BULL RUN
"ON TO RICHMOND!"--SHERMAN'S BRIGADE AT BULL RUN--FEATURES OF
BATTLE--SHERMAN'S OFFICIAL REPORT--THE STAMPEDE BACK TO THE
POTOMAC--HOW SHERMAN DEALT WITH MUTINEERS--A THREAT THAT
THE PRESIDENT THOUGHT HE WOULD EXECUTE--RE-ORGANIZATION AND
PROMOTION--GENERAL McCLELLAN ASSUMES COMMAND--SHERMAN'S FRANK
CRITICISMS AND UNCOMFORTABLE TRUTH-TELLING AND CONSEQUENT
UNPOPULARITY.
When Sherman was at last assigned to active army duty at Washington,
on June 20th, 1861, Lieutenant-General Scott was Commander-in-Chief of
the Army, Brigadier-General J. K. Mansfield commanded the troops in
and about Washington, and Brigadier-General Irvin McDowell commanded
the Federal troops south of the Potomac. The North had come to a
realization of the fact that actual war was at hand, and the cry "On
to Richmond!" was being vigorously uttered. There was an idea that an
immediate and vigorous forward movement would crush the rebellion at
a blow. Sherman found that this view was generally held by the army
officers, among whom he moved a great deal in company with his brother
John, and his old friend and classmate, George H. Thomas.
A considerable volunteer army under General Patterson moved down
from Pennsylvania and crossed the Potomac at the beginning of July,
and there were now plenty of troops at Washington to render that
city secure from attack. The appearance of the troops in and about
Washington was good, but they were evidently altogether unused to war.
Scarcely two regiments wore the same uniform, and their arms were of
all sorts and patterns. Sherman talked much with General Scott about
the plans for the war, and was taken deeply into his confidence. The
gallant old General fretted much at the clamors of the newspapers for
an immediate advance on Richmond, and at the frequent interference of
the President and Secretary of War with his plans. It was his idea to
organize a "Grand Army of Invasion," which he would lead in person,
although at that time he was very old and physically incapacitated for
service in the field.
Congress met on July 4th, and Lincoln sent it a vigorous message,
announcing that war had begun, that there could be no more thought
of compromise, and that he wanted four hundred thousand men and four
hundred million dollars to suppress the rebellion and save the Union.
The Southern members of Congress had now left Washington, and the
general atmosphere of that Capitol was more wholesome and patriotic.
Indeed, Congress seemed fully in sympathy with the popular zeal
and daily re-echoed the cry "On to Richmond!" And the same cry was
taken up by the three months' volunteers; who were the first to be
panic-stricken, when actual fighting was begun.
The Rebels now had two armies in front of Washington; one at Manassas
Junction, under General Beauregard, and the other at Winchester, under
General Joe Johnston. Goaded on by the popular clamor, General Scott
hurried his preparations for an advance, and about the middle of July
ordered his armies forward. McDowell was to attack Beauregard, and
Patterson was to move against Johnston. Sherman was put in command of a
brigade of five regiments at Fort Corcoran. This was the Third Brigade
of the First Division of McDowell's army, the division being commanded
by General Tyler, who was a West Point man, but had as yet seen no real
fighting.
Sherman took command of these troops at the beginning of July, and at
once set about preparing four of the five regiments for service in the
field. These were the Thirteenth New York, the Sixty-ninth New York,
the Seventy-ninth New York, and the Second Wisconsin; all volunteer
regiments, strong and in good condition; and Sherman congratulated
himself on having the best brigade in the army. He had some difficulty
with the New York Sixty-ninth, an Irish regiment, which had volunteered
early in April for ninety days, but had not been mustered in for a
month thereafter. Many of the men wanted to go home at the end of
ninety days from the date of enlistment, but Sherman referred the
matter to the War Department, and obtained an authoritative decision
that the men must serve for ninety days from the date of mustering in.
About the middle of July the division moved forward, and on July 18th
had a skirmish at Centreville, in which four or five of Sherman's men
were killed. This engagement assured the Federal commanders of the
fact that the Rebels were in strong force just beyond Bull Run, and
that a serious battle was imminent. That battle occurred on July 21st,
but there is no need here to rehearse its confused story in detail.
It was, in Sherman's judgment, afterward frankly expressed, one of
the best-planned battles of the war, but one of the worst fought. The
Federal army was composed of good troops, well organized; but they had
no real knowledge of war and had not yet learned the lesson of military
obedience. Moreover, they had the false idea that at their first
volley and charge the enemy would be routed. There have been volumes
of controversy about the battle in after years, mostly productive of
little good. Perhaps it need now only be said that the conflict was
little creditable to either side.
Sherman personally led his brigade in the battle. It was his first
serious fighting, and he was of a nervous and excitable temperament;
yet he displayed remarkable coolness and steadiness. He entered the
action early in the afternoon, and pursued the retreating enemy for
more than a mile. Then he had to assume the defensive, and, after a
determined struggle, his brigade was beaten, regiment by regiment, and
driven back in disorder. When the panic set in his men joined in it,
and their retreat was, in his own words, "disorderly in the extreme."
The total loss of his brigade was 111 killed, 205 wounded and 293
missing. His own conduct, however, was such as to impress favorably
his friends at Washington, and, on the request of the Ohio members
of Congress, he was, on August 3d, appointed Brigadier-General of
Volunteers. His commission was dated May 17th, and was accepted on
August 16th.
Following is Sherman's official report of the operations of his brigade
at Bull Run, made to Captain Baird, Assistant Adjutant-General of the
First Division:
"The brigade was composed of the Thirteenth New York Volunteers,
Colonel Quimby; Sixty-ninth New York, Colonel Corcoran; Seventy-ninth
New York, Colonel Cameron; Second Wisconsin, Lieutenant-Colonel Peck,
and Company E, Third Artillery, under command of Captain R. B Ayres,
Fifth Artillery. We left our camp near Centreville, pursuant to
orders, at 2.30 A. M., taking place in your column next to the brigade
of General Schenck, and proceeded as far as the halt before the enemy's
position, near the stone bridge at Bull Run. Here the brigade was
deployed in line along the skirt of timber, and remained quietly in
position till after 10 A. M. The enemy remained very quiet, but about
that time we saw a regiment leave its cover in our front, and proceed
in double-quick time on the road toward Sudley Springs, by which we
knew the columns of Colonels Hunter and Heintzelman was approaching.
About the same time, we observed in motion a large force of the enemy
below the stone bridge. I directed Captain Ayres to take position
with his battery near our right, and opened fire on this mass, but
you had previously directed the two guns belonging to this battery;
and, finding the smooth bore guns did not reach the enemy's position,
we ceased firing, and I sent a request that you should send to me the
thirty-pounder rifled gun attached to Captain Carlisle's Battery, at
the same time I shifted the New York Sixty-ninth to the extreme right
of the brigade. There we remained till we heard the musketry fire
across Bull Run, showing that the head of Colonel Hunter's column was
engaged. This firing was brisk, and showed that Hunter was driving
before him the enemy, till about noon when it became certain that the
enemy had come to a stand, and that our force on the other side of Bull
Run was all engaged, artillery and infantry.
"Here you sent me the order to cross over with the whole brigade to the
assistance of Colonel Hunter. Early in the day, when reconnoitering
the ground, I had seen a horseman descend from a bluff to a point,
cross the stream and show himself in the open field. And, inferring
we should cross over at the same point, I sent forward a company
as skirmishers, and followed with the whole brigade, the New York
Sixty-ninth leading. We found no difficulty in crossing over, and met
no opposition in ascending the steep bluff opposite with our infantry,
but it was impassable to the artillery; and I sent word back to Captain
Ayres to follow, if possible, otherwise to use his discretion. Captain
Ayres did not cross Bull Run, but remained with the remainder of your
division. His report herewith described his operations during the
remainder of the day. Advancing slowly and continuously with the head
of the column, to give time for the regiments in succession to close up
their ranks, we first encountered a party of the enemy retreating along
a cluster of pines. Lieutenant-Colonel Haggerty of the Sixty-ninth
Regiment, without orders, rode over and endeavored to intercept their
retreat. One of the enemy, in full view and short range, shot Haggerty,
and he fell dead from his horse. The Sixty-ninth opened fire on this
party, which was returned; but, determined to effect our junction with
Hunter's Division, I ordered this fire to cease, and we proceeded with
caution toward the field, when we then plainly saw our forces engaged.
Displaying our colors conspicuously at the head of our column, we
succeeded in attracting the attention of our friends, and soon formed
the brigade in rear of Colonel Porter's. Here I learned that Colonel
Hunter was disabled by a severe wound, and that General McDowell was
on the field. I sought him out and received his orders to join in the
pursuit of the enemy, who were falling back to the left of the road
by which the army had approached from Sudley Springs. Placing Colonel
Quimby's Regiment of Rifles in front, in column by division, I directed
the other regiments to follow in line of battle, in the order of the
Wisconsin Second, New York Seventy-ninth, and New York Sixty-ninth.
[Illustration: GEN. JNO. C. FREMONT.]
"Quimby's Regiment advanced steadily down the hill and up the ridge,
from which he opened fire upon the enemy, who had made another stand on
ground very favorable to him, and the regiment continued advancing as
the enemy gave way, till the head of the column reached the point near
which Rickett's Battery was so severely cut up. The other regiments
descended the hill in line of battle, under a severe cannonading, and
the ground affording comparative shelter against the enemy's artillery,
they changed directions by the right flank and followed the road before
mentioned. At the point where this road crossed the bridge to our
left, the ground was swept by a most severe fire by artillery, rifle,
and musketry, and we saw in succession several regiments driven from
it, among them the Zouaves and battalion of marines. Before reaching
the crest of the hill the roadway was worn deep enough to afford
shelter, and I kept the several regiments in it as long as possible;
but when the Wisconsin Second was abreast of the enemy, by order of
Major Wadsworth, of General McDowell's staff, I ordered it to leave
the roadway by the left flank and to attack the enemy. This regiment
ascended to the brow of the hill steadily, received the severe fire of
the enemy, returned it with spirit, and advanced delivering its fire.
This regiment is uniformed in gray cloth, almost identical with that
of the great bulk of the secession army, and when the regiment fled in
confusion and retreated toward the road, there was a universal cry that
they were being fired upon by our own men. The regiment rallied again,
passed the brow of the hill a second time, and was again repulsed in
disorder.
"By this time the New York Seventy-ninth had closed up, and in like
manner it was ordered to cross the brow of the hill and drive the
enemy from cover. It was impossible to get a good view of the ground.
In it there was one battery of artillery, which poured an incessant
fire upon our advancing column, and the ground was irregular, with
small clusters of pines, affording shelter, of which the enemy took
good advantage. The fire of rifles and musketry was very severe. The
Seventy-ninth, headed by its Colonel (Cameron), charged across the
hill, and for a short time the contest was severe. They rallied several
times under fire, but finally broke and gained the cover of the hill.
This left the field open to the New York Sixty-ninth, Colonel Corcoran,
who, in his turn, led his regiment over the crest, and had in full open
view the ground so severely contested. The firing was very severe, and
the roar of cannon, musketry, and rifles, incessant. It was manifest
the enemy was here in great force, far superior to us at that point.
The Sixty-ninth held the ground for some time, but finally fell back in
disorder.
"At this time Quimby's Regiment occupied another ridge to our left,
overlooking the same field of action, and similarly engaged. Here
(about 3.30 P. M.) began the scene of disorder and confusion that
characterized the remainder of the day. Up to that time, all had kept
their places, and seemed perfectly cool, and used to the shell and shot
that fell comparatively harmless. Crossing Bull Run, I sought it at its
last position before the Brigadier crossed, but it was not there; then
passing through the wood, where, in the morning we had first formed
line, we approached the blacksmith's shop, but there found a detachment
of Rebel cavalry; then made a circuit, avoiding Cub Run bridge, into
Centreville, where I found General McDowell. From him I understood that
it was his purpose to rally the forces and make a stand at Centreville.
"But about 9 o'clock at night I received from General Tyler, in person,
the order to continue the retreat to the Potomac. This retreat was by
night, and disorderly in the extreme. The men of different regiments
mingled together, and some reached the river at Arlington, some at
Long Bridge, and the greater part returned to their former camps at
or near Fort Corcoran. I reached this point at noon next day, and
found a miscellaneous crowd crossing over the aqueduct and ferries.
Conceiving this to be demoralizing, I at once commanded the guard to
be increased, and all persons attempting to pass over to be stopped.
This soon produced its effect. Men sought their proper companies and
regiments, comparative order was restored, and all now posted to the
best advantage.
"Our loss was heavy, all around us; but the short exposure to an
intense fire of small-arms, at close range, had killed many, wounded
more, and had produced disorder in all the battalions that had
attempted to destroy it. Men fell away talking, and in great confusion.
Colonel Cameron had been mortally wounded, carried to an ambulance,
and reported dying. Many other officers were reported dead or missing,
and many of the wounded were making their way, with more or less
assistance, to the buildings or hospitals. On the ridge to the west we
succeeded in partially re-forming the regiments, but it was manifest
they would not stand, and I directed Colonel Corcoran to move along
the ridge to the rear, near the position where we had first formed the
brigade. General McDowell was there in person, and used all possible
efforts to reassure the men. By the active exertions of Colonel
Corcoran, we formed an irregular square against the cavalry, which was
then seen to issue from the position from which we had been driven, and
we began our retreat towards that ford of Bull Run by which we had
approached the field of battle. There was no possible order to retreat,
although for an hour it had been going on by the operations of the men
themselves. The ranks were thin and irregular, and we found a stream
of people stirring from the hospital across Bull Run, and far toward
Centreville.
"After putting in motion the irregular square, I pushed forward to find
Captain Ayres's Battery, occupied chiefly at the point where Rickett's
Battery was destroyed. Lieutenant-Colonel Haggerty was killed about
noon, before we effected a junction with Colonel Hunter's Division.
Colonel Cameron was mortally wounded leading the regiment in charge,
and Colonel Corcoran has been missing since the cavalry charge near the
building used as a hospital."
After the battle, Sherman made his way back to Centreville, where he
saw General McDowell, and reorganized as far as possible his disordered
regiments. During the night they marched back to Fort Corcoran, and
expecting the Rebels to pursue them, placed themselves in a state
of defence. By July 25th many of his men, especially the New York
Sixty-ninth Regiment, became sick of war, and wanted to go home. One
captain of the Sixty-ninth grew mutinous, and in the presence of a
number of the soldiers declared that he was going home at once, with or
without permission. Sherman turned upon him sharply and said: "If you
attempt to leave without orders I will shoot you like a dog!" The man
weakened and went back to his place in the fort, and no more such talk
was heard.
That same day, Lincoln and Seward came down to the camp in an open
carriage. "We heard," said Lincoln, "that you had got over the big
scare, and we thought we would come over and see the boys." Sherman
escorted them about the camp, and then called out his troops on parade.
Lincoln stood up in the carriage and made a most effective address to
them. When the soldiers tried to cheer him he stopped them, saying:
"Don't cheer, boys. I rather like it myself, but Colonel Sherman says
it is not military, and we had better defer to his opinion." Lincoln
praised the condition of the troops highly, and the effect of his
speech and visit was excellent.
When the President entered Fort Corcoran, Sherman in the carriage with
him, the mutinous captain of the Sixty-ninth New York, whom Sherman
had threatened to shoot, came forward and said: "Mr. President,
this morning I went to speak to Colonel Sherman, and he threatened
to shoot me." "Threatened to shoot you?" echoed Lincoln. "Yes, sir;
he threatened to shoot me." Lincoln looked at the officer, then at
Sherman, and then, stooping over, said to the Captain, in a whisper
loud enough to be heard by others: "Well, if I were you, and he
threatened to shoot, I would be mighty careful, for he looks like a
man who would do just what he says." The officer sneaked away amid the
laughter of the by-standers, and the President afterward remarked to
Sherman: "Of course, I didn't know anything about it, but I thought you
knew your own business best."
General McDowell now had his headquarters at the Arlington House,
and was busily reorganizing his army. All the subordinate officers
were in great trepidation, lest they should be held responsible for
the disaster of the battle. General McClellan had been sent for, and
changes in command were occurring daily. One evening, as a number of
the officers were gathered in the Adjutant-General's office, a list of
newly-appointed Brigadiers was announced. The list comprised the names
of Sherman, Heintzelman and several other Colonels, all of whom had
shared in the panic at Bull Run. None of them could believe that they
had actually been promoted, and Heintzelman exclaimed, with an oath:
"It's all a lie! Every mother's son of you will be cashiered." The
appointments, however, were actually made; and when McClellan assumed
command, he confirmed the organization made by McDowell. Sherman
received several new regiments, built two new forts, and organized an
elaborate system of drills. He was now convinced that there was a long,
hard war ahead, and he made up his mind to prepare for it as thoroughly
as possible.
During the month of August, troops kept pouring in. McClellan talked
about organizing an army of one hundred thousand men, with one hundred
field batteries. Sherman was anxious for him to come to the south of
the Potomac and prepare for real work in the field, but McClellan
tarried at his comfortable house in Washington. Sherman then thought,
and frankly declared that he thought, it a mistake, and this opinion
he always retained. On account of this and other expressions, Sherman
became unpopular both with McClellan and his favorites. His frank
truth-telling about the panic at Bull Run, both in his own command
and in the commands of others, gave great offense. He was never at
all backward in expressing his opinions, and at this time he enjoyed
unusual freedom of utterance. His nature was nervous, outspoken and
arbitrary, and his experience as Principal of the Military Seminary in
Louisiana had enhanced his mandatory air.