1. We have already touched upon this subject in the thirtieth chapter
of the sixth book. It is one which concerns the defence and the attack
in common; nevertheless it has always in it something more of the
nature of the offensive than the defensive. We shall therefore now
examine it more thoroughly.
2. Manœuvring is not only the opposite of executing the offensive by
force, by means of great battles; it stands also opposed to every such
execution of the offensive as proceeds directly from offensive means,
let it be either an operation against the enemy’s communications, or
line of retreat, a diversion, etc., etc.
3. If we adhere to the ordinary use of the word, there is in the
conception of manœuvring an effect which is first _produced_, to a
certain extent, from nothing, that is, from a state of rest or
_equilibrium_ through the mistakes into which the enemy is enticed. It
is like the first moves in a game of chess. It is, therefore, a game of
evenly-balanced powers, to obtain results from favourable opportunity,
and then to use these as an advantage over the enemy.
4. But those interests which, partly as the final object, partly as the
principal supports (pivot) of action, must be considered in this
matter, are chiefly:—
(_a._) The subsistence from which it is our object to cut off the
enemy, or to impede his obtaining.
(_b._) The junction with other corps.
(_c._) The threatening other communications with the interior of the
country, or with other armies or corps.
(_d._) Threatening the retreat.
(_e._) Attack of isolated points with superior forces
These five interests may establish themselves in the smallest features
of detail belonging to any particular situation; and any such object
then becomes, on that account, a point round which everything for a
time revolves. A bridge, a road, or an entrenchment, often thus plays
the principal part. It is easy to show in each case that it is only the
relation which any such object has to one of the above interests which
gives it importance.
(_f._) The result of a successful manœuvre, then, is for the offensive,
or rather for the active party (which may certainly be just as well the
defensive), a piece of land, a magazine, etc.
(_g._) In a strategic manœuvre two converse propositions appear, which
look like different manœuvres, and have sometimes served for the
derivation of false maxims and rules, and have four branches, which
are, however, in reality, all necessary constituents of the same thing,
and are to be regarded as such. The first antithesis is the surrounding
the enemy, and the operating on interior lines; the second is the
concentration of forces, and their extension over several posts.
(_h._) As regards the first antithesis, we certainly cannot say that
one of its members deserves a general preference over the other; for
partly it is natural that action of one kind calls forth the other as
its natural counterpoise, its true remedy; partly the enveloping form
is homogeneous to the attack, but the use of interior lines to the
defence; and therefore, in most cases, the first is more suitable to
the offensive side, the latter to the defensive. That form will gain
the upper hand which is used with the greatest skill.
(_i._) The branches of the other antithesis can just as little be
classed the one above the other. The stronger force has the choice of
extending itself over several posts; by that means he will obtain for
himself a convenient strategic situation, and liberty of action in many
respects, and spare the physical powers of his troops. The weaker, on
the other hand, must keep himself more concentrated, and seek by
rapidity of movement to counteract the disadvantage of his inferior
numbers. This greater mobility supposes greater readiness in marching.
The weaker must therefore put a greater strain on his physical and
moral forces,—a final result which we must naturally come upon
everywhere if we would always be consistent, and which, therefore, we
regard, to a certain extent, as the logical test of the reasoning. The
campaigns of Frederick the Great against Daun, in the years 1759 and
1760, and against Laudon, 1761, and Montecuculis against Turenne in
1673, 1675, have always been reckoned the most scientific combinations
of this kind, and from them we have chiefly derived our view.
(_j._) Just as the four parts of the two antitheses above supposed must
not be abused by being made the foundation of false maxims and rules,
so we must also give a caution against attaching to other general
relations, such as base, ground, etc., an importance and a decisive
influence which they do not in reality possess. The smaller the
interests at stake, so much the more important the details of time and
place become, so much the more that which is general and great falls
into the background, having, in a certain measure no place in small
calculations. Is there to be found, viewed generally, a more absurd
situation than that of Turenne in 1675, when he stood with his back
close to the Rhine, his army along a line of three miles in extent, and
with his bridge of retreat at the extremity of his right wing? But his
measures answered their object, and it is not without reason that they
are acknowledged to show a high degree of skill and intelligence. We
can only understand this result and this skill when we look more
closely into details, and judge of them according to the value which
they must have had in this particular case.
We are convinced that there are no rules of any kind for strategic
manœuvring; that no method, no general principle can determine the mode
of action; but that superior energy, precision, order, obedience,
intrepidity in the most special and trifling circumstances may find
means to obtain for themselves signal advantages, and that, therefore,
chiefly on those qualities will depend the victory in this sort of
contest.