ATLANTA.
THE TURNING OF ROCKY FACE--RESACA--GENERAL HOWARD'S NARRATIVE--
ADAIRSVILLE--CROSSING THE ETOWAH--SHERMAN ON FAMILIAR GROUND--
DEALING WITH BREACHES OF DISCIPLINE--ALLATOONA PASS--THE SIEGE
AND TURNING OF KENESAW--SMYRNA AND PEACH TREE--HOOD SUCCEEDS
JOHNSTON--DEATH OF McPHERSON--HOWARD IN COMMAND OF THE ARMY OF
THE TENNESSEE--EZRA CHURCH--OPERATIONS AROUND ATLANTA--THE
RUSH TO JONESBORO--CAPTURE OF ATLANTA.
Sherman moved forward on May 6th toward Dalton, where lay the enemy.
A direct attack on this position, however, was impossible. Dalton lay
behind a precipitous mountain ridge, called Rocky Face, which it was
impracticable to scale. The only passage way was through a narrow
gap called Buzzard's Roost, through which ran a railroad and a small
stream known as Mill Creek. The enemy had strongly fortified the
place, and Sherman quickly decided that it would be folly to try to
force his way through. He therefore gave orders to McPherson to move
rapidly southward to Snake Creek Gap, at the southern extremity of the
Rocky Face Ridge, where there was an easy passage through to Resaca,
at the railroad crossing over Oostanaula River, eighteen miles south
of Dalton. Thomas, on May 7th, took up a strong position on Tunnel
Hill, almost directly facing the Buzzard's Roost Gap, while Schofield
steadily approached Dalton from the north. Two days later, to keep
Johnston occupied, Thomas made a feigned attack upon the Gap, driving
the enemy's cavalry and skirmishers through it. The day was very
stormy, but the troops rushed on in high spirits and with enthusiastic
determination. A division of Howard's troops under Newton actually
surrounded the narrow ridge and carried a part north of the Gap, but
the crest was too strait for them to make much progress there. South
of the Roost some of Hooker's men also made a rush for the summit, but
found the enemy's works too strong to take and hold.
The gallant McPherson had, meanwhile, reached Snake Creep Gap, and
surprised the Confederate cavalry brigade that had been posted
there. He marched practically without opposition to within a mile of
Resaca, but then found that Johnston had defended that place with
fortifications which he deemed too strong for direct assault; so, he
fell back to Snake Creek Gap and waited for reinforcements.
Next, Sherman directed Howard to remain on guard at Buzzard's Roost
with the Fourth Corps and Stoneman's Cavalry, and sent forward
Schofield and Thomas, with Cox's, Hooker's, and Palmer's Corps, to aid
McPherson. Nearly the whole army was thus assembled on May 12th before
Resaca, so that Johnston, seeing his flank turned, that night abandoned
Dalton and concentrated at Resaca. Howard following close with his
horse and foot, pressed through Buzzard's Roost Gap, entered Dalton,
and pursued Johnston till he joined Sherman at Resaca.
[Illustration: MAP No. 1.
ATLANTA CAMPAIGN]
Sherman now undertook to drive Johnston out of Resaca by attacking
him in front with his main army, while a detachment crossed over the
Oostanaula and threatened his communications. The latter movement
was effected by the way of Lay's Ferry and Calhoun. Early in the
afternoon of May 14th the grand attack upon Resaca began. Sherman's
left centre made a gallant assault, carried a work, captured some guns,
but was then checked. Then the famous Hood made a furious attack upon
Sherman's left flank and at first gained some advantage, which Howard,
aided by a division of Hooker's, repulsed with great loss to the enemy.
McPherson also gained a position from which he could pour an enfilading
fire into Johnston's intrenchments. Johnston tried to dislodge him,
but in vain, though the fighting was continued until nearly midnight.
Next morning while a detachment crossed the river to the south, the
battle was renewed, and by one o'clock the Union troops had captured
a portion of the Rebel lines, and were within gunshot of Johnston's
communications. That night he abandoned Resaca and fled to the south,
burning the railroad bridge behind him. But Sherman entered the town in
time to save the wagon bridge over the Oostanaula. In these operations
at Resaca, Sherman's total losses were between 4,000 and 5,000.
