The overthrow of the enemy is the aim in war; destruction of the
hostile military forces, the means both in attack and defence. By the
destruction of the enemy’s military force, the defensive is led on to
the offensive, the offensive is led by it to the conquest of territory.
Territory is, therefore, the object of the attack; but that need not be
a whole country, it may be confined to a part, a province, a strip of
country, a fortress. All these things may have a substantial value from
their political importance, in treating for peace, whether they are
retained or exchanged.
The object of the strategic attack is, therefore, conceivable in an
infinite number of gradations, from the conquest of the whole country
down to that of some insignificant place. As soon as this object is
attained, and the attack ceases, the defensive commences. We may,
therefore, represent to ourselves the strategic attack as a distinctly
limited unit. But it is not so if we consider the matter practically,
that is in accordance with actual phenomena. Practically the moments of
the attack, that is, its views and measures, often glide just as
imperceptibly into the defence as the plans of the defence into the
offensive. It is seldom, or at all events not always, that a general
lays down positively for himself what he will conquer, he leaves that
dependent on the course of events. His attack often leads him further
than he had intended; after rest more or less, he often gets renewed
strength, without our being obliged to make out of this two quite
different acts; at another time he is brought to a standstill sooner
than he expected, without, however, giving up his intentions, and
changing to a real defensive. We see, therefore, that if the successful
defence may change imperceptibly into the offensive; so on the other
hand an attack may, in like manner, change into a defence. These
gradations must be kept in view, in order to avoid making a wrong
application of what we have to say of the attack in general.