_THE SIXTH SIEGE._
About the beginning of July, 1636, France, governed by the Cardinal de
Richelieu, saw its northern frontier invaded by the too celebrated Jean
de Weert, with an army of Hispano-Belgians, to which the empire had
added a numerous body of cavalry, composed of Poles, Hungarians, and
Croats. These allied troops advanced into Picardy, and Paris was, for
the moment, anticipating a siege; but the enemy were delayed by the
siege of Corbie, and, having taken this town, in which they left a
garrison, they retired for fear of being taken in rear by the Dutch.
The French army soon came in its turn to besiege and retake Corbie. At
the same time, an attack on Burgundy had been concerted by the Imperial
troops, while the army of Condé was besieging Dôle, which was holding
out for the Spaniards. But the Imperialist army having had to wait long
for the necessary reinforcements, did not start at the same time as that
of the Hispano-Belgians, and did not cross the frontier till the 22nd of
October; which gave time for the French troops employed at the siege of
Corbie to pass into Burgundy, to assemble the troops of the province,
and to receive the reinforcements sent to the Prince de Condé by the
Duke of Weimar and the Cardinal de la Valette. Being unable to raise the
siege of Dôle, the Imperialists directed their course to the Saône,
which they passed, and sent a body to seize the little _cité_ of La
Roche-Pont, the capture of which would give them a centre for attacking
Dijon or Langres, and enable them to isolate the Prince de Condé. The
town of La Roche-Pont was but scantily furnished with artillery, and had
a garrison of only a thousand men, when the Imperialist forces presented
themselves before it on the 2nd of November. They numbered six thousand
men, and brought with them thirty pieces of ordnance, of which twelve
were of large calibre. They were commanded by Galas, and were expecting
to take the place in a few days, for the captains knew by their scouts
that the garrison was weak, scantily provisioned and unprepared for an
attack.
However, Count Rantzau had been sent by the French generals to
re-victual Saint-Jean-de-Losne and La Roche-Pont, and to place an
experienced captain in the latter. The count arrived before La
Roche-Pont two days previous to the Germans; he left a thousand men
there, with Rincourt as governor--ordnance munitions and a convoy of
provisions; but having only two or three thousand men left him, he
thought himself not in a condition to attack the Imperialist army, and
therefore marched to Saint-Jean-de-Losne, which he entered on the 2nd of
November, in the teeth of the Germans, who were already beginning to
invest the town. Immediately on his arrival before La Roche-Pont, Galas
summoned the place, offering the garrison the most favourable
conditions, and the inhabitants respect for their persons and property.
The envoy of the Imperialist general was sent back as he had come, and
attack and defence were respectively prepared for.
Rincourt's nature was one of those which are apparently nonchalant and
cold, fond of repose, and never appearing discomposed; he was of middle
height, with a little embonpoint. His pale face, blonde hair, and dull
blue eyes, would be deemed no indication of a soul of firm temper, but
rather of one quite destitute of elasticity--an _esprit blasé_, or at
least an impassive disposition. Rincourt had however given proof of his
ability on many occasions, and Count de Rantzau, who knew him well,
esteemed him highly. On leaving him in the place, he had given him these
simple instructions--"Hold out here to the last man: for the rest act as
you judge best." To Galas's messenger, Rincourt had replied: "My
instructions are to defend the place, and I shall defend it."
Rincourt, while making the arrangements necessary for the defence, and
enquiring into the stores of provisions, was aware that if he allowed
himself to be shut up at once in the town, the enemy would have made a
breach in less than a week, and the taking of La Roche-Pont would be at
most an affair of fifteen or twenty days. The stock of provisions
scarcely admitted of so long a resistance; and at this time of the year
it was difficult to add to them, even if the place were not closely
invested. The governor resolved, therefore, to take the initiative and
to hinder the enemy's approach-works to such an extent, that however
favourable the weather might be, the enemy would have difficulty in
maintaining his position.
He sent for the mayor and notables of the town, and asked them what they
intended to do, and whether the inhabitants would remain at home with
their hands folded, while the king's men were fighting to defend the
town. They assured him that, on the contrary, the inhabitants were
disposed to defend themselves, and that even the women would mount the
ramparts if necessary; that all of them knew how the enemy had behaved
in Picardy, and thought that the worst course was to trust to their
promises, and that if they must die, it was better to die fighting. "If
it be so," replied the governor, "and if your acts respond to your
words, you may be assured that the Germans will not enter this place;
but, you must be doing. Have you any artillerymen among the
inhabitants?" "We have some; all our young men are hardy and robust, and
many know how to make use of musket and pike." "Well, assemble them
to-night, and let all the volunteers, armed or unarmed, be with you
to-morrow morning, in the open space before the castle. Whatever you
hear this evening, do not let your attention be diverted from this
object, and do not be alarmed."
When night arrived (and it comes early on the 2nd of November), Rincourt
prepared for the transport of two small pieces of cannon, and ordered two
hundred men to mount their horses--for he had some cavalry--accompanied
by four hundred foot soldiers; took care that the artillerymen should be
at their guns in the works of the tenaille, leaving their captains
precise instructions; summoned four hundred men to appear at three
o'clock in the morning; and about ten o'clock sallied forth with his
six hundred men and two guns through the gate of the outwork.
The night was foggy and perfectly dark. The governor had taken the
precaution to envelope the wheels of his two guns with pieces of cloth
and canvas, and to have the crowbars, powder spoons, and rammers,
carried by the servers, to avoid noise. On issuing from the ravelin, he
directed the two cannons obliquely right and left, so as to keep them
within musket shot from the centre column; the cavalry was escorting
them. He himself, with his three or four hundred foot soldiers, marched
straight for the enemy's outposts. About a thousand yards from the
outwork he met them, making soup in front of their fires. Falling
suddenly on the sentinels and neighbouring posts, he threw himself into
the very heart of the enemy dispersed among the orchards, and killing
all who resisted, drove them before him.
In conformity with the instructions they had received, the artillerymen
then brought their pieces into position, and fired right and left
towards the two extremities of the encampment. The Imperialists believed
themselves attacked along the whole extent of their front, and took some
time to concert their defence.
As soon as Rincourt saw the enemy drawn up in considerable numbers
before him, he hastily drew off the right and left of his small band
towards the two guns and the cavalry. The Germans then advanced in a
compact, but not very orderly body, looking for the assailant, and not
knowing whether they should go towards the east or west of the plateau
in pursuit of him. Then, after a renewed discharge of the pieces, the
two small French corps, cavalry and infantry, rushed upon the flanks of
the column, killed or took about a hundred men, and fell back with all
speed to the outwork, protected by volleys discharged with as good aim
as circumstances allowed from the bastions of the tenaille.
This affray terminated at midnight, without loss. Rincourt sent his men
to rest, and at three o'clock in the morning sallied forth once more
with the four hundred foot soldiers, summoned for that hour; this time
without cannon or cavalry. He went along the western edge of the
plateau, and when he saw himself within musket shot of the advanced
posts, drawing out his musketeers in a long line, he commanded a general
discharge; then moving off obliquely, he executed the same movements a
few seconds afterwards, on the eastern side, after which he retired.
The enemy were completely puzzled by these attacks. They had passed the
whole of the night on the look-out, and in the morning determined to
establish their first lines about a mile from the tenaille, placing
advanced posts behind intrenchments hastily thrown up. They then opened
the trench about half a mile distant.
Throughout the day the heavy guns mounted on the platforms of the
tenaille kept up a fire on these advanced posts, killed some men and
overthrew the intrenchments. During the night of the 3rd of November,
Rincourt, who had observed that a considerable body of the enemy was
advancing up the river, perhaps with the view of passing the night
there, and attacking the front K[52] in the rear with cannon, sent out
two hundred of his infantry, under efficient command, through the
ravelin of the outwork, and made a sortie with three hundred men through
the gate of the front, K. He attacked the posts along the river, while
the first troop was skirmishing with the advanced posts established
along the western slopes of the plateau. When the first troop saw itself
too much pressed, it rapidly descended the western slope to rally
Rincourt's force, who on his side was retreating after having thrown the
enemy into confusion.
The besiegers, however, being on their guard, went in pursuit of the
five hundred men from the town with vigour, and in increasing numbers.
But this had been foreseen by the governor; and a second body of four
hundred men, which during the action issued in its turn from the
ravelin, descended the western slopes at full speed, and fell upon the
flank of the Imperialists.
On this the five hundred men commanded by Rincourt faced about. There,
also, two or three hundred Germans were killed, wounded, or threw
themselves into the water. The losses of the French were insignificant.
While these continual alarms in some degree fatigued and disconcerted
the besiegers, who did not suppose they had before them a garrison
numerous enough to dare to act on the offensive, they restored
confidence to the besieged, and gave them a high idea of the military
talents of the governor.
Rincourt continued to preserve his cool aspect and nonchalant demeanour,
though he was constantly on the alert, and gave his orders with
precision. Seeing the turn things were taking the _dizainiers_ of the
town assured the governor of their entire devotion, and of the good-will
of the volunteers, who deemed themselves capable of guarding the
ramparts unaided; he might therefore commence operations outside in full
confidence, and "amuse" the enemy. This was exactly what Rincourt
wanted.
The Imperialists in the meantime continued to advance with their trench.
On the evening of the 5th of November it was fifteen hundred feet from
the salient, and in the rear there was a pretty good _place d'armes_,
surrounded by an epaulement with cannon at the angles and abatis of
trees, at the foot of the bank. Every night the governor found means to
disquiet the enemy, often at intervals of two or three hours, so as to
keep him incessantly in alarm.
Galas, in the meanwhile, had sent two pieces of ordnance to the right
bank of the stream out of sight of the besieged, and on the 7th of
November he mounted them on this bank so as to attack the front _à
crémaillère_, K,[53] in the rear. The wooden bridge had been burned by
the besieged, and the stone bridge barricaded and furnished with a
cavalier on the left bank, which swept the right bank. Behind the houses
of the western faubourg, Rincourt established a battery armed with three
cannons, which had been taken from the arsenal during the night. On the
morning of the 8th of November the houses which masked the three pieces
having been thrown down, these guns opened their fire against the
besieger's battery, which was soon silenced.
[Illustration: FIG. 62.]
That same day the trench was nine hundred feet from the outwork, and a
second _place d'armes_ was commenced at this point (Fig. 62). The
governor resolved to overthrow the enemy's works. At two o'clock in the
morning he first sent out a troop of five hundred men to attack the
_place d'armes_ on the west, while a second troop of two hundred men was
to attack it on the east, and himself going out with four hundred men to
continue the offensive, if the former had a chance of succeeding, or to
protect its retreat. His men were armed with pikes, cutlasses, grenades,
and pistols.
The besieger had at this point from twelve to fifteen hundred men to
protect the workmen. The first troop of the garrison advanced resolutely
against the flank, throwing grenades into the trenches, and destroying
the gabions and fascines. They were soon attacked by all the Germans
posted at this point; but knowing that they were going to be immediately
reinforced, they maintained their position in the middle of the _place
d'armes_, making use of every obstacle to intrench themselves. This
struggle was visible only through some bivouac fires at a considerable
distance, and the explosions of the grenades. The townspeople, that they
might recognise each other, had put shirts over their buff coats, or
their _pourpoints_. The second troop soon arrived from the east, and a
part of the besiegers was thus attacked on both sides. The latter
retired, and rallying about a hundred paces behind the _place d'armes_,
attacked in their turn the people of the town on the two flanks; the
struggle recommenced with violence, the French not being willing to
abandon the place. They would, however, have been ultimately overwhelmed
by numbers, if Rincourt had not come up in the midst of the _mêlée_ with
his reserve of four hundred men (Fig. 63). He fell upon one of the
flanks of the numerous troop of the Germans without uttering a sound.
These then fell into confusion, and commenced a speedy retreat. Soon, in
spite of the officers, the route was complete, and the fugitives went
off and alarmed the neighbouring posts, and even the camp, asserting
that they had been surprised by a large body that had come to succour
the besieged.
[Illustration: FIG. 63.--NIGHT SORTIE--THE ATTACK ON ONE OF THE
BESIEGERS' PLACE D'ARMES.]
Galas was not certain whether this was a concerted sortie or whether
succour had reached the besieged between his lines and the place.
Collecting all the troops at his disposal, and ordering two or three
hundred men to mount their horses, he betook himself to the abandoned
works. Rincourt had not waited for him; but having damaged the trench
for the length of a hundred paces, scattered the gabions, set fire to
heaps of fascines, spiked two guns, which the enemy had abandoned,
broken open some casks of munitions, and taken away the tools of the
pioneers, retreated with his men. This sortie had cost him about fifty
men; he brought back his wounded.
When Galas came up none but the dead of both parties and some wounded
remained in the works. In his anger, he broke his cane on the back of
the first soldiers he met with, calling them cowards and traitors, and
threatening to decimate the whole troop entrusted with the guard of the
trench. The mischief could not be repaired in the few hours of night
that were left. They were quite bewildered in the midst of these
scattered gabions and trenches filled up at some points; and when day
appeared the besieged discharged three or four volleys from the tenaille
in the midst of this confused host, which then retreated to the first
_place d'armes_.
To increase his embarrassment, about ten o'clock in the morning, a
message sent from Saint-Jean-de-Losne informed the Imperialist general
that this insignificant town was holding out, that the continual sorties
of the garrison were fatiguing the troops, that the siege would be
longer than was supposed at first, and that, in fact, his presence would
be necessary to direct the attack and make head against the Count de
Rantzau, who was occupying the town.
The possession of Saint-Jean-de-Losne, which he supposed was already in
the hands of his troops, was still more important to the Imperialists
than that of La Roche-Pont. For Saint-Jean-de-Losne secured to the
Germans the passage of the Saône; but if this town held out they might
be cut off by the Prince de Condé, who, on raising the siege of Dôle, or
taking that place, would fall upon the rear of the Imperial army.
Galas was therefore much embarrassed. To raise the siege of La
Roche-Pont, and to march with all his forces against the Prince de
Condé, was perhaps the wisest part to take, but this would have
interfered with the plan of the campaign on which the Imperialists
founded the most brilliant hopes; it would have been to abandon that
conquest of Burgundy which a few days before Germany had regarded as
certain; it would have been a manifest check at the very commencement of
the campaign.
Galas therefore adopted a middle course, which in war is always the
least desirable; he resolved to leave before La Roche-Pont sufficient
troops to invest it closely, knowing that the place had not provisions
sufficient to last long, and to finish the siege of Saint-Jean-de-Losne.
This place fallen, he might resume his original plan.
On the evening of the 9th of November, after having appointed a
commander for the troops remaining before La Roche-Pont, and leaving his
instructions, he quitted the camp to go and rejoin the army before
Saint-Jean-de-Losne.
These instructions were in substance as follows--the establishment of a
line of investment around the place and the continuance of the attack on
the northern salient, under good protection and taking the time
necessary for the works. He had also a plan made out for a battery of
bomb mortars. He had sent for four of these engines to bombard the
town.[54] Galas's lieutenant was of Italian origin, and was named
Forcia: he was an impetuous man, serviceable for a bold stroke, a great
talker, a fairly skilful engineer, but wanting in persistency and
perseverance, and continually changing his plans. By dint of flattery
and the admiration he manifested on all occasions for the military
talents of Galas, Forcia had succeeded in persuading him that no one was
better fitted than himself to act for the general, to enter into his
designs, and put his plans in execution. Forcia, we say, had appeared to
appreciate the wisdom of Galas's designs, and had promised to follow his
instructions implicitly and to the letter. But where is the flatterer,
however astute, who does not leave in the mind of the person
flattered--however wanting in judgment--a feeling of mistrust.