Johnston's were less, probably not over 2,500, since his men fought in
this roughest of country chiefly from behind fortifications. A general
pursuit of Johnston by Sherman's entire army was immediately ordered.
Speaking of the battle of Resaca, General Howard says:
"One scene at Resaca might be painted. Two rivers come together, one,
the Oostanaula flowing west, and its tributary, the Connassauga, south.
Confederate Johnston, after fleeing from Dalton, placed his army in
the northwest angle of the streams, resting Polk's Corps against the
Oostanaula, facing west, put Hardee's next above, running up a creek,
and then bore Hood back in a convex curve till his men touched the
Connassauga. Sherman made McPherson breast Polk; Schofield face
Hardee's intended lines, and Thomas take care of Hood. Thus we were
holding the outer or enveloping lines, all in the midst of forest land
exceedingly rough and wild. Thomas had not men enough to fill his
line and cover half of Hood's front. Stanley, of Howard's Corps, held
the left. He put much cannon on convenient knolls and had as large
reserves as he could spare; but either the indomitable Hood or the
wary Johnston had discovered the weakness of our left, so that about
3 P. M. the masses of Hood came pouring, like mountain torrents, upon
Stanley and far beyond the reach of his rifles and the staying force of
his artillery. Word came, "Stanley's left is turned." And so instantly
Howard rode to a group of mounted officers. Here were Hooker, Thomas
and Sherman together. "What is it, Howard?" asked Thomas anxiously. "I
want a division at once for my left." "General Hooker will give you
one." "Yes," said Hooker, "Williams' Division is right there." Colonel
Morgan, of Howard's staff, in less than five minutes was guiding
Williams' brave men in quick time, to the threatened flank. In less
than fifteen minutes Hood's masses were running back for cover to his
fortified ground. This was the crisis. Prompt action and fearless men
saved the left from impending disaster."
The Union armies pressed forward as rapidly as possible, along roads
on which the dust lay a foot deep. The heat was intense and the men
suffered greatly. On the afternoon of the 17th the advance guards
struck the rear guard of the enemy at Adairsville, and had a sharp
skirmish. Here, between 4 and 5 P. M., Howard and Newton with their
respective staffs, all mounted, were watching from elevated ground,
Newton's skirmish line, as it joined fire with Johnston's rear guard.
"Musketry was lively," says Howard, "and a few cannon were sounding.
It was something like a lion's interrupted roar, or the thunder of an
approaching storm. Sherman and other officers rode up and began to take
observations. Suddenly, from a new place, from the edge of a wood, a
hostile four-gun battery took us for a practice-target. Shell after
shell cut the air and burst beside and behind us, and over our heads.
It was probably the fourth shot which exploded high up, skyward, but
at just the point to scatter its fragments among the men and animals
of our company; Colonel Morgan's horse was injured; Lieutenant-Colonel
Fullerton's was put _hors du combat_ and several others of the
orderlies and escort lamed or slain. Captain Bliss, of Newton's staff,
by a flying fragment lost his shoulder-strap, and he himself was
painfully hurt. Of course, that social crowd instantly altered the
shape of the practice-target and changed its location."
That night the enemy hastened the flight, different divisions of the
army going in different directions, but on the next day Sherman came up
with Johnston again at Kingston. The two armies faced each other in a
rolling, wooded region, on to and beyond Cassville, and Sherman hoped
to bring on a decisive battle. But Johnston again retreated, and that
night, across the Etowah River, "a step," says Johnston, "which I have
regretted ever since." This step was taken, it was said, on the advice
of Polk and Hood, who regarded their position to be already turned and
untenable. By this retreat across the Etowah a valuable region was
given up to Sherman.
