(From the _New York Journal_, Dec. 26, 1899 By =Franklin K. Young=.)
“The position of the British armies is deplorable.
“With the single exception of Gen. Buller’s force, the situation of these
bodies of British troops, thus unfortunately circumstanced, is cause for
the greatest anxiety.
“Strong indications point to a grand offensive movement on the part of
the Boers, with the object of terminating the war in one campaign and by
a single blow.
“True, this movement may be but a feint, but if it be a true movement, it
is difficult to over-estimate the gravity of the situation of the British
in South Africa.
“For if this movement is a true military movement, it shows as clearly
as the sun in the sky to those who know the Strategetic Art, that the
Boer armies are in transition from the defensive to an offensive plan of
campaign, with the purpose of capturing DeArr and from thence advancing
in force against the chief British depot, Capetown.”
* * * * *
The United States War Department, _Report on the British-Boer War_,
published June 14, 1901, contains the following:
(By =Capt. S. L’H. Slocum=, December 25, 1899. U. S. Military Attache
with the British Army.)
“I consider the present situation to be the most critical for the English
forces, since hostilities began. Should the Boers assume offensive
operations, the English armies with their long and thinly guarded lines
of communication, would be placed in great jeopardy.”
* * * * *
(By =Chas. S. Goldmann=, war correspondent with Gen. Buller and Lord
Roberts in the South African Campaign. MacMillan & Co., 1902.)
“Had the defence (of Cape Colony) been entrusted to less capable hands
than those of Gen. French, who, with a mere handful of troops succeeded
not only in checking the Boer advance, but in driving them back on
Colesberg, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the enemy would have
been able to push on south and west to Craddock and Hex River range and
thus bring about a state of affairs which might have shaken British rule
in South Africa to its foundation.”