Accordingly Galas in quitting the camp of La Roche-Pont, had instructed
a young lieutenant who acted as his secretary, and whom he left with
Forcia, to take note of all that transpired and to keep him informed of
the minutest details by frequent messages.
Rincourt allowed his troops the night of the 9th for repose, as half the
garrison had been engaged the night before. On the morning of the 10th
one of the spies whom he was careful to employ in the country, and even
in the camp of the enemy, came to inform him that Galas had departed the
evening before with an inconsiderable escort, and that the Imperialist
troops were placed under the command of one of his lieutenants. This
news set the governor gravely thinking; he knew that Saint-Jean-de-Losne
was still holding out, and he gained a glimpse of the real state of
affairs. Devoted to the Count de Rantzau, he felt it his duty more than
ever to give the enemy so much to do as to render it impossible for him
to think of reducing the number of troops assembled around La
Roche-Pont, to reinforce those engaged in the siege of
Saint-Jean-de-Losne.
The garrison was full of confidence and determination; and the militia
of the town asked to share in the sorties. This militia consisted of a
body of about twelve hundred men, which Rincourt had divided into
companies of one hundred men each, commanded by ten subalterns and a
captain. He had divided these companies into two battalions of six
hundred men each. The first was composed of the robuster men who had had
some experience in arms; the second was composed of the householders,
men of mature age inexperienced in war. These latter were especially
employed as guards of the ramparts, as a daily and nightly patrol, and
as a police for the town. With the regular troops, therefore, the
governor had at his disposal, even after the losses he had sustained,
and after leaving in the town artillerymen enough to man the guns, about
two thousand two hundred men.
The women of Roche-Pont had also offered their services. Rincourt formed
them into brigades of ten; and their duty was to bring ammunition,
prepare the provisions, repair military accoutrements, and make fascines
and bags.
Even since the enemy's arrival, the governor had been able to get some
cattle, grain, and fodder into the town, affording a supply for sixteen
days longer.
He had good hopes of getting rid of the Germans before the end of this
period. The townspeople, moreover, were rationed like the garrison, and
the inhabitants were obliged under pain of death to deposit all the
provisions they had in the public storehouses. The two churches of the
upper town had been converted into hospitals for the wounded.
If the spirits of the garrison were kept up and even raised, such was by
no means the case with the Imperialists. Forcia lost no time in announcing
to the German troops that he was appointed commander-in-chief; he called
the captains together and thought it incumbent upon him to address them
in a somewhat long and high-flown discourse, accompanied by theatrical
gestures.
This had but a slight effect on the minds of the officers, who were for
the most part veterans, and who had no great respect for Forcia. They
returned to their quarters, therefore, somewhat depressed, and auguring
no good for the prospects of the siege. Following the instructions left
him by Galas, Forcia gave orders for the complete investment of the
place.
Deducting the losses suffered since the beginning of the siege, and the
desertions, Forcia when entrusted with the command had little more than
five thousand men. The object to be secured was to maintain at the point
of attack a body of troops numerous enough to prevent the sorties of the
garrison from not being formidable to them, and to distribute around the
_cité_ posts sufficiently well connected and defended to cut off all
communication between the town and the outside; for it was certain that
the inhabitants would be reduced to famine before many days elapsed.
