THE EARTHQUAKE
Austria-Hungary, sobered down by the tremendous consequences of her
obstinacy, which now loomed large, displayed a conciliatory frame of
mind. Her Ambassador in the Russian capital, implicitly confessing
that the ultimatum to Servia was an act of provocation, wisely yielded
on the crucial difference between the two Governments, and assured M.
Sazonoff that Austria would submit to mediation the demands in the
ultimatum which appeared destructive of Servia’s independence. In other
words, she gave way, and the long-sought issue out of the deadlock was
found, and found without Germany’s assistance. What was wanted now was
no longer Germany’s active co-operation, but only her abstention from
mischief-making.
But the moment Austria became conciliatory Germany assumed an attitude
of sheer aggression which at once took the matter out the diplomatic
sphere and left no room for compromise.
On July 31st the earthquake came. Germany presented her ultimatum
to Russia, allowing her only twelve hours to issue the order for
demobilization. Twelve hours! It is impossible not to recognize the
same Hohenzollern touch in this document and that other one which had
been presented shortly before to Servia. They both bear the impress of
the monarch who once publicly said: “There is but one will, and that is
mine.”[26] Contemptuous silence was the only answer vouchsafed to this
arrogant demand, which was intended to cow the Tsar and his Ministers
before they could consult with their foreign friends. On August 1st
the sheepish-looking diplomatist who represented the mighty Kaiser in
St. Petersburg proceeded to the Foreign Office to deliver his last
and fatal message there, and, according to the papers, he transformed
the awful tragism of the moment into an incident worthy of an _opéra
bouffe_ by handing to the Foreign Minister a paper one side of which
contained a declaration of war, while the other was a statement
prepared for the eventuality of Russia’s acquiescence. And with this
claim to be remembered in the history of involuntary humour Count
Pourtalès made his exit from public life.
In this odd way new actors were introduced into a drama which had
been originally composed only for three. The result was exceedingly
distasteful to the statesmen of Vienna, and Budapest. It was recognized
as a source of complications and difficulties which had indeed been
provided for, but which it would have been more advantageous to
separate and cope with in detail. All that now remained for German
diplomacy was to make absolutely sure of the neutrality of Great
Britain.
It may not be amiss, however, to lay before the reader the instructive
account of the final stages of diplomatic effort as sketched by the
British ex-Ambassador to the Court of Vienna in his supplementary
dispatch, dated London, September 1st:--
The delivery at Belgrade on July 23rd of the Austrian note to
Servia was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the
Ballplatz. Except Herr von Tschirschky, who must have been aware
of the tenour if not of the actual words of the note, none of my
colleagues was allowed to see through the veil. On July 22nd and
23rd M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, had long interviews with Baron
Macchio, one of the Under Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs,
by whom he was left under the impression that the words of warning
he had been instructed to speak to the Austro-Hungarian Government
had not been unavailing, and that the note which was being drawn
up would be found to contain nothing with which a self-respecting
State need hesitate to comply. At the second of these interviews he
was not even informed that the note was at that very moment being
presented at Belgrade, or that it would be published in Vienna on
the following morning. Count Forgach, the other Under Secretary of
State, had indeed been good enough to confide to me on the same day
the true character of the note, and the fact of its presentation
about the time we were speaking.
THE BOLT FROM THE BLUE.
So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was
preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight’s leave
of absence about July 20th. He had only been absent a few days
when events compelled him to return. It might have been supposed
that Duc Avarna, Ambassador of the allied Italian Kingdom, which
was bound to be so closely affected by fresh complications in
the Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence of
Count Berchtold during this critical time. In point of fact, his
Excellency was left completely in the dark. As for myself, no
indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the impending storm,
and it was from a private source that I received on July 15th
the forecast of what was about to happen, which I telegraphed to
you the following day. It is true that during all this time the
_Neue Freie Presse_ and other leading Viennese newspapers were
using language which pointed unmistakably to war with Servia. The
official _Fremdenblatt_, however, was more cautious, and till the
note was published the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was
that Austria would shrink from courses calculated to involve her in
grave European complications.
On July 24th the note was published in the newspapers. By common
consent it was at once styled an ultimatum. Its integral acceptance
by Servia was neither expected nor desired; and when, on the
following afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it
had been unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen
disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as
it was known later in the evening that the Servian reply had been
rejected and that Baron Giesl had broken off relations at Belgrade,
Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading the
streets and singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the
morning.
WAR AGAINST SERVIA ONLY.
The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the
most part of organized processions through the principal streets,
ending up at the Ministry of War. One or two attempts to make
hostile manifestations against the Russian Embassy were frustrated
by the strong guard of police which held the approaches to the
principal Embassies during those days. The demeanour of the people
at Vienna, and, as I was informed, in many other principal cities
of the Monarchy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of
war with Servia, and there can be no doubt that the small body
of Austrian and Hungarian statesmen by whom this momentous step
was adopted gauged rightly the sense, and it may even be said the
determination, of the people, except presumably in portions of
the provinces inhabited by the Slav races. There had been much
disappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Servia
during the annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connection with
the recent Balkan War. Count Berchtold’s peace policy had met
with little sympathy in the Delegation. Now the floodgates were
opened, and the entire people and Press clamoured impatiently
for immediate and condign punishment of the hated Servian race.