The army now rested for three days, while supplies were brought
forward. Rome had been captured with its important foundries and
stores. The two bridges across the Etowah were secured, and all was
made ready for the next stage of the campaign. About this time a
remarkable thing began to be observed. Sherman displayed a knowledge
of the country through which they were marching that was most amazing
to his comrades, to whom it was an unknown land. He seemed to know by
intuition that this road ran so and that one so, that beyond this hill
was a pleasant valley, and beyond that an impassable swamp. The whole
topography of the country was at his command. But the explanation was
simple. They were now in the region that Sherman had travelled through
on horseback and afoot many years before.
And it was one of Sherman's most notable traits of intellect to see
everything that was to be seen and to remember everything that he saw,
so that his mind became a perfect encyclopædia of useful information.
If he went through a cotton mill, or a salt work, or an iron foundry,
he was so observant, and his memory so retentive, that always
thereafter he appeared an expert on that industry. This knowledge of
the geography and topography of Georgia was of incalculable service to
him during the march to Atlanta.
And at the same time many other interesting traits of Sherman's
personality began to show themselves. He was at times a strict
disciplinarian, and yet often so kindly and sympathetic that he
inclined to be lenient with offenders. At Resaca for instance, he
had been working all night, while the army slept, and in the morning
he fell asleep sitting on the ground, his head and shoulders resting
against a fallen tree. There he sat as some of the troops marched by,
and awoke just in time to hear a grumbling private remark, "That's a
pretty commander for an army." Instead of ordering the man's arrest,
Sherman simply remarked, "My man, I was working all night while you
were asleep. Now, don't you think I have a right to take a nap while
you are marching to your work?"
Again, during the rest before crossing the Etowah, an incident occurred
which General Howard relates. It was Sunday morning, and E. P. Smith,
a member of the Christian Commission, mounted to the belfry floor,
and tried to ring the bell of the church at Kingston for service. He
slipped against a nail, and had his clothes badly torn. The noise of
the bell disturbed Sherman, and, not knowing who the ringer was, he
sent a guard to the church, and had Smith arrested. In spite of his
protests, Smith was marched to headquarters and kept in confinement
for an hour. Then, with his rent clothing, he was led into Sherman's
presence. The General, scarcely looking up from his writing, to see
who it was, and supposing it to be one of the army "bummers," demanded
abruptly, "What did you ring that bell for?" "For service, General; it
is Sunday," replied Smith. "Oh, is it Sunday?" said Sherman. "I didn't
know 'twas Sunday. Let him go."
Johnston was now intrenched at Allatoona Pass, and Sherman knew
that the position was too strong to be carried by direct assault.
He therefore determined to make a circuit to the right, and marched
toward Dallas. Johnston detected this movement, and prepared to meet
it. On May 25th, the armies met again at New Hope Church, just north
of Dallas. Hooker led Sherman's advance, and ran against one of Hood's
brigades in a forest. A sharp conflict followed, while a terrific
thunder storm was raging. Hooker's men made repeated attacks upon the
enemy's position, but were hurled back from the log breastworks with
much loss. Heavy rain continued all that night, but Sherman's men
worked steadily constructing fortifications of earthwork and logs.
The next morning the engagement was continued, and for several days
thereafter there was almost continual skirmishing. On the 28th the
Rebels made a strong attack far to the right of Hooker, upon McPherson,
at Dallas, but were repulsed. Then the army began pushing to the left,
and by June 1st Allatoona Pass was completely within the national lines.
"The picture of the field of New Hope Church," says General Howard,
"crowds memory like the painting of a young artist who has put too
much upon his canvas. There was Hooker just at evening in an open
wood--there were glimpses of log breastworks beyond him, from which
came fierce firing against his lines stretched out--there were
numberless maimed and many dead among the trees--and a little back was
a church with many wounded, and many surgeons doing bloody work. It was
dreadfully dark that night. Schofield's horse stumbled and disabled
him, and General Cox took his place. We had numerous torches, weird
in effect among the trees, as our men bravely worked into place and
intrenched the batteries, and covered their front. But the torches
seemed to make the darkness darker, and our hopes that night beat low.
Johnston had stopped us rudely at New Hope Church. But afterwards
Dallas and McPherson, off to our right, gave us the reverse side, and
so hopes which had drooped revived, when Confederates, and not Yankees,
were there several times driven back.