Prudence therefore demanded that a line of contravallation should be
established, and provided with artillery, that every point should be
efficiently guarded, and that the garrison should be so occupied as to
make vigorous sorties impossible. These tactics must infallibly result
in the surrender of the town at no distant time. Such were in substance
the instructions of Galas. But Forcia had a more ambitious aim; these
methods appeared to him tedious and unworthy of him; and he saw himself
in imagination master of the place, and sending the news of its
capitulation to Galas in a message worthy of ancient Rome.
Still he dared not formally disregard his instructions, but he resolved
merely to affect compliance with them, eager to show the army how an
engineer of first-rate ability can conduct a siege. He believed that
three thousand men would be enough to keep the besieged in awe on the
north, to prosecute the approach-works vigorously and to take the place.
With two thousand men he made sure of intercepting all communication
between the inhabitants and the outside. Accordingly he established a
post of two hundred men along the river on the left bank, two hundred
yards from the angle of the curtain K;[1] a second post of two hundred
men on the right bank, in front of the destroyed wooden bridge O; a
third post of one hundred men, opposite the ancient bridge P; a fourth
post of three hundred men, two hundred yards from the stone bridge; a
fifth post of three hundred men along the rivulet to the south-east of
the escarpment of the castle; a sixth post of two hundred men behind the
embankment of the mills on the east; and a seventh post of three hundred
men above the pool to the north-east--in all sixteen hundred men. Four
hundred men were commissioned to connect these principal posts, or to
strengthen them at need. The rampart L[55], prevented the besieger from
making his way between the pool and the town, the fifth, sixth, and
seventh posts communicated with headquarters only by a long détour, and
could not be supported by the posts of the right bank unless a bridge
were thrown across below the stone bridge. This was a serious
disadvantage. Forcia had no idea of taking possession of the stone
bridge by a sudden attack, as this passage was commanded by a cavalier
and by the bastions of the castle. He preferred throwing a bridge across
below to put his posts in communication with each other.
Wishing to keep all his artillery to batter the place and to effect a
breach quickly, he did not provide any of these posts with guns, but
contented himself with ordering them to erect a strong palisading, and
to raise epaulements for shelter. The instructions he gave were wanting
in precision, but he often cited Cæsar and Vegetius and Frontinus, and
some of the great captains who had shed a lustre on Italy in the
preceding century. While urging vigilance on his captains he merely went
with them to reconnoitre the ground, and to determine their posts; but
did not trouble himself further to know whether his orders were
understood and strictly carried out. The investment was only a
concession made to the general-in-chief, and his attention was entirely
given to the attack on the north. He could not even avoid observing in
presence of his officers that up to that time the works had been feebly
conceived and executed; a remark which soon reached the ears of Galas.
Rincourt took advantage of the respite allowed him by the besieger to
organize his little garrison more effectually. We have seen that he had
six hundred militiamen capable of acting outside the ramparts. He set
about equipping these men, who were but imperfectly armed. The castle
contained a hundred muskets, which he distributed to those who knew best
how to use this weapon, but had not been provided with it. The rest he
armed with strong pikes, breach-knives, and partisans. Not counting
artillerymen, he had remaining sixteen hundred soldiers--three hundred
being horsemen--whom he formed into four bodies of four companies of
infantry of eighty men each, commanded by a captain, and three companies
of horsemen, one hundred strong.
The town contained thirty-two pieces of ordnance of various calibre.
There were sixteen mounted in the north work; two on the cavalier behind
the bridge; one in the bastion of the donjon; two in the bastion F[56]
and one in each of the seven other bastions; in all twenty-eight. Two
were placed in the tenaille of the castle, and two were kept in reserve.
The enemy's arrangements were soon made known to the governor, either
through spies or the reconnaissances made by his best officers, or
himself personally; he took care not to disturb the carrying out of
those arrangements, and contented himself with doubling the guard at the
bridge, which was raised to two hundred men.
[Illustration: FIG. 64.]