The country certainly believed that it had before it only the
alternative of subduing Servia or of submitting sooner or later
to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful solution should first
have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect that the forcible
intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans must inevitably call
other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause of Austria
held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any
country should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere
policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding the
necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the
crime of Sarajevo. The conviction had been expressed to me by the
German Ambassador on July 24th that Russia would stand aside. This
feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced, no
doubt, the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort
should have been made to secure by means of diplomatic negociations
the acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful
compromise of the Servian question by which Austrian fears of
Servian aggression and intrigue might have been removed for the
future. Instead of adopting this course, the Austro-Hungarian
Government resolved upon war. The inevitable consequence ensued.
Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilization and declaration
of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobilization against
Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilization,
and Russia again responded with results which have passed into
history.
RUSSIA HAD NO RIGHT TO INTERVENE.
On July 28th I saw Count Berchtold and urged as strongly as I
could that the scheme of mediation mentioned in your speech in
the House of Commons on the previous day should be accepted as
offering an honourable and peaceful settlement of the question at
issue. His Excellency himself read to me a telegraphic report of
the speech, but added that matters had gone too far; Austria was
that day declaring war on Servia, and she could never accept the
conference which you had suggested should take place between the
less interested Powers on the basis of the Servian reply. This was
a matter which must be settled directly between the two parties
immediately concerned. I said his Majesty’s Government would hear
with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared
they would lead to European complications. I disclaimed any British
lack of sympathy with Austria in the matter of her legitimate
grievances against Servia, and pointed out that, whereas Austria
seemed to be making these the starting-point of her policy, his
Majesty’s Government were bound to look at the question primarily
from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace of Europe.
In this way the two countries might easily drift apart.
His Excellency said that he, too, was keeping the European aspect
of the question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would
have no right to intervene after receiving his assurance that
Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement. His Excellency
remarked to me in the course of his conversation that, though he
had been glad to co-operate towards bringing about the settlement
which had resulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London
during the Balkan crisis, he had never had much belief in the
permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly
artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought to
harmonize were in themselves profoundly divergent. His Excellency
maintained a most friendly demeanour throughout the interview,
but left no doubt in my mind as to the determination of the
Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed with the invasion of Servia.
AUSTRIA YIELDS AT LAST.
The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the
endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the
interest of peace. Herr von Tschirschky abstained from inviting
my co-operation or that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in
carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no means of
knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian
Government. I was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko,
the Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negociations with Count
Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on July 28th to persuade the
Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count Szapary with full
powers to continue at St. Petersburg the hopeful conversations
which had there been taking place between the latter and M.
Sazonoff. Count Berchtold refused at the time, but two days later
(July 30th), though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilized
against Austria, he received M. Schebeko again, in a perfectly
friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the
conversations in St. Petersburg. From now onwards the tension
between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia
and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in
sight, and on August 1st I was informed by M. Schebeko that Count
Szapary had at last conceded the main point at issue by announcing
to M. Sazonoff that Austria would consent to submit to mediation
the points in the Note to Servia which seemed incompatible with
the maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonoff, M. Schebeko
added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would
refrain from the actual invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact,
had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good
hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to
you on August 1st by Count Mensdorff, to the effect that Austria
had neither “banged the door” on compromise nor cut off the
conversations. M. Schebeko to the end was working hard for peace.
He was holding the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold,
and he informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach, had
responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia
to expect that Austria would hold back her armies, but this matter
could probably have been settled by negociation, and M. Schebeko
repeatedly told me he was prepared to accept any reasonable
compromise.
GERMANY ENTERS THE LISTS.
Unfortunately, these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna
were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous
ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany
intervened on July 31st by means of her double ultimatums to St.
Petersburg and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only
one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on
August 1st, and on France on August 3rd. A few days’ delay might
in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest
calamities in history.
Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebeko had
been instructed to remain at his post till war should actually
be declared against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This
only happened on August 6th, when Count Berchtold informed the
foreign missions at Vienna that “the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador
at St. Petersburg had been instructed to notify the Russian
Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of Russia in the
Austro-Servian conflict, and the fact that Russia had commenced
hostilities against Germany, Austria-Hungary considered herself
also at war with Russia.”
THE AMBASSADORS MAKE THEIR EXIT.
M. Schebeko left quietly in a special train provided by the
Austro-Hungarian Government on August 7th. He had urgently
requested to be conveyed to the Rumanian frontier, so that he might
be able to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead to the
Swiss frontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne.
M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till August 12th. On the
previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the
ground that Austrian troops were being employed against France.
This point was not fully cleared up when I left Vienna. On August
9th M. Dumaine had received from Count Berchtold the categorical
declaration that no Austrian troops were being moved to Alsace.
