And the remedy is not that suggested in the quatrain that runs--

_Cada vez que considero

que me tengo de morir,

tiendo la capa en el suelo

y no me harto de dormir._[11]

No! The remedy is to consider our mortal destiny without flinching, to

fasten our gaze upon the gaze of the Sphinx, for it is thus that the

malevolence of its spell is discharmed.

If we all die utterly, wherefore does everything exist? Wherefore? It is

the Wherefore of the Sphinx; it is the Wherefore that corrodes the

marrow of the soul; it is the begetter of that anguish which gives us

the love of hope.

Among the poetic laments of the unhappy Cowper there are some lines

written under the oppression of delirium, in which, believing himself to

be the mark of the Divine vengeance, he exclaims--

Hell might afford my miseries a shelter.

This is the Puritan sentiment, the preoccupation with sin and

predestination; but read the much more terrible words of Sénancour,

expressive of the Catholic, not the Protestant, despair, when he makes

his Obermann say, "L'homme est périssable. Il se peut; mais périssons en

résistant, et, si le néant nous est réservé, ne faisons pas que ce soit

une justice." And I must confess, painful though the confession be, that

in the days of the simple faith of my childhood, descriptions of the

tortures of hell, however terrible, never made me tremble, for I always

felt that nothingness was much more terrifying. He who suffers lives,

and he who lives suffering, even though over the portal of his abode is

written "Abandon all hope!" loves and hopes. It is better to live in

pain than to cease to be in peace. The truth is that I could not

believe in this atrocity of Hell, of an eternity of punishment, nor did

I see any more real hell than nothingness and the prospect of it. And I

continue in the belief that if we all believed in our salvation from

nothingness we should all be better.

What is this _joie de vivre_ that they talk about nowadays? Our hunger

for God, our thirst of immortality, of survival, will always stifle in

us this pitiful enjoyment of the life that passes and abides not. It is

the frenzied love of life, the love that would have life to be unending,

that most often urges us to long for death. "If it is true that I am to

die utterly," we say to ourselves, "then once I am annihilated the world

has ended so far as I am concerned--it is finished. Why, then, should it

not end forthwith, so that no new consciousnesses, doomed to suffer the

tormenting illusion of a transient and apparential existence, may come

into being? If, the illusion of living being shattered, living for the

mere sake of living or for the sake of others who are likewise doomed to

die, does not satisfy the soul, what is the good of living? Our best

remedy is death." And thus it is that we chant the praises of the

never-ending rest because of our dread of it, and speak of liberating

death.

Leopardi, the poet of sorrow, of annihilation, having lost the ultimate

illusion, that of believing in his immortality--

_Peri l'inganno estremo

ch'eterno io mi credei_,

spoke to his heart of _l'infinita vanitá del tutto_, and perceived how

close is the kinship between love and death, and how "when love is born

deep down in the heart, simultaneously a languid and weary desire to die

is felt in the breast." The greater part of those who seek death at

their own hand are moved thereto by love; it is the supreme longing for

life, for more life, the longing to prolong and perpetuate life, that

urges them to death, once they are persuaded of the vanity of this

longing.

The problem is tragic and eternal, and the more we seek to escape from

it, the more it thrusts itself upon us. Four-and-twenty centuries ago,

in his dialogue on the immortality of the soul, the serene Plato--but

was he serene?--spoke of the uncertainty of our dream of being immortal

and of the _risk_ that the dream might be vain, and from his own soul

there escaped this profound cry--Glorious is the risk!--_kalos

gar o kindunos_, glorious is the risk that we are able to run of our

souls never dying--a sentence that was the germ of Pascal's famous

argument of the wager.

Faced with this risk, I am presented with arguments designed to

eliminate it, arguments demonstrating the absurdity of the belief in the

immortality of the soul; but these arguments fail to make any impression

upon me, for they are reasons and nothing more than reasons, and it is

not with reasons that the heart is appeased. I do not want to die--no; I

neither want to die nor do I want to want to die; I want to live for

ever and ever and ever. I want this "I" to live--this poor "I" that I am

and that I feel myself to be here and now, and therefore the problem of

the duration of my soul, of my own soul, tortures me.

