We have not treated of this subject in the defence, because a line of
cantonments is not to be regarded as a defensive means, but as a mere
existence of the army in a state which implies little readiness for
battle. In respect to this readiness for battle, we therefore did not
go beyond what we required to say in connection with this condition of
an army in the 13th chapter of the 5th book.
But here, in considering the attack, we have to think of an enemy’s
army in cantonments in all respects as a special object; for, in the
first place, such an attack is of a very peculiar kind in itself; and,
in the next place, it may be considered as a strategic means of
particular efficacy. Here we have before us, therefore, not the
question of an onslaught on a single cantonment or a small corps
dispersed amongst a few villages, as the arrangements for that are
entirely of a tactical nature, but of the attack of a large army,
distributed in cantonments more or less extensive; an attack in which
the object is not the mere surprise of a single cantonment, but to
prevent the assembly of the army.
The attack on an enemy’s army in cantonments is therefore the surprise
of an army not assembled. If this surprise succeeds fully, then the
enemy’s army is prevented from reaching its appointed place of
assembly, and, therefore, compelled to choose another more to the rear;
as this change of the point of assembly to the rear in a state of such
emergency can seldom be effected in less than a day’s march, but
generally will require several days, the loss of ground which this
occasions is by no means an insignificant loss; and this is the first
advantage gained by the assailant.
But now, this surprise which is in connection with the general
relations, may certainly at the same time, in its commencement, be an
onslaught on some of the enemy’s single cantonments, not certainly upon
all, or upon a great many, because that would suppose a scattering of
the attacking army to an extent which could never be advisable.
Therefore, only the most advanced quarters, only those which lie in the
direction of the attacking columns, can be surprised, and even this
will seldom happen to many of them, as large forces cannot easily
approach unobserved. However, this element of the attack is by no means
to be disregarded; and we reckon the advantages which may be thus
obtained, as the second advantage of the surprise.
A third advantage consists in the minor combats forced upon the enemy
in which his losses will be considerable. A great body of troops does
not assemble itself at once by single battalions at the spot appointed
for the general concentration of the army, but usually forms itself by
brigades, divisions, or corps, in the first place, and these masses
cannot then hasten at full speed to the rendezvous; in case of meeting
with an enemy’s column in their course, they are obliged to engage in a
combat; now, they may certainly come off victorious in the same,
particularly if the enemy’s attacking column is not of sufficient
strength, but in conquering, they lose time, and, in most cases, as may
be easily conceived, a corps, under such circumstances, and in the
general tendency to gain a point which lies to the rear, will not make
any beneficial use of its victory. On the other hand, they may be
beaten, and that is the most probable issue in itself, because they
have not time to organise a good resistance. We may, therefore, very
well suppose that in an attack well planned and executed, the assailant
through these partial combats will gather up a considerable number of
trophies, which become a principal point in the general result.
Lastly, the fourth advantage, and the keystone of the whole, is a
certain momentary disorganisation and discouragement on the side of the
enemy, which, when the force is at last assembled, seldom allows of its
being immediately brought into action, and generally obliges the party
attacked to abandon still more ground to his assailant, and to make a
change generally in his plan of operations.
Such are the proper results of a successful surprise of the enemy in
cantonments, that is, of one in which the enemy is prevented from
assembling his army without loss at the point fixed in his plan. But by
the nature of the case, success has many degrees; and, therefore, the
results may be very great in one case, and hardly worth mentioning in
another. But even when, through the complete success of the enterprise,
these results are considerable, they will seldom bear comparison with
the gain of a great battle, partly because, in the first place, the
trophies are seldom as great, and in the next, the moral impression
never strikes so deep.
This general result must always be kept in view, that we may not
promise ourselves more from an enterprise of this kind than it can
give. Many hold it to be the _non plus ultra_ of offensive activity;
but it is not so by any means, as we may see from this analysis, as
well as from military history.
One of the most brilliant surprises in history, is that made by the
Duke of Lorraine in 1643, on the cantonments of the French, under
General Ranzan, at Duttlingen. The corps was 16,000 men, and they lost
the General commanding, and 7,000 men; it was a complete defeat. The
want of outposts was the cause of the disaster.
The surprise of Turenne at Mergentheim (Mariendal, as the French call
it,) in 1644, is in like manner to be regarded as equal to a defeat in
its effects, for he lost 3,000 men out of 8,000, which was principally
owing to his having been led into making an untimely stand after he got
his men assembled. Such results we cannot, therefore, often reckon
upon; it was rather the result of an ill-judged action than of the
surprise, properly speaking, for Turenne might easily have avoided the
action, and have rallied his troops upon those in more distant
quarters.
A third noted surprise is that which Turenne made on the Allies under
the great Elector, the Imperial General Bournonville and the Duke of
Lorraine, in Alsace, in the year 1674. The trophies were very small,
the loss of the Allies did not exceed 2,000 or 3,000 men, which could
not decide the fate of a force of 50,000; but the Allies considered
that they could not venture to make any further resistance in Alsace,
and retired across the Rhine again. This strategic result was all that
Turenne wanted, but we must not look for the causes of it entirely in
the surprise. Turenne surprised the plans of his opponents more than
the troops themselves; the want of unanimity amongst the allied
generals and the proximity of the Rhine did the rest. This event
altogether deserves a closer examination, as it is generally viewed in
a wrong light.
In 1741, Neipperg surprised Frederick the Great in his quarters; the
whole of the result was that the king was obliged to fight the battle
of Mollwitz before he had collected all his forces, and with a change
of front.
