in the world; for, though of ancient family, he was not rich. He must
make money by his profession, or he must borrow it, if he would secure
office. It seems he borrowed it. How he contrived to borrow such vast
sums as he spent on elections, I do not know. He probably made friends
of rich men like Crassus, who became security for him. He was in debt to
the amount of $1,500,000 of our money before he held office. He was a
bold political gambler, and played for high stakes. It would seem that
he had very winning and courteous manners, though he was not
distinguished for popular oratory. His terse and pregnant sentences,
however, won the admiration of his friend Cicero, a brother lawyer, and
he was very social and hospitable. He was on the liberal side in
politics, and attacked the abuses of the day, which won him popular
favor. At first he lived in a modest house with his wife and mother, in
the Subarra, without attracting much notice. The first office to which
he was elected was that of a Military Tribune, soon after his sojourn of
two years in Rhodes to learn from Apollonius the arts of oratory. His
next office was that of Quaestor, which enabled him to enter the Senate,
at the age of thirty-two; and his third office, that of Aedile, which
gave him the control of the public buildings: the Aediles were expected
to decorate the city, and this gave him opportunities of cultivating
popularity by splendor and display. The first thing which brought him
into notice as an orator was a funeral oration he pronounced on his Aunt
Julia, the widow of Marius. The next fortunate event of his life was his
marriage with Pompeia, a cousin of Pompey, who was then the foremost man
in Rome, having distinguished himself in Spain and in putting down the
slave insurrection under Spartacus; but Pompey's great career in the
East had not yet commenced, so that the future rivals at that time were
friends. Caesar glorified Pompey in the Senate, which by virtue of his
office he had lately entered. The next step to greatness was his
election by the people--through the use of immense amounts of borrowed
money--to the great office of Pontifex Maximus, which made him the pagan
Pope of Rome for life, with a grand palace to live in. Soon after he was
made Praetor, which office entitled him to a provincial government; and
he was sent by the Senate to Spain as Pro-praetor, completed the
conquest of the peninsula, and sent to Borne vast sums of money. These
services entitled him to a triumph; but, as he presented himself at the
same time as a candidate for the consulship, he was obliged to forego
the triumph, and was elected Consul without opposition: his vanity ever
yielded to his ambition.
Thus far there was nothing remarkable in Caesar's career. He had risen
by power of money, like other aristocrats, to the highest offices of the
State, showing abilities indeed, but not that extraordinary genius which
has made him immortal. He was the leader of the political party which
Sulla had put down, and yet was not a revolutionist like the Gracchi. He
was an aristocratic reformer, like Lord John Russell before the passage
of the Reform Bill, whom the people adored. He was a liberal, but not a
radical. Of course he was not a favorite with the senators, who wished
to perpetuate abuses. He was intensely disliked by Cato, a most
excellent and honest man, but narrow-minded and conservative,--a sort of
Duke of Wellington without his military abilities. The Senate would make
no concessions, would part with no privileges, and submit to no changes.
Like Lord Eldon, it "adhered to what was established, because it was
established."
Caesar, as Consul, began his administration with conciliation; and he
had the support of Crassus with his money, and of Pompey as the
representative of the army, who was then flushed with his Eastern
conquests,--pompous, vain, and proud, but honest and incorruptible.
Cicero stood aloof,--the greatest man in the Senate, whose aristocratic
privileges he defended. He might have aided Caesar "in the speaking
department;" but as a "new man" he was jealous of his prerogatives, and
was always conservative, like Burke, whom he resembled in his eloquence
and turn of mind and fondness for literature and philosophy. Failing to
conciliate the aristocrats, Caesar became a sort of Mirabeau, and
appealed to the people, causing them to pass his celebrated "Leges
Juliae," or reform bills; the chief of which was the "land act," which
conferred portions of the public lands on Pompey's disbanded soldiers
for settlement,--a wise thing, which senators opposed, since it took
away their monopoly. Another act required the provincial governors, on
their return from office, to render an account of their stewardship and
hand in their accounts for public inspection. The Julian Laws also were
designed to prevent the plunder of the public revenues, the debasing of
the coin, the bribery of judges and of the people at elections. There
were laws also for the protection of citizens from violence, and sundry
other reforms which were enlightened and useful. In the passage of these
laws against the will of the Senate, we see that the people were still
recognized as sovereign in _legislation_. The laws were good. All
depended on their execution; and the Senate, as the administrative body,
could practically defeat their operation when Caesar's term of office
expired; and this it unwisely determined to do. The last thing it
wished was any reform whatever; and, as Mr. Froude thinks, there must
have been either reform or revolution. But this is not so clear to me.
Aristocracy was all-powerful when money could buy the people, and when
the people had no virtue, no ambition, no intelligence. The struggle at
Rome in the latter days of the Republic was not between the people and
the aristocracy, but between the aristocracy and the military chieftains
on one side, and those demagogues whom it feared on the other. The
result showed that the aristocracy feared and distrusted Caesar; and he
used the people only to advance his own ends,--of course, in the name of
reform and patriotism. And when he became Dictator, he kicked away the
ladder on which he climbed to power. It was Imperialism that he
established; neither popular rights nor aristocratic privileges. He had
no more love of the people than he had of those proud aristocrats who
afterwards murdered him.
But the empire of the world--to which Caesar at that time may, or may
not, have aspired: who can tell? but probably not--was not to be gained
by civil services, or reforms, or arguments in law courts, or by holding
great offices, or haranguing the people at the rostrum, or making
speeches in the Senate,--where he was hated for his liberal views and
enlightened mind, rather than from any fear of his overturning the
constitution,--but by military services and heroic deeds and the
devotion of a tried and disciplined regular army. Caesar was now
forty-three years of age, being in the full maturity of his powers. At
the close of his term as Consul he sought a province where military
talents were indispensable, and where he could have a long term of
office. The Senate gave him the "woods and forests,"--an unsubdued
country, where he would have hard work and unknown perils, and from
which it was probable he would never return. They sent him to Gaul. But
this was just the field for his marvellous military genius, then only
partially developed; and the second period of his career now began.
It was during this second period that he rendered his most important
services to the State and earned his greatest fame. The dangers which
threatened the Empire came from the West, and not the East. Asia was
already-subdued by Sulla, Lucullus, and Pompey, or was on the point of
being subdued. Mithridates was a formidable enemy; but he aimed at
establishing an Asiatic empire, not conquering the European provinces.
He was not so dangerous as even Pyrrhus had been. Moreover, the conquest
of the East was comparatively easy,--over worn-out races and an effete
civilization; it gave _éclat_ to Sulla and Pompey,--as the conquest of
India, with a handful of British troops, made Clive and Hastings
famous; it required no remarkable military genius, nor was it necessary
for the safety of Italy. Conquest over the Oriental monarchies meant
only spoliation. It was prompted by greed and vanity more than by a
sense of danger. Pompey brought back money enough from the East to
enrich all his generals, and the Senate besides,--or rather the State,
which a few aristocrats practically owned.
But the conquest of Gaul would be another affair. It was peopled with
hardy races, who cast their greedy eyes on the empire of the Romans, or
on some of its provinces, and who were being pushed forward to invasion
by a still braver people beyond the Rhine,--races kindred to those
Teutons whom Marius had defeated. There was no immediate danger from the
Germans; but there was ultimate danger, as proved by the union they made
in the time of Marcus Antoninus for the invasion of the Roman provinces.
It was necessary to raise a barrier against their inundations. It was
also necessary to subdue the various Celtic tribes of Gaul, who were
getting restless and uneasy. There was no money in a conquest over
barbarians, except so far as they could be sold into slavery; but there
was danger in it. The whole country was threatened with insurrections,
leagues, and invasion, from the Alps to the ocean. There was a
confederacy of hostile kings and chieftains; they commanded innumerable
forces; they controlled important posts and passes. The Gauls had long
made fixed settlements, and had built bridges and fortresses. They were
not so warlike as the Germans; but they were yet formidable enemies.
United, they were like "a volcano giving signs of approaching eruption;
and at any moment, and hardly without warning, another lava stream might
be poured down Venetia and Lombardy."
To rescue the Empire from such dangers was the work of Caesar; and it
was no small undertaking. The Senate had given him unlimited power, for
five years, over Gaul,--then a _terra incognita_,--an indefinite
country, comprising the modern States of France, Holland, Switzerland,
Belgium, and a part of Germany. Afterward the Senate extended the
governorship five years more; so difficult was the work of conquest, and
so formidable were the enemies. But it was danger which Caesar loved.
The greater the obstacles the better was he pleased, and the greater was
the scope for his genius,--which at first was not appreciated, for the
best part of his life had been passed in Rome as a lawyer and orator and
statesman. But he had a fine constitution, robust health, temperate
habits, and unbounded energies. He was free to do as he liked with
several legions, and had time to perfect his operations. And his legions
were trained to every kind of labor and hardship. They could build
bridges, cut down forests, and drain swamps, as well as march with a
weight of eighty pounds to the man. They could make their own shoes,
mend their own clothes, repair their own arms, and construct their own
tents. They were as familiar with the axe and spade as they were with
the lance and sword. They were inured to every kind of danger and
difficulty, and not one of them was personally braver than the general
who led them, or more skilful in riding a horse, or fording a river, or
climbing a mountain. No one of them could be more abstemious. Luxury is
not one of the peculiarities of successful generals in barbaric
countries.
To give a minute sketch of the various encounters with the different
tribes and nations that inhabited the vast country he was sent to
conquer and govern, would be impossible in a lecture like this. One must
read Caesar's own account of his conflicts with Helvetii, Aedui, Remi,
Nervii, Belgae, Veneti, Arverni, Aquitani, Ubii, Eubueones, Treveri, and
other nations between the Alps, the Pyrenees, the Rhine, and the sea.
Their numbers were immense, and they were well armed, and had cavalry,
military stores, efficient leaders, and indomitable courage. When beaten
in one place they sprang up in another, like the Saxons with whom
Charlemagne contended. They made treaties only to break them. They
fought with the desperation of heroes who had their wives and children,
firesides and altars, to guard; yet against them Caesar was uniformly
successful. He was at times in great peril, yet he never lost but one
battle, and this through the fault of his generals. Yet he had able
generals, whom he selected himself,--Labienus, who afterwards deserted
him, Antony, Publius Crassus, Cotta, Sabinus,--all belonging to the
aristocracy. They made mistakes, but Caesar never. They would often have
been cut off but for Caesar's timely aid.
When we consider the dangers to which he was constantly exposed, the
amazing difficulties he had to surmount, the hardships he had to
encounter, the fears he had to allay, the murmurs he was obliged to
silence, the rivers he was compelled to cross in the face of enemies,
the forests it was necessary to penetrate, the swamps and mountains and
fortresses which impeded his marches, we are amazed at his skill and
intrepidity, to say nothing of his battles with forces ten times more
numerous than his own. His fertility of resources, his lightning
rapidity of movement, his sagacity and insight, his perfection of
discipline, his careful husbandry of forces, his ceaseless diligence,
his intrepid courage, the confidence with which he inspired his
soldiers, his brilliant successes (victory after victory), with the
enormous number of captives by which he and the State became
enriched,--all these things dazzled his countrymen, and gave him a fame
such as no general had ever earned before. He conquered a population of
warriors to be numbered by millions, with no aid from charts and maps,
exposed perpetually to treachery and false information. He had to please
and content an army a thousand miles from home, without supplies, except
such as were precarious,--living on the plainest food, and doomed to
infinite labors and drudgeries, besides attacking camps and assaulting
fortresses, and fighting pitched battles. Yet he won their love, their
respect, and their admiration,--and by an urbanity, a kindness, and a
careful protection of their interests, such as no general ever showed
before. He was a hero performing perpetual wonders, as chivalrous as the
knights of the Middle Ages. No wonder he was adored, like a Moses in the
wilderness, like a Napoleon in his early conquests.
This conquest of Gaul, during which he drove the Germans back to their
forests, and inaugurated a policy of conciliation and moderation which
made the Gauls the faithful allies of Rome, and their country its most
fertile and important province, furnishing able men both for the Senate
and the Army, was not only a great feat of genius, but a great
service--a transcendent service--to the State, which entitled Caesar to
a magnificent reward. Had it been cordially rendered to him, he might
have been contented with a sort of perpetual consulship, and with the
éclat of being the foremost man of the Empire. The people would have
given him anything in their power to give, for he was as much an idol to
them as Napoleon became to the Parisians after the conquest of Italy. He
had rendered services as brilliant as those of Scipio, of Marius, of
Sulla, or of Pompey. If he did not save Italy from being subsequently
overrun by barbarians, he postponed their irruptions for two hundred
years. And he had partially civilized the country he had subdued, and
introduced Roman institutions. He had also created an army of
disciplined veterans, such as never before was seen. He perfected
military mechanism, that which kept the Empire together after all
vitality had fled. He was the greatest master of the art of war known to
antiquity. Such transcendent military excellence and such great services
entitled him to the gratitude and admiration of the whole Empire,
although he enriched himself and his soldiers with the spoils of his ten
years' war, and did not, so far as I can see, bring great sums into the
national treasury.
But the Senate was reluctant to give him the customary rewards for ten
years' successful war, and for adding Western Europe to the Empire. It
was jealous of his greatness and his renown. It also feared him, for he
had eleven legions in his pay, and was known to be ambitious. It hated
him for two reasons: first, because in his first consulship he had
introduced reforms, and had always sided with the popular and liberal
party; and secondly, because military successes of unprecedented
brilliancy had made him dangerous. So, on the conclusion of the conquest
of Gaul, it withdrew two legions from his army, and sought to deprive
him of his promised second consulate, and even to recall him before his
term of office as governor was expired. In other words, it sought to
cripple and disarm him, and raise his rival, Pompey, over him in the
command of the forces of the Empire.
It was now secret or open war, not between Caesar and the Roman people,
but between Caesar and the Senate,--between a great and triumphant
general and the Roman oligarchy of nobles, who, for nearly five hundred
years, had ruled the Empire. On the side of Caesar were the army, the
well-to-do classes, and the people; on the side of the Senate were the
forces which a powerful aristocracy could command, having the prestige
of law and power and wealth, and among whom were the great names of
the republic.
Mr. Froude ridicules and abuses this aristocracy, as unfit longer to
govern the State, as a worn-out power that deserved to fall. He
uniformly represents them as extravagant, selfish, ostentatious,
luxurious, frivolous, Epicurean in opinions and in life, oppressive in
all their social relations, haughty beyond endurance, and controlling
the popular elections by means of bribery and corruption. It would be
difficult to refute these charges. The Patricians probably gave
themselves up to all the pleasures incident to power and unbounded
wealth, in a corrupt and wicked age. They had their palaces in the city
and their villas in the country, their parks and gardens, their
fish-ponds and game-preserves, their pictures and marbles, their
expensive furniture and costly ornaments, gold and silver vessels, gems
and precious works of art. They gave luxurious banquets; they travelled
like princes; they were a body of kings, to whom the old monarchs of
conquered provinces bowed down in fear and adulation. All this does not
prove that they were incapable, although they governed for the interests
of their class. They were all experienced in affairs of State,--most of
them had been quaestors, aediles, praetors, censors, tribunes, consuls,
and governors. Most of them were highly educated, had travelled
extensively, were gentlemanly in their manners, could make speeches in
the Senate, and could fight on the field of battle when there was a
necessity. They doubtless had the common vices of the rich and proud;
but many of them were virtuous, patriotic, incorruptible, almost austere
in morals, dignified and intellectual, whom everybody respected,--men
like Cato, Brutus, Cassius, Cicero, and others. Their sin was that they
wished to conserve their powers, privileges, and fortunes, like all
aristocracies,--like the British House of Lords. Nor must it be
forgotten that it was under their régime that the conquest of the world
was made, and that Rome had become the centre of everything magnificent
and glorious on the earth.
It was doubtless shortsighted and ungrateful in these nobles to attempt
to deprive Caesar of his laurels and his promised consulship. He had
earned them by grand services, both as a general and a statesman. But
their jealousy and hatred were not unnatural. They feared, not
unreasonably, that the successful general--rich, proud, and dictatorial
from the long exercise of power, and seated in the chair of supremest
dignity--would make sweeping changes; might reduce their authority to a
shadow, and elevate himself to perpetual dictatorship; and thus, by
substituting imperialism for aristocracy, subvert the Constitution. That
is evidently what Cicero feared, as appears in his letters to Atticus.