"Another night scene, though not quite so gloomy as that of New Hope
Church, pictured itself the 27th of May at Pickett's Mill. Our enemy
thus describes its cause. He says: 'The fighting rose above the grade
of skirmishing, especially in the afternoon, when, at half-past 5,
the Fourth Corps (Howard's) and a division of the Fourteenth (Palmer)
attempted to turn our (Confederate) right, but the movement, after
being impeded by the cavalry, was met by two regiments of our right
division (Cleburn's) and two brigades of his Second brought up on
the first. The Federal formation was so deep that its front did not
equal that of our two brigades; consequently those troops were greatly
exposed to our musketry--all but the leading troops being on a hillside
facing us. They advanced until their first line was within twenty-five
or thirty paces of ours and fell back only after at least seven hundred
men had fallen dead in their places. When the leading Federal troops
paused in their advance, a color bearer came on and planted his colors
eight or ten feet in front of his regiment, but was killed in the act.
A soldier who sprang forward to hold up or bear off the colors was shot
dead as he seized the staff. Two others who followed successively fell
like him, but the fourth bore back the noble emblem. Some time after
nightfall, we (the Confederates) captured above two hundred prisoners
in the hollow before them.'
"It was of that sad night that this was written: 'We worked our men all
that weary night in fortifying. The Confederate commander was ready at
daylight to take the offensive against us there at Pickett's Mill, but
he did not do so, because he found our position too strong to warrant
the attempt. With a foot bruised by a fragment of a shell, General
Howard sat that night among the wounded in the midst of a forest glade,
while Major Howard of his staff led regiments and brigades into the new
positions chosen for them. General R. W. Johnson, (Palmer's Division
Commander) had been wounded and Captain Stinson of Howard's staff had
been shot through the lungs, and a large number lay there on a sliding
slope by a faint camp fire, with broken limbs or disfigured faces.'
Actually but one division, and not a corps, made that unsuccessful
assault, and its conduct has received a brave enemy's high praise. The
fighting and the night work secured the object of the movement, causing
Johnston to swing back his whole army from Sherman's post to a new
position."
Thus Johnson abandoned his lines at New Hope Church and retreated to
Marietta, taking up almost impregnable positions on Kenesaw, Pine and
Lost Mountains. Sherman marched to Ackworth, between Marietta and
Allatoona Pass, and fortified the Pass. He was here reinforced by two
divisions of the Seventeenth Corps and some other bodies of troops,
which nearly compensated him for the losses in the battles he had
fought. He had now driven Johnston before him nearly one hundred miles,
had forced him to abandon four strong positions, had fought him six
times, had captured over two thousand prisoners, twelve guns and three
colors, had weakened the Rebel army by about fifteen thousand men, and
had captured or destroyed many important factories, mills and other
works of a public character.
[Illustration: DEATH OF GEN. J. B. McPHERSON.
JULY 22D, 1864.
From Painting by J. E. Taylor.]
The line held by Johnston at Kenesaw and Pine Top was a strong one. But
it was twelve miles long, and he had scarcely enough men to hold it at
all points. To attack him on the crest of Kenesaw Mountain would be a
hopeless task. But Sherman thought he could break through his lines
on the gentler southern slope. On June 11th the advance began. Hooker
was at the right front and Howard at the left front, and they pressed
forward with great vigor. During their cannonading, on June 14th, they
inflicted heavy losses upon the enemy, killing General Polk. Next day
the Rebels abandoned Pine Mountain and retired to Muddy Creek, holding
the rugged range of hills between Kenesaw and Lost Mountains. Again
Sherman pressed the centre and turning to Johnston's flank on the 17th
captured Lost Mountain and all the hills except Kenesaw. For three
weeks thereafter the Union army vainly sought to dislodge Johnston
from the heights of Kenesaw. It seemed an impossible task. The whole
mountain was a fortress. There were miles of strong intrenchments. All
the time the rain fell in torrents and the low lands were flooded. The
roads were almost impassable. Sherman's soldiers at times worked knee
deep in mud. But they kept on working.
