_“Men habituated to luxury cannot contend with an army accustomed
to fatigue and inured to want.”--Caesar._
* * * * *
_“That wing with which you propose to engage the enemy should be
composed of your best troops.”--Epaminondas._
The _Sacred Band_ of the Thebans was composed of men selected for valor
and character. Epaminondas called them _Comrades_ and by honorable
rewards and distinctions induced them to bear without murmur the hardest
fatigues and to confront with intrepidity the greatest dangers.
At Leuctra (371 B.C.) and again at Mantinea (362 B.C.) the right wing
of the Lacedaemonian Army, composed exclusively of Spartans and for six
hundred years invincible, was overthrown and destroyed by the Sacred Band
led by Epaminondas.
This formidable body of Theban warriors was massacred by Alexander the
Great at the Battle of Chaeronea (338 B.C.)
* * * * *
The _Macedonian Phalanx_ was devised by Philip, King of Macedon. It was
made up of heavy infantry accoutred with cuirass, helmet, greaves, and
shield. The principal weapon was a pike twenty-four feet long.
The Phalanx had a front of two hundred and fifty-six files and a depth of
sixteen ranks. A file of sixteen men was termed Lochos; two files were
called Dilochie; four files made a Tetrarchie; eight files a Taxiarchie
and thirty-two of the last constituted a simple Phalanx of 4096 men.
A grand Phalanx had a front of one thousand and twenty-four files and
a depth of sixteen ranks. It was made up of four simple Phalanxes and
contained 16,384 men.
With this formation of his infantry, Alexander the Great, when eighteen
years of age, destroyed the Allied Athenian--Theban--Boeotian army at
Chaeronea, the hosts of Persia at the river Grancius (334 B.C.) at Issus
(333 B.C.) and Arbela (331 B.C.) and conquered Porus, King of India at
the Hydaspes (326 B.C.).
* * * * *
The _Spanish Heavy Cavalry_ and _Nubian Infantry_ of Hannibal was a
reproduction of that Macedonian organization whereby Alexander the Great
had conquered the world.
With this formation Hannibal maintained himself for fifteen years in
the richest provinces of Italy and destroyed seven Roman armies, at the
Trebia (218 B.C.) at Lake Trasymenus (217 B.C.) at Cannae (216 B.C.) and
at Herdonea (212 B.C.) at Herdonea (210 B.C.) at Locri (208 B.C.) and at
Apulia (208 B.C.).
At Zama (202 B.C.) Hannibal’s effacement as a military factor was
directly due to his lack of that organization which had been the
instrument of his previous successes; a circumstance thus commented on by
the victorious Roman commander, Scipio Africanus;
“Hitherto I have been opposed by an army without a general; now
they send against me a General without an army.”
* * * * *
The _Tenth Legion_ of Caesar was the quintessence of that perfection
in elementary tactics devised by the Romans to accord with the use of
artillery.
The fundamentals of minor tactics as elucidated by Epaminondas and
exploited by Alexander the Great and Hannibal are unchanged in the
Legion, but by subdivision of the simple Phalanx into ten Cohorts, a
necessary and maximum gain in mobility was effected.
The Roman Legion consisted of 6100 infantry and 726 cavalry, divided
into the Militarain Cohort of 1105 heavy foot, 132 Cuirassiers and nine
ordinary Cohorts, each containing 555 heavy foot and 66 Cuirassiers.
The Legion was drawn up in three lines; the first of which was termed
Principes, the second Hastati, and the third Triarii. The infantry were
protected by helmet, cuirass, greaves and shield; their arms were a long
sword, a short sword, five javelins and two large spears.
With this formation Caesar over-run Spain, Gaul, Germany, Britain,
Africa, Greece, and Italy. The Scots alone withstood him and the ruins
of a triple line of Roman entrenchments extending from the North to
the Irish Seas to this day mark the southern boundary of the Scottish
Highlands and the northern limit of Roman dominion.