During the night of the 11th of November, Forcia had a second breach
opened, and marked out the approach-works, as shown in Fig. 64. Besides
the two _places d'armes_ A and B, already marked out, he planned a
third, C, to be reached by a new trench D, next two batteries at G and
F, for two pieces each, and a battery for two mortars H. He had the
first trench lengthened at I, with a piece at its extremity sweeping the
curtain K. Two pieces mounted in the _place d'armes_ B commanded the
battery F, and the surroundings; a piece mounted at E commanded the
battery G; and a piece mounted in the _place d`armes_ C swept the
outside of the western battery. He thought he should thus provide for
every contingency. If the besieged determined to attempt some bold
stroke, they could not advance far, and if they succeeded in taking
either of the batteries G, F, he could crush them. The two batteries G,
F were intended to silence the fire of the north-west salient and of the
left half of the tenaille. That done, he could--secure against the
right-hand fire--advance as far as the counterscarp, set up a breach
battery, and take the place by the north-west salient. Meanwhile, the
mortar battery would render the right of the work untenable, crush the
defenders of the ancient terraced walls, damage the gates, and prevent
the besieged from attempting anything at this point. The plan was not
badly conceived; nothing remained but to execute it.
The phlegmatic governor had the gabionades of the work strengthened, and
traverses and _paréclats_ raised, especially on the platforms of the two
great towers. He had shelter places arranged on the platforms of the
earthworks. Moreover he kept up a continual fire on the workmen, so that
they could scarcely make any advance except during the night. Sometimes
at ten o'clock at night, sometimes at midnight, at two o'clock in the
morning, or shortly before daybreak, Rincourt would alarm the enemy's
camp by sorties of no importance considered with reference to the final
result, but which greatly exhausted the besiegers.
These sorties were effected by one or two companies while the others
rested. In this way he exercised the militia, and accustomed them to
fighting.
By the 15th of November the besieger's works had scarcely made any
progress. However the _place d'armes_ C was made, as also the parallel
which connected it with the _place d'armes_ B; and the trenches were
commenced which were to lead to the two batteries. The bomb-mortars were
mounted, and began to fire towards evening. But they produced more noise
than damage to the besieged. Their fire was badly directed, and most of
the bombs burst too soon or too late. The besieged became accustomed to
them, and kept out of their way when they saw them coming. For a dozen
bombs fired the first evening, two men were wounded, and one
gun-carriage damaged.
On the morning of the 25th of November the weather, hitherto fine,
suddenly changed. About nine a fine snow fell, and was soon after
followed by a deluge of rain, accompanied by squalls. During the night
of the 15th, the men on guard in the trenches were up to their knees in
water; it was impossible to work. The rain continued regular and heavy
during the whole of the 16th. Rincourt took advantage of this
disagreeable state of the weather. The bridge which had been thrown
across the river by the Imperialists, below the stone bridge, consisted
of a floor six feet wide, laid partly on trestles, partly on boats
collected in the valley and linked together. This was a clumsy
contrivance, for the water on beginning to rise lifted the boats
proportionately so that it was extremely difficult to maintain the
connexion between the floor resting on the boats and that laid on the
trestles. Accordingly in spite of the rain the besiegers worked all day
on the 16th to prevent the rupture of this bridge. The governor who
passed all that day in examining the environs, had perceived from the
top of the platform of the cavalier the precarious condition of the
besieger's bridge, and at night he had some large trunks of trees thrown
over the parapet of the stone bridge, which struck against the boats and
trestles and impeded the current, which kept on rising. At midnight
twenty of these trunks had accumulated against the boats, and the river
continuing to rise, the bridge was carried away. A light appearing for
an instant at a certain point of the valley of Abonne apprised Rincourt
of the destruction of the bridge. The signal was given by one of the
spies.