In 1745, Frederick the Great surprised the Duke of Lorraine in his
cantonments in Lusatia; the chief success was through the real surprise
of one of the most important quarters, that of Hennersdorf, by which
the Austrians suffered a loss of 2,000 men; the general result was that
the Duke of Lorraine retreated to Bohemia by Upper Lusatia, but that
did not at all prevent his returning into Saxony by the left bank of
the Elbe, so that without the battle of Kesselsdorf, there would have
been no important result.
1758. The Duke Ferdinand surprised the French quarters; the immediate
result was that the French lost some thousands of men, and were obliged
to take up a position behind the Aller. The moral effect may have been
of more importance, and may have had some influence on the subsequent
evacuation of Westphalia.
If from these different examples we seek for a conclusion as to the
efficacy of this kind of attack, then only the two first can be put in
comparison with a battle gained. But the corps were only small, and the
want of outposts in the system of war in those days was a circumstance
greatly in favour of these enterprises. Although the four other cases
must be reckoned completely successful enterprises, it is plain that
not one of them is to be compared with a battle gained as respects its
result. The general result could not have taken place in any of them
except with an adversary weak in will and character, and therefore it
did not take place at all in the case of 1741.
In 1806 the Prussian army contemplated surprising the French in this
manner in Franconia. The case promised well for a satisfactory result.
Buonaparte was not present, the French corps were in widely extended
cantonments; under these circumstances, the Prussian army, acting with
great resolution and activity, might very well reckon on driving the
French back across the Rhine, with more or less loss. But this was also
all; if they reckoned upon more, for instance, on following up their
advantages beyond the Rhine, or on gaining such a moral ascendancy,
that the French would not again venture to appear on the right bank of
the river in the same campaign, such an expectation had no sufficient
grounds whatever.
In the beginning of August, 1812, the Russians from Smolensk meditated
falling upon the cantonments of the French when Napoleon halted his
army in the neighbourhood of Witepsk. But they wanted courage to carry
out the enterprise; and it was fortunate for them they did; for as the
French commander with his centre was not only more than twice the
strength of their centre, but also in himself the most resolute
commander that ever lived, as further, the loss of a few miles of
ground would have decided nothing, and there was no natural obstacle in
any feature of the country near enough up to which they might pursue
their success, and by that means, in some measure make it certain, and
lastly, as the war of the year 1812 was not in any way a campaign of
that kind, which draws itself in a languid way to a conclusion, but the
serious plan of an assailant who had made up his mind to conquer his
opponent completely,—therefore the trifling results to be expected from
a surprise of the enemy in his quarters, appear nothing else than
utterly disproportionate to the solution of the problem, they could not
justify a hope of making good by their means the great inequality of
forces and other relations. But this scheme serves to show how a
confused idea of the effect of this means may lead to an entirely false
application of the same.
What has been hitherto said, places the subject in the light of a
_strategic means_. But it lies in its nature that its execution also is
not purely tactical, but in part belongs again to strategy so far,
particularly that such an attack is generally made on a front of
considerable width, and the army which carries it out can, and
generally will, come to blows before it is concentrated, so that the
whole is an agglomeration of partial combats. We must now add a few
words on the most natural organisation of such an attack.
The first condition is:—
(1.) To attack the front of the enemy’s quarters in a certain width of
front, for that is the only means by which we can really surprise
several cantonments, cut off others, and create generally that
disorganisation in the enemy’s army which is intended.—The number of,
and the intervals between, the columns must depend on circumstances.
(2.) The direction of the different columns must converge upon a point
where it is intended they should unite; for the enemy ends more or less
with a concentration of his force, and therefore we must do the same.
This point of concentration should, if possible, be the enemy’s point
of assembly, or lie on his line of retreat, it will naturally be best
where that line crosses an important obstacle in the country.
(3.) The separate columns when they come in contact with the enemy’s
forces must attack them with great determination, with dash and
boldness, as they have general relations in their favour, and daring is
always there in its right place. From this it follows that the
commanders of the separate columns must be allowed freedom of action
and full power in this respect.
(4.) The tactical plan of attack against those of the enemy’s corps
that are the first to place themselves in position, must always be
directed to turn a flank, for the greatest result is always to be
expected by separating the corps, and cutting them off.
(5.) Each of the columns must be composed of portions of the three
arms, and must not be stinted in cavalry, it may even sometimes be well
to divide amongst them the whole of the reserve cavalry; for it would
be a great mistake to suppose that this body of cavalry could play any
great part in a mass in an enterprise of this sort. The first village,
the smallest bridge, the most insignificant thicket would bring it to a
halt.
(6.) Although it lies in the nature of a surprise that the assailant
should not send his advanced guard very far in front, that principle
only applies to the first approach to the enemy’s quarters. When the
fight has commenced in the enemy’s quarters, and therefore all that was
to be expected from actual surprise has been gained, then the columns
of the advanced guard of all arms should push on as far as possible,
for they may greatly increase the confusion on the side of the enemy by
more rapid movement. It is only by this means that it becomes possible
to carry off here and there the mass of baggage, artillery,
non-effectives, and camp-followers, which have to be dragged after a
cantonment suddenly broken up, and these advanced guards must also be
the chief instruments in turning and cutting off the enemy.
(7.) Finally, the retreat in case of ill-success must be thought of,
and a rallying point be fixed upon beforehand.