1793 - 1795
The AGAMEMNON sent to the Mediterranean --Commencement of Nelson's
Aquaintance with Sir W. Hamilton--He is sent to Corsica, to cooperate
with Paoli--State of Affairs in that Island--Nelson undertakes the Siege
of Bastia, and reduces it--Takes a distinguished Part in the Siege of
Calvi, where he loses an Eye--Admiral Hotham's Action--The AGAMEMNON
ordered to Genoa, to co-operate with the Austrian and Sardinian
Forces--Gross Misconduct of the Austrian General.
"THERE are three things, young gentleman," said Nelson to one of his
midshipmen, "which you are constantly to bear in mind. First, you must
always implicitly obey orders, without attempting to form any opinion of
your own respecting their propriety; secondly, you must consider every
man your enemy who speaks ill of your king; and, thirdly, you must hate
a Frenchman as you do the devil." With these feelings he engaged in the
war. Josiah, his son-in-law, went with him as a midshipman.
The AGAMEMNON was ordered to the Mediterranean under Lord Hood. The
fleet arrived in those seas at a time when the south of France would
willingly have formed itself into a separate republic, under the
protection of England. But good principles had been at that time
perilously abused by ignorant and profligate men; and, in its fear
and hatred of democracy, the English Government abhorred whatever was
republican. Lord Hood could not take advantage of the fair occasion
which presented itself; and which, if it had been seized with vigour,
might have ended in dividing France:--but he negotiated with the people
of Toulon, to take possession provisionally of their port and city;
which, fatally for themselves, was done. Before the British fleet
entered, Nelson was sent with despatches to Sir William Hamilton, our
envoy at the Court of Naples. Sir William, after his first interview
with him, told Lady Hamilton he was about to introduce a little man to
her, who could not boast of being very handsome; but such a man as, he
believed, would one day astonish the world. "I have never before," he
continued, "entertained an officer at my house; but I am determined
to bring him here. Let him be put in the room prepared for Prince
Augustus." Thus that acquaintance began which ended in the destruction
of Nelson's domestic happiness. It seemed to threaten no such
consequences at its commencement. He spoke of Lady Hamilton, in a letter
to his wife, as a young woman of amiable manners, who did honour to the
station to which she had been raised; and he remarked, that she had been
exceedingly kind to Josiah. The activity with which the envoy exerted
himself in procuring troops from Naples, to assist in garrisoning
Toulon, so delighted him, that he is said to have exclaimed, "Sir
William, you are a man after my own heart!--you do business in my own
way:" and then to have added, "I am now only a captain; but I will, if I
live, be at the top of the tree." Here, also, that acquaintance with
the Neapolitan court commenced, which led to the only blot upon Nelson's
public character. The king, who was sincere at that time in his enmity
to the French, called the English the saviours of Italy, and of his
dominions in particular. He paid the most flattering attentions to
Nelson, made him dine with him, and seated him at his right hand.
Having accomplished this mission, Nelson received orders to join
Commodore Linzee at Tunis. On the way, five sail of the enemy were
discovered off the coast of Sardinia, and he chased them. They proved to
be three forty-four gun frigates, with a corvette of twenty-four and
a brig of twelve. The AGAMEMNON had only 345 men at quarters, having
landed part of her crew at Toulon, and others being absent in prizes.
He came near enough one of the frigates to engage her, but at great
disadvantage, the Frenchman manoeuvring well and sailing greatly better.
A running fight of three hours ensued, during which the other ships,
which were at some distance, made all speed to come up. By this time the
enemy was almost silenced, when a favourable change of wind enabled her
to get out of reach of the AGAMEMNON's guns; and that ship had received
so much damage in the rigging that she could not follow her. Nelson,
conceiving that this was but the forerunner of a far more serious
engagement, called his officers together, and asked them if the ship was
fit to go into action against such a superior force without some small
refit and refreshment for the men. Their answer was, that she certainly
was not. He then gave these orders,--"Veer the ship, and lay her head
to the westward: let some of the best men be employed in refitting the
rigging, and the carpenter in getting crows and capstan-bars to prevent
our wounded spars from coming down: and get the wine up for the people,
with some bread, for it may be half an hour good before we are again
in action." But when the French came up, their comrade made signals of
distress, and they all hoisted out their boats to go to her assistance,
leaving the AGAMEMNON unmolested.
Nelson found Commodore Linzee at Tunis, where he had been sent to
expostulate with the dey upon the impolicy of his supporting the
revolutionary government of France. Nelson represented to him the
atrocity of that government. Such arguments were of little avail
in Barbary; and when the Dey was told that the French had put their
sovereign to death, he drily replied, that "Nothing could be more
heinous; and yet, if historians told the truth, the English had once
done the same." This answer had doubtless been suggested by the
French about him: they had completely gained the ascendancy, and all
negotiation on our part proved fruitless. Shortly afterward, Nelson was
detached with a small squadron, to co-operate with General Paoli and the
Anti-Gallican party in Corsica.
Some thirty years before this time the heroic patriotism of the
Corsicans, and of their leader Paoli, had been the admiration of
England. The history of these brave people is but a melancholy tale. The
island which they inhabit has been abundantly blessed by nature; it
has many excellent harbours; and though the MALARIA, or pestilential
atmosphere, which is so deadly in many parts of Italy and of the Italian
islands, prevails on the eastern coast, the greater part of the country
is mountainous and healthy. It is about 150 miles long, and from 40
to 50 broad; in circumference, some 320; a country large enough, and
sufficiently distant from the nearest shores, to have subsisted as an
independent state, if the welfare and happiness of the human race
had ever been considered as the end and aim of policy. The Moors, the
Pisans, the kings of Aragon, and the Genoese, successively attempted,
and each for a time effected its conquest. The yoke of the Genoese
continued longest, and was the heaviest. These petty tyrants ruled
with an iron rod; and when at any time a patriot rose to resist their
oppressions, if they failed to subdue him by force they resorted to
assassination. At the commencement of the last century they quelled one
revolt by the aid of German auxiliaries, whom the Emperor Charles VI.
sent against a people who had never offended him, and who were fighting
for whatever is most dear to man. In 1734 the war was renewed; and
Theodore, a Westphalian baron, then appeared upon the stage. In that
age men were not accustomed to see adventurers play for kingdoms, and
Theodore became the common talk of Europe. He had served in the
French armies; and having afterwards been noticed both by Ripperda and
Alberoni, their example, perhaps, inflamed a spirit as ambitious and as
unprincipled as their own. He employed the whole of his means in raising
money and procuring arms; then wrote to the leaders of the Corsican
patriots, to offer them considerable assistance, if they would erect
Corsica into an independent kingdom, and elect him king. When he landed
among them, they were struck with his stately person, his dignified
manners, and imposing talents. They believed the magnificent promises of
foreign assistance which he held out, and elected him king accordingly.
