_In Strategetics there is but a single method whereby Opportunity may
be availed of, and that is by so augmenting kindred advantages and so
depreciating adverse advantages as to acquire for the kindred army that
particular advantage of Strategetic means which in the given situation is
the proper basis of the Strategetic movement next in sequence._
* * * * *
_At Distance._
_The chief requisite for success when acting against an adverse army at
Distance, is the advantage in MOBILITY._
The primary process is that of a Grand Manoeuvre against an adverse army
acting in the formation by Grand Columns, and the object of such Grand
Manoeuvre always is, by superior celerity of movement, to occupy:
1. The Strategic Center by the Kindred Column of Attack, thus
intersecting the Route of Communication between the adverse main body and
its Base of Operation; or to occupy:
2. The Logistic Center with the Kindred Columns of Support and of
Manoeuvre, thus intersecting the Route of Communication between the
adverse main body and its Chief Supporting Column and clearing the way
for the advance of the Kindred Column of Support against the flank and
rear of the adverse Main Body.
Obviously, the united Kindred Columns of Attack and of Support always
will constitute an overwhelming superiority in Numbers as compared with
the adverse main body.
_In Presence._
_The chief requisite for success when acting against an adverse Grand
Column in Presence, is the advantage in POSITION._
The primary process is that of a Grand Manoeuvre against an adverse army
acting in the Formation by Wings, and the object of such Grand Manoeuvre
always is, by availing to the uttermost of its situation upon the
Tactical Center, _i.e._, upon the area midway between the adverse Wings
thus isolated from each other; to act in overwhelming Numbers, first
against one and then against the other hostile bodies.
_In Contact._
_The chief requisite for success when acting offensively against an
adverse Grand Column, or Wing, or Corps d’armee, in Contact, is the
advantage in NUMBERS._
The primary process is that of a Grand Battle in which the kindred army
has an overwhelming superiority in Numbers in contact, and at least the
equality in all other Prime Strategetic Means.
In this circumstance, the object of such Grand Battle always is:
1. To attack the hostile Formation in Mass frontally at the center, and
upon both wings obliquely; all three attacks being made simultaneously
and the evolutions so executed that the hostile army never is able to
penetrate between either kindred wing and the kindred center, nor to
outflank that kindred wing which may be in the air.
2. In case the kindred army has the equality or inferiority in all
other Prime Strategetic Means, then the object of a Grand Battle on the
Offensive is to attack the hostile Formation in Mass obliquely with the
whole kindred army, and preferably upon that wing which covers the
route of communication of the adverse army with its Base of Operations,
but always upon that wing which contains the Tactical Key of the actual
Battlefield.
Obviously, the concentration of the entire kindred army against a single
adverse wing always will constitute an overwhelming superiority in
Numbers.
In making such attack obliquely against a single adverse wing, the center
and remaining wing of the kindred army must not engage until the kindred
Van and Corps of Position of the attacking wing first have formed the
_center_ of three sides of an octagon; of which the Kindred Corps of
Evolution will form the _farthest_ side and the Kindred Center and left
wing Corps d’armee will form the _nearest_ and latest constructed side.
* * * * *
_The chief requisite for success when acting defensively against a Grand
Column, or Wing, or Corps d’armee is the advantage in TOPOGRAPHY._
The primary process is that of a Grand Battle in which the kindred army,
decidedly inferior in Numbers in the aggregate, has the advantage in
Topography and equality in all other Prime Strategetic Means.
In this case the object is to support both flanks of the inferior army
upon impassable natural barriers, strengthening both wings at the expense
of the center, both in quantity and in quality of troops.
If the Tactical Defensive be selected, the center should retire before
the oncoming of the hostile army in order to enclose it between the
Kindred Wings, which will then overwhelm it by superior Numbers, while
the natural barriers on the flanks being impassable will prevent the
remaining hostile corps from participating in the battle otherwise than
as spectators.
Should the Tactical Offensive be selected, that kindred wing best adapted
for attack should engage supported by all kindred Corps of Evolution,
while advancing the Kindred Center in reserve and holding the remaining
wing refused and in observation.
All else being equal, relative advantage in either branch of Prime
Strategetic Means is sufficient to ensure victory in battle, and the
proper use of such advantage for securing victory is outlined thus: