SHERMAN'S STORY OF THE MARCH.
THE SOLDIER'S MODEST NARRATION OF HIS ARDUOUS DEEDS--WHY THE MARCH
WAS DECIDED UPON--OPERATIONS AROUND SAVANNAH--MATERIAL RESULTS
OF THE CAMPAIGN--HANDSOME TRIBUTES TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF
HIS ARMY.
After his safe arrival at Savannah, General Sherman made the following
official report on the great march "from Atlanta to the Sea":
"HDQRS. MIL. DIV. OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
"IN THE FIELD, SAVANNAH, GA., Jan. 1st, 1865.
"_Major-General H. W. Halleck, Chief of Staff, Washington City, D. D_.
"GENERAL:--I have the honor to offer my report of the operations of the
armies under my command since the occupation of Atlanta in the early
part of September last, up to the present date.
"As heretofore reported in the month of September the Army of the
Cumberland, Major-General Thomas commanding, held the city of Atlanta;
the Army of the Tennessee, Major-General Howard commanding, was grouped
about East Point; and the Army of the Ohio, Major-General Schofield
commanding, held Decatur. Many changes occurred in the composition of
those armies, in consequence of expiration of the time of service of
many of the regiments. The opportunity was given to us to consolidate
the fragments, reclothe and equip the men, and make preparations
for the future campaign. I also availed myself of the occasion to
strengthen the garrisons to our rear, to make our communications more
secure, and sent Wagner's Division of the Fourth Corps, and Morgan's
Division of the Fourteenth Corps back to Chattanooga, and Corse's
Division of the Fifteenth Corps to Rome. Also a thorough reconnoissance
was made of Atlanta, and a new line of works begun, which required a
small garrison to hold.
"During this month, the enemy whom we had left at Lovejoy's Station,
moved westward toward the Chattahoochee, taking position facing us and
covering the West Point railroad, about Palmetto Station. He also threw
a pontoon bridge across the Chattahoochee, and sent cavalry detachments
to the west, in the direction of Carrolton and Powder Springs. About
the same time President Davis visited Macon, and his army at Palmetto,
and made harangues referring to an active campaign against us. Hood
still remained in command of the Confederate forces, with Cheatham, S.
D. Lee and Stewart, commanding his three corps, and Wheeler in command
of his cavalry, which had been largely reinforced.
"My cavalry consisted of two divisions. One was stationed at Decatur,
under command of Brigadier-General Garrard; the other, commanded by
Brigadier-General Kilpatrick, was posted near Sandtown, with a pontoon
bridge over the Chattahoochee, from which he could watch any movement
of the enemy toward the west.
"As soon as I became convinced that the enemy intended to assume the
offensive, namely, September 28th, I sent Major-General Thomas, second
in command, to Nashville, to organize the new troops expected to
arrive, and to make preliminary preparations to meet such an event.
"About the 1st of October some of the enemy's cavalry made their
appearance on the west of the Chattahoochee, and one of his infantry
corps was reported near Powder Springs; and I received authentic
intelligence that the rest of his infantry was crossing to the west
of the Chattahoochee. I at once made my orders that Atlanta and the
Chattahoochee railroad bridge should be held by the Twentieth Corps,
Major-General Slocum, and on the 4th of October put in motion the
Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps, and the Fourth, Fourteenth, and
Twenty-third Corps, to Smyrna camp-ground, and on the 5th moved to the
strong position about Kenesaw. The enemy's cavalry had, by a rapid
movement, got upon our railroad, at Big Shanty and broken the line of
telegraph and railroad, and with a division of infantry (French's) had
moved against Allatoona, where were stored about a million rations.
Its redoubts were garrisoned by three small regiments under Colonel
Tourtellotte, Fourth Minnesota.
[Illustration: SHERMAN SENDING HIS LAST TELEGRAM BEFORE CUTTING THE
WIRES.]
"I had anticipated this movement, and had by signal and telegraph
ordered General Corse to reinforce that post from Rome. General Corse
had reached Allatoona with a brigade during the night of the 4th, just
in time to meet the attack by French's Division on the morning of
the 5th. In person I reached Kenesaw Mountain about 10 A. M. of the
5th, and could see the smoke of battle and hear the faint sounds of
artillery. The distance, eighteen miles, was too great for me to make
in time to share in the battle, but I directed the Twenty-third Corps,
Brigadier-General Cox commanding, to move rapidly from the base of
Kenesaw due west, aiming to reach the road from Allatoona to Dallas,
threatening the rear of the forces attacking Allatoona I succeeded in
getting a signal message to General Corse during the fight, notifying
him of my presence. The defence of Allatoona by General Corse was
admirably conducted, and the enemy repulsed with heavy slaughter. His
description of the defence is so graphic that it leaves nothing for
me to add; and the movement of General Cox had the desired effect of
causing the withdrawal of French's Division rapidly in the direction of
Dallas.
"On the 6th and 7th I pushed my cavalry well toward Burnt Hickory
and Dallas, and discovered that the enemy had moved westward, and
inferred that he would attempt to break our railroad again in the
neighborhood of Kingston. Accordingly, on the morning of the 8th I
put the army in motion through Allatoona Pass to Kingston, reaching
that point on the 10th. There I learned that the enemy had feigned on
Rome, and was passing the Coosa River on a pontoon bridge about eleven
miles below Rome. I therefore, on the 11th, moved to Rome, and pushed
Garrard's Cavalry and the Twenty-third Corps, under General Cox, across
the Oostanaula, to threaten the flanks of the enemy passing north.
Garrard's cavalry drove a cavalry brigade of the enemy to and beyond
the Narrows, leading into the Valley of the Chattooga, capturing two
field pieces. The enemy had moved with great rapidity, and made his
appearance at Resaca, and Hood had in person demanded its surrender.
"I had from Kingston reinforced Resaca by two regiments of the Army of
the Tennessee. I at first intended to move the army into the Chattooga
Valley, to interpose between the enemy and his line of retreat down the
Coosa, but feared that General Hood would in that event turn eastward
by Spring Place, and down the Federal road, and therefore moved against
him at Resaca. Colonel Weaver at Resaca, afterward reinforced by
General Raum's brigade, had repulsed the enemy from Resaca, but he had
succeeded in breaking the railroad from Tilton to Dalton, and as far
north as the tunnel. Arriving at Resaca on the evening of the 14th,
I determined to strike Hood in flank, or force him to battle; and
directed the Army of the Tennessee, General Howard, to move to Snake
Creek Gap which was held by the enemy, while General Stanley, with the
Fourth and Fourteenth Corps, moved by Tilton, across the mountains, to
the rear of Snake Creek Gap in the neighborhood of Villianow.
"The Army of the Tennessee found the enemy occupying our old lines in
Snake Creek Gap, and on the 15th skirmished for the purpose of holding
him there until Stanley could get to his rear. But the enemy gave way
about noon, and was followed through the gap, escaping before General
Stanley had reached the further end of the pass. The next day (the
16th) the armies moved directly toward Lafayette, with a view to cut
off Hood's retreat. We found him intrenched in Ship's Gap, but the
leading division (Wood's) of the Fifteenth Corps rapidly carried the
advanced posts held by two companies of a South Carolina regiment,
making them prisoners. The remaining eight companies escaped to the
main body near Lafayette. The next morning we passed over into the
Valley of the Chattooga, the Army of the Tennessee moving in pursuit by
Lafayette and Alpine, toward Blue Pond; the Army of the Cumberland by
Summerville and Melville Postoffice, to Gaylesville, and the Army of
the Ohio and Garrard's Cavalry from Villainow, Dirttown, and Gover's
Gap, to Gaylesville. Hood, however, was little incumbered with trains,
and marched with great rapidity, and had succeeded in getting into the
narrow gorge formed by the lookout Range abutting against the Coosa
River, in the neighborhood of Gadsden. He evidently wanted to avoid the
fight.
"On the 19th all the armies were grouped about Gaylesville, in the rich
valley of the Chattooga, abounding in corn and meat, and I determined
to pause in my pursuit of the enemy, to watch his movements and live
on the country. I hoped that Hood would turn toward Guntersville and
Bridgeport. The Army of the Tennessee was posted near Little River,
with instructions to feel forward in support of the cavalry, which was
ordered to watch Hood in the neighborhood of Will's Valley, and to give
me the earliest notice possible of his turning northward. The Army of
the Ohio was posted at Cedar Bluff, with orders to lay a pontoon across
the Coosa, and to feel forward to Center and down in the direction
of Blue Mountain. The Army of the Cumberland was held in reserve at
Gaylesville; and all the troops were instructed to draw heavily for
supplies from the surrounding country. In the meantime communications
were opened to Rome, and a heavy force set to work in repairing the
damages done to our railroads. Atlanta was abundantly supplied with
provisions, but forage was scarce, and General Slocum was instructed to
send strong foraging parties out in the direction of South River and
collect all the corn and fodder possible, and to put his own trains in
good condition for further service.
"Hood's movements and strategy had demonstrated that he had an army
capable of endangering at all times my communications, but unable to
meet me in open fight. To follow him would simply amount to being
decoyed away from Georgia, with little prospect of overtaking and
overwhelming him. To remain on the defensive would have been bad policy
for an army of so great value as the one I then commanded, and I was
forced to adopt a course more fruitful in results than the naked one
of following him to the southwest. I had previously submitted to the
Commander-in-Chief a general plan, which amounted substantially to
the destruction of Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga, and
sallying forth from Atlanta, through the heart of Georgia, to capture
one or more of the great Atlantic seaports. This I renewed from
Gaylesville, modified somewhat by the change of events.
"On the 26th of October, satisfied that Hood had moved westward
from Gadsden across Sand Mountain, I detached the Fourth Corps,
Major-General Stanley, and ordered him to proceed to Chattanooga and
report to Major-General Thomas at Nashville. Subsequently, on the 30th
of October, I also detached the Twenty-third Corps, Major-General
Schofield, with the same destination, and delegated to Major-General
Thomas full power over all the troops subject to my command, except
the four corps with which I designed to move into Georgia. This gave
him the two divisions under A. J. Smith, then in Missouri, but en
route for Tennessee, the two corps named, and all the garrisons in
Tennessee, as also all the cavalry of my Military Division, except
one division under Brigadier-General Kilpatrick, which was ordered to
rendezvous at Marietta. Brevet-Major-General Wilson had arrived from
the Army of the Potomac, to assume command of the cavalry of my army,
and I dispatched him back to Nashville with all dismounted detachments,
and orders as rapidly as possible to collect the cavalry serving in
Kentucky and Tennessee, to mount, organize and equip them, and report
to Major-General Thomas for duty. These forces I judged would enable
General Thomas to defend the railroad from Chattanooga back, including
Nashville and Decatur, and give him an army with which he could
successfully cope with Hood, should the latter cross the Tennessee
northward.
"By the 1st of November Hood's army had moved from Gadsden, and made
its appearance in the neighborhood of Decatur, where a feint was made;
he then passed on to Tuscumbia and laid a pontoon bridge opposite
Florence. I then began my preparations for the march through Georgia,
having received the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief carrying into
effect my plan, the details of which were explained to all my corps
commanders and heads of staff departments, with strict injunctions of
secrecy. I had also communicated full details to General Thomas, and
had informed him I would not leave the neighborhood of Kingston until
he felt perfectly confident that he was entirely prepared to cope with
Hood, should he carry into effect his threatened invasion of Tennessee
and Kentucky. I estimated Hood's force at 35,000 infantry and 10,000
cavalry.
"I moved the Army of the Tennessee by slow and easy marches on the
south of the Coosa back to the neighborhood of Smyrna camp ground, and
the Fourteenth Corps, General Jeff. C. Davis, to Kingston, whither I
repaired in person on the 2d of November. From that point I directed
all surplus artillery, all baggage not needed for my contemplated
march, all the sick and wounded, refugees, &c., to be sent back to
Chattanooga; and the four corps above-mentioned, with Kilpatrick's
Cavalry, were put in the most efficient condition possible for a long
and difficult march. This operation consumed the time until the 11th of
November, when, everything being ready, I ordered General Corse, who
still remained at Rome, to destroy the bridges there, all foundries,
mills, shops, warehouses, or other property that could be useful to
an enemy, and to move to Kingston. At the same time the railroad in
and about Atlanta, and between the Etowah and the Chattahoochee, was
ordered to be utterly destroyed.
"The garrisons from Kingston northward were also ordered to draw back
to Chattanooga, taking with them all public property and all railroad
stock, and to take up the rails from Resaca back, saving them, ready
to be replaced whenever future interests should demand. The railroad
between the Etowah and the Oostanaula was left untouched, because I
thought it more than probable we would find it necessary to re-occupy
the country as far forward as the Etowah. Atlanta itself is only of
strategic value as long as it is a railroad centre; and as all the
railroads leading to it are destroyed, as well as all its foundries,
machine shops, warehouses, depots, &c., it is of no more value than
any other point in North Georgia; whereas the line of the Etowah, by
reasons of its rivers and natural features, possesses an importance
which will always continue. From it all parts of Georgia and Alabama
can be reached by armies marching with trains down the Coosa or the
Chattahoochee Valleys.
"On the 12th of November, my army stood detached and cut off from
all communication with the rear. It was composed of four corps,
the Fifteenth and Seventeenth constituting the right wing, under
Major-General O. O. Howard; the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps,
constituting the left wing, under Major-General H. W. Slocum; of
an aggregate strength of 60,000 infantry; one cavalry division, in
aggregate strength 5,500, under Brigadier-General Judson Kilpatrick,
and the artillery reduced to the minimum, one gun per thousand men.
"The whole force moved rapidly and grouped about Atlanta on the 14th
November. In the meantime Captain O. M. Poe had thoroughly destroyed
Atlanta, save its mere dwelling houses and churches, and the right
wing, with General Kilpatrick's cavalry, was put in motion in the
direction of Jonesborough and McDonough, with orders to make a strong
feint on Macon, to cross the Ocmulgee about Planters' Mills, and
rendezvous in the neighborhood of Gordon in seven days, exclusive
of the day of march. On the same day General Slocum moved with the
Twentieth corps by Decatur and Stone Mountain, with orders to tear
up the railroad from Social Circle to Madison, to burn the large and
important railroad bridge across the Oconee, east of Madison, and turn
south and reach Milledgeville on the seventh day, exclusive of the day
of march.
"In person I left Atlanta on the 16th, in company with the Fourteenth
Corps, Brevet-Major-General Jeff. C. Davis, by Lithonia, Covington,
and Shady Dale, directly on Milledgeville. All the troops were
provided with good wagon trains, loaded with ammunition, and supplies
approximating twenty days' bread, forty days' sugar and coffee, a
double allowance of salt for forty days, and beef cattle equal to
forty days' supplies. The wagons were also supplied with about three
days' forage, in grain. All were instructed by a judicious system of
foraging, to maintain this order of things as long as possible, living
chiefly, if not solely, upon the country, which I knew to abound in
corn, sweet potatoes and meats.
"My first object was, of course, to place my army in the very heart
of Georgia, interposing between Macon and Augusta, and obliging the
enemy to divide his forces to defend not only those points, but
Millen, Savannah and Charleston. All my calculations were fully
realized. During the 22d, General Kilpatrick made a good feint on
Macon, driving the enemy within his intrenchments, and then drew back
to Griswoldville, where Walcott's Brigade of infantry joined him to
cover that flank, while Howard's trains were closing up and his men
scattered, breaking up railroads. The enemy came out of Macon and
attacked Wolcott in position, but was so roughly handled that he never
repeated the experiment. On the eighth day after leaving Atlanta,
namely, on the 23d, General Slocum occupied Milledgeville and the
important bridge across the Oconee there, and Generals Howard and
Kilpatrick were in and about Gordon.
"General Howard was then ordered to move eastward, destroying the
railroad thoroughly in his progress as far as Tennille Station,
opposite Sandersville, and General Slocum to move to Sandersville
by two roads. General Kilpatrick was ordered to Milledgeville, and
thence move rapidly eastward, to break the railroad which leads from
Millen to Augusta, then to turn upon Millen and rescue our prisoners
of war supposed to be confined at that place. I accompanied the
Twentieth Corps from Millegeville to Sandersville, approaching which
place, on the 25th, we found the bridges across Buffalo Creek burned,
which delayed us three hours. The next day we entered Sandersville,
skirmishing with Wheeler's Cavalry, which offered little opposition to
the advance of the Twentieth and Fourteenth Corps, entering the place
almost at the same moment.
"General Slocum was then ordered to tear up and destroy the Georgia
Central Railroad, from Station No. 13 (Tennille) to Station No.
10, near the crossing of Ogeechee; one of his Corps substantially
followed the railroad, the other by way of Louisville, in support of
Kilpatrick's Cavalry. In person I shifted to the right wing, and
accompanied the Seventeenth Corps, General Blair, on the south of the
railroad, till abreast of Station No. 9-1/2, (Barton;) General Howard,
in person, with the Fifteenth Corps, keeping further to the right, and
about one day's march ahead, ready to turn against the flank of any
enemy who should oppose our progress.
"At Barton I learned that Kilpatrick's Cavalry had reached the Augusta
railroad about Waynesborough, where he ascertained that our prisoners
had been removed from Millen and therefore the purpose of rescuing
them, upon which we had set our hearts, was an impossibility. But
as Wheeler's Cavalry had hung around him, and as he had retired to
Louisville to meet our infantry, in pursuance of my instructions not
to risk a battle unless at great advantage, I ordered him to leave
his wagons and all incumbrances with the left wing, and moving in the
direction of Augusta, if Wheeler gave him the opportunity, to indulge
him with all the fighting he wanted. General Kilpatrick, supported
by Baird's Division of infantry of the Fourteenth Corps, again moved
in the direction of Waynesborough, and encountering Wheeler in the
neighborhood of Thomas's station, attacked him in position, driving
him from three successive lines of barricades handsomely through
Waynesborough and across Brier Creek, the bridges over which he burned;
and then, with Baird's Division, rejoined the left wing, which in the
meantime had been marching by easy stages of ten miles a day in the
direction of Lumpkin's Station and Jacksonborough.
"The Seventeenth Corps took up the destruction of the railroad at the
Ogeechee, near Station No. 10, and continued it to Millen; the enemy
offering little or no opposition, although preparation had seemingly
been made at Millen."
"On the 3d of December the 17th Corps which I accompanied, was at
Millon; the 15th Corps, General Howard, was south of the Ogeechee,
opposite Station No. 7 (Scarboro); the 20th Corps, General Slocum, on
the Augusta Railroad, about four miles north of Millen, near Buckhead
Church, and the 14th Corps, General Jeff. C. Davis, in the neighborhood
of Lumpkin's Station, on the Augusta Railroad. All were ordered to
march in the direction of Savannah--the 15th Corps to continue south
of the Ogeechee, the 17th to destroy the railroad as far as Ogeechee
Church--and four days were allowed to reach the line from Ogeechee
Church to the neighborhood of Halley's Ferry, on the Savannah River.
All the columns reached their destinations in time, and continued to
march on their several roads--General Davis following the Savannah
River road, General Slocum the middle road by way of Springfield,
General Blair the railroad, and General Howard still south and west
of the Ogeechee, with orders to cross to the east bank opposite 'Eden
Station,' or Station No. 2.
"As we approached Savannah the country became more marshy and
difficult, and more obstructions were met, in the way of felled trees,
where the roads crossed the creek swamps or narrow causeways; but our
pioneer companies were well organized, and removed the obstructions in
an incredibly short time. No opposition from the enemy worth speaking
of was encountered until the heads of columns were within 15 miles
of Savannah, where all the roads leading to the city were obstructed
more or less by felled timber, with earthworks, and artillery. But
these were easily turned and the enemy driven away, so that by the
10th of December the enemy was driven within his lines at Savannah.
These followed substantially a swampy creek which empties into the
Savannah River about three miles above the city, across to the head of
a corresponding stream which empties into the Little Ogeechee. These
streams were singularly favorable to the enemy as a cover, being very
marshy, and bordered by rice-fields, which were flooded either by the
tide-water or by inland ponds, the gates to which were controlled and
covered by his heavy artillery.
"The only approaches to the city were by five narrow causeways,
namely, the two railroads, and the Augusta, the Louisville, and the
Ogeechee dirt roads; all of which were commanded by heavy ordnance,
too strong for us to fight with our light field guns. To assault an
enemy of unknown strength at such a disadvantage appeared to me unwise,
especially as I had so successfully brought my army, almost unscathed,
so great a distance, and could surely attain the same result by the
operation of time. I therefore instructed my army commanders to closely
invest the city from the north and west, and to reconnoitre well
the ground in their fronts, respectively, while I gave my personal
attention to opening communication with our fleet, which I knew was
waiting for us in Tybee, Warsaw, and Ossabaw Sounds.
"In approaching Savannah, General Slocum struck the Charleston Railroad
near the bridge, and occupied the river bank as his left flank, where
he had captured two of the enemy's river boats, and had prevented two
others (gunboats) from coming down the river to communicate with the
city; while General Howard, by his right flank, had broken the Gulf
Railroad at Fleming's and way stations, and occupied the railroad
itself down to the Little Ogeechee, near 'Station No. 1;' so that no
supplies could reach Savannah by any of its accustomed channels. We,
on the contrary, possessed large herds of cattle, which we had brought
along or gathered in the country, and our wagons still contained a
reasonable amount of breadstuffs and other necessaries, and the fine
rice crops of the Savannah and Ogeechee Rivers furnished to our men
and animals a large amount of rice and rice straw. We also held the
country to the south and west of the Ogeechee as foraging ground.
Still, communication with the fleet was of vital importance, and I
directed General Kilpatrick to cross the Ogeechee by a pontoon bridge,
to reconnoitre Fort McAllister, and to proceed to Catherine's Sound,
in the direction of Sunbury or Kilkenny Bluff, and open communication
with the fleet. General Howard had previously by my direction sent one
of his best scouts down the Ogeechee in a canoe for a like purpose. But
more than this was necessary. We wanted the vessels and their contents,
and the Ogeechee River, a navigable stream, close to the rear of our
camps, was the proper avenue of supply.