Secure, therefore, against being cut off on his right by the
Imperialists, the governor sent out three hundred militiamen and three
companies of soldiers, kept under arms after supper, by the western
gate, next to the castle; and another three hundred of the militia, and
two companies by the eastern gate. This second troop was commissioned to
make for the causeway of the pool, attack the enemy's post established
beyond the embankment, outflank it on his right and pursue it hotly
along the rivulet. Rincourt commanded the foremost troop of six hundred
men. He descended the slope of the bridge, crossed the rivulet by means
of planks and trestles which he had ready prepared behind the cavalier,
and attacked the post of three hundred men established at two hundred
yards below the stone bridge. Finding themselves attacked by a body much
more numerous than themselves, they quitted the bivouacs in all haste,
and set off along the left bank of the rivulet to join the second post
(consisting) of three hundred men established between them and the dam,
as the bridge was broken. This was just what Rincourt anticipated. At
the same time, in an opposite direction the post at the pool embankment
was in flight, pursued by the second troop of the besieged,--depending
on getting the support of the post at the rivulet and that of the
bridge, since they were outflanked on their right. These two posts--that
of the bridge and that of the embankment--retreating as fast as the
nature of the ground permitted in an inverse direction, to the post at
the rivulet, the latter supposed it was an attack, and fired several
arquebusades at the two troops of these outposts. They recognised each
other with difficulty, and these eight hundred men thus collected, saw
themselves attacked on two sides by Rincourt and the second troop of the
besieged. The combat did not last long, in consequence of the confusion
into which they were thrown as much as through the numerical
inferiority. Few resisted, many sought the marshes, and two or three
hundred laid down their arms and begged for quarter. Of those who had
betaken themselves right and left to the marshes, about a hundred
managed to reach the camp in the morning, the others were killed by the
peasants.
Forcia, informed in the middle of the night of the attack on his
south-eastern posts, got a thousand men under arms. But the weather
continued as bad as ever; the captains obeyed with a very ill grace;
they had lost all confidence, and it was not until daylight that Galas's
lieutenant was able to go down into the valley. His three posts were
taken, and he found from two to three hundred men dead or wounded on the
banks of the rivulet.
Rincourt had quietly gone up again into the town with his two troops and
his prisoners by the castle gate, about three o'clock in the morning. He
had not lost more than fifty men, killed, wounded, or strayed. Forcia
returned to the camp about ten o'clock in the morning. But from the top
of the donjon, at the first glimmering of daylight, the governor had
seen the troop of Imperialists defiling in the direction of the posts
that had been taken. Without an instant's delay, placing himself at the
head of four companies of foot soldiers, fresh and ready for the
struggle, and of his three hundred horsemen, and after having fired
several volleys on the besieger's works, he courageously sallied forth
by the ravelin and rushed impetuously upon the trenches. The enemy,
taken by surprise, without a commander, and out of heart, fled, and
Rincourt succeeded in spiking the guns of the two foremost _places
d'armes_, spiking and throwing down the mortars along the slopes,
breaking the gun-carriages, overthrowing the gabionades, and taking a
quantity of workmen's tools.
When Forcia returned, it was to learn this fresh disaster. His captains
murmured loudly. He called them cowards and ignoramuses, and they
retorted sharply, and abuse was lavished on both sides. Happily for
Forcia a messenger came from Galas that evening enjoining him to raise
the siege of Roche-Pont and to fall back upon the Saône without an
hour's delay.
Saint-Jean-de-Losne had held out and had suffered no damage; the
Imperialists, surprised by the inundations, and fearing to be cut off by
the French army, determined on returning home.
If that French army had been led by a Rantzau and a Rincourt, not a
German would have repassed the frontier; but the Duke of Weimar and the
Cardinal de la Valette, who might have destroyed the invaders, were by
no means energetic in the pursuit. The Imperialists, however, lost in
this expedition, by which they hoped to gain the most brilliant
advantages, all their baggage, a good part of their artillery, and a
third of their force.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 52: See Fig. 59.]
[Footnote 53: See Fig. 59.]
[Footnote 54: Bombs, invented by the Dutch in the beginning of the
seventeenth century, were already used in sieges.]
[Footnote 55: See Fig. 59.]
[Footnote 56: See Fig. 59.]