For some time to come we are likely to see, in all the leading nations,

a restricted birth-rate, prompted by desire for social betterment,

combined, however, with concessions to the rival policy of commercial

expansion, growing numbers, and military preparation. The nations will

not cease to fear and suspect each other in the twentieth century, and

any one nation which chooses to be a nuisance to Europe will keep back

the progress and happiness of the rest. The prospect is not very bright;

a too generous confidence might betray some nation into irretrievable

disaster. But the bracing influence of national danger may perhaps be

beneficial. For we have to remember the pitiable decay of the ancient

classical civilisation, which was partly due, as we have found, to a

desire for comfortable and easy living. There have been signs that many

of our countrymen no longer think the strenuous life worth while; part

of our resentment against Germany resembles the annoyance of an

old-fashioned firm, disturbed in its comfortable security by the

competition of a young and more vigorous rival. It is even suggested

that after the war we should protect ourselves against German

competition by tariff walls. This abandonment of the free trade policy

on which our prosperity is built would soon bring our over-populated

island to ruin.

In conclusion, if we leave the distant future to fend for itself when

the time comes, what should be our policy with regard to population for

the next fifty years? I am led to an opinion which may seem to run

counter to the general purport of this article. For though the British

Isles are even dangerously full, so that we are liable to be starved out

if we lose the command of the sea, the British Empire is very far from

being over-populated. In Canada and Australasia there is probably room

for nearly 200,000,000 people. These countries are remarkably healthy

for Northern Europeans; there is no reason why they should not be as

rich and powerful as the United States are now. We hope that we have

saved the Empire from German cupidity--for the time; but we cannot tell

how long we may be undisturbed. It would be criminal folly not to make

the most of the respite granted us, by peopling our Dominions with our

own stock, while yet there is time. This, however, cannot be done by

casual and undirected emigration of the old kind. We need an Imperial

Board of Emigration, the officials of which will work in co-operation

with the Governments of our Dominions. These Governments, it may be

presumed, will be anxious, after the war, to strengthen the colonies by

increasing their population and developing their resources. They, like

ourselves, have had a severe fright, and know that prompt action is

necessary. Systematic plans of colonisation should be worked out, and

emigrants drafted off to the Dominions as work can be found for them.

Young women should be sent out in sufficient numbers to keep the sexes

equal. We know now that our young people who emigrate are by no means

lost to the Empire. The Dominions have shown that in time of need they

are able and willing to defend the mother country with their full

strength. Indeed, a young couple who emigrate are likely to be of more

value to the Empire than if they had stayed at home; and their chances

of happiness are much increased if they find a home in a part of the

world where more human beings are wanted. But without official advice

and help emigration is difficult. Parents do not know where to send

their sons, nor what training to give them. Mistakes are made, money is

wasted, and bitter disappointment caused. All this may be obviated if

the Government will take the matter up seriously. The real issue of this

war is whether our great colonies are to continue British; and the

question will be decided not only on the field of battle, but by the

action of our Government and people after peace is declared. The next

fifty years will decide for all time whether those magnificent and still

empty countries are to be the home of great nations speaking our

language, carrying on our institutions, and valuing our traditions. When

the future of our Dominions is secure, the part of England as a

World-Power will have been played to a successful issue, and we may be

content with a position more consonant with the small area of these

islands.

I believe, then, that if facilities for migration are given by

Government action, it will be not only possible but desirable for the

increase in the population of the Empire, taken as a whole, to be

maintained during the twentieth century. It is, of course, possible that

chemical discoveries and other scientific improvements may greatly

increase the yield of food from the soil, and that in this way the final

limit to the population of the earth may be further off than now seems

probable. But within a few centuries, at most, this limit must be

reached; and after that we may hope that the world will agree to

maintain an equilibrium between births and deaths, that being the most

stable and the happiest condition in which human beings can live

together.[22]

FOOTNOTES:

[10] Myres, _Eugenics Review_, April, 1915.

[11] Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, _Kultur der Gegenwart_, 2, 4, 1.

[12] Cimon, Pericles, and Socrates all had three sons, and

apparently no daughters.--Zimmern, _The Greek Commonwealth_,

p. 331.

[13] _Cf. (e.g.)_ Plato, _Theaetetus_, 149.

[14] We may suppose that the disproportion of the sexes,

caused by female infanticide, was about rectified by the

deaths of males in battle and civic strife. We do not hear

that the Greek had any difficulty in finding a wife.

[15] Families, he says, were limited to one or two 'in order

to leave these rich.'

[16] The population of England and Wales is said to have

been 4,800,000 in 1600, and 6,500,000 in 1750. It was

8,890,000 in 1801, 32,530,000 in 1901, and approximately

37,000,000 in 1914.

[17] Statistics are wanting for the early part of the

industrial revolution, but my study of pedigrees leads me to

think that the average duration of life was considerably

increased in the eighteenth century.

[18] _The Family and the Nation_, p. 143.

[19] The births per 1000 married men under fifty-five in the

different classes are:--Upper and middle class, 119;

Intermediate, 132; Skilled workmen, 153; Intermediate, 158;

Unskilled workmen, 213.

[20] It must be remembered that the illegitimate birth-rate

in Berlin is scandalously high.

[21] The crude birth-rate of Ireland is wholly misleading,

because so many young couples emigrate before the birth of

their first child.

[22] The possible effect of the labour movement in

diminishing the population is considered in the next Essay.

The last two years have, in my opinion, made the outlook

less favourable.

THE FUTURE OF THE ENGLISH RACE

(THE GALTON LECTURE, 1919)

In the year 1890 Sir Charles Dilke ended his survey of 'Greater Britain'

and its problems with the prediction that 'the world's future belongs to

the Anglo-Saxon, the Russian, and the Chinese races.' This was in the

heyday of British imperialism, which was inaugurated by Seeley's

'Expansion of England' and Froude's 'Oceana,' and which inspired Mr.

Chamberlain to proclaim at Toronto in 1887 that the 'Anglo-Saxon stock

is infallibly destined to be the predominant force in the history and

civilisation of the world.' It was an arrogant, but not truculent, mood,

which reached its climax at the 1897 Jubilee, and rapidly declined

during and after the Boer war. These writers and statesmen were utterly

blind to the German peril, though the disciples of Treitschke were

already working out a theory about the future destinies of the world, in

which neither Great Britain nor Russia nor China counted for very much.

There were illusions on both sides of the North Sea, which had to be

paid for in blood. In both countries imperialism was a sentiment

curiously compounded of idealism and bombast, and supported by very

doubtful science. In the case of Germany the distortion of facts was

deliberate and monstrous. Not only was every schoolboy brought up on

cooked population statistics and falsified geography, but the thick-set,

brachycephalous Central European persuaded himself that he belonged to

the pure Nordic race, the great blond beasts of Nietzsche, which, as he

was taught, had already produced nearly all the great men in history,

and was now about to claim its proper place as master of the world.

Political anthropology is no genuine science. Race and nationality are

catchwords for which rulers find that their subjects are willing to

fight, as they fought for what they called religion four hundred years

ago. In reality, if we want to find a pure race, we must visit the

Esquimaux, or the Fuegians, or the Pygmies; we shall certainly not find

one in Europe. Our own imperialists had their illusions too, and we are

not rid of them yet, because we do not realise that the fate of races is

decided, not in the council-chamber or on the battle-field, but by the

same laws of nature which determine the distribution of the various

plants and animals of the world. It may be that by approaching our

subject from this side we shall arrive at a more scientific, if a more

chastened, anticipation of our national future than was acceptable to

the enthusiasts of expansion in the last twenty years of Queen

Victoria's reign.

The history of the world shows us that there have been three great human

reservoirs which from time to time have burst their banks and flooded

neighbouring countries. These are the Arabian peninsula, the steppes of

Central Asia, and the lands round the Baltic, the original home of the

Germanic and Anglo-Saxon peoples. The invaders in each case were

pastoral folk, who were driven from their homes by over-population, or

drought and famine, or the pressure of enemies behind them. It is easy

for nomads to 'trek,' even for great distances; and till the discovery

of gunpowder they were the most formidable of foes. The Arabs and

Northern Europeans have founded great civilisations; the Mongol hordes

have been an unmitigated curse to humanity. The invaders never kept

their blood pure. The famous Jewish nose is probably Hittite, and

certainly not Bedouin. There are no pure Turks in Europe, and the

Hungarians have lost all resemblance to Mongols. The modern Germans seem

to belong mainly to the round-headed Alpine race, which migrated into

Europe in early times from the Asiatic highlands. In England there is a

larger proportion of Nordic blood, because the Anglo-Saxons partially

exterminated the natives; but the old Mediterranean race, which had

made its way up the warm western coasts, still holds its own in

Cornwall, Wales, Ireland, and the Western Highlands; and within the last

hundred years, owing to frequent migrations, has mixed so thoroughly

with the Anglo-Saxon stock that the English are becoming darker in each

generation. This is not the result of a racial decay of the blonds, as

the American, Dr. Charles Woodruff, supposes, but is to be accounted for

by the fact that dark eyes seem to be a Mendelian dominant, and dark

hair a more potent character than light. The inhabitants of these

islands are nearly all long-headed, this being a characteristic of both

the Nordic and Mediterranean races. The round-headed invaders, who

perhaps brought with them the so-called Celtic languages at a remote

period, and imposed them upon the inhabitants, seem to have left no

other mark upon the population, though their type of head is prevalent

over a great part of France.

The ability of races to flourish in climates other than their own is a

question of supreme importance to historians and statesmen, and, it need

not be said, to emigrants. But it is only lately that it has been

studied scientifically, and the results are still tentative. German

ethnologists, of what we may call the _ædicephalous_ school, already

referred to, regard it as one of the tragedies of nature that the noble

Nordic race, to which they think they belong, dies out when it

penetrates southwards. In accordance with this law, the yellow-haired

Achæans decayed in Greece, the Lombards in North Italy, the Vandals in

Spain and Africa. After a few generations of life in a warm climate the

Aryan stock invariably disappears. We shall show reasons for thinking

that this theory is much exaggerated; but there is undoubtedly some

truth in it. It has been found to be impossible for white men to

colonise India, Burma, tropical America, and West Africa. It has been

said that 'there is in India no third generation of pure English blood.'

It is notoriously difficult to bring up even one generation of white

children in India. The French cannot maintain themselves without race

admixture in Martinique and Guadaloupe, nor the Dutch in Java, though

it is said that the expectation of life for a European in Java is as

good as in his own country. It seems to be also true that the blond race

suffers most in a hot climate. In the Philippines it was observed that

the fair-haired soldiers in the American army succumbed most readily to

disease. In Queensland the Italian colonists are said to stand the heat

better than the English, and Mr. Roosevelt, among other items of good

advice which he bestowed so liberally on the European nations, advised

us to populate the torrid parts of Australia with immigrants from the

Latin races. In Natal the English families who are settled in the

country are said to be enervated by the climate; and on the high

plateaux of the interior our countrymen find it necessary to pay

periodical visits to the coast, to be unbraced. The early deaths and not

infrequent suicides of Rand magnates may indicate that the air of the

Transvaal is too stimulating for a life of high tension and excitement.

There are even signs that the same may be true in a minor degree of the

United States of America. Both the capitalist and the working man, if

they come of English stock, seem to wear out more quickly than at home;

and the sterility of marriages among the long settled American families

is so pronounced that it can hardly be due entirely to voluntary

restriction of parentage. The effects of an unsuitable climate are

especially shown in nervous disorders, and are therefore likely to tell

most heavily on those who engage in intellectual pursuits, and perhaps

on women rather more than on men. The sterilising effects of women's

higher education in America are incontrovertible, though this inference

is hotly denied in England. At Holyoake College it was found that only

half the lady graduates afterwards married, and the average family of

those who did marry was less than two children. At Bryn Mawr only 43 per

cent, married, and had 0.84 children each; the average family per

graduate was therefore 0.37. If it be objected that new immigrants and

their children are healthy and vigorous in America, it may be truly

answered that the effects of an unfavourable climate are manifested

fully only in the third and later generations. The argument may be

further supported by the fate of black men who try to settle in Europe.

