SHILOH.
THE GLOOMY WINTER OF 1861-2--EXULTATION OVER DONELSON--THE
ADVANCE UP THE TENNESSEE--RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ENCAMPMENT AT
PITTSBURGH LANDING--CONTROVERSIES OVER THE BATTLE--VARYING
ACCOUNTS--SHERMAN'S PERSONAL HEROISM--NUMBER OF TROOPS ENGAGED
ON BOTH SIDES--SERVICES OF THE ARMY OF THE OHIO--LOSSES OF THE
TWO ARMIES.
The winter of 1861-62 was a time of gloom and depression to the Union.
Vast armies were in the field, and the wealth of the Government was
being poured out most lavishly for their support. Yet they remained
chiefly inert, while the active and energetic Southern leaders
strengthened the position of the Rebel hosts and promoted the claims
of the Rebel cause upon the sympathetic interest of the world. A few
small bodies of Union troops encountered the enemy here and there, with
results not cheering to the Nation. And there was throughout the North
such a feeling of discouragement and gloom as only those who personally
experienced it can fully realize.
The eyes of the Government and of the Nation were chiefly fixed upon
McClellan, the "Young Napoleon," from whom great things were expected.
But they were to be gladdened not by the glory of his achievements, but
by a sunburst of victory from another quarter, from that very central
western region which, according to Sherman's bitter complaints, had
hitherto been so much neglected. The news of the triumphs of Grant
and Foote at Forts Donelson and Henry, in February, 1862, literally
thrilled the heart of the Nation. For the first time Northern valor
was grandly vindicated, and for the first time since Bull Run, a
cheerful confidence in the victory of the Union cause prevailed.
"Unconditional Surrender" Grant became the hero of the hour, and his
terse message to Buckner, "I propose to move immediately upon your
works," was exultingly re-echoed from Maine to California. Even the
stern War Secretary, Stanton, who had succeeded Cameron, was moved to
enthusiastic expressions of joy.
This campaign on the Tennessee, for the conception and direction of
which Sherman should doubtless be largely credited, was, however,
merely the beginning of incomparably greater operations, in which
Sherman himself played a most important part. After the fall of
Donelson, Grant incurred the displeasure of Halleck and was removed
from the command of the Army of the Tennessee, and General Charles F.
Smith, who had distinguished himself greatly at Donelson, was appointed
to take his place. Smith accordingly directed the forward movement of
the victorious army, southward, up the Tennessee River, but presently
fell sick, at Savannah, Tennessee, and a few weeks later died. Thus
Grant was restored to his command, and thenceforth was responsible for
the conduct of the campaign.
Who was responsible for the encampment of the army at Pittsburgh
Landing, however, has been a matter of dispute. To place the army
there, instead of on the other side of the river, has been criticised
as a serious error. Grant's friends have sought to free him from
blame by saying that the choice was made by Smith, while Grant was in
disgrace and practically under arrest. As Smith was dead when this
statement was made, he could not reply to it. Grant himself made no
effort to exculpate himself at Smith's expense. He has left it on
record that when he was restored to his command, on March 13th, he
found his army partly at Savannah, on the northeast bank, and partly
at Pittsburgh Landing, on the southwest bank, nine miles apart. He at
once moved them all to the latter place, but personally remained at
Savannah, awaiting the arrival of Buell, who was to join him there with
his Army of the Ohio. Lew. Wallace was with his division at Crump's
Landing, on the southwest bank, five miles below Pittsburgh Landing,
where he had been placed by Smith and where Grant was well satisfied
to let him remain. By this acceptance of the place selected by Smith,
Grant practically approved it; and by remaining there for three weeks,
until the battle was fought, he made himself entirely responsible for
the whole situation, a responsibility which he never sought to evade.
Concerning the arrangement and management of the Federal army during
the three weeks before the battle, there have been voluminous and
bitter controversies. Sherman was in a measure responsible for whatever
was done, or left undone, since he was at Pittsburgh Landing all the
time, while Grant spent half of his time at Savannah; and Sherman was
the adviser of McClernand, who was the actual senior. The Rebels were
known to be massed in force at Corinth, only a score of miles away,
under their ablest and bravest commanders. Sherman himself had been,
before the rendezvous was made at Pittsburgh Landing, sent out to cut
the communication between the two points, to prevent a sudden advance
of the enemy. In this he had not been successful. The errand was then
accomplished by W. H. L. Wallace, but the damage done was quickly
repaired by the Rebels and the line of approach restored. With such
danger of attack staring them in the face, the troops made no elaborate
preparations for defence. General Buell and other critics have charged
them with the most astounding and culpable negligence. The army,
according to Buell, had no line or order of battle, although it was on
the enemy's ground and the enemy was confronting it in force; it had no
defensive works of any sort; no outposts, properly speaking, to give
warning of or to check the advance of an enemy; and no recognized head
in the absence of its Commander, who spent half his time nine miles
away. And so, continues this drastic critic, the enemy advanced upon
it and formed in line of battle only a mile and a half away without
being checked or even observed; and the actual attack was a complete
and overwhelming surprise to the Union army. In this view the Rebel
commander, General Beauregard, coincides, characterizing the attack as
"one of the most surprising surprises ever achieved."
Grant made no detailed reply to these charges, merely saying, as to
the lack of fortifications, that at that time the pick and spade were
little used in the Western armies, and that he considered drill and
discipline of more value than mere earthworks. Sherman himself thought
very highly of the Pittsburgh Landing site, as of great strategic
importance and as easy of defence. At a later period of the war, he
says, the place might in one night have been rendered impregnable.