"The enemy had burned the road-bridge across the Ogeechee, just
below the mouth of the Canoochee, known as 'King's bridge.' This was
reconstructed in an incredibly short time, in the most substantial
manner, by the 58th Indiana, Colonel Buel, under the direction of
Captain Reese, of the Engineers' Corps, and on the 13th of December
the 2d Division of the 15th Corps, under command of Brigadier-General
Hazen, crossed the bridge to the west bank of the Ogeechee and marched
down with orders to carry by assault Fort McAllister, a strong inclosed
redoubt, manned by two companies of artillery and three of infantry, in
all about two hundred men, and mounting 23 guns _en barbette_, and one
mortar. General Hazen reached the vicinity of Fort McAllister about 1
P. M., deployed his division about that place, with both flanks resting
upon the river, posted his skirmishers judiciously behind the trunks of
trees whose branches had been used for _abattis_, and about 5 P. M.,
assaulted the place with nine regiments at three points; all of them
successful. I witnessed the assault from a rice-mill on the opposite
bank of the river, and can bear testimony to the handsome manner in
which it was accomplished.
"Up to this time we had not communicated with our fleet. From the
signal station at the rice-mill our officers had looked for two days
over the rice-fields and salt marsh in the direction of Ossabaw Sound,
but could see nothing of it. But while watching the preparations for
the assault on Fort McAllister, we discovered in the distance what
seemed to be the smoke-stack of a steamer, which became more and
more distinct. Until about the very moment of the assault she was
plainly visible below the fort, and our signal was answered. As soon
as I saw our colors fairly planted upon the walls of McAllister, in
company with General Howard I went in a small boat down to the fort
and met General Hazen, who had not yet communicated with the gunboat
below, as it was shut out to him by a point of timber. Determined to
communicate that night, I got another small boat and a crew and pulled
down the river till I found the tug 'Dandelion,' Captain Williamson,
U. S. N., who informed me that Captain Duncan, who had been sent by
General Howard, had succeeded in reaching Admiral Dahlgren and General
Foster, and that he was expecting them hourly in Ossabaw Sound. After
making communications to those officers, and a short communication
to the War Department, I returned to Fort McAllister that night, and
before daylight was overtaken by Major Strong, of General Foster's
staff, advising me that General Foster had arrived in the Ogeechee,
near Fort McAllister, and was very anxious to meet me on board his
boat. I accordingly returned with him, and met General Foster on board
the steamer 'Nemeha,' and, after consultation, determined to proceed
with him down the sound in hopes to meet Admiral Dahlgren. But we did
not meet him until we reached Warsaw Sound, about noon. I there went
on board the Admiral's flag-ship, the 'Harvest Moon,' after having
arranged with General Foster to send us from Hilton Head some siege
ordnance and some boats suitable for navigating the Ogeechee River.
Admiral Dahlgren very kindly furnished me with all the data concerning
his fleet and the numerous forts that guarded the inland channels
between the sea and Savannah. I explained to him how completely
Savannah was invested at all points, save only the plank road on the
South Carolina shore known as the 'Union Causeway,' which I thought I
could reach from my left flank across the Savannah River. I explained
to him that if he would simply engage the attention of the forts along
Wilmington Channel, at Beaulieu and Rosedew, I thought I could carry
the defenses of Savannah by assault as soon as the heavy ordnance
arrived from Hilton Head. On the 15th the Admiral carried me back to
Fort McAllister, whence I returned to our lines in the rear of Savannah.
"Having received and carefully considered all the reports of division
commanders, I determined to assault the lines of the enemy as soon as
my heavy ordnance came from Port Royal, first making a formal demand
for surrender. On the 17th, a number of thirty-pounder Parrott guns
having reached King's Bridge, I proceeded in person to the headquarters
of Major-General Slocum, on the Augusta Road, and dispatched thence
into Savannah, by flag of truce, a formal demand for the surrender of
the place; and on the following day received an answer from General
Hardee refusing to surrender.