Had his means been as he represented them, they could not have acted
more wisely than in thus at once fixing the government of their country,
and putting an end to those rivalries among the leading families, which
had so often proved pernicious to the public weal. He struck money,
conferred titles, blocked up the fortified towns which were held by the
Genoese, and amused the people with promises of assistance for about
eight months: then, perceiving that they cooled in their affections
towards him in proportion as their expectations were disappointed, he
left the island, under the plea of expediting himself the succours which
he had so long awaited. Such was his address, that he prevailed upon
several rich merchants in Holland, particularly the Jews, to trust him
with cannon and warlike stores to a great amount. They shipped these
under the charge of a supercargo. Theodore returned with this supercargo
to Corsica, and put him to death on his arrival, as the shortest way of
settling the account. The remainder of his life was a series of deserved
afflictions. He threw in the stores which he had thus fraudulently
obtained; but he did not dare to land, for Genoa had now called in the
French to their assistance, and a price had been set upon his head.
His dreams of royalty were now at an end; he took refuge in London,
contracted debts, and was thrown into the King's Bench. After lingering
there many years, he was released under an act of insolvency, in
consequence of which he made over the kingdom of Corsica for the use of
his creditors, and died shortly after his deliverance.
The French, who have never acted a generous part in the history of the
world, readily entered into the views of the Genoese, which accorded
with their own policy: for such was their ascendancy at Genoa, that in
subduing Corsica for these allies, they were in fact subduing it for
themselves. They entered into the contest, therefore, with their usual
vigour, and their usual cruelty. It was in vain that the Corsicans
addressed a most affecting memorial to the court of Versailles; that
remorseless government persisted in its flagitious project. They poured
in troops; dressed a part of them like the people of the country, by
which means they deceived and destroyed many of the patriots; cut down
the standing corn, the vines, and the olives; set fire to the villages,
and hung all the most able and active men who fell into their hands.
A war of this kind may be carried on with success against a country so
small and so thinly peopled as Corsica. Having reduced the island to
perfect servitude, which they called peace, the French withdrew their
forces. As soon as they were gone, men, women, and boys rose at once
against their oppressors. The circumstances of the times were now
favourable to them; and some British ships, acting as allies of
Sardinia, bombarded Bastia and San Fiorenzo, and delivered them into the
hands of the patriots. This service was long remembered with gratitude:
the impression made upon our own countrymen was less favourable. They
had witnessed the heartburnings of rival chiefs, and the dissensions
among the patriots; and perceiving the state of barbarism to which
continual oppression, and habits of lawless turbulence, had reduced the
nation, did not recollect that the vices of the people were owing to
their unhappy circumstances, but that the virtues which they displayed
arose from their own nature. This feeling, perhaps, influenced the
British court, when, in 1746, Corsica offered to put herself under
the protection of Great Britain: an answer was returned, expressing
satisfaction at such a communication, hoping that the Corsicans would
preserve the same sentiments, but signifying also that the present was
not the time for such a measure.
These brave islanders then formed a government for themselves, under two
leaders, Gaffori and Matra, who had the title of protectors. The latter
is represented as a partisan of Genoa, favouring the views of the
oppressors of his country by the most treasonable means. Gaffori was
a hero worthy of old times. His eloquence was long remembered with
admiration. A band of assassins was once advancing against him; he heard
of their approach, went out to meet them; and, with a serene dignity
which overawed them, requested them to hear him. He then spake to them
so forcibly of the distresses of their country, her intolerable wrongs,
and the hopes and views of their brethren in arms, that the very men
who had been hired to murder him, fell at his feet, implored his
forgiveness, and joined his banner. While he was besieging the Genoese
in Corte, a part of the garrison perceiving the nurse with his eldest
son, then an infant in arms, straying at a little distance from the
camp, suddenly sallied out and seized them. The use they made of their
persons was in conformity to their usual execrable conduct. When Gaffori
advanced to batter the walls, they held up the child directly over that
part of the wall at which the guns were pointed. The Corsicans stopped:
but Gaffori stood at their head, and ordered them to continue the fire.
Providentially the child escaped, and lived to relate, with becoming
feeling, a fact so honourable to his father. That father conducted
the affairs of the island till 1753, when he was assassinated by some
wretches, set on, it is believed, by Genoa, but certainly pensioned by
that abominable government after the deed. He left the country in such a
state that it was enabled to continue the war two years after his death
without a leader: the Corsicans then found one worthy of their cause in
Pasquale de Paoli.
Paoli's father was one of the patriots who effected their escape from
Corsica when the French reduced it to obedience. He retired to Naples,
and brought up his youngest son in the Neapolitan service. The Corsicans
heard of young Paoli's abilities, and solicited him to come over to
his native country, and take the command. He did not hesitate long:
his father, who was too far advanced in years to take an active part
himself, encouraged him to go; and when they separated, the old man fell
on his neck, and kissed him, and gave him his blessing. "My son," said
he, "perhaps I may never see you more; but in my mind I shall ever be
present with you. Your design is great and noble; and I doubt not
but God will bless you in it. I shall devote to your cause the little
remainder of my life in offering up my prayers for your success." When
Paoli assumed the command, he found all things in confusion: he formed
a democratical government, of which he was chosen chief: restored the
authority of the laws; established a university; and took such measures,
both for repressing abuses and moulding the rising generation, that, if
France had not interfered, upon its wicked and detestable principle of
usurpation, Corsica might at this day have been as free, and flourishing
and happy a commonwealth as any of the Grecian states in the days of
their prosperity. The Genoese were at this time driven out of their
fortified towns, and must in a short time have been expelled. France was
indebted some millions of livres to Genoa: it was not convenient to pay
this money; so the French minister proposed to the Genoese, that she
should discharge the debt by sending six battalions to serve in Corsica
for four years. The indignation which this conduct excited in all
generous hearts was forcibly expressed by Rousseau, who, with all his
errors, was seldom deficient in feeling for the wrongs of humanity. "You
Frenchmen," said he, writing to one of that people, "are a thoroughly
servile nation, thoroughly sold to tyranny, thoroughly cruel and
relentless in persecuting the unhappy. If you knew of a freeman at the
other end of the world, I believe you would go thither for the mere
pleasure of extirpating him."
The immediate object of the French happened to be purely mercenary: they
wanted to clear off their debt to Genoa; and as the presence of their
troops in the island effected this, they aimed at doing the people no
farther mischief. Would that the conduct of England had been at this
time free from reproach! but a proclamation was issued by the English
government, after the peace of Paris, prohibiting any intercourse with
the rebels of Corsica. Paoli said, he did not expect this from Great
Britain. This great man was deservedly proud of his country. "I defy
Rome, Sparta, or Thebes," he would say, "to show me thirty years of such
patriotism as Corsica can boast!" Availing himself of the respite which
the inactivity of the French and the weakness of the Genoese allowed,
he prosecuted his plans of civilising the people. He used to say, that
though he had an unspeakable pride in the prospect of the fame to which
he aspired; yet if he could but render his countrymen happy, he could
be content to be forgotten. His own importance he never affected to
undervalue. "We are now to our country," said he, "like the prophet
Elisha stretched over the dead child of the Shunamite,--eye to eye, nose
to nose, mouth to mouth. It begins to recover warmth, and to revive: I
hope it will yet regain full health and vigour."
