The most magnificent illustration both of the proper and of the improper
use of the Column of Support is found in that Grand Operation executed
by the Roman consuls, Claudius Nero and Marcus Livius, whereby the
Carthagenian Army under Hasdrubal was destroyed at the river Metaurus 207
B.C.
Hannibal, with the main Carthagenian army, posted in the south of Italy
near Canusium, was observed by Nero and his troops; while in the west,
Hasdrubal, observed by Livius was slowly advancing southward to form a
junction with his brother, a most unscientific procedure.
Livius permitted Hasdrubal to penetrate into Italy to a point a few
miles south of the Metaurus River; whereupon Nero, taking 7,000 of his
best troops, by a rapid march of 200 miles united with Livius; and the
two consuls at once falling upon Hasdrubal utterly annihilated the
Carthagenian army. Nero returned at all speed and the first news of his
march and of the death blow to the Carthagenian projects against Rome
was furnished by the sight of his brother’s head, which Nero cast into
Hannibal’s camp from a military machine.
The true method for uniting the Columns of Support to a Column of Attack
is thus shown by Gustavus Adolphus:
“We encamped about Nuremberg the middle of June, the army after
so many detachments was not above 11,000 infantry and 8,000 horse
and dragoons. The King posted his army in the suburbs and drew
intrenchments around the circumference so that he begirt the
whole city with his army. His works were large, the ditch deep,
planked by innumerable bastions, ravelins, horn-works, forts,
redoubts, batteries and palisades, the incessant labor of 8000
men for fourteen days.
“On the 30th of June the Imperialists, joined to the Bavarian
army arrived and sat down 60,000 strong, between the city and the
friendly states; in order to intercept the King’s provisions and
to starve him out.
“The King had three great detachments and several smaller ones,
acting abroad, reducing to his power the castles and towns of the
adjacent countries and these he did not hasten to join him until
their work was done.
“The two chief armies had now lain for five or six weeks in
sight of each other and the King thinking all was ready, ordered
his generals to join him. Gustavus Horn was on the Moselle,
Chancellor Oxenstern about Mentz and Cologne and Dukes William
and Bernard and Gen. Bannia in Bavaria.
“Our friends were not backward in obeying the King’s command, and
having drawn together their forces from various parts and _ALL_
joined the chancellor Oxenstern, they set out in full march for
Nuremburg, where they arrived Aug. 21, being 30,000 old soldiers
commanded by officers of the greatest conduct and experience in
the world.”
* * * * *
Only once, at the battle of Torgau, (Nov. 5, 1760) did Frederick the
Great rely upon the co-operation of his Columns of Support for victory.
As the result, his Column of Attack of 25,000 men fought the entire
battle and was so ruined by the fire and sabres of 90,000 enemies and 400
pieces of artillery that, as the sun went down the King charged at the
head of two battalions, his sole remaining troops. At this moment Gen.
Zeithen, with the Column of Support, of 22,000 men occupied Siptka Hill,
the tactical key of the battlefield, and fired a salvo of artillery to
inform the King of their presence. The astonished Austrians turned and
fled; the King’s charge broke their line of battle and Frederic grasped a
victory, “for which” says Napoleon, “he was indebted to Fortune and the
only one in which he displayed no talent.”
This comment of course is not true. Frederic displayed magnificent
talent that day, by holding in check a force of thrice his numbers and
so shattering it by his incessant attacks that it crumbled to pieces
before the mere presence and at sight of his fresh and vigorous Column
of Support. Had Napoleon displayed such talent in the personal conduct
of battles during 1813, 1814 and 1815 it is possible that he would have
terminated his career at some other place than at St. Helena.
The experience, however, was enough to fully satisfy Frederic, and never
again did he attempt a Logistic battle.
* * * * *
The capture of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown is perhaps the nearest
approach to the achievement of Nero and Livius in the annals of the
military art. Decoyed by the retrograde movements of Gen. Greene, the
British army was deluded into taking up a position at Yorktown, having
the unfordable James River in rear, and within striking distance of the
main American army under Washington about New York City.
Lafayette was ordered to reinforce Greene; Count d’Esting was induced to
bring the French fleet from the West Indies to Chesapeake Bay to prevent
the rescue of Cornwallis by British coming by the ocean, and Count
Rochambeau was requested to join Washington with the French army then in
Rhode Island.
All this took time, but everything was executed like clockwork. The
French fleet arrived in the Chesapeake; the next day came a British
fleet to rescue the Earl’s army. In the naval fight which ensued, the
British were driven to sea and so damaged as to compel their return to
New York. By a swift march, Washington, with his Continentals and the
French, joined Greene and Lafayette, and two of his redoubts being taken
by storm, Lord Cornwallis surrendered. This victory established the
independence of the American Colonies.
* * * * *
The Logistic Battle, _i.e._, the combination of the Columns of Attack
and of Support was first favorite with Napoleon and to his partiality
for this particular form of the tactical offensive was due both the
spectacular successes and the annihilating catastrophes which mark his
astonishing career.
The retrieving of his lost battle of Marengo, by the fortuitous arrival
of Dessaix column, seems to have impressed Napoleon to the extent that he
ever after preferred to win by such process, rather than by any other.
The first attempt to put his new hypothesis into practice was at Jena.
Single handed his column of attack destroyed the Prussian main body,
while Davoust with the column of manoeuvre held in check over three times
his numbers.
The French Column of Support under Bernadotte did not arrive in season to
fire a shot.
* * * * *
At Eylau, the French Column of Support under Davoust was four hours
in advancing six miles against the opposition of the Russian general
Doctoroff. The second French Column of Support under Ney did not reach
the field until the battle was over.
* * * * *
In the retreat from Russia, the French Column of Support under the Duke
of Belluno was driven from its position at Smolensko, thus permitting the
Russians under Kutosof to occupy the Strategic center, which disaster
cost Napoleon 30,000 men in clearing his communications.
* * * * *
In 1813, the Column of Support under Ney at Bautzen was misdirected and
the battle rendered indecisive by its lack of co-operation with the
French Column of Attack.
* * * * *
In 1814, Napoleon conformed to the Art by acting in three columns, but
yielding to his besetting military sin, he joined his Column of Support
to his Column of Attack and through the open space thus created in the
French Strategetic Front, Blucher advanced triumphantly to Paris.
* * * * *
In the Waterloo campaign, Napoleon properly began with three Grand
Columns. At the battle of Ligny, his Column of Support arrived upon
Blucher’s left flank and then without firing a shot, wheeled about and
marched away.
At Waterloo, by uniting his Columns of Attack and of Support prematurely,
Napoleon permitted Blucher to penetrate the French Strategetic Front and
to win in the same manner and as decisively as he did at Paris.
* * * * *
Von Moltke won the battle of Sadowa by the arrival of the Prussian Column
of Support, commanded by Prince Frederic William. But in the interim, the
German main army was driven in several miles by the Austrians, and Prince
Bismark’s first white hairs date from that day.