That is what all the leading Senators feared, especially Cato. It was
known that Caesar--although urbane, merciful, enlightened, hospitable,
and disposed to govern for the public good--was unscrupulous in the use
of tools; that he had originally gained his seat in the Senate by
bribery and demagogic arts; that he was reckless as to debts, regarding
money only as a means to buy supporters; that he had appropriated vast
sums from the spoils of war for his own use, and, from being poor, had
become the richest man in the Empire; that he had given his daughter
Julia in marriage to Pompey from political ends; that he was
long-sighted in his ambition, and would be content with nothing less
than the gratification of this insatiate passion. All this was known,
and it gave great solicitude to the leaders of the aristocracy, who
resolved to put him down,--to strip him of his power, or fight him, if
necessary, in a civil war. So the aristocracy put themselves under the
protection of Pompey,--a successful but overrated general, who also
aimed at supreme power, with the nobles as his supporters, not perhaps
as Imperator, but as the agent and representative of a subservient
Senate, in whose name he would rule.
This contest between Caesar and the aristocracy under the lead of
Pompey, its successful termination in Caesar's favor, and his brilliant
reign of about four years, as Dictator and Imperator, constitute the
third period of his memorable career.
Neither Caesar nor Pompey would disband their legions, as it was
proposed by Curio in the Senate and voted by a large majority. In fact,
things had arrived at a crisis: Caesar was recalled, and he must obey
the Senate, or be decreed a public enemy; that is, the enemy of the
power that ruled the State. He would not obey, and a general levy of
troops in support of the Senate was made, and put into the hands of
Pompey with unlimited command. The Tribunes of the people, however,
sided with Caesar, and refused confirmation of the Senatorial decrees.
Caesar then no longer hesitated, but with his army crossed the Rubicon,
which was an insignificant stream, but was the Rome-ward boundary of his
province. This was the declaration of civil war. It was now "'either
anvil or hammer." The admirers of Caesar claim that his act was a
necessity, at least a public benefit, on the ground of the misrule of
the aristocracy. But it does not appear that there was anarchy at Rome,
although Milo had killed Clodius. There were aristocratic feuds, as in
the Middle Ages. Order and law--the first conditions of society--were
not in jeopardy, as in the French Revolution, when Napoleon arose. The
people were not in hostile array against the nobles, nor the nobles
against the people. The nobles only courted and bribed the people; but
so general was corruption that a change in government was deemed
necessary by the advocates of Caesar,--at least they defended it. The
gist of all the arguments in favor of the revolution is: better
imperialism than an oligarchy of corrupt nobles. It is not my province
to settle that question. It is my work only to describe events.
It is clear that Caesar resolved on seizing supreme power, in taking it
away from the nobles, on the ground probably that he could rule better
than they,--the plea of Napoleon, the plea of Cromwell, the plea of
all usurpers.
But this supreme power he could not exercise until he had conquered
Pompey and the Senate and all his enemies. It must need be that "he
should wade through slaughter to his throne." This alternative was
forced on him, and he accepted it. He accepted civil war in order to
reign. At best, he would do evil that good might come. He was doubtless
the strongest man in the world; and, according to Mr. Carlyle's theory,
the strongest ought to rule.
Much has been said about the rabble,--the democracy,--their turbulence,
corruption, and degradation, their unfitness to rule, and all that sort
of thing, which I regard as irrelevant, so far as the usurpation of
Caesar is concerned; since the struggle was not between them and the
nobles, but between a fortunate general and the aristocracy who
controlled the State. Caesar was not the representative of the people or
of their interests, as Tiberius Gracchus was, but the representative of
the Army. He had no more sympathy with the people than he had with the
nobles: he probably despised them both, as unfit to rule. He flattered
the people and bought them, but he did not love them. It was his
soldiers whom he loved, next to himself; although, as a wise and
enlightened statesman, he wished to promote the great interests of the
nation, so far as was consistent with the enjoyment of imperial rule.
This friend of the people would give them spectacles and shows,
largesses of corn,--money, even,--and extension of the suffrage, but not
political power. He was popular with them, because he was generous and
merciful, because his exploits won their admiration, and his vast public
works gave employment to them and adorned their city.