But when the four years were expired, France purchased the sovereignty
of Corsica from the Genoese for forty millions of livres; as if the
Genoese had been entitled to sell it; as if any bargain and sale could
justify one country in taking possession of another against the will of
the inhabitants, and butchering all who oppose the usurpation! Among the
enormities which France has committed, this action seems but as a
speck; yet the foulest murderer that ever suffered by the hand of the
executioner has infinitely less guilt upon his soul than the statesman
who concluded this treaty, and the monarch who sanctioned and confirmed
it. A desperate and glorious resistance was made, but it was in vain;
no power interposed in behalf of these injured islanders, and the French
poured in as many troops as were required. They offered to confirm Paoli
in the supreme authority, only on condition that he would hold it under
their government. His answer was, that "the rocks which surrounded him
should melt away before he would betray a cause which he held in common
with the poorest Corsican." This people then set a price upon his
head. During two campaigns he kept them at bay: they overpowered him
at length; he was driven to the shore, and having escaped on shipboard,
took refuge in England. It is said that Lord Shelburne resigned his
seat in the cabinet because the ministry looked on without attempting to
prevent France from succeeding in this abominable and important act of
aggrandizement. In one respect, however, our country acted as became
her. Paoli was welcomed with the honours which he deserved, a pension of
L1200 was immediately granted him, and provision was liberally made for
his elder brother and his nephew.
About twenty years Paoli remained in England, enjoying the friendship of
the wise and the admiration of the good. But when the French Revolution
began, it seemed as if the restoration of Corsica was at hand. The whole
country, as if animated by one spirit, rose and demanded liberty;
and the National Assembly passed a decree recognising the island as a
department of France, and therefore entitled to all the privileges of
the new French constitution. This satisfied the Corsicans, which it
ought not to have done; and Paoli, in whom the ardour of youth was
passed, seeing that his countrymen were contented, and believing that
they were about to enjoy a state of freedom, naturally wished to return
to his native country. He resigned his pension in the year 1790, and
appeared at the bar of the Assembly with the Corsican deputies, when
they took the oath of fidelity to France. But the course of events in
France soon dispelled those hopes of a new and better order of things,
which Paoli, in common with so many of the friends of human-kind, had
indulged; and perceiving, after the execution of the king, that a civil
war was about to ensue, of which no man could foresee the issue,
he prepared to break the connection between Corsica and the French
Republic. The convention suspecting such a design, and perhaps
occasioning it by their suspicions, ordered him to their bar. That way
he well knew led to the guillotine; and returning a respectful answer,
he declared that he would never be found wanting in his duty, but
pleaded age and infirmity as a reason for disobeying the summons.
Their second order was more summary; and the French troops, who were in
Corsica, aided by those of the natives, who were either influenced by
hereditary party feelings, or who were sincere in Jacobinism, took the
field against him. But the people were with him. He repaired to Corte,
the capital of the island, and was again invested with the authority
which he had held in the noonday of his fame. The convention upon this
denounced him as a rebel, and set a price upon his head. It was not the
first time that France had proscribed Paoli.
Paoli now opened a correspondence with Lord Hood, promising, if the
English would make an attack upon St. Fiorenzo from the sea, he would at
the same time attack it by land. This promise he was unable to perform;
and Commodore Linzee, who, in reliance upon it, was sent upon this
service, was repulsed with some loss. Lord Hood, who had now been
compelled to evacuate Toulon, suspected Paoli of intentionally deceiving
him. This was an injurious suspicion. Shortly afterwards he dispatched
Lieutenant-Colonel (afterward Sir John) Moore and Major Koehler
to confer with him upon a plan of operations. Sir Gilbert Elliot
accompanied them; and it was agreed that, in consideration of the
succours, both military and naval, which his Britannic Majesty should
afford for the purpose of expelling the French, the island of Corsica
should be delivered into the immediate possession of his Majesty,
and bind itself to acquiesce in any settlement he might approve of
concerning its government, and its future relation with Great Britain.
While this negotiation was going on, Nelson cruised off the island with
a small squadron, to prevent the enemy from throwing in supplies. Close
to St. Fiorenzo the French had a storehouse of flour near their only
mill: he watched an opportunity, and landed 120 men, who threw the flour
into the sea, burnt the mill, and re-embarked before 1000 men, who were
sent against him, could occasion them the loss of a single man. While he
exerted himself thus, keeping out all supplies, intercepting despatches,
attacking their outposts and forts, and cutting out vessels from the
bay,--a species of warfare which depresses the spirit of an enemy
even more than it injures them, because of the sense of individual
superiority which it indicates in the assailants--troops were landed,
and St. Fiorenzo was besieged. The French finding themselves unable
to maintain their post sunk one of their frigates, burnt another,
and retreated to Bastia. Lord Hood submitted to General Dundas, who
commanded the land forces, a plan for the reduction of this place:
the general declined co-operating, thinking the attempt impracticable
without a reinforcement of 2000 men, which he expected from Gibraltar.
Upon this Lord Hood determined to reduce it with the naval force under
his command; and leaving part of his fleet off Toulon, he came with the
rest to Bastia.
He showed a proper sense of respect for Nelson's services, and of
confidence in his talents, by taking care not to bring with him any
older captain. A few days before their arrival, Nelson had had what he
called a brush with the enemy. "If I had had with me 500 troops," he
said, "to a certainty I should have stormed the town; and I believe it
might have been carried. Armies go so slow that seamen think they
never mean to get forward; but I daresay they act on a surer principle,
although we seldom fail." During this partial action our army appeared
upon the heights; and having reconnoitered the place, returned to
St. Fiorenzo. "What the general could have seen to make a retreat
necessary," said Nelson, "I cannot comprehend. A thousand men would
certainly take Bastia: with five hundred and the AGAMEMNON I would
attempt it. My seamen are now what British seamen ought to be--almost
invincible. They really mind shot no more than peas." General Dundas
had not the same confidence. "After mature consideration," he said in a
letter to Lord Hood, "and a personal inspection for several days of all
circumstances, local as well as others, I consider the siege of Bastia,
with our present means and force, to be a most visionary and rash
attempt; such as no officer would be justified in undertaking." Lord
Hood replied that nothing would be more gratifying to his feelings than
to have the whole responsibility upon himself; and that he was ready and
willing to undertake the reduction of the place at his own risk with
the force and means at present there. General D'Aubant, who succeeded
at this time to the command of the army, coincided in opinion with his
predecessor, and did not think it right to furnish his lordship with a
single soldier, cannon, or any stores. Lord Hood could only obtain a few
artillerymen; and ordering on board that part of the troops who, having
been embarked as marines, "were borne on the ships" books as part of
their respective complements, he began the siege with 1183 soldiers,
artillerymen, and marines, and 250 sailors. "We are but few," said
Nelson, "but of the right sort; our general at St. Fiorenzo not giving
us one of the five regiments he has there lying idle."