At Pharseleus, Pompey made the inexplicable blunder of placing his best
troops in his right wing, which was covered by the river Enipeus and
inferior troops on his left wing which was in the air. By its first
charge, the Tenth Legion destroyed the latter, outflanked the entire
Pompeian army, drove it backward into the river and single handed won for
Caesar undisputed dominion of the Earth.
* * * * *
The _Scots Volunteers_ of Gustavus Adolphus consisted of two brigades
aggregating about 12,000 foot, made up of Scottish gentlemen who for
various reasons were attracted to the Continental Wars.
At Leipsic, (Sept. 7, 1631) 20,000 Saxons, constituting one-half of the
allied Protestant army, were routed at the first charge, put to flight
and never seen again. Tilly’s victorious right wing then turned upon the
flank of the King’s army. Three regiments of the Scots Volunteers on foot
held in check in open field 12,000 of the best infantry and cavalry in
Europe, until Gustavus had destroyed the Austrian main body and hastened
to their aid with the Swedish heavy cavalry.
The Castle of Oppenheim was garrisoned by 800 Spanish infantry. Gustavus
drew up 2,000 Swedes to escalade the place. Thirty Scots Volunteers,
looking on observed that the Spaniards, intently watching the King had
neglected to guard the opposite side of the fortress. Beckoning to their
aid about a hundred of their comrades, they scaled the wall, captured the
garrison and opened the gates to the king. Gustavus entered on foot, hat
in hand. “My brave Scots,” said he, “you carry in your scabbards, the key
to every castle in Europe.”
* * * * *
The _Van-Guard_ of Frederic the Great is the perfect adaptation of the
minor tactics of Epaminondas to gunpowder. This choice body was made
up of the best troops in the army divided into infantry, cuirassiers,
dragoons and light artillery.
The Van-Guard, a miniature army in itself, always marched between the
main body and the enemy; it always led in the attack, followed by that
wing containing the best soldiers, in two lines; and supported by the
heavy cavalry on that flank.
At Rosbach (Nov. 5, 1757) the Prussian Van-Guard, composed of 4,800
infantry, 2,500 cavalry and 30 guns, annihilated 70,000 French regular
troops, by evolutions so rapidly executed that the Prussian main army
was unable to overtake either pursuers or pursued and had no part in the
battle, other than as highly interested spectators.
The _Continentals_ of the Revolutionary army under Washington were made
up of troops enlisted for the war and trained by Baron von Steuben, a
Major-General in the Prussian service, who had served throughout the
Seven Years War under Frederic the Great.
The Continentals, without firing a shot, carried by assault, Stony
Point (July 16, 1779), Paulus Hook (July 20, 1779) and the British
intrenchments at Yorktown (Oct. 19, 1781). Of these troops, the Baron von
Steuben writes:
“I am satisfied with having shown to those who understand the
Art of Warfare, an American army worthy of their approbation;
officers who know their profession and who would do honor to any
army in Europe; an infantry such as England has never brought
into the field, soldiers temperate, well-drilled and obedient and
the equal of any in the world.”
* * * * *
The _Consular Guard_ was the reproduction of the Van Guard of Frederic
the Great, but its sphere of action was strangely restricted by
Bonaparte, who, instead of placing his best troops in the front of his
army, as is the practice of all other of the Great Captains; subordinated
their functions to that of a reserve and to personal attendance upon
himself.
This Corps d’elite was but once notably in action; at Marengo (June 14,
1800) it undoubtedly saved the day for France, by maintaining the battle
until the arrival of Gen. Desaix and his division.
* * * * *
The _Imperial Guard_ of Napoleon was the development of the Consular
Guard of Bonaparte. Under the Empire the Guard became an independent
army, consisting of light and heavy infantry, horse and field artillery,
cuirassiers, dragoons, hussars and chasseurs, and composed of the best
troops in the French service.
The functions of this fine body, like that of its prototype, was limited
to the duties of a reserve and to attendance upon the person of the
Emperor; and perhaps next to announcement of victory, Napoleon’s favorite
bulletin always read, “The Imperial Guard was not engaged.”