The army was not content with besieging Kenesaw, but kept trying
to work its way around that mountain. Disquieted by these events,
the enemy sought to check them on June 22d, by a sharp attack upon
Hooker at Kulp's farm, which was repulsed with heavy losses. Five
days later, the 27th of June, Sherman ordered an attack to be made
just South of the mountain, by Thomas, and a supporting movement by
McPherson northward. They were both repulsed with heavy losses, and
Sherman then decided to waste no more lives in direct attacks, but to
turn the enemy's position, as he had done several times before. So
on July 1st, McPherson marched toward Turner's Ferry, there to cross
the Chattahoochee. The movement was effective. Johnston immediately
abandoned Kenesaw, and retreated five miles, to Smyrna Camp Ground.
That Fourth of July Sherman was exultant. He did not believe the enemy
would make another stand that side of the Chattahoochee. But Howard
thought otherwise, and soon proved, by sending out a double line
of skirmishers, that he was right. Johnston had intrenched himself
strongly, and threatened to dispute Sherman's further progress toward
Atlanta. Schofield made a strong demonstration across a neighboring
ferry, however, and Johnston soon fell back to the Chattahoochee
bridge, Thomas following closely. The river was deep and swift, but
Sherman determined to cross it. Schofield went over first, near the
mouth of South Creek; then McPherson further up at Roswell; Thomas
built a bridge at Power's Ferry and crossed over, nearest of all to
the Rebel lines; and thus, by July 9th, they had crossed the river at
three points and commanded three good roads to Atlanta. And the Rebel
position was once more turned. Forthwith Johnston hurried across the
river, burning the bridges behind him.
"At Smyrna," says General Howard, "Atlanta was in plain sight. Johnston
had bothered us long. He had repelled direct assaults with success
except, perhaps, at Muddy Creek where Baird and Harker had ditched and
covered their men, in the open, at one of his angles, and then had run
squarely over his barricades. But Sherman, by that unceasing flanking
operation of his, persistently undertaken and accomplished, while
Hooker, Palmer, and Howard were hammering away at the centre motes,
which had no approaches and no drawbridges, and now at last pressed
Johnston back, back across the Etowah and across the Chattahoochee.
Johnston had planned a final terrible blow for him at Peach Tree, when,
fortunately for Sherman and his army, Jefferson Davis, favoring, as he
claimed, the indications of Providence, relieved the able Johnston from
command, and put in charge the hardy but rash Hood. He at once, as was
expected, took the offensive. He came on, as at Gettysburg, from the
close wood into the valley, to welcome us in his charming way, several
miles out from Atlanta. His blows were so sudden and his onslaught so
swift, that at first it disturbed Hooker's breathing, made Williams
talk fast, and Geary suspend his favorite Kansas stories and tales of
the Mexican war. In the language of the football men, the Unions for a
few hours, 'had a hard tussle.' They lost heavily, but managed to keep
on the Atlanta side of the Peach Tree. Newton planted his big cross,
made of soldiers, at the east end of Thomas's line, and Newton, though
no doubt badly terrified, was as always, too obstinate to go back.
Thomas's modesty put in additional reserve batteries and kept pieces
of iron rattling among the chaparral and alders of those low-land
intervales. So Thomas and Newton preserved that weak left flank from
capture. Hood had put forth his tremendous energy, but was baffled and
turned back to his cover within the fortified lines of Atlanta."
By this time the people of Georgia were fully roused from their
old feeling of false security. They had seen the Union Army march
triumphantly over the mountain barrier at the northwest. They had seen
their favorite commander, Johnston, and his great army, driven from
point to point and forced to surrender positions which had been deemed
impregnable. And now Sherman's conquering hosts, flushed with success,
had crossed the Chattahoochee and lay only eight miles from Atlanta.
Consternation prevailed throughout the State, and the people of Atlanta
itself were panic-stricken. Nor were they allowed to gain new courage
by a respite. Sherman's advance upon the city suffered no delay. A
strong cavalry force was pushed forward from Decatur, Alabama, to
Opelika, and thence to Marietta, completely cutting off Johnston's army
from all sources of supply and reinforcement in that direction. Sherman
also brought up fresh stores from Chattanooga. July 17th a general
advance was made.