That it was not fortified, he freely admits; and he adds that it was
probably well that it was not thus fortified. It was next to impossible
to move raw troops from fortified lines in such offensive work as
that contemplated by Grant and Sherman. The story of a surprise, he
indignantly repudiates, from first to last.
As this volume is not written for purposes of controversy, no
discussion of these points will be indulged in here. The two sides
of the case will be presented to the reader, and he may draw his own
conclusions, if he has not already done so. Whatever that verdict may
be, it cannot seriously affect the transcendent fame of Sherman.
Grant was superseded, as we have seen, by C. F. Smith, on March 4th,
1862. At this time Sherman was busy at Paducah, sending out boats and
organizing troops, which he hoped soon to be allowed to lead in the
field. The movement up the river was now begun, and on March 10th,
Sherman, to his great satisfaction, was ordered to join it. He at once
embarked with his four brigades, and proceeded to Fort Henry, where he
reported to Smith, and was ordered to wait near by for the remainder of
the army. A day or two later, he was sent on, escorted by two gunboats,
to cut the Memphis and Charleston Railroad between Tuscumbia and
Corinth. On his way up the river he was impressed with the importance
of Pittsburgh Landing, and sent back word to Smith that it ought to
be occupied. He landed at the mouth of the Yellow River, and tried to
reach the railroad and destroy it. But the country was flooded, and an
advance was impossible; so he returned. Smith sent him back to take
possession of Pittsburgh Landing, along with General Hurlbut, and told
him to make room there for the whole army.
Sherman occupied Pittsburgh Landing on March 16th, and immediately
marched inland about ten miles to a cross-road hamlet called Monterey,
or Pea Ridge, where he learned that the enemy were gathering in
force at Corinth. His idea was to take the offensive. To throw up
fortifications would, he thought, make the raw recruits more timid.
Presently other divisions came up, until the bulk of the army was at
the landing.
Pittsburgh Landing, then, was an insignificant settlement of two or
three cabins on the Tennessee River, near the mouth of Snake Creek. The
country there is rolling, almost hilly. The table-land comes boldly up
to the river, forming abrupt bluffs along the water-edge. At that time
the country was well wooded and thinly populated. A couple of miles
back from the Landing was a little log meeting-house, called Shiloh
Church, and from this the place has become popularly known as the
battleground of Shiloh. It was at such a place as this that the Union
army of 32,000 or 33,000 men lay, awaiting the enemy's attack, although
Sherman was anxious to attack the enemy instead.
About the first of April, the Rebel cavalry began skirmishing and
raiding along the front of the Union camp, and on April 4th actually
captured a number of pickets. That was Friday. On Saturday nothing of
importance occurred, though skirmishing was continued, and the sounds
of battle were heard at Savannah, where Grant lay abed, injured by the
fall of his horse. The weather was wet, the roads miry. Sunday morning
there was more skirmishing, then the whole Rebel army came through the
woods with a rush, and one of the greatest battles of the war had begun.
Accounts of this tremendous conflict vary greatly. In the succeeding
chapters will be found Sherman's own official report, giving his
version, and also that of _The Cincinnati Gazette's_ correspondent,
which presents most forcibly the other view--that of the surprise. But
upon one point all the numerous narratives are agreed, and that is,
Sherman's personal valor in the battle, and his consummate ability
in rallying and leading his men in action. Grant was on the field on
Sunday, going from division to division, to encourage the commanders;
but he "never deemed it important to stay long with Sherman." Sherman
held the most critical position, and his troops had never been under
fire before. But his constant presence inspired them with such courage
that the most of them stood and fought like veterans of a long
campaign. Sherman was shot twice, once in the hand and once in the
shoulder, and a third bullet passed through his hat; and several horses
were shot under him. But nothing made him waver for a moment. To him,
the post of danger was the post of honor.
The severest critic of Sherman's management at Shiloh, was General
Buell. Yet he frankly says of Sherman that, when he met him on
that very field, he appeared a frank, brave soldier, ready without
affectation or bravado to do anything that duty required of him.
When the battle began on Sunday morning there were about 33,000 Federal
troops at Pittsburgh Landing, and on the evening of that day General
Lew. Wallace arrived from Crump's Landing with some 5,000 more. But as
many men fled from the field, panic-stricken, without firing a shot, it
is not likely that on that day there were at any time more that 25,000
men in line. This is Grant's estimate. The next day, Buell came up
with the Army of the Ohio, 20,000 strong. And then, there were the two
gunboats, the Tyler and Lexington, which rendered valuable service.
Reports of the strength of the Rebel force vary. According to General
Beauregard, it contained more than 40,000 men on the first day of the
battle, although, he says, he was not able to get more than 20,000
into action on the morning of the second day. Official records state
that the effective Rebel forces, at the beginning of the battle,
included 35,953 infantry and artillery and 4,382 cavalry, a total of
40,335. From these figures it is apparent that the two armies were,
on the first day, by no means equally matched, the Rebels having a
preponderance of about 7,000 men, while on the second day the Union
army was numerically by far the stronger.
The Union loss in the two days' fighting was 1,754 killed, 8,408
wounded and 2,885 captured or missing; total, 13,047. Of these, Buell's
Army of the Ohio lost 241 killed, 1,807 wounded and 55 captured or
missing; total, 2,103. The official report of Rebel losses was 1,728
killed, 8,012 wounded, and 959 missing; total, 10,699. This, Grant
says, cannot be correct, for the Union troops after the battle buried,
by actual count, more Rebel dead than thus reported in front of
Sherman's and McClernand's divisions alone. The estimate of the Union
burial parties was that fully 4,000 Rebel dead lay on the whole field.