EXTRACT from the military diary of the General Officer commanding the
XII. (1st Royal Saxon) Army Corps.
_August 22nd, 1914._
On August 22nd the Imperial Headquarters remained at the Château of
Taviet. The day was occupied in carrying on reconnaissances in the
manner directed. Towards 3 o'clock in the forenoon the report came
through a General Staff-Officer sent in advance that the 2nd Battalion
of Rifle Regiment No. 108 had succeeded by a night attack in throwing
the enemy back across the Meuse at Dinant. Here the inhabitants had
once more taken part in the fighting, in some cases with shot-guns.
_August 23rd, 1914._
The General's Staff reached the western outlet of Sorinnes at 4 a.m.
The 23rd Infantry Division, present at the same point, immediately
reported its readiness for opening fire; the 32nd Infantry Division,
communication with which was at first lacking, did not report until
5.40 a.m. At 5.55 a.m. the Commander-in-Chief gave the order to fire,
which, at first, could not be complied with on account of the thick
weather.
In virtue of the command to open fire, the General in command gave the
order: "The divisions to occupy the bank on this side of the Meuse
with strong lines of riflemen, to enable the slopes on the opposite
side to be taken under an effective infantry fire." As the weather,
towards 6 a.m., permitted regular artillery fire to be delivered, it
was observed that the enemy only replied weakly. For this reason the
General in command gave the order at 6.30 a.m. that his reserve troops
were to follow their divisions, as he expected a more rapid advance of
the divisions towards the Meuse. For the same reason the General Staff
proceeded at 8 a.m. to Gemechenne.
The next reports received up to 8.30 a.m., as well as a reconnaissance
undertaken by Captain Bahrdt and 1st Lieutenant Count Schall in the
district of Dinant, seemed to contradict this assumption. At 8.50 a.m.
a report arrived from Colonel Francke, Infantry Regiment No. 180, which
seemed to confirm the original opinion of the General in command.
A communication by the Oberquartiermeister with reference to the
observation of an army airman coincided also with this opinion. At the
same time the Commanding General had directed that the order for the
crossing of the Meuse should be made out.
In the meantime, the troops had also advanced into new positions in the
direction of the Meuse. It seemed to be more and more certain that the
enemy had to all intents and purposes withdrawn, and only continued
to offer any serious resistance at the presumed crossing-places,
especially at Houx.
Although 1st Lieutenant Berckmüller and 1st Lieutenant Count Schall
reported at 10.15 a.m. that on a renewed reconnaissance near Dinant
they had met with brisk shrapnel-fire, the Army Corps order to cross
the Meuse was given at 10.20 a.m.; for this purpose a half of the
bridge-building corps was placed at the disposal of each of the two
divisions. For the more rapid suppression of the resistance at Houx,
the reserve division of the General in command was given back to the
32nd Infantry Division at 10 a.m.
After the issue of this order, 1st Lieutenant Hasse of General Staff
No. 3 arrived and reported that the II. Army had crossed the Sambre
to the west of Namur on August 22nd, so that a serious resistance on
the part of the enemy on the Meuse was not to be expected. It was
intended to give the XII. Army Corps the direction on Anthée; the XIX.
Army Corps, on the other hand, was to be taken over the Meuse to the
south of Givet. The possibility of getting into touch on the western
bank of the Meuse with the General Command (left wing, II. Army) was
immediately communicated to the 32nd Infantry Division.
The opinion, seemingly confirmed by an air report received in the
meantime that the Corps would get across the Meuse without serious
difficulties, was destined to prove incorrect. The 32nd Infantry
Division met with serious opposition at Houx and Leffe, and a similar
experience befell the 46th Infantry Brigade in burning Dinant. It was
only at the crossing-place of the 45th Infantry Brigade at Les Rivages
that everything, at first, appeared to go smoothly, so that the 23rd
Infantry Division reported at 12.40 a.m. through Major v. Zeschau that
they were able to commence the crossing.
It was to be inferred from the reports in general that the crossing,
even if beset with difficulties, could still be effected in the
afternoon. A Corps command was therefore issued at 5.10 p.m., which
assigned Sommière as the objective of the 32nd Infantry Division, and
Onhaye that of the 23rd Infantry Division.
The General Staff, in view of the shortly expected crossing, proceeded
from Gemechenne to the bend in the road 1.5 kilometres to the east of
Dinant. At 2 p.m. the XIX. Army Corps reported that the 24th Infantry
Division was crossing at Lenne with a brigade.
The troops of the Corps had, however, at the crossing-places some very
severe fighting with the enemy posted on the west bank of the Meuse.
This fighting, through the participation of the inhabitants, assumed an
especiallv severe character. At the moment when the (Guards) Grenadier
Regiment No. 100 had lowered the first pontoons into the water, a
violent fire was delivered from the adjacent houses. The troops found
themselves in the unpleasant position of being fired at by the infantry
and artillery of the enemy on the western bank and by the inhabitants
in their rear. The most unsatisfactory result of this fight was that a
part of the pontoons had been rendered unserviceable by the bombardment.
Subsequently the crossing of the 23rd Infantry Division proved
exceedingly difficult. The material to hand was no longer sufficient
for the building of a military bridge. The General in command, who
towards 7 p.m. had personally ascertained the position of the 32nd
Infantry Division in Leffe, proceeded to the crossing-place of the 23rd
Infantry Division, which he reached towards 8 p.m. The position of the
Corps at this time was more or less as follows:
In Leffe the 32nd Infantry Division was still fighting for the
crossing. At Dinant the 46th Infantry Brigade had been obliged to
withdraw to the heights on the eastern bank because it was impossible
to remain in the burning town. At Les Rivages a part of the bridge
was ready, but the material was not sufficient for its completion,
consequently a system of ferrying had to be contrived.
The commander of the 23rd Infantry Division accordingly arranged that a
mixed force under Colonel Meister (Grenadier Regiment No. 101, Hussar
Regiment No. 20, 1st Section, Field Artillery Regiment No. 12) should
first be put across. The (Guards) Grenadier Regiment No. 100 was to
follow next, while the remainder of the Army Corps was directed to the
bridge of the 32nd Infantry Division at Leffe.
According to an Army Order sent at 7.15 p.m. to the east of Dinant, the
pursuit was to be taken up with the available troops on the western
bank of Meuse; XII. Army Corps; direction, Philippeville.
For correct transcript.
Signed: VON LOEBEN, Captain on the General Staff.