On this very day the Rebel government at Richmond committed an act
that was worth three victories to the Union Army. There had long been
antagonism between Joe Johnston and J. P. Benjamin, the Rebel Secretary
of War, and Jefferson Davis had sympathized with the latter. Benjamin
had now been removed from office, but his successor, Seddon, had
inherited the antagonism to Johnston. So now, on July 17th, a dispatch
came to Johnston from Richmond, saying that since he had failed to
check Sherman's advance the government had no confidence in his ability
to do so, and ordering him immediately to surrender his command to
General Hood. This did great injustice to Johnston, but it also did
greater injury to Rebel cause. Hood was a brave general, but rash and
not competent to direct the operations of a great army in an important
campaign. Indeed he himself felt most deeply his unfitness to continue
Johnston's work, although he of course resolved to do his best.
In response to the harsh criticisms made upon him for not fighting a
decisive battle with Sherman, Johnston said:
"Defeat would have been our ruin. Our troops, always fighting under
cover, had trifling losses when compared with the enemy, whose
numerical superiority was thus reduced daily and rapidly. We could,
therefore, reasonably expect to cope with him on equal terms by the
time that the Chattahoochee was passed. Defeat on our side of that
river would have been his destruction. We, if beaten, had a refuge
in Atlanta too strong to be assaulted, too extensive to be invested.
I also hoped, by breaking the railroad in his rear, that he might be
compelled to attack us in a position of our own choosing, or to a
retreat easily converted into a rout. After we crossed the Etowah,
five detachments of cavalry were successively sent with instructions to
destroy as much as they could of the railroad between Dalton and the
Etowah; all failed, because too weak. We could never spare a sufficient
body of cavalry for this service, as its assistance was absolutely
necessary in the defence of every position we occupied. Early in the
campaign the statements of the strength of cavalry in the Departments
of Mississippi and East Louisiana given me by Lieutenant-General Polk,
just from that command, and my telegraphic correspondence with his
successor, led me to hope that a competent force could be sent from
Mississippi and Alabama to prevent the use of the railroad by the
United States army."
The Rebel army was now about 51,000 strong, and was strongly posted at
Peach Tree Creek, four miles northwest of Atlanta. The place had been
selected by Johnston for a decisive battle, and he had expected that
the Union Army, in spreading out to flank him, would weaken its centre
so that he could make an effective attack. Exactly this thing occurred,
and on the afternoon of July 20th, the Rebel blow was struck. Hood's
troops came rushing down the hillside against the Union lines with just
such fury as Stonewall Jackson's columns used to display. But they were
met by strong resistance, and after a bloody conflict, were driven to
their intrenchments. Thus the first of Johnston's plans which Hood
tried to execute, failed. The second plan and effort was to withdraw
the main army from Peach Tree Creek far to the right, leaving Atlanta
almost undefended, and then fall upon Sherman's left flank as his army
advanced upon the city.
When Sherman came up and found the works on Peach Tree Creek abandoned,
he thought Atlanta also had been evacuated, and he marched right up
to within two miles of that city. Then after an all night circuit
the Rebel attack was made upon his left and rear. For four hours the
battle raged furiously. The Union lines were broken and some guns
captured. Sherman watched the struggle from a point between Schofield
and McPherson, John A. Logan and other officers performed prodigies of
valor, and finally the Rebels were checked and driven back, leaving
more than three thousand dead upon the field, together with other
thousands of wounded and about one thousand prisoners. Their total
loss must have been at least eight thousand, while Sherman's entire
loss, in killed, wounded and prisoners, was 3,722. But in this battle
almost in the outset the Union Army suffered an irreparable loss in the
death of the gallant and accomplished McPherson, who was shot by Rebel
skirmishers as he was hastening from Dodge's Corps to Blair's through
the woods, _i.e._, the left flank of the army, to meet there the Rebel
attack which first struck his rear.