These men were landed on the 4th of April, under Lieutenant-Colonel
Villettes and Nelson, who had now acquired from the army the title of
brigadier. Guns were dragged by the sailors up heights where it appeared
almost impossible to convey them--a work of the greatest difficulty, and
which Nelson said could never, in his opinion, have been accomplished
by any but British seamen. The soldiers, though less dexterous in such
service, because not accustomed, like sailors, to habitual dexterity.
behaved with equal spirit. "Their zeal," said the brigadier, "is almost
unexampled. There is not a man but considers himself as personally
interested in the event, and deserted by the general. It has, I am
persuaded, made them equal to double their numbers." This is one proof,
of many, that for our soldiers to equal our seamen, it is only necessary
for them to be equally well commanded. They have the same heart and
soul, as well as the same flesh and blood. Too much may, indeed, be
exacted from them in a retreat; but set their face toward a foe, and
there is nothing within the reach of human achievement which they
cannot perform. The French had improved the leisure which our military
commander had allowed them; and before Lord Hood commenced his
operations, he had the mortification of seeing that the enemy were
every day erecting new works, strengthening old ones, and rendering the
attempt more difficult. La Combe St. Michel, the commissioner from the
national convention, who was in the city, replied in these terms to the
summons of the British admiral--"I have hot shot for your ships, and
bayonets for your troops. When two-thirds of our men are killed, I will
then trust to the generosity of the English." The siege, however, was
not sustained with the firmness which such a reply seemed to augur. On
the 19th of May a treaty of capitulation was begun; that same evening
the troops from St. Fiorenzo made their appearance on the hills; and, on
the following morning, General d'Aubant arrived with the whole army to
take possession of Bastia.
The event of the siege had justified the confidence of the sailors; but
they themselves excused the opinion of the generals when they saw what
they had done. "I am all astonishment," said Nelson, "when I reflect on
what we have achieved; 1000 regulars, 1500 national guards, and a large
party of Corsican troops, 4000 in all, laying down their arms to 1200
soldiers, marines, and seamen! I always was of opinion, have ever acted
up to it, and never had any reason to repent it, that one Englishman was
equal to three Frenchmen. Had this been an English town, I am sure it
would not have been taken by them." When it had been resolved to attack
the place, the enemy were supposed to be far inferior in number; and
it was not till the whole had been arranged, and the siege publicly
undertaken, that Nelson received certain information of the great
superiority of the garrison. This intelligence he kept secret,
fearing lest, if so fair a pretext were afforded, the attempt would be
abandoned. "My own honour," said he to his wife, "Lord Hood's honour,
and the honour of our country, must have been sacrificed had I mentioned
what I knew; therefore you will believe what must have been my feelings
during the whole siege, when I had often proposals made to me to write
to Lord Hood to raise it." Those very persons who thus advised him, were
rewarded for their conduct at the siege of Bastia: Nelson, by whom it
may truly be affirmed that Bastia was taken, received no reward. Lord
Hood's thanks to him, both public and private, were, as he himself said,
the handsomest which man could give; but his signal merits were not so
mentioned in the despatches as to make them sufficiently known to the
nation, nor to obtain for him from government those honours to which
they so amply entitled him. This could only have arisen from the haste
in which the despatches were written; certainly not from any deliberate
purpose, for Lord Hood was uniformly his steady and sincere friend.
One of the cartel's ships, which carried the garrison of Bastia to
Toulon, brought back intelligence that the French were about to sail
from that port;-such exertions had they made to repair the damage done
at the evacuation, and to fit out a fleet. The intelligence was speedily
verified. Lord Hood sailed in quest of them toward the islands of
Hieres. The AGAMEMNON was with him. "I pray God," said Nelson, writing
to his wife, "that we may meet their fleet. If any accident should
happen to me, I am sure my conduct will be such as will entitle you to
the royal favour; not that I have the least idea but I shall return to
you, and full of honour: if not, the Lord's will be done. My name shall
never be a disgrace to those who may belong to me. The little I have,
I have given to you, except a small annuity--I wish it was more; but
I have never got a farthing dishonestly: it descends from clean hands.
Whatever fate awaits me, I pray God to bless you, and preserve you, for
your son's sake." With a mind thus prepared, and thus confident, his
hopes and wishes seemed on the point of being gratified, when the enemy
were discovered close under the land, near St. Tropez. The wind fell,
and prevented Lord Hood from getting between them and the shore, as
he designed: boats came out from Antibes and other places to their
assistance, and towed them within the shoals in Gourjean Roads, where
they were protected by the batteries on isles St. Honore and St.
Marguerite, and on Cape Garousse. Here the English admiral planned a new
mode of attack, meaning to double on five of the nearest ships; but the
wind again died away, and it was found that they had anchored in compact
order, guarding the only passage for large ships. There was no way of
effecting this passage, except by towing or warping the vessels;
and this rendered the attempt impracticable. For this time the enemy
escaped; but Nelson bore in mind the admirable plan of attack which Lord
Hood had devised, and there came a day when they felt its tremendous
effects.
The AGAMEMNON was now despatched to co-operate at the siege of Calvi
with General Sir Charles Stuart; an officer who, unfortunately for his
country, never had an adequate field allotted him far the display of
those eminent talents which were, to all who knew him, so conspicuous.
Nelson had less responsibility here than at Bastia; and was acting with
a man after his own heart, who was never sparing of himself, and slept
every night in the advanced battery. But the service was not less hard
than that of the former siege. "We will fag ourselves to death," said he
to Lord Hood, "before any blame shall lie at our doors. I trust it will
not be forgotten, that twenty-five pieces of heavy ordnance have been
dragged to the different batteries, mounted, and, all but three, fought
by seamen, except one artilleryman to point the guns." The climate
proved more destructive than the service; for this was during the lion
sun, as they call our season of the dog-days. Of 2000 men, above half
were sick, and the rest like so many phantoms. Nelson described himself
as the reed among the oaks, bowing before the storm when they were laid
low by it. "All the prevailing disorders have attacked me," said he,
"but I have not strength enough for them to fasten on." The loss from
the enemy was not great; but Nelson received a serious injury: a shot
struck the ground near him, and drove the sand and small gravel into one
of his eyes. He spoke of it slightly at the time: writing the same day
to Lord Hood, he only said that he had got a little hurt that morning,
not much; and the next day, he said, he should be able to attend his
duty in the evening. In fact, he suffered it to confine him only one
day; but the sight was lost.