The next day this statement was supplemented by a further one,
in writing, giving Count Berchtold’s assurance that not only had
no Austrian troops been moved actually to the French frontier,
but that none were moving from Austria in a westerly direction
into Germany in such a way that they might replace German troops
employed at the front. These two statements were made by Count
Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine,
under instructions from his Government. The French Ambassador’s
departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but his
Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue
made by the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled
before the steps of the Town Hall, in which he assured the people
that Paris was in the throes of a revolution and that the President
of the Republic had been assassinated.
The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna
by special editions of the newspapers about midday on August 5th.
An abstract of your speeches in the House of Commons, and also of
the German Chancellor’s speech in the Reichstag of August 4th,
appeared the same day, as well as the text of the German ultimatum
to Belgium. Otherwise few details of the great events of these
days transpired. The _Neue Freie Presse_ was violently insulting
towards England. The _Fremdenblatt_ was not offensive, but little
or nothing was said in the columns of any Vienna paper to explain
that the violation of Belgian neutrality had left his Majesty’s
Government no alternative but to take part in the war.
The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna,
but scarcely mentioned in the newspapers.
On August 5th I had the honour to receive your instruction of the
previous day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war with
Germany, but adding that, Austria being understood to be not yet
at that date at war with Russia and France, you did not desire me
to ask for my passport or to make any particular communication to
the Austro-Hungarian Government. You stated at the same time that
his Majesty’s Government of course expected Austria not to commit
any act of war against us without the notice required by diplomatic
usage.
On Thursday morning, August 13th, I had the honour to receive your
telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled to inform
Count Mensdorff, at the request of the French Government, that a
complete rupture had occurred between France and Austria, on the
ground that Austria had declared war on Russia, who was already
fighting on the side of France, and that Austria had sent troops to
the German frontier under conditions that were a direct menace to
France. The rupture having been brought about with France in this
way, I was to ask for my passport, and your telegram stated, in
conclusion, that you had informed Count Mensdorff that a state of
war would exist between the two countries from midnight of August
12th.
TRADITIONAL AUSTRIAN COURTESY.
After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Ambassador, who
accepted immediately in the most friendly spirit my request
that his Excellency would take charge provisionally of British
interests in Austria-Hungary during the unfortunate interruption
of relations, I proceeded, with Mr. Theo Russell, Counsellor of
his Majesty’s Embassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold received
me at midday. I delivered my message, for which his Excellency did
not seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a long telegram
from Count Mensdorff had just come in, but had not yet been brought
to him. His Excellency received my communication with the courtesy
which never leaves him. He deplored the unhappy complications which
were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into war.
In point of fact, he added, Austria did not consider herself then
at war with France, though diplomatic relations with that country
had been broken off. I explained in a few words how circumstances
had forced this unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided
useless argument. Then I ventured to recommend to his Excellency’s
consideration the case of the numerous stranded British subjects
at Carlsbad, Vienna, and other places throughout the country. I
had already had some correspondence with him on the subject, and
his Excellency took a note of what I said, and promised to see what
could be done to get them away when the stress of mobilization
should be over. Count Berchtold agreed to, Mr. Phillpotts, till
then British Consul at Vienna under Consul-General Sir Frederick
Duncan, being left by me at the Embassy in the capacity of Chargé
des Archives. He presumed a similar privilege would not be
refused in England if desired on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian
Government. I took leave of Count Berchtold with sincere regret,
having received from the day of my arrival in Vienna, not quite
nine months before, many marks of friendship and consideration
from his Excellency. As I left I begged his Excellency to present
my profound respects to the Emperor Francis Joseph, together with
an expression of my hope that his Majesty would pass through these
sad times with unimpaired health and strength. Count Berchtold was
pleased to say he would deliver my message.
Count Walterskirchen, of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office,
was deputed the following morning to bring me my passport and
to acquaint me with the arrangements made for my departure that
evening (August 14th). In the course of the day Countess Berchtold
and other ladies of Vienna society called to take leave of Lady
de Bunsen at the Embassy. We left the railway station by special
train for the Swiss frontier at 7 p.m. No disagreeable incidents
occurred. Count Walterskirchen was present at the station on behalf
of Count Berchtold. The journey was necessarily slow, owing to
the encumbered state of the line. We reached Buchs, on the Swiss
frontier, early in the morning of August 17th. At the first halting
place there had been some hooting and stone throwing on the part of
the entraining troops and station officials, but no inconvenience
was caused, and at the other large stations on our route we found
that ample measures had been taken to preserve us from molestation
as well as to provide us with food. I was left in no doubt that the
Austro-Hungarian Government had desired that the journey should be
performed under the most comfortable conditions possible, and that
I should receive on my departure all the marks of consideration
due to his Majesty’s representative. I was accompanied by my own
family and the entire staff of the Embassy, for whose untiring zeal
and efficient help in trying times I desire to express my sincere
thanks.
Germany’s first care, once Russia and France had been provoked to
take up arms, was to make British neutrality quite secure. It had
been relied upon from the very inception of the German plan down to
the moment[27] when Sir Edward Grey delivered his telling speech
in the House of Commons. British neutrality was an unquestioned
postulate which lay at the very root of the scheme engineered by the
Empire-builders of Berlin. And they clung to it throughout with the
tenacity of drowning men holding on to a frozen plank in Polar seas.