Who should succeed McPherson in command was a question that caused
some perplexity. Logan succeeding to McPherson in the battle had done
well, but was junior to several corps commanders, and had, as Sherman
thought, some other disabilities, as a rivalry between him and Blair,
and political aspirations. At last Sherman and Thomas agreed upon
the appointment of General O. O. Howard, a choice which was promptly
approved by the Government at Washington. This offended Hooker,
Howard's senior in rank. He had aspired to succeed McPherson, and so at
once asked to be relieved of the command of the Twentieth Corps. His
wish, as before Gettysburg, was granted, and General Slocum came from
Vicksburg to take his place.
The 26th of July Sherman's army lay before Atlanta in this position:
the Army of the Tennessee was at the left, the Army of the Ohio,
under Schofield, came next; the Army of the Cumberland, under Thomas,
completed the line at the right. This line was about five miles long,
and strongly fortified. The cavalry and other minor detachments of the
army were posted at the rear and at the flank.
The 27th, General Howard took command and marched around beyond Thomas.
At Ezra Church, due west from Atlanta, the next battle was fought on
July 28th. Howard, putting in his last corps, had led the way thither,
believing that at this point the Rebel attack would be made. Hood's
men came on with a rush, and some of them forced their way for a
space beyond the Union right. But Howard's troops, particularly the
Fifteenth Corps, under Logan, aided by detachments from Dodge and
Blair, stood like an iron wall, and repulsed the enemy with a coolness
and steadiness that has seldom been equalled. Artillery and repeating
rifles threw back the enemy's flanks. Attack after attack was made by
the Rebels, with the same result, and the engagement finally ended in
an unqualified victory for the Union army. "As this," says General
Howard, "was Hood's third attempt, anger and energy were engendered in
his heart and transfused into his charging lines; it showed itself in
the scream, the yell, the run, the brisk, unceasing musket-fire, and
the cannon roar. We who were there cannot forget them. But at last our
enemy was effectually repulsed and the sad field at night was ours. The
baffled Confederates again returned to the shelter of their protecting
batteries."
This was Howard's first engagement after his appointment to succeed
McPherson, and both he and Sherman were deeply gratified at its result.
When the conflict was at its height, a straggler of some rank hurried
to Sherman with the report that Howard was proving incompetent and
that his army was going to pieces. Sherman asked him if Howard himself
was at the scene of action. He replied, "Yes, I suppose so." "Well,"
said Sherman, "I will wait till I hear from him."
During the early days of August Sherman kept extending his lines to
the right, with frequent demonstrations against the enemy at all
points. He brought down from Chattanooga some heavy rifled guns with
which to bombard the enemy's works. Many of the shells fell beyond the
enemy's fortifications in the city itself, and did much damage. At the
middle of the month it was decided to execute a grand flank movement
around the city. The advance was made toward the right or southward.
At the same time Hood sent a force of cavalry, from 6,000 to 10,000
strong, to pass around Sherman's rear and cut off his communications
and lines of supply. Sherman was glad to learn this, for he knew
that the absence of these troops from the Rebel army would be a more
serious loss to Hood than they could possibly inflict upon the Union
army. He at once halted his flanking movement, and sent Kilpatrick
with 5,000 cavalry to break the West Point Railroad near Fairburn,
and then go on and break the Macon Railroad, cutting off Atlanta from
the Southern counties. Kilpatrick was not able to accomplish this
work as completely as Sherman desired, and the flanking movement was
soon resumed. On the night of August 26th, the Army of the Tennessee
moved to the South, followed by the Army of the Cumberland, while the
Army of the Ohio remained substantially in its position. The armies
thoroughly accomplished the destructive work which Kilpatrick had
tried to do, and then faced eastward. Howard encountered the enemy's
cavalry at several points, and drove it before him. "From the 25th to
the 30th of August," says General Howard, "Sherman's forces made a
curious manoeuvre. If you should face a line of cavalry, infantry and
artillery to the rear, and then make a little more than a half wheel
about its new left as a pivot, you would get some idea of the manner
in which we fell upon Hood's communications. Yet the line, like an
Indian rubber string, was stretched out till the Army of the Tennessee,
rapidly marching, reached Renfro Place, twenty-five miles from Atlanta.