Their strongly pigmented skin, which seems to protect them from the

actinic rays of the tropical sun, so noxious to Europeans, and their

broad nostrils, which inhale a larger number of tubercle bacilli than

the narrow nose-slits of the Northerner, are disadvantages in a

temperate climate. In any case, of the many thousands of negro servants

who lived in England in the eighteenth century, it would be difficult to

find a single descendant.

But there are other factors in the problem which should make us beware

of hasty generalisations. It is obvious that since the American Republic

contains many climates in its vast area, there may be parts of it which

are perfectly healthy for Anglo-Saxons, and other parts where they

cannot live without degenerating. Very few athletes, we are told, come

from south of the fortieth parallel of latitude. But the decline in the

birth-rate is most marked in the older colonies, the New England States,

where for a long period the English colonists, living mainly on the

land, not only throve and developed a singularly virile type of

humanity, but multiplied with almost unexampled rapidity. The same is

true not only of the French Canadian farmers, but of the South African

Boers, who rear enormous families in a climate very different from that

of Holland. The inference is that Europeans living on the land may

flourish in any tolerably healthy climate which is not tropical.

There are, in fact, two other causes besides climate which may prevent

immigrants from multiplying in a new country. The first of these is the

presence of microbic diseases to which the old inhabitants are wholly or

partially immune, but which find a virgin soil in the bodies of the

newcomers. The strongest example is the West Coast of Africa, of which

Miss Mary Kingsley writes: 'Yet remember, before you elect to cast your

lot with the West Coasters, that 85 per cent, of them die of fever, or

return home with their health permanently wrecked. Also remember that

there is no getting acclimatised to the Coast. There are, it is true, a

few men out there who, although they have been resident in West Africa

for years, have never had fever, but you can count them on the fingers

of one hand.' There can be no acclimatisation where the weeding out is

as drastic as this. Either the anopheles mosquito or the European must

quit. There are parts of tropical America where the natives have

actually been protected by the malaria, which keeps the white man at

arm's length. But more often the microbe is on the side of the civilised

race, killing off the natives who have not run the gauntlet of

town-life. The extreme reluctance of the barbarians who overran the

Roman Empire to settle in the towns is easily accounted for if, as is

probable, the towns killed them off whenever they attempted to live in

them. The difference is remarkable between the fate of a conquered race

which has become accustomed to town-life, and that of one which has not.

There are no 'native quarters' in the towns of any country where the

aborigines were nomads or tillers of the soil. To the North American

Indian, residence in a town is a sentence of death. The American Indians

were accustomed to none of our zymotic diseases except malaria. In the

north they were destroyed wholesale by tuberculosis; in Mexico and Peru,

where large towns existed before the conquest, they fared better. Fiji

was devastated by measles; other barbarians by small-pox. Negroes have

acquired, through severe natural selection, a certain degree of

immunisation in America; but even now it is said that 'every other negro

dies of consumption.' There are, however, two races, both long

accustomed to town-life under horribly insanitary conditions, which have

shown that they can live in almost any climate. These are the Jews and

the Chinese. The medieval Ghetto exterminated all who were not naturally

resistant to every form of microbic disease; the modern Jew, though

often of poor physique, is hard to kill. The same may be said of the

Chinaman, who, when at home, lives under conditions which would kill

most Europeans.

