect myself; and

smother the contempt I feel rising for your rhetorical flourishes and

infantine sensibility.

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Taking a retrospective view of my hasty answer, and casting a cursory

glance over your _Reflections_, I perceive that I have not alluded to

several reprehensible passages, in your elaborate work; which I marked

for censure when I first perused it with a steady eye. And now I find it

almost impossible candidly to refute your sophisms, without quoting your

own words, and putting the numerous contradictions I observed in

opposition to each other. This would be an effectual refutation; but,

after such a tedious drudgery, I fear I should only be read by the

patient eye that scarcely wanted my assistance to detect the flagrant

errors. It would be a tedious process to shew, that often the most just

and forcible illustrations are warped to colour over opinions _you_ must

_sometimes_ have secretly despised; or, at least, have discovered, that

what you asserted without limitation, required the greatest. Some

subjects of exaggeration may have been superficially viewed; depth of

judgment is, perhaps, incompatible with the predominant features of your

mind. Your reason may have often been the dupe of your imagination; but

say, did you not sometimes angrily bid her be still, when she whispered

that you were departing from strict truth? Or, when assuming the awful

form of conscience, and only smiling at the vagaries of vanity, did she

not austerely bid you recollect your own errors, before you lifted the

avenging stone? Did she not sometimes wave her hand, when you poured

forth a torrent of shining sentences, and beseech you to concatenate

them—plainly telling you that the impassioned eloquence of the heart was

calculated rather to affect than dazzle the reader, whom it hurried

along to conviction? Did she not anticipate the remark of the wise, who

drink not at a shallow sparkling dream, and tell you that they would

discover when, with the dignity of sincerity, you supported an opinion

that only appeared to you with one face; or, when superannuated vanity

made you torture your invention?—But I forbear.

I have before animadverted on our method of electing representatives,

convinced that it debauches both the morals of the people and the

candidates, without rendering the member really responsible, or attached

to his constituents; but, amongst your other contradictions, you blame

the National Assembly for expecting any exertions from the servile

principle of responsibility, and afterwards insult them for not

rendering themselves responsible. Whether the one the French have

adopted will answer the purpose better, and be more than a shadow of

representation, time only can shew. In theory it appears more promising.

Your real or artificial affection for the English constitution seems to

me to resemble the brutal affection of some weak characters. They think

it a duty to love their relations with a blind, indolent tenderness,

that _will not_ see the faults it might assist to correct, if their

affection had been built on rational grounds. They love they know not

why, and they will love to the end of the chapter.

Is it absolute blasphemy to doubt of the omnipotence of the law, or to

suppose that religion might be more pure if there were fewer baits for

hypocrites in the church? But our manners, you tell us, are drawn from

the French, though you had before celebrated our native plainness[28].

If they were, it is time we broke loose from dependence——Time that

Englishmen drew water from their own springs; for, if manners are not a

painted substitute for morals, we have only to cultivate our reason, and

we shall not feel the want of an arbitrary model. Nature will suffice;

but I forget myself:—Nature and Reason, according to your system, are

all to give place to authority; and the gods, as Shakespeare makes a

frantic wretch exclaim, seem to kill us for their sport, as men do

flies.

Before I conclude my cursory remarks, it is but just to acknowledge that

I coincide with you in your opinion respecting the _sincerity_ of many

modern philosophers. Your consistency in avowing a veneration for rank

and riches deserves praise; but I must own that I have often indignantly

observed that some of the _enlightened_ philosophers, who talk most

vehemently of the native rights of men, borrow many noble sentiments to

adorn their conversation, which have no influence on their conduct. They

bow down to rank, and are careful to secure property; for virtue,

without this adventitious drapery, is seldom very respectable in their

eyes—nor are they very quick-sighted to discern real dignity of

character when no sounding name exalts the man above his fellows.—But

neither open enmity nor hollow homage destroys the intrinsic value of

those principles which rest on an eternal foundation, and revert for a

standard to the immutable attributes of God.

A vindication of the rights of men, in a letter to the Right Honourable Edmund Burke; occasioned by his Reflections on the Revolution in France · 第 5 / 7 题