Schofield kept near the pivot, and Thomas was between.
"The evening of the thirtieth, after a weary day during which our
cavalry and infantry had been forcing a succession of log barricades
and repairing culverts and bridges, we came to a tract of barren
sand-banks, intending to camp there for the night. After a short halt,
I called Kilpatrick to me and said: 'It is but six miles to Flint
River, where a bridge crosses, and but a few more miles to Jonesboro,
the railway station. Can you send me an officer who can take a squadron
of cavalry and keep Wheeler's rear guard in motion?' 'Yes, here is
Captain Estes. He can do it if anybody can.' 'All right, go ahead,
Estes; I will follow you with infantry.' Wheeler's men, thinking we
had stopped for the night, had already dismounted and were preparing
to bivouac at a respectful distance, when suddenly they beheld
Captain Estes with his indomitable squadron charging down the road.
The Confederates sprang to their saddles and nobody tarried, neither
pursuer or pursued, till the Flint River bridge had been reached. Our
men extinguished the flames already kindled, saved the bridge, and
soon were crossing in force, just as the twilight was darkening into
the night. One corps, Logan's, was quickly marched over and along
the farther bank of the river and began to ascend the wooded hill
beyond. Hardee's Confederate Corps, hastily brought hither by rail
from Atlanta, now gave in the darkness only a feeble skirmish line
resistance. We charged the hill, cleared the way to the crest, and the
men, though exceedingly weary with a long march of twenty-five miles or
more, worked the whole night, so strong were they then to cover their
front with the habitual intrenchments.
"The next day, the thirty-first of August, Logan's and Ransom's men
supported by Blair, received Hardee's renewal of the conflict. The
charges were not as vigorous as at Atlanta. They were, all along the
line, repulsed. Before the next day Thomas had closed in on my left;
had a combat, and the two together made a vigorous push for Jonesboro.
By this movement Hardee's half of Hood's army was dislodged. The
instant the situation was known Hood, still 25 miles back at Atlanta,
he abandoned the city and succeeded by a wonderful night march in
forming a junction with Hardee below us at Lovejoy station.
"Slocum, who with the Twentieth Corps being left behind, had intrenched
himself in a strong fortified place across Sherman's northern
communications, soon had positive evidence by the city fires and
explosions, that Hood had left. He put his columns in motion at dawn of
September second and marched joyously into the lately beleaguered city.
"General Sherman, who was near us at Jonesboro, gives a graphic
picture: that night, he says, he was so restless and impatient that he
could not sleep. About midnight there arose, toward Atlanta, sounds
of shells exploding and other sounds like that of musketry. He walked
to the house of a farmer close by his bivouac, and called him out to
listen. The farmer said, that these sounds were just like those of a
battle. An interval of quiet then ensued, when again, about 4 A. M.,
arose another similar explosion. Sherman remained in doubt whether the
enemy was engaged in blowing up his own magazines, or whether General
Slocum had not felt forward and become engaged in a real battle.
Finally a note from Slocum himself assured the anxious General of the
facts. Then, as he turned back to take possession, Sherman sent Mr.
Lincoln that memorable despatch: 'Atlanta is ours and fairly won.'
"Probably no words uttered at this date could give to our children
an idea of the joy and the assurance of hope that penetrated all
classes of society when the proclamation was made at Washington and
echoed through the North and West, 'Atlanta is won.' It meant that our
glorious cause had prevailed. Rebellion, it is said, cannot last much
longer. It spoke of the end of war, of the beginning of peace, glimpses
of which were already seen from the hilltops of Georgia. It meant
speedy emancipation to white men as well as to black. It spoke of happy
homes soon to be visited, of lovely women and precious children who had
long waited for such good news, and whose eyes were already sparkling
with delight to welcome us home.
"Yes, yes, 'Atlanta won' was indeed a bow of promise set in the clouds,
though yet heavy; a bow of promise to America and to the world, that
right and justice should prevail, and God's will be done sooner or
later upon the earth."