The other factor, which is really promoting the gradual disappearance of

the Anglo-Saxons from the United States, is of a very different

character. The descendants of the old immigrants are on the whole the

aristocracy of the country. Now it is a law which hardly admits of

exceptions, that aristocracies do not maintain their numbers. The ruling

race rules itself out; nothing fails like success. Gibbon has called

attention to the extreme respect paid to long descent in the Roman

Empire, and to the strange fact that, in the fourth century, no

ingenuity of pedigree makers could deny that all the great families of

the Republic were extinct, so that the second-rate plebeian family of

the Anicii, whose name did appear in the Fasti, enjoyed a prestige far

greater than that of the Howards and Stanleys in this country. Our own

peerage consists chiefly of parvenus. Only six of our noble families, it

is said, can trace their descent in the male line without a break to the

fifteenth century. The peerage of Sweden tells the same tale. According

to Gallon, the custom or law of primogeniture, combined with the habit

of marrying heiresses who, as the last representatives of dwindling

families, tend to be barren, is mainly responsible for this. Additional

causes may be the greater danger which the officer-class incurs in war,

and, in former times, the executioner's axe. In our own day the

reluctance of rich and self-indulgent women to bear children is

undoubtedly a factor in the infertility of the leisured class.

This brings us naturally to the second part of our discussion--the

consideration of the causes which lead to the increase or decrease of

population. It is the most important part of our inquiry; for it is

usually assumed that the British Isles will continue to send out

colonists in large numbers, as it did in the last century, and the hopes

of the imperialist that a large part of the world will speak English for

all time depend on the untested assurance that the swarming-time of our

race is not yet over. Our starting-point must be that the pressure of

population upon the means of subsistence is a constant fact in the human

race, as in every other species of animals and plants. There is no

species in which the numbers are not kept down, far below the natural

capacity for increase, by the limitation of available food. It may not

always be easy to trace the connection between the appearance of new

lives and the passing away of old, nor to say whether it is the

birth-rate which determines the death-rate, or the death-rate the

birth-rate. But it is well known that, wherever statistics are kept, the

numbers of births and of deaths rise and fall in nearly parallel lines,

so that the net rate of increase hardly alters at all, unless some

change, which can easily be traced, occurs in the habits of the people

or in the amount of the food supply. In civilised countries the greater

care taken of human life, and its consequent prolongation, has reduced

the birth-rate, just as in the higher mammals we find a greatly

diminished fertility as compared with the lower, and a much higher

survival-rate among the offspring born. The average duration of life in

this country has increased by about one-third in the last sixty years,

and the birth-rate has fallen in almost exactly the same proportion. The

position of a nation in the scale of civilisation may almost be gauged

by its births and deaths. The order in Europe, beginning with the lowest

birth-rate, is France, Belgium, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Switzerland,

Norway, Denmark, Holland, Germany, Spain, Austria, Italy, Hungary, the

Balkan States, Russia. The order of death-rates, again beginning at the

bottom, is Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United

Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Serbia, Spain,

Bulgaria, Hungary, Roumania, Russia. These two lists, as will be seen,

correspond very nearly with the scale of descending civilisation, the

only notable exception being the low position of France in the second

list. This anomaly is explained by the fact that France having a

stationary population, the death-rate in that country corresponds nearly

with the mean expectation of life, whereas in countries where the

population is increasing rapidly, either by excess of births over deaths

or by immigration, the preponderance of young lives brings the

death-rate down. We must, therefore, be on our guard against supposing

that countries with the lowest death-rates are necessarily the most

healthy. In New Zealand, for example, the death-rate is under 10 per

1000, the lowest in the world; and though that country is undoubtedly

healthy, no one supposes that the average duration of life in New

Zealand is a hundred years. To ascertain whether a nation is long-lived,

we must correct the crude death-rate by taking into account the average

age of the population. When this correction has been made, a low

death-rate, and the low birth-rate which necessarily accompanies it, is

a sign that the doctors are doing their duty by keeping their patients

alive. If our physicians desire more maternity cases, they must make

more work for the undertaker. Large families almost always mean a high

infant mortality; and it is significant that a twelfth child has a very

much poorer chance of survival than a first or second. The agitation for

the endowment of motherhood and the reduction of infant mortality is

therefore futile, because, while other conditions remain the same, every

baby 'saved' sends another baby out of the world or prevents him from

coming into it. The number of the people is not determined by

philanthropists or even by parents. Children will come somehow whenever

there is room for them, and go when there is none. But other conditions

do not remain the same, and it is in these other conditions that we must

seek the causes of expansion or contraction in the numbers of a

community.

Outspoken Essays · 第 7 / 25 段