After the fall of Calvi, his services were, by a strange omission,
altogether overlooked; and his name was not even mentioned in the list
of wounded. This was no ways imputable to the admiral, for he sent
home to government Nelson's journal of the siege, that they might fully
understand the nature of his indefatigable and unequalled exertions. If
those exertions were not rewarded in the conspicuous manner which they
deserved, the fault was in the administration of the day, not in Lord
Hood. Nelson felt himself neglected. "One hundred and ten days," said
he, "I have been actually engaged at sea and on shore against the enemy;
three actions against ships, two against Bastia in my ship, four boat
actions, and two villages taken, and twelve sail of vessels burnt. I do
not know that any one has done more. I have had the comfort to be always
applauded by my Commander-in-Chief, but never to be rewarded; and, what
is more mortifying, for services in which I have been wounded, others
have been praised, who, at the same time, were actually in bed, far from
the scene of action. They have not done me justice. But never mind,
I'll have a GAZETTE of my own." How amply was this second-sight of glory
realised!
The health of his ship's company had now, in his own words, been
miserably torn to pieces by as hard service as a ship's crew ever
performed: 150 were in their beds when he left Calvi; of them he lost 54
and believed that the constitutions of the rest were entirely destroyed.
He was now sent with despatches to Mr. Drake, at Genoa, and had his
first interview with the Doge. The French had, at this time, taken
possession of Vado Bay, in the Genoese territory; and Nelson foresaw
that, if their thoughts were bent on the invasion of Italy, they would
accomplish it the ensuing spring. "The allied powers," he said, "were
jealous of each other; and none but England was hearty in the cause."
His wish was for peace on fair terms, because England he thought was
draining herself to maintain allies who would not fight for themselves.
Lord Hood had now returned to England, and the command devolved on
Admiral Hotham. The affairs of the Mediterranean wore at this time a
gloomy aspect. The arts, as well as the arms of the enemy, were gaining
the ascendancy there. Tuscany concluded peace relying upon the faith of
France, which was, in fact, placing itself at her mercy. Corsica was in
danger. We had taken that island for ourselves, annexed it formally to
the crown of Great Britain, and given it a constitution as free as our
own. This was done with the consent of the majority of the inhabitants;
and no transaction between two countries was ever more fairly or
legitimately conducted: yet our conduct was unwise;--the island is large
enough to form an independent state, and such we should have made
it, under our protection, as long as protection might be needed; the
Corsicans would then have felt as a nation; but when one party had given
up the country to England, the natural consequence was that the other
looked to France. The question proposed to the people was, to which
would they belong? Our language and our religion were against us; our
unaccommodating manners, it is to be feared, still more so. The French
were better politicians. In intrigue they have ever been unrivalled; and
it now became apparent that, in spite of old wrongs, which ought
never to have been forgotten nor forgiven, their partisans were daily
acquiring strength. It is part of the policy of France, and a wise
policy it is, to impress upon other powers the opinion of its strength,
by lofty language: and by threatening before it strikes; a system which,
while it keeps up the spirit of its allies, and perpetually stimulates
their hopes, tends also to dismay its enemies. Corsica was now loudly
threatened. "The French, who had not yet been taught to feel their own
inferiority upon the seas, braved us in contempt upon that element."
They had a superior fleet in the Mediterranean, and they sent it out
with express orders to seek the English and engage them. Accordingly,
the Toulon fleet, consisting of seventeen ships of the line and five
smaller vessels, put to sea. Admiral Hotham received this information
at Leghorn, and sailed immediately in search of them. He had with him
fourteen sail of the line, and one Neapolitan seventy-four; but his
ships were only half-manned, containing but 7650 men, whereas the
enemy had 16,900. He soon came in sight of them: a general action was
expected; and Nelson, as was his custom on such occasions, wrote a
hasty letter to his wife, as that which might possibly contain his last
farewell. "The lives of all," said he, "are in the hand of Him who knows
best whether to preserve mine or not; my character and good name are in
my own keeping."
But however confident the French government might be of their naval
superiority, the officers had no such feeling; and after manoeuvring
for a day in sight of the English fleet, they suffered themselves to
be chased. One of their ships, the CA IRA, of eighty-four guns, carried
away her main and fore top-masts. The INCONSTANT frigate fired at the
disabled ship, but received so many shot that she was obliged to leave
her. Soon afterwards a French frigate took the CA IRA in tow; and
the SANS-CULOTTES, one hundred and twenty, and the JEAN BARRAS,
seventy-four, kept about gunshot distance on her weather bow. The
AGAMEMNON stood towards her, having no ship of the line to support her
within several miles. As she drew near, the CA IRA fired her stern guns
so truly, that not a shot missed some part of the ship; and latterly,
the masts were struck by every shot. It had been Nelson's intention not
to fire before he touched her stern; but seeing how impossible it was
that he should be supported, and how certainly the AGAMEMNON must
be severely cut up if her masts were disabled, he altered his plan
according to the occasion. As soon, therefore, as he was within a
hundred yards of her stern, he ordered the helm to be put a-starboard,
and the driver and after-sails to be brailed up and shivered; and, as
the ship fell off, gave the enemy her whole broadside. They instantly
braced up the after-yards, put the helm a-port, and stood after her
again. This manoeuvre he practised for two hours and a quarter, never
allowing the CA IRA to get a single gun from either side to bear on him;
and when the French fired their after-guns now, it was no longer with
coolness and precision, for every shot went far ahead. By this time her
sails were hanging in tatters, her mizen-top-mast, mizen-top-sail, and
cross-jack-yards shot away. But the frigate which had her in tow hove in
stays, and got her round. Both these French ships now brought their
guns to bear, and opened their fire. The AGAMEMNON passed them within
half-pistol shot; almost every shot passed over her, for the French had
elevated their guns for the rigging, and for distant firing, and did not
think of altering the elevation. As soon as the AGAMEMNON's after-guns
ceased to bear, she hove in stays, keeping a constant fire as she came
round; and being worked, said Nelson, with as much exactness as if
she had been turning into Spithead. On getting round, he saw that the
Sans-Culottes, which had wore, with many of the enemy's ships, was under
his lee bow, and standing to leeward. The admiral, at the same time,
made the signal for the van ships to join him. Upon this Nelson bore
away, and prepared to set all sail; and the enemy, having saved their
ship, hauled close to the wind, and opened upon him a distant and
ineffectual fire. Only seven of the AGAMEMNON's men were hurt--a thing
which Nelson himself remarked as wonderful: her sails and rigging were
very much cut, and she had many shots in her hull, and some between wind
and water. The CA IRA lost 110 men that day, and was so cut up that she
could not get a top-mast aloft during the night.