Many were the unavailing remonstrances made by his advisors against this
policy, which judged by the practice of the great masters of warfare, is
putting the cart before the horse; and seemingly is that speck of cloud
in Napoleon’s political sky, which properly may be deemed a precursor of
St. Helena.
At Austerlitz (Dec. 2, 1805), the cuirassiers of the French Imperial
Guard routed a like body of Russian cavalry. At Eylau (Nov. 7, 1807) the
Guard, as at Marengo again saved the day, after the corps d’armee of
Soult and Angereau had been destroyed, by maintaining the battle until
the arrival of Ney and Davoust. In the retreat from Russia (1812) the
Guard then numbering 64,000 men was nearly destroyed. What was left of
it won at Ligny (June 16, 1815), Napoleon’s last victory and at Waterloo
(June 18, 1815), one of its two surviving divisions covered the flight of
the French army, while the other escorted Napoleon in safety to Paris.
* * * * *
The _Royal Prussian Guard_, under Von Moltke, was organized and utilized
in accord with the teachings of Frederic the Great.
Its most notable achievement occurred in the campaign of 1870. The right
flank of the French having been turned by the battle of Woerth (Aug.
4, 1870) and Marshal MacMahon’s army being driven to the westward, it
became the paramount object of Von Moltke to seize the country in rear of
Metz and thus prevent the retreat of Marshall Bazine across the Moselle
River.
The Royal Prussian Guard out-marching both friends and enemies first
reached the Nancy road (Aug. 18, 1870) and until the German corps reached
the battlefield this body of picked troops successfully withstood the
assault of nearly the entire French army. In the first half-hour the
Guard lost 8,000 men.
As the result of all this, Marshal Bazine with 150,000 men was forced
back into and taken in the intrenched camp at Metz; and the Emperor
Napoleon III, Marshal MacMahon and a second French army of 140,000 men
was captured at Sedan (Sept. 1, 1870), in an attempt to rescue Marshal
Bazine.
_“I must tell you beforehand this will be a bloody touch. Tilly has a
great army of old lads with iron faces that dare look an enemy in the
eye; they are confident of victory, have never been beaten and do not
know what it means to fly. Tilly tells his men he will beat me and the
old man is as likely to do it as to say it.”--Gustavus Adolphus._
“Tilly’s men were rugged, surly fellows; their faces mangled by wounds
and scars had an air of hardy courage. I observed of them that their
clothes were always dirty, their armor rusty from winter storms and
bruised by musket-balls, their weapons sharp and bright. They were
used to camp in the open fields and to sleep in the frosts and rain.
The horses like the men were strong and hardy and knew by rote their
exercises. Both men and animals so well understood the trade of arms that
a general command was sufficient; every man was fit to command the whole,
and all evolutions were performed in order and with readiness, at a note
of the trumpet or a motion of their banners.
“The 7th of Sept. (1631) before sunrise, the Swedish army marched from
Dieben to a large field about a mile from Leipsic, where we found old
Tilly’s army in full battalia in admirable order, which made a show both
glorious and terrible.
“Tilly, like a fair gamester, had taken up but one side of the plain,
and left the other side clear and all the avenues open to the King’s
approach, nor did he stir to the charge until the Swedish army was
fully drawn up and was advancing toward him. He had with him 44,000 old
soldiers and a better army I believe never was so soundly beaten.…
“Then was made a most dreadful slaughter, and yet there was no flying.
Tilly’s men might be killed or knocked down, but no man turned his back,
nor would give an inch of ground, save as they were marched, wheeled, or
retreated by their officers.… About six o’clock the field was cleared of
the enemy except at one place on the King’s front, where some of them
rallied; and though they knew that all was lost, they would take no
quarter, but fought it out to the last man, being found dead the next day
in rank and file as they were drawn up.”
* * * * *
Perfection in Organization is attained when troops instantly and
intelligently act according to order and execute with exactness and
precision any and every prescribed evolution.