"In the meantime further reconnoissances from our left flank had
demonstrated that it was impracticable or unwise to push any
considerable force across the Savannah River, for the enemy held the
river opposite the city with iron-clad gunboats, and could destroy any
pontoons laid down by us between Hutchinson's Island and the South
Carolina shore, which would isolate any force sent over from that
flank. I therefore ordered General Slocum to get into position the
siege guns and make all the preparations necessary to assault, and
to report to me the earliest moment when he could be ready, while I
should proceed rapidly round by the right and make arrangements to
occupy the Union Causeway from the direction of Port Royal. General
Foster had already established a division of troops on the peninsula or
neck between the Coosawatchie and Tullifinney Rivers, at the head of
Broad River, from which position he could reach the railroad with his
artillery.
"I went to Port Royal in person, and made arrangements to reinforce
that command by one or more divisions, under a proper officer, to
assault and carry the railroad, and thence turn toward Savannah until
it occupied the causeway in question. I went on board the Admiral's
flagship, the 'Harvest Moon,' which put out to sea the night of the
20th. But the wind was high, and increased during the night, so that
the pilot judged Ossabaw bar impassable, and ran into the Tybee, whence
we proceeded through the inland channels into Warsaw Sound, and thence
through Romney Marsh. But the ebb tide caught the 'Harvest Moon' and
she was unable to make the passage. Admiral Dahlgren took me in his
barge, and pulling in the direction of Vernon River we met the army tug
'Red Legs,' bearing a message from my Adjutant, Captain Dayton, of that
morning, the 21st, to the effect that our troops were in possession
of the enemy's lines, and were advancing without opposition into
Savannah, the enemy having evacuated the place during the previous
night.
"Admiral Dahlgren proceeded up the Vernon River in his barge, while I
transferred to the tug, in which I proceeded to Fort McAllister, and
thence to the rice-mill; and on the morning of the 22d rode into the
city of Savannah, already occupied by our troops.
"I was very much disappointed that Hardee had escaped with his
garrison, and had to content myself with the material fruits of victory
without the cost to life which would have attended a general assault.
The substantial results will be more clearly set forth in the tabular
statements of heavy ordnance and other public property acquired, and it
will suffice here to state that the important city of Savannah, with
its valuable harbor and river, was the chief object of the campaign.
With it we acquire all the forts and heavy ordnance in its vicinity,
with large stores of ammunition, shot and shells, cotton, rice, and
other valuable products of the country. We also gain locomotives and
cars, which, though of little use to us in the present condition of the
railroads, are a serious loss to the enemy; as well as four steamboats
gained, and the loss to the enemy of the ironclad 'Savannah,' one ram
and three transports, blown up or burned by them the night before.
"Formal demand having been made for the surrender, and having been
refused, I contend that everything within the line of intrenchments
belongs to the United States; and I shall not hesitate to use it,
if necessary, for public purposes. But inasmuch as the inhabitants
generally have manifested a friendly disposition, I shall disturb them
as little as possible consistently with the military rights of present
and future military commanders, without remitting the least our just
rights as captors.
[Illustration: CAPTURING THE FLAG.]
"After having made the necessary orders for the disposition of the
troops in and about Savannah, I ordered Captain O. M. Poe, Chief
Engineer, to make a thorough examination of the enemy's works in and
about Savannah, with a view to making it conform to our future uses.
New lines of defenses will be built, embracing the city proper, Forts
Jackson, Thunderbolt, and Pulaski retained, with slight modifications
in their armament and rear defenses. All the rest of the enemy's forts
will be dismantled and destroyed, and their heavy ordnance transferred
to Hilton Head, where it can be more easily guarded. Our base of
supplies will be established in Savannah, as soon as the very difficult
obstructions placed in the river can be partially removed. These
obstructions at present offer a very serious impediment to the commerce
of Savannah, consisting of crib-work of logs and timber heavily bolted
together, and filled with the cobble-stones which formerly paved the
streets of Savannah. All the channels below the city were found more or
less filled with torpedoes, which have been removed by order of Admiral
Dahlgren, so that Savannah already fulfills the important part it was
designed in our plans for the future.
"In thus sketching the course of events connected with this campaign,
I have purposely passed lightly over the march from Atlanta to the
seashore, because it was made in four or more columns, sometimes at
a distance of fifteen or twenty miles from each other, and it was
impossible for me to attend but one. Therefore I have left it to the
army and corps commanders to describe in their own language the events
which attended the march of their respective columns. These reports are
herewith submitted, and I beg to refer to them for further details. I
would merely sum up the advantages which I conceive have accrued to us
by this march.
"Our former labors in North Georgia had demonstrated the truth that
no large army, carrying with it the necessary stores and baggage, can
overtake and capture an inferior force of the enemy in his own country.
Therefore, no alternative was left me but the one I adopted, namely,
to divide my forces, and with one part act offensively against the
enemy's resources, while with the other I should act defensively, and
invite the enemy to attack, risking the chances of battle. In this
conclusion I have been singularly sustained by the results. General
Hood, who, as I have heretofore described, had moved to the westward
near Tuscumbia with a view to decoy me away from Georgia, finding
himself mistaken, was forced to choose either to pursue me or to act
offensively against the other part left in Tennessee. He adopted the
latter course, and General Thomas has wisely and well fulfilled his
part in the grand scheme in drawing Hood well up into Tennessee until
he could concentrate all his own troops, and then turn upon Hood, as he
has done, and destroy or fatally cripple his army. That part of my army
is so far removed from me that I leave, with perfect confidence, its
management and history to General Thomas.
"I was thereby left with a well-appointed army to sever the enemy's
only remaining railroad communication eastward and westward for over
one hundred miles, namely, the Georgia State Railroad, which is broken
up from Fairburn Station to Madison and the Oconee, and the Central
Railroad from Gordon clear to Savannah, with numerous breaks on the
latter road from Gordon to Eatonton, and from Millen to Augusta, and
the Savannah and Gulf Railroad. We have also consumed the corn and
fodder in the region of country thirty miles on either side of a line
from Atlanta to Savannah, as also the sweet potatoes, cattle, hogs,
sheep, and poultry, and have carried away more than ten thousand
horses and mules, as well as a countless number of their slaves. I
estimate the damage done to the State of Georgia and its military
resources at $100,000,000, at least $20,000,000 of which has inured to
our advantage, and the remainder is simple waste and destruction. This
may seem a hard species of warfare, but it brings the sad realities of
war home to those who have been directly or indirectly instrumental in
involving us in its attendant calamities.
"This campaign has also placed this branch of my army in a position
from which other great military results may be attempted, beside
leaving in Tennessee and North Alabama a force which is amply
sufficient to meet all the chances of war in that region of our country.
"Since the capture of Atlanta my staff is unchanged, save that General
Barry, Chief of Artillery, has been absent, sick, since our leaving
Kingston, Surgeon Moore, United States Army, is Chief Medical Director
in place of Surgeon Kittoe, relieved to resume his proper duties as a
Medical Inspector. Major Hitchcock, A. A. G., has also been added to
my staff, and has been of great assistance in the field and office.
Captain Dayton still remains as my Adjutant-General. All have, as
formerly, fulfilled their parts to my entire satisfaction.
"In the body of my army I feel a just pride. Generals Howard and
Slocum are gentlemen of singular capacity and intelligence, thorough
soldiers and patriots, working day and night, not for themselves, but
for their country and their men. General Kilpatrick, who commanded the
cavalry of this army, has handled it with spirit and dash to my entire
satisfaction, and kept a superior force of the enemy's cavalry from
even approaching our infantry columns or wagon trains. His report is
full and graphic. All the division and brigade commanders merit my
personal and official thanks, and I shall spare no efforts to secure
them commissions equal to the rank they have exercised so well. As
to the rank and file, they seem so full of confidence in themselves,
that I doubt if they want a compliment from me; but I must do them
the justice to say that whether called on to fight, to march, to wade
streams, to make roads, clear out obstructions, build bridges, make
'corduroy,' or tear up railroads, they have done it with alacrity and
a degree of cheerfulness unsurpassed. A little loose in foraging, they
'did some things they ought not to have done,' yet on the whole they
have supplied the wants of the army with as little violence as could be
expected, and as little loss as I calculated. Some of these foraging
parties had encounters with the enemy which would in ordinary times
rank as respectable battles. The behavior of our troops in Savannah
has been so manly, so quiet, so perfect, that I take it as the best
evidence of discipline and true courage. Never was a hostile city,
filled with women and children, occupied by a large army with less
disorder, or more system, order, and good government. The same general
and generous spirit of confidence and good feeling pervades the army
which it has ever afforded me especial pleasure to report on former
occasions.
"I avail myself of this occasion to express my heartfelt thanks to
Admiral Dahlgren and the officers and men of his fleet and also to
General Foster and his command, for the hearty welcome given us on our
arrival at the coast, and for their steady and prompt co-operation in
all measures tending to the result accomplished.
"I send herewith a map of the country through which we have passed;
reports from General Howard, General Slocum, and General Kilpatrick,
and their subordinates respectively, with the usual lists of captured
property killed, wounded and missing, prisoners of war taken and
rescued, as also copies of all papers illustrating the campaign, all of
which are respectfully submitted by
"Your obedient servant,
"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General."