At daylight on the following morning, the English ships were taken aback
with a fine breeze at N.W., while the enemy's fleet kept the southerly
wind. The body of their fleet was about five miles distant; the CA IRA
and the CENSEUR, seventy-four, which had her in tow, about three and
a half. All sail was made to cut these ships off; and as the French
attempted to save them, a partial action was brought on. The AGAMEMNON
was again engaged with her yesterday's antagonist; but she had to fight
on both sides the ship at the same time. The CA IRA and the CENSEUR
fought most gallantly: the first lost nearly 300 men, in addition to
her former loss; the last, 350. Both at length struck; and Lieutenant
Andrews, of the AGAMEMNON, brother to the lady to whom Nelson had become
attached in France, and, in Nelson's own words, "as gallant an officer
as ever stepped a quarter-deck," hoisted English colours on board them
both. The rest of the enemy's ships' behaved very ill. As soon as these
vessels had struck, Nelson went to Admiral Hotham and proposed that the
two prizes should be left with the ILLUSTRIOUS and COURAGEUX, which had
been crippled in the action, and with four frigates, and that the rest
of the fleet should pursue the enemy, and follow up the advantage to
the utmost. But his reply was--"We must be contented: we have done very
well."--"Now," said Nelson, "had we taken ten sail, and allowed the
eleventh to escape, when it had been possible to have got at her, I
could never have called it well done. Goodall backed me; I got him to
write to the admiral; but it would not do. We should have had such a day
as, I believe, the annals of England never produced." In this letter the
character of Nelson fully manifests itself. "I wish," said he, "to be
an admiral, and in the command of the English fleet: I should very soon
either do much, or be ruined: my disposition cannot bear tame and slow
measures. Sure I am, had I commanded on the 14th, that either the whole
French fleet would have graced my triumph, or I should have been in a
confounded scrape." What the event would have been, he knew from his
prophetic feelings and his own consciousness of power; and we also know
it now, for Aboukir and Trafalgar have told it.
The CA IRA and CENSEUR probably defended themselves with more obstinacy
in this action, from a persuasion that, if they struck, no quarter
would be given; because they had fired red-hot shot, and had also a
preparation sent, as they said, by the convention from Paris, which
seems to have been of the nature of the Greek fire; for it became liquid
when it was discharged, and water would not extinguish its flames. This
combustible was concealed with great care in the captured ships; like
the red-hot shot, it had been found useless in battle. Admiral Hotham's
action saved Corsica for the time; but the victory had been incomplete,
and the arrival at Toulon of six sail of the line, two frigates, and two
cutters from Brest, gave the French a superiority which, had they
known how to use it, would materially have endangered the British
Mediterranean fleet. That fleet had been greatly neglected at the
Admiralty during Lord Chatham's administration: and it did not, for some
time, feel the beneficial effect of his removal. Lord Hood had gone
home to represent the real state of affairs, and solicit reinforcements
adequate to the exigencies of the time, and the importance of the scene
of action. But that fatal error of under-proportioning the force to the
service; that ruinous economy, which, by sparing a little, renders all
that is spent useless, infected the British councils; and Lord Hood,
not being able to obtain such reinforcements as he knew were necessary,
resigned the command. "Surely," said Nelson, "the people at home have
forgotten us." Another Neapolitan seventy-four joined Admiral Hotham,
and Nelson observed with sorrow that this was matter of exultation to
an English fleet. When the store-ships and victuallers from Gibraltar
arrived, their escape from the enemy was thought wonderful; and yet, had
they not escaped, "the game," said Nelson, "was up here. At this moment
our operations are at a stand for want of ships to support the Austrians
in getting possession of the sea-coast of the king of Sardinia; and
behold our admiral does not feel himself equal to show himself, much
less to give assistance in their operations." It was reported that
the French were again out with 18 or 20 sail. The combined British and
Neapolitan were but sixteen; should the enemy be only eighteen, Nelson
made no doubt of a complete victory; but if they were twenty, he said,
it was not to be expected; and a battle, without complete victory, would
have been destruction, because another mast was not to be got on that
side Gibraltar. At length Admiral Man arrived with a squadron from
England. "What they can mean by sending him with only five sail of the
line," said Nelson, "is truly astonishing; but all men are alike, and
we in this country do not find any amendment or alteration from the old
Board of Admiralty. They should know that half the ships in the
fleet require to go to England; and that long ago they ought to have
reinforced us."
About this time Nelson was made colonel of marines; a mark of
approbation which he had long wished for rather than expected. It came
in good season, for his spirits were oppressed by the thought that his
services had not been acknowledged as they deserved; and it abated the
resentful feeling which would else have been excited by the answer to an
application to the War-office. During his four months' land service in
Corsica, he had lost all his ship furniture, owing to the movements of
a camp. Upon this he wrote to the Secretary at War, briefly stating what
his services on shore had been, and saying, he trusted it was not asking
an improper thing to request that the same allowance might be made to
him which would be made to a land officer of his rank, which, situated
as he was, would be that of a brigadier-general: if this could not be
accorded, he hoped that his additional expenses would be paid him. The
answer which he received was, that "no pay had ever been issued under
the direction of the War-office to officers of the navy serving with the
army on shore."
He now entered upon a new line of service. The Austrian and Sardinian
armies, under General de Vins, required a British squadron to co-operate
with them in driving the French from the Riviera di Genoa; and as Nelson
had been so much in the habit of soldiering, it was immediately fixed
that the brigadier should go. He sailed from St. Fiorenzo on this
destination; but fell in, off Cape del Mele, with the enemy's fleet, who
immediately gave his squadron chase. The chase lasted four-and-twenty
hours; and, owing to the fickleness of the wind, the British ships were
sometimes hard pressed; but the want of skill on the part of the French
gave Nelson many advantages. Nelson bent his way back to St. Fiorenzo,
where the fleet, which was in the midst of watering and refitting, had,
for seven hours, the mortification of seeing him almost in possession
of the enemy, before the wind would allow them to put out to his
assistance. The French, however, at evening, went off, not choosing to
approach nearer the shore. During the night, Admiral Hotham, by great
exertions, got under weigh; and, having sought the enemy four days, came
in sight of them on the fifth. Baffling winds and vexatious calms, so
common in the Mediterranean, rendered it impossible to close with them;
only a partial action could be brought on; and then the firing made
a perfect calm. The French being to windward, drew inshore; and the
English fleet was becalmed six or seven miles to the westward. L'ALCIDE,
of seventy-four guns, struck; but before she could be taken possession
of, a box of combustibles in her fore-top took fire, and the unhappy
crew experienced how far more perilous their inventions were to
themselves than to their enemies. So rapid was the conflagration, that
the French in their official account say, the hull, the masts, and
sails, all seemed to take fire at the same moment; and though the
English boats were put out to the assistance of the poor wretches on
board, not more than 200 could be saved. The AGAMEMNON, and Captain
Rowley in the CUMBERLAND, were just getting into close action a second
time, when the admiral called them off, the wind now blowing directly
into the Gulf of Frejus, where the enemy anchored after the evening
closed.