I am the centre of my universe, the centre of the universe, and in my

supreme anguish I cry with Michelet, "Mon moi, ils m'arrachent mon moi!"

What is a man profited if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own

soul? (Matt. xvi. 26). Egoism, you say? There is nothing more universal

than the individual, for what is the property of each is the property of

all. Each man is worth more than the whole of humanity, nor will it do

to sacrifice each to all save in so far as all sacrifice themselves to

each. That which we call egoism is the principle of psychic gravity, the

necessary postulate. "Love thy neighbour as thyself," we are told, the

presupposition being that each man loves himself; and it is not said

"Love thyself." And, nevertheless, we do not know how to love ourselves.

Put aside the persistence of your own self and ponder what they tell

you. Sacrifice yourself to your children! And sacrifice yourself to them

because they are yours, part and prolongation of yourself, and they in

their turn will sacrifice themselves to their children, and these

children to theirs, and so it will go on without end, a sterile

sacrifice by which nobody profits. I came into the world to create my

self, and what is to become of all our selves? Live for the True, the

Good, the Beautiful! We shall see presently the supreme vanity and the

supreme insincerity of this hypocritical attitude.

"That art thou!" they tell me with the Upanishads. And I answer: Yes, I

am that, if that is I and all is mine, and mine the totality of things.

As mine I love the All, and I love my neighbour because he lives in me

and is part of my consciousness, because he is like me, because he is

mine.

Oh, to prolong this blissful moment, to sleep, to eternalize oneself in

it! Here and now, in this discreet and diffused light, in this lake of

quietude, the storm of the heart appeased and stilled the echoes of the

world! Insatiable desire now sleeps and does not even dream; use and

wont, blessed use and wont, are the rule of my eternity; my disillusions

have died with my memories, and with my hopes my fears.

And they come seeking to deceive us with a deceit of deceits, telling us

that nothing is lost, that everything is transformed, shifts and

changes, that not the least particle of matter is annihilated, not the

least impulse of energy is lost, and there are some who pretend to

console us with this! Futile consolation! It is not my matter or my

energy that is the cause of my disquiet, for they are not mine if I

myself am not mine--that is, if I am not eternal. No, my longing is not

to be submerged in the vast All, in an infinite and eternal Matter or

Energy, or in God; not to be possessed by God, but to possess Him, to

become myself God, yet without ceasing to be I myself, I who am now

speaking to you. Tricks of monism avail us nothing; we crave the

substance and not the shadow of immortality.

Materialism, you say? Materialism? Without doubt; but either our spirit

is likewise some kind of matter or it is nothing. I dread the idea of

having to tear myself away from my flesh; I dread still more the idea of

having to tear myself away from everything sensible and material, from

all substance. Yes, perhaps this merits the name of materialism; and if

I grapple myself to God with all my powers and all my senses, it is that

He may carry me in His arms beyond death, looking into these eyes of

mine with the light of His heaven when the light of earth is dimming in

them for ever. Self-illusion? Talk not to me of illusion--let me live!

They also call this pride--"stinking pride" Leopardi called it--and they

ask us who are we, vile earthworms, to pretend to immortality; in virtue

of what? wherefore? by what right? "In virtue of what?" you ask; and I

reply, In virtue of what do we now live? "Wherefore?"--and wherefore do

we now exist? "By what right?"--and by what right are we? To exist is

just as gratuitous as to go on existing for ever. Do not let us talk of

merit or of right or of the wherefore of our longing, which is an end in

itself, or we shall lose our reason in a vortex of absurdities. I do not

claim any right or merit; it is only a necessity; I need it in order to

live.

And you, who are you? you ask me; and I reply with Obermann, "For the

universe, nothing; for myself, everything!" Pride? Is it pride to want

to be immortal? Unhappy men that we are! 'Tis a tragic fate, without a

doubt, to have to base the affirmation of immortality upon the insecure

and slippery foundation of the desire for immortality; but to condemn

this desire on the ground that we believe it to have been proved to be

unattainable, without undertaking the proof, is merely supine. I am

dreaming ...? Let me dream, if this dream is my life. Do not awaken me

from it. I believe in the immortal origin of this yearning for

immortality, which is the very substance of my soul. But do I really

believe in it ...? And wherefore do you want to be immortal? you ask me,

wherefore? Frankly, I do not understand the question, for it is to ask

the reason of the reason, the end of the end, the principle of the

principle.

But these are things which it is impossible to discuss.

It is related in the book of the Acts of the Apostles how wherever Paul

went the Jews, moved with envy, were stirred up to persecute him. They

stoned him in Iconium and Lystra, cities of Lycaonia, in spite of the

wonders that he worked therein; they scourged him in Philippi of

Macedonia and persecuted his brethren in Thessalonica and Berea. He

arrived at Athens, however, the noble city of the intellectuals, over

which brooded the sublime spirit of Plato--the Plato of the gloriousness

of the risk of immortality; and there Paul disputed with Epicureans and

Stoics. And some said of him, "What doth this babbler (_spermologos_)

mean?" and others, "He seemeth to be a setter forth of strange gods"

(Acts xvii. 18), "and they took him and brought him unto Areopagus,

saying, May we know what this new doctrine, whereof thou speakest, is?

for thou bringest certain strange things to our ears; we would know,

therefore, what these things mean" (verses 19-20). And then follows that

wonderful characterization of those Athenians of the decadence, those

dainty connoisseurs of the curious, "for all the Athenians and strangers

which were there spent their time in nothing else, but either to tell or

to hear some new thing" (verse 21). A wonderful stroke which depicts for

us the condition of mind of those who had learned from the _Odyssey_

that the gods plot and achieve the destruction of mortals in order that

their posterity may have something to narrate!

Here Paul stands, then, before the subtle Athenians, before the

_græuli_, men of culture and tolerance, who are ready to welcome and

examine every doctrine, who neither stone nor scourge nor imprison any

man for professing these or those doctrines--here he stands where

liberty of conscience is respected and every opinion is given an

attentive hearing. And he raises his voice in the midst of the Areopagus

and speaks to them as it was fitting to speak to the cultured citizens

of Athens, and all listen to him, agog to hear the latest novelty. But

when he begins to speak to them of the resurrection of the dead their

stock of patience and tolerance comes to an end, and some mock him, and

others say: "We will hear thee again of this matter!" intending not to

hear him. And a similar thing happened to him at Cæsarea when he came

before the Roman prætor Felix, likewise a broad-minded and cultured man,

who mitigated the hardships of his imprisonment, and wished to hear and

did hear him discourse of righteousness and of temperance; but when he

spoke of the judgement to come, Felix said, terrified (_emphobos

genomenos_): "Go thy way for this time; when I have a convenient season

I will call for thee" (Acts xxiv. 22-25). And in his audience before

King Agrippa, when Festus the governor heard him speak of the

resurrection of the dead, he exclaimed: "Thou art mad, Paul; much

learning hath made thee mad" (Acts xxvi. 24).

Whatever of truth there may have been in Paul's discourse in the

Areopagus, and even if there were none, it is certain that this

admirable account plainly shows how far Attic tolerance goes and where

the patience of the intellectuals ends. They all listen to you, calmly

and smilingly, and at times they encourage you, saying: "That's

strange!" or, "He has brains!" or "That's suggestive," or "How fine!" or

"Pity that a thing so beautiful should not be true!" or "this makes one

think!" But as soon as you speak to them of resurrection and life after

death, they lose their patience and cut short your remarks and exclaim,

"Enough of this! we will talk about this another day!" And it is about

this, my poor Athenians, my intolerant intellectuals, it is about this

that I am going to talk to you here.

And even if this belief be absurd, why is its exposition less tolerated

than that of others much more absurd? Why this manifest hostility to

such a belief? Is it fear? Is it, perhaps, spite provoked by inability

to share it?

And sensible men, those who do not intend to let themselves be deceived,

keep on dinning into our ears the refrain that it is no use giving way

to folly and kicking against the pricks, for what cannot be is

impossible. The manly attitude, they say, is to resign oneself to fate;

since we are not immortal, do not let us want to be so; let us submit

ourselves to reason without tormenting ourselves about what is

irremediable, and so making life more gloomy and miserable. This

obsession, they add, is a disease. Disease, madness, reason ... the

everlasting refrain! Very well then--No! I do not submit to reason, and

I rebel against it, and I persist in creating by the energy of faith my

immortalizing God, and in forcing by my will the stars out of their

courses, for if we had faith as a grain of mustard seed we should say to

that mountain, "Remove hence," and it would remove, and nothing would be

impossible to us (Matt. xvii. 20).

There you have that "thief of energies," as he[12] so obtusely called

Christ who sought to wed nihilism with the struggle for existence, and

he talks to you about courage. His heart craved the eternal all while

his head convinced him of nothingness, and, desperate and mad to defend

himself from himself, he cursed that which he most loved. Because he

could not be Christ, he blasphemed against Christ. Bursting with his own

self, he wished himself unending and dreamed his theory of eternal

recurrence, a sorry counterfeit of immortality, and, full of pity for

himself, he abominated all pity. And there are some who say that his is

the philosophy of strong men! No, it is not. My health and my strength

urge me to perpetuate myself. His is the doctrine of weaklings who

aspire to be strong, but not of the strong who are strong. Only the

feeble resign themselves to final death and substitute some other desire

for the longing for personal immortality. In the strong the zeal for

perpetuity overrides the doubt of realizing it, and their superabundance

of life overflows upon the other side of death.

Before this terrible mystery of mortality, face to face with the Sphinx,

man adopts different attitudes and seeks in various ways to console

himself for having been born. And now it occurs to him to take it as a

diversion, and he says to himself with Renan that this universe is a

spectacle that God presents to Himself, and that it behoves us to carry

out the intentions of the great Stage-Manager and contribute to make the

spectacle the most brilliant and the most varied that may be. And they

have made a religion of art, a cure for the metaphysical evil, and

invented the meaningless phrase of art for art's sake.

And it does not suffice them. If the man who tells you that he writes,

paints, sculptures, or sings for his own amusement, gives his work to

the public, he lies; he lies if he puts his name to his writing,

painting, statue, or song. He wishes, at the least, to leave behind a

shadow of his spirit, something that may survive him. If the _Imitation

of Christ_ is anonymous, it is because its author sought the eternity of

the soul and did not trouble himself about that of the name. The man of

letters who shall tell you that he despises fame is a lying rascal. Of

Dante, the author of those three-and-thirty vigorous verses (_Purg._ xi.

85-117) on the vanity of worldly glory, Boccaccio says that he relished

honours and pomps more perhaps than suited with his conspicuous virtue.

The keenest desire of his condemned souls is that they may be remembered

and talked of here on earth, and this is the chief solace that lightens

the darkness of his Inferno. And he himself confessed that his aim in

expounding the concept of Monarchy was not merely that he might be of

service to others, but that he might win for his own glory the palm of

so great prize (_De Monarchia_, lib. i., cap. i.). What more? Even of

that holy man, seemingly the most indifferent to worldly vanity, the

Poor Little One of Assisi, it is related in the _Legenda Trium Sociorum_

that he said: _Adhuc adorabor per totum mundum!_--You will see how I

shall yet be adored by all the world! (II. _Celano_, i. 1). And even of

God Himself the theologians say that He created the world for the

manifestation of His glory.

When doubts invade us and cloud our faith in the immortality of the

soul, a vigorous and painful impulse is given to the anxiety to

perpetuate our name and fame, to grasp at least a shadow of immortality.

And hence this tremendous struggle to singularize ourselves, to survive

in some way in the memory of others and of posterity. It is this

struggle, a thousand times more terrible than the struggle for life,

that gives its tone, colour, and character to our society, in which the

medieval faith in the immortal soul is passing away. Each one seeks to

affirm himself, if only in appearance.

Once the needs of hunger are satisfied--and they are soon satisfied--the

vanity, the necessity--for it is a necessity--arises of imposing

ourselves upon and surviving in others. Man habitually sacrifices his

life to his purse, but he sacrifices his purse to his vanity. He boasts

even of his weaknesses and his misfortunes, for want of anything better

to boast of, and is like a child who, in order to attract attention,

struts about with a bandaged finger. And vanity, what is it but

eagerness for survival?

The vain man is in like case with the avaricious--he takes the means for

the end; forgetting the end he pursues the means for its own sake and

goes no further. The seeming to be something, conducive to being it,

ends by forming our objective. We need that others should believe in our

superiority to them in order that we may believe in it ourselves, and

upon their belief base our faith in our own persistence, or at least in

the persistence of our fame. We are more grateful to him who

congratulates us on the skill with which we defend a cause than we are

to him who recognizes the truth or the goodness of the cause itself. A

rabid mania for originality is rife in the modern intellectual world and

characterizes all individual effort. We would rather err with genius

than hit the mark with the crowd. Rousseau has said in his _Émile_ (book

iv.): "Even though philosophers should be in a position to discover the

truth, which of them would take any interest in it? Each one knows well

that his system is not better founded than the others, but he supports

it because it is his. There is not a single one of them who, if he came

to know the true and the false, would not prefer the falsehood that he

had found to the truth discovered by another. Where is the philosopher

who would not willingly deceive mankind for his own glory? Where is he

who in the secret of his heart does not propose to himself any other

object than to distinguish himself? Provided that he lifts himself above

the vulgar, provided that he outshines the brilliance of his

competitors, what does he demand more? The essential thing is to think

differently from others. With believers he is an atheist; with atheists

he would be a believer." How much substantial truth there is in these

gloomy confessions of this man of painful sincerity!

This violent struggle for the perpetuation of our name extends backwards

into the past, just as it aspires to conquer the future; we contend

with the dead because we, the living, are obscured beneath their shadow.

We are jealous of the geniuses of former times, whose names, standing

out like the landmarks of history, rescue the ages from oblivion. The

heaven of fame is not very large, and the more there are who enter it

the less is the share of each. The great names of the past rob us of our

place in it; the space which they fill in the popular memory they usurp

from us who aspire to occupy it. And so we rise up in revolt against

them, and hence the bitterness with which all those who seek after fame

in the world of letters judge those who have already attained it and are

in enjoyment of it. If additions continue to be made to the wealth of

literature, there will come a day of sifting, and each one fears lest he

be caught in the meshes of the sieve. In attacking the masters,

irreverent youth is only defending itself; the iconoclast or

image-breaker is a Stylite who erects himself as an image, an _icon_.

"Comparisons are odious," says the familiar adage, and the reason is

that we wish to be unique. Do not tell Fernandez that he is one of the

most talented Spaniards of the younger generation, for though he will

affect to be gratified by the eulogy he is really annoyed by it; if,

however, you tell him that he is the most talented man in Spain--well

and good! But even that is not sufficient: one of the worldwide

reputations would be more to his liking, but he is only fully satisfied

with being esteemed the first in all countries and all ages. The more

alone, the nearer to that unsubstantial immortality, the immortality of

the name, for great names diminish one another.

What is the meaning of that irritation which we feel when we believe

that we are robbed of a phrase, or a thought, or an image, which we

believed to be our own, when we are plagiarized? Robbed? Can it indeed

be ours once we have given it to the public? Only because it is ours we

prize it; and we are fonder of the false money that preserves our

impress than of the coin of pure gold from which our effigy and our

legend has been effaced. It very commonly happens that it is when the

name of a writer is no longer in men's mouths that he most influences

his public, his mind being then disseminated and infused in the minds of

those who have read him, whereas he was quoted chiefly when his thoughts

and sayings, clashing with those generally received, needed the

guarantee of a name. What was his now belongs to all, and he lives in

all. But for him the garlands have faded, and he believes himself to

have failed. He hears no more either the applause or the silent tremor

of the heart of those who go on reading him. Ask any sincere artist

which he would prefer, whether that his work should perish and his

memory survive, or that his work should survive and his memory perish,

and you will see what he will tell you, if he is really sincere. When a

man does not work merely in order to live and carry on, he works in

order to survive. To work for the work's sake is not work but play. And

play? We will talk about that later on.

A tremendous passion is this longing that our memory may be rescued, if

it is possible, from the oblivion which overtakes others. From it

springs envy, the cause, according to the biblical narrative, of the

crime with which human history opened: the murder of Abel by his brother

Cain. It was not a struggle for bread--it was a struggle to survive in

God, in the divine memory. Envy is a thousand times more terrible than

hunger, for it is spiritual hunger. If what we call the problem of life,

the problem of bread, were once solved, the earth would be turned into a

hell by the emergence in a more violent form of the struggle for

survival.

For the sake of a name man is ready to sacrifice not only life but

happiness--life as a matter of course. "Let me die, but let my fame

live!" exclaimed Rodrigo Arias in _Las Mocedades del Cid_ when he fell

mortally wounded by Don Ordóñez de Lara. "Courage, Girolamo, for you

will long be remembered; death is bitter, but fame eternal!" cried

Girolamo Olgiati, the disciple of Cola Montano and the murderer,

together with his fellow-conspirators Lampugnani and Visconti, of

Galeazzo Sforza, tyrant of Milan. And there are some who covet even the

gallows for the sake of acquiring fame, even though it be an infamous

fame: _avidus malæ famæ_, as Tacitus says.

And this erostratism, what is it at bottom but the longing for

immortality, if not for substantial and concrete immortality, at any

rate for the shadowy immortality of the name?

And in this there are degrees. If a man despises the applause of the

crowd of to-day, it is because he seeks to survive in renewed minorities

for generations. "Posterity is an accumulation of minorities," said

Gounod. He wishes to prolong himself in time rather than in space. The

crowd soon overthrows its own idols and the statue lies broken at the

foot of the pedestal without anyone heeding it; but those who win the

hearts of the elect will long be the objects of a fervent worship in

some shrine, small and secluded no doubt, but capable of preserving them

from the flood of oblivion. The artist sacrifices the extensiveness of

his fame to its duration; he is anxious rather to endure for ever in

some little corner than to occupy a brilliant second place in the whole

universe; he prefers to be an atom, eternal and conscious of himself,

rather than to be for a brief moment the consciousness of the whole

universe; he sacrifices infinitude to eternity.

And they keep on wearying our ears with this chorus of Pride! stinking

Pride! Pride, to wish to leave an ineffaceable name? Pride? It is like

calling the thirst for riches a thirst for pleasure. No, it is not so

much the longing for pleasure that drives us poor folk to seek money as

the terror of poverty, just as it was not the desire for glory but the

terror of hell that drove men in the Middle Ages to the cloister with

its _acedia_. Neither is this wish to leave a name pride, but terror of

extinction. We aim at being all because in that we see the only means of

escaping from being nothing. We wish to save our memory--at any rate,

our memory. How long will it last? At most as long as the human race

lasts. And what if we shall save our memory in God?

Unhappy, I know well, are these confessions; but from the depth of

unhappiness springs new life, and only by draining the lees of spiritual

sorrow can we at last taste the honey that lies at the bottom of the cup

of life. Anguish leads us to consolation.

This thirst for eternal life is appeased by many, especially by the

simple, at the fountain of religious faith; but to drink of this is not

given to all. The institution whose primordial end is to protect this

faith in the personal immortality of the soul is Catholicism; but

Catholicism has sought to rationalize this faith by converting religion

into theology, by offering a philosophy, and a philosophy of the

thirteenth century, as a basis for vital belief. This and its

consequences we will now proceed to examine.

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