Nelson now proceeded to his station with eight sail of frigates under
his command. Arriving at Genoa, he had a conference with Mr. Drake, the
British envoy to that state; the result of which was, that the object
of the British must be to put an entire stop to all trade between Genoa,
France, and the places occupied by the French troops; for unless this
trade were stopped, it would be scarcely possible for the allied armies
to hold their situation, and impossible for them to make any progress in
driving the enemy out of the Riviera di Genoa. Mr. Drake was of opinion
that even Nice might fall for want of supplies, if the trade with Genoa
were cut off. This sort of blockade Nelson could not carry on without
great risk to himself. A captain in the navy, as he represented to the
envoy, is liable to prosecution for detention and damages. This danger
was increased by an order which had then lately been issued; by which,
when a neutral ship was detained, a complete specification of her cargo
was directed to be sent to the secretary of the Admiralty, and no legal
process instituted against her till the pleasure of that board should be
communicated. This was requiring an impossibility. The cargoes of ships
detained upon this station, consisting chiefly of corn, would be spoiled
long before the orders of the Admiralty could be known; and then, if
they should happen to release the vessel, the owners would look to
the captain for damages. Even the only precaution which could be taken
against this danger, involved another danger not less to be apprehended:
for if the captain should direct the cargo to be taken out, the freight
paid for, and the vessel released, the agent employed might prove
fraudulent, and become bankrupt; and in that case the captain became
responsible. Such things had happened: Nelson therefore required, as the
only means for carrying on that service, which was judged essential
to the common cause, without exposing the officers to ruin, that the
British envoy should appoint agents to pay the freight, release the
vessels, sell the cargo, and hold the amount till process was had upon
it: government thus securing its officers. "I am acting," said Nelson.
"not only without the orders of my commander-in-chief, but, in some
measure, contrary to him. However, I have not only the support of his
Majesty's ministers, both at Turin and Genoa, but a consciousness that
I am doing what is right and proper for the service of our king and
country. Political courage, in an officer abroad, is as highly necessary
as military courage."
This quality, which is as much rarer than military courage as it is more
valuable, and without which the soldier's bravery is often of little
avail, Nelson possessed in an eminent degree. His representations were
attended to as they deserved. Admiral Hotham commended him for what he
had done; and the attention of government was awakened to the injury
which the cause of the allies continually suffered from the frauds
of neutral vessels. "What changes in my life of activity!" said the
indefatigable man. "Here I am, having commenced a co-operation with an
old Austrian general, almost fancying myself charging at the head of
a troop of horse! I do not write less than from ten to twenty letters
every day; which, with the Austrian general and aides-de-camp, and my
own little squadron, fully employ my time. This I like; active service
or none." It was Nelson's mind which supported his feeble body through
these exertions. He was at this time almost blind, and wrote with very
great pain. "Poor AGAMEMNON," he sometimes said, "was as nearly worn out
as her captain; and both must soon be laid up to repair."
When Nelson first saw General de Vins, he thought him an able man, who
was willing to act with vigour. The general charged his inactivity upon
the Piedmontese and Neapolitans, whom, he said, nothing could induce
to act; and he concerted a plan with Nelson for embarking a part of the
Austrian army, and landing it in the rear of the French. But the English
commodore soon began to suspect that the Austrian general was little
disposed to any active operations. In the hope of spurring him on, he
wrote to him, telling him that he had surveyed the coast to the W. as
far as Nice, and would undertake to embark 4000 or 5000 men, with their
arms and a few days' provisions, on board the squadron, and land them
within two miles of St. Remo, with their field-pieces. Respecting
further provisions for the Austrian army, he would provide convoys, that
they should arrive in safety; and if a re-embarkation should be found
necessary, he would cover it with the squadron. The possession of St.
Remo, as headquarters for magazines of every kind, would enable the
Austrian general to turn his army to the eastward or westward. The enemy
at Oneglia would be cut off from provisions, and men could be landed
to attack that place whenever it was judged necessary. St. Remo was the
only place between Vado and Ville Franche where the squadron could lie
in safety, and anchor in almost all winds. The bay was not so good as
Vado for large ships; but it had a mole, which Vado had not, where all
small vessels could lie, and load and unload their cargoes. This bay
being in possession of the allies, Nice could be completely blockaded by
sea. General de Vins affecting, in his reply, to consider that Nelson's
proposal had no other end than that of obtaining the bay of St. Remo as
a station for the ships, told him, what he well knew, and had expressed
before, that Vado Bay was a better anchorage; nevertheless, if MONSIEUR
LE COMMANDANT NELSON was well assured that part of the fleet could
winter there, there was no risk to which he would not expose himself
with pleasure, for the sake of procuring a safe station for the vessels
of his Britannic Majesty. Nelson soon assured the Austrian commander
that this was not the object of his memorial. He now began to suspect
that both the Austrian Court and their general had other ends in view
than the cause of the allies. "This army," said he, "is slow beyond all
description; and I begin to think that the Emperor is anxious to touch
another L4,000,000 of English money. As for the German generals, war is
their trade, and peace is ruin to them; therefore we cannot expect that
they should have any wish to finish the war. The politics of courts are
so mean, that private people would be ashamed to act in the same way;
all is trick and finesse, to which the common cause is sacrificed. The
general wants a loop-hole; it has for some time appeared to me that
he means to go no further than his present position, and to lay the
miscarriage of the enterprise against Nice, which has always been held
out as the great object of his army, to the non-cooperation of the
British fleet and of the Sardinians."
To prevent this plea, Nelson again addressed De Vins, requesting only to
know the time, and the number of troops ready to embark; then he would,
he said, dispatch a ship to Admiral Hotham, requesting transports,
having no doubt of obtaining them, and trusting that the plan would be
successful to its fullest extent. Nelson thought at the time that, if
the whole fleet were offered him for transports, he would find some
other excuse; and Mr. Drake, who was now appointed to reside at the
Austrian headquarters, entertained the same idea of the general's
sincerity. It was not, however, put so clearly to the proof as it ought
to have been. He replied that, as soon as Nelson could declare himself
ready with the vessels necessary for conveying 10,000 men, with their
artillery and baggage, he would put the army in motion. But Nelson was
not enabled to do this: Admiral Hotham, who was highly meritorious in
leaving such a man so much at his own discretion, pursued a cautious
system, ill according with the bold and comprehensive views of Nelson,
who continually regretted Lord Hood, saying that the nation had suffered
much by his resignation of the Mediterranean command. The plan which
had been concerted, he said, would astonish the French, and perhaps the
English.
There was no unity in the views of the allied powers, no cordiality
in their co-operation, no energy in their councils. The neutral powers
assisted France more effectually than the allies assisted each other.
The Genoese ports were at this time filled with French privateers, which
swarmed out every night, and covered the gulf; and French vessels were
allowed to tow out of the port of Genoa itself, board vessels which were
coming in, and then return into the mole. This was allowed without
a remonstrance; while, though Nelson abstained most carefully from
offering any offence to the Genoese territory or flag, complaints were
so repeatedly made against his squadron, that, he says, it seemed a
trial who should be tired first; they of complaining, or he of answering
their complaints. But the question of neutrality was soon at an end. An
Austrian commissary was travelling from Genoa towards Vado; it was known
that he was to sleep at Voltri, and that he had L10,000 with him--a
booty which the French minister in that city, and the captain of a
French frigate in that port, considered as far more important than the
word of honour of the one, the duties of the other, and the laws of
neutrality. The boats of the frigate went out with some privateers,
landed, robbed the commissary, and brought back the money to Genoa. The
next day men were publicly enlisted in that city for the French army:
700 men were embarked, with 7000 stand of arms, on board the frigates
and other vessels, who were to land between Voltri and Savona. There
a detachment from the French army was to join them, and the Genoese
peasantry were to be invited to insurrection--a measure for which
everything had been prepared. The night of the 13th was fixed for the
sailing of this expedition; the Austrians called loudly for Nelson to
prevent it; and he, on the evening of the 13th, arrived at Genoa. His
presence checked the plan: the frigate, knowing her deserts, got within
the merchant-ships, in the inner mole; and the Genoese government did
not now even demand of Nelson respect to the neutral port, knowing that
they had allowed, if not connived at, a flagrant breach of neutrality,
and expecting the answer which he was prepared to return, that it was
useless and impossible for him to respect it longer.
But though this movement produced the immediate effect which was
designed, it led to ill consequences, which Nelson foresaw, but for want
of sufficient force was unable to prevent. His squadron was too small
for the service which it had to perform. He required two seventy-fours
and eight or ten frigates and sloops; but when he demanded this
reinforcement, Admiral Hotham had left the command. Sir Hyde Parker
had succeeded till the new commander should arrive; and he immediately
reduced it to almost nothing, leaving him only one frigate and a brig.
This was a fatal error. While the Austrian and Sardinian troops,
whether from the imbecility or the treachery of their leaders, remained
inactive, the French were preparing for the invasion of Italy. Not many
days before Nelson was thus summoned to Genoa, he chased a large convoy
into Alassio. Twelve vessels he had formerly destroyed in that port,
though 2000 French troops occupied the town. This former attack had made
them take new measures of defence; and there were now above 100 sail
of victuallers, gun-boats, and ships of war. Nelson represented to the
Admiral how important it was to destroy these vessels; and offered,
with his squadron of frigates, and the CULLODEN and COURAGEUX, to lead
himself in the AGAMEMNON, and take or destroy the whole. The attempt was
not permitted; but it was Nelson's belief that, if it had been made, it
would have prevented the attack upon the Austrian army, which took place
almost immediately afterwards.
General de Vins demanded satisfaction of the Genoese government for the
seizure of his commissary; and then, without waiting for their reply,
took possession of some empty magazines of the French, and pushed his
sentinels to the very gates of Genoa. Had he done so at first, he
would have found the magazines full; but, timed as the measure was, and
useless as it was to the cause of the allies, it was in character with
the whole of the Austrian general's conduct; and it is no small proof of
the dexterity with which he served the enemy, that in such circumstances
he could so act with Genoa as to contrive to put himself in the wrong.
Nelson was at this time, according to his own expression, placed in a
cleft stick. Mr. Drake, the Austrian minister, and the Austrian general,
all joined in requiring him not to leave Genoa; if he left that port
unguarded, they said, not only the imperial troops at St. Pier d'Arena
and Voltri would be lost, but the French plan for taking post between
Voltri and Savona would certainly succeed; if the Austrians should be
worsted in the advanced posts, the retreat of the Bocchetta would be cut
off; and if this happened, the loss of the army would be imputed to him,
for having left Genoa. On the other hand, he knew that if he were not
at Pietra, the enemy's gun-boats would harass the left flank of the
Austrians, who, if they were defeated, as was to be expected, from the
spirit of all their operations, would, very probably, lay their defeat
to the want of assistance from the AGAMEMNON. Had the force for which
Nelson applied been given him, he could have attended to both objects;
and had he been permitted to attack the convoy in Alassio, he would have
disconcerted the plans of the French, in spite of the Austrian general.
He had foreseen the danger, and pointed out how it might be prevented;
but the means of preventing it were withheld. The attack was made as
he foresaw; and the gun-boats brought their fire to bear upon the
Austrians. It so happened, however, that the left flank, which was
exposed to them, was the only part of the army that behaved well: this
division stood its ground till the centre and the right wing fled, and
then retreated in a soldier-like manner. General de Vins gave up the
command in the middle of the battle, pleading ill health. "From that
moment," says Nelson, "not a soldier stayed at his post: it was the
devil take the hindmost. Many thousands ran away who had never seen the
enemy; some of them thirty miles from the advanced posts. Had I not,
though I own, against my inclination, been kept at Genoa, from 8000 to
10,000 men would have been taken prisoners, and, amongst the number,
General de Vins himself; but by this means the pass of the Bocchetta
was kept open. The purser of the ship, who was at Vado, ran with
the Austrians eighteen miles without stopping; the men without arms,
officers without soldiers, women without assistance. The oldest officers
say they never heard of so complete a defeat, and certainly without
any reason. Thus has ended my campaign. We have established the French
republic: which but for us, I verily believe, would never have been
settled by such a volatile, changeable people. I hate a Frenchman: they
are equally objects of my detestation whether royalists or republicans:
in some points, I believe, the latter are the best." Nelson had a
lieutenant and two midshipmen taken at Vado: they told him, in their
letter, that few of the French soldiers were more than three or four
and twenty years old, a great many not more than fourteen, and all were
nearly naked; they were sure, they said, his barge's crew could have
beat a hundred of them; and that, had he himself seen them, he would not
have thought, if the world had been covered with such people, that they
could have beaten the Austrian army.
The defeat of General de Vins gave the enemy possession of the Genoese
coast from Savona to Voltri, and it deprived the Austrians of their
direct communication with the English fleet. The AGAMEMNON, therefore,
could no longer be useful on this station, and Nelson sailed for Leghorn
to refit. When his ship went into dock, there was not a mast, yard,
sail, or any part of the rigging, but what stood in need of repair,
having been cut to pieces with shot. The hull was so damaged that it
had for some time been secured by cables, which